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The  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  explore  the  effect  of  the  changing  constitutional 
relationship  between  Scotland  and  England  on  the  Scottish  approach  to  conflicts  of  law 
with  an  English  element  (i.  e.,  competitions  of  jurisdiction  between  Scots  and  English 
courts;  cases  in  which  both  Scots  and  English  law  have  a  claim  to  application;  and 
recognition  and  enforcement  of  English  court  orders  in  Scotland).  Dewar  Gibb  once 
wrote  a  work  entitled  "Law  from  over  the  Border":  although  the  conflicts  relationship 
between  Scotland  and  England  may  be  viewed,  to  some  extent,  as  interdependent,  the 
exposition  provided  in  this  thesis  is  a  view  principally  from  north  of  the  Tweed,  though 
the  English  view  is  sometimes  recorded. 
A  historical  perspective  is  obtained  by  brief  study  of  the  period  prior  to 
parliamentary  union.  Once  united  in  one  political  state,  the  constitutionalising  of 
conflicts,  the  internalising  of  conflicts,  and  the  use  of  international  private  law  rules,  are 
three  ways  in  which  conflicts  of  law  within  that  state  might  be  handled.  The  extent  to 
which  each  of  these  methods  has  influenced  the  Scottish  approach  to  intra-UK  conflicts, 
and  the  effect  of  devolution  on  each,  is  examined.  The  availability  to  Scots  courts  of 
public  policy  objections  in  respect  of  English  law  is  also  investigated.  The  context  of  the 
Anglo-Scottish  relationship  changed  with  UK  entry  into  the  (now)  European  Union,  and 
the  effect  of  that  on  intra-UK  conflict  rules  is  considered. 
The  conclusion  is  that  the  nature  of  the  constitutional  relationship  between  Scotland 
and  England  impacts  upon  the  handling  in  Scotland  of  conflicts  of  law  with  an  English 
element.  The  parliamentary  union  may  not  have  resulted  in  wide-spread 
constitutionalisation  of  conflicts,  but  there  has  been  a  degree  of  internalisation  of 
conflicts.  In  general,  however,  the  interaction  of  the  constitutional  relationship  between 
Scotland  and  England  and  its  private  law  consequences  has  permitted,  indeed  sometimes 
necessitated,  the  use  (in  certain  areas)  of  Scottish  international  private  law  rules  without 
differentiation  between  intra-UK,  and  international,  conflicts.  Public  policy  allows  the 
exclusion  of  English  law  by  Scots  courts.  Devolution  might  permit  further 
constitutionalising  of  conflicts  in  Scotland,  but  this  is  neither  appropriate  nor  desirable. 
Whilst  devolution  might  not  diminish  the  internalisation  of  conflicts,  international  private 
law  rules  may  be  of  increased  importance  in  the  intra-UK  context.  It  also  presents  an 
opportunity  for  reform  of  these  rules.  In  the  long  term,  however,  the  most  significant 
constitutional  event  for  intra-UK  conflicts  is  likely  to  come  to  be  regarded  as  entry  into 
the  EU. 
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xxv' 1  INTRODUCTION 
The  study  of  international  private  law  involves  exposure  to  the  rules  and  norms  of 
very  different  cultures.  That  the  same  rules  as  are  utilised  to  solve  international 
conflicts  of  laws,  may  also  be  relied  upon  as  between  the  jurisdictions  within  the 
United  Kingdom  (UK),  might  often  seem  to  merit  no  more  than  an  aside.  It  is 
contended  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  handling  in  Scots  law  of  issues  of  jurisdiction, 
choice  of  law,  and  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments,  arising  in  the 
context  of  the  constitutional  relationship  between  Scotland  and  England,  deserves 
study  in  its  own  right. 
How,  for  example,  does  one  draw  together  all  the  different  strands  exemplified  by 
the  following  statements:  "the  law  of  England  and  other  foreign  nations  being 
matter  of  fact  to  us";  '  "nothing  more  anomalous  or  indecent  than  that  any  Court 
in  Great  Britain  or  Ireland  should  scrutinise  the  decrees  of  another  Court  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  as  if  they  were  those  of  a  foreign  country";  2  "no  greater 
deference  was  due  to  the  law  of  England  than  that  which  was  due  to  the  laws  of 
other  civilized  Countries";  3  "the  question  of  territorial  limitation  as  between  the 
different  jurisdictions 
...  within  the  United  Kingdom  ... 
depends  on  constitutional 
practice,  not  on  international  comity";  4  "it  is  said  that  the  Scotch  court  is  asked  to 
enforce  a  law  which  is  against  the  public  policy  of  the  law  of  Scotland"5  (the  law 
in  question  being  English  law);  "[a]  receiver  appointed  under  the  law  of  either 
part  of  Great  Britain 
...  may  exercise  his  powers  in  the  other  part  of  Great  Britain 
so  far  as  their  exercise  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  law  applicable  there";  6  and 
Stair,  The  Institutions  of  the  Law  of  Scotland  6`h  edn.,  (ed.  )  D.  M.  Walker  (Edinburgh  & 
Glasgow  University  Presses,  1981),  I,  i,  16. 
2  Wilkie  v  Cathcart  (1870)  9M  168  per  Lord  President  Inglis  at  171. 
3  Argument  put  forward  in  the  1812  case  of  Pollock  v  Manners,  reproduced  in  L.  Leneman, 
Alienated  Affections:  The  Scottish  Experience  of  Divorce  and  Separation  1684-1830 
(Edinburgh  University  Press,  1998),  p224. 
4Rv  Treacy  [1971]  AC  537  per  Lord  Diplock  at  564. 
Hamlyn  &  Co  v  Talisker Distillery  (1894)  21  R  (HL)  21  per  Lord  Chancellor  Herschell  at  23. 
6  Insolvency  Act  1986,  c.  45,  s72(1). 
1 "Scotland  has  made  history  today,  signing  the  Hague  Convention  for  the  first 
time".  7 
Purpose  of  thesis 
This  thesis  sets  out  to  explore  the  link  between  the  constitutional  relationship  of 
Scotland  to  England,  and  the  Scottish  approach  to  the  resolution  of  questions  of 
conflict  of  laws  arising  between  these  two  countries.  The  term  conflict  of  laws 
encompasses  three  separate  issues.  Firstly,  the  subject  treats  the  situation  when 
there  is  a  competition  of  jurisdiction  between  a  Scottish  and  an  English  court, 
with  each  asserting  that  it  could  properly  hear  the  case.  Secondly,  it  must  decide 
cases  in  which  there  are  links  with  both  Scotland  and  England,  such  that  there  is  a 
dispute  over  whether  it  would  be  most  appropriate  for  Scots  or  English  law  to  be 
used  to  determine  the  issues  of  the  case.  Thirdly,  it  informs  the  Scottish  attitude 
to  judgments  and  orders  pronounced  by  English  courts:  are  such  judgments 
afforded  recognition  in  Scotland,  and  may  they  be  enforced?  Essentially  then, 
what  is  being  sought  to  be  examined  is  the  content  and  operation  of  rules  to 
resolve  such  conflicts  within  a  state,  rather  than  those  as  between  politically 
foreign  jurisdictions.  It  is  submitted  that  this  is  a  matter  which  has  not  been 
adequately  studied  in  the  UK.  In  contrast,  as  will  be  seen,  in  Canada  and 
Australia  in  recent  years  there  has  been  discussion  and  debate  on  the  interplay 
between  the  constitution  and  conflicts  of  law  arising  between  the  different 
Canadian  provinces,  and  Australian  states,  respectively. 
Indeed  although  both  of  these  countries  might  often  have  looked,  or  look,  to 
English  Common  Law  for  guidance,  it  was  asserted  that  the  English  approach  to 
conflict  of  laws  was  inappropriate  for  a  quasi-federal  state  such  as  Canada,  8  or  a 
federation  such  as  Australia.  9  The  UK,  it  seemed  to  be  assumed,  had  nothing  to 
contribute  to  a  debate  on  the  use  of  international  private  law  for  resolving 
conflicts  within  a  country.  In  fact,  it  is  submitted,  the  reverse  is  true.  The 
constitutional  relationship  between  Scotland  and  England  is  more  subtle  than  a 
1  "Scotland  makes  history  at  the  Hague",  Scottish  Executive  News  Release  (SEJD349/2003),  4 
November  2003. 
8  For  example,  see  Morguard  Investments  Ltd  v  De  Savoye  [1990]  3  SCR  1077  per  La  Forest  J 
at  1101-1102. 
9  See,  for  example,  John  Pfeiffer  Pty  Limited  v  Rogerson  [2000]  HCA  36  per  Kirby  J  at  paras 
119-124. 
2 federal  system,  but  is  one  in  which  the  resolution  of  cross-border  British  conflicts 
has  been  of  great  importance.  For  almost  three  hundred  years  after  the  union  of 
the  Scottish  and  English  Parliaments  in  1707,  a  most  unusual  constitutional 
relationship  prevailed:  one  Parliament  served  both  countries,  but  the  separate 
Scottish  and  English  systems  of  private  law  were  retained.  Each  legal  system  has 
distinct  court  hierarchies  and,  in  terms  of  substantive  law,  each  draws  on  different 
roots.  Whereas  England  is  the  pre-eminent  Common  Law  jurisdiction,  10  the 
Scottish  legal  system  has,  at  least  in  the  past,  been  more  open  to  civilian 
influences,  and  is  now  commonly  described  as  a  mixed  legal  system.  Prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  in  1999,  Scotland  (and  certain  other 
components  of  the  UK)  were  perhaps  unique  in  each  being  a  jurisdiction  with  its 
own  legal  system,  but  no  legislature  of  its  own.  11  The  devolution  settlement  of 
the  late  twentieth  century  has  created  another  interesting  constitutional 
relationship  between  Scotland  and  England.  Scotland  now  has  its  own  Parliament 
with  legislative  (and  limited  tax-raising)  powers,  but  certain  matters  are  reserved 
to  the  UK  Parliament  at  Westminster.  Devolution  for  Scotland,  however,  has  not 
been  achieved  by  a  federalisation  of  the  UK.  Primary  legislation  for  England  and 
Wales  continues  to  be  delivered  by  the  UK  Parliament,  and  there  is  no  English 
equivalent  of  the  National  Assembly  for  Wales  or  the  Northern  Irish  Assembly 
and  Executive. 
In  this  thesis  will  be  examined  the  interplay  between  these  permutations  of  the 
Anglo-Scottish  constitutional  relationship  and  the  Scottish  approach  to  resolving 
cross-border  conflicts  within  Britain. 
Schema 
Before  embarking  upon  the  main  focus  of  the  study,  it  is  first  necessary  to  explore 
the  development  of  Scottish  international  private  law  rules  applying  as  between 
10  Pre-eminent  in  the  sense  that  it  begat  the  systems  of  law  prevailing  in  other  Common  Law 
jurisdictions,  and  that  English  law  is  still  looked  to  by  many  members  of  the  Commonwealth 
for  guidance  in  difficult  cases. 
31  In  the  White  Paper  preceding  devolution,  Scotland  was  described  as  "the  only  democratic 
country  with  its  own  legal  system  but  no  legislature  of  its  own"  ("Scotland's  Parliament"  (Cm 
3658)  (1997),  Foreword,  p.  vii).  Himsworth  noted  that  Washington  DC  might  be  said  to  be  in 
the  same  position  (C.  Himsworth,  "Devolution  and  the  mixed  legal  system  of  Scotland"  2002 
JR  115  at  115).  However,  since  the  Parliament  which  sits  at  Westminster  is  a  UK  Parliament, 
England  must  theoretically  have  been  in  the  same  position. 
3 Scotland  and  England  before  the  union  of  their  Parliaments  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  Prior  to  this,  and  from  their  inceptions  as  nation  states,  Scotland  and 
England  were  independent  countries,  and  politically  foreign  to  each  other. 
Therefore  the  aim  of  Chapter  Two  is  to  provide  a  historical  perspective.  The 
thesis  will  seek  to  identify  the  time  at  which  it  could  be  said  that  all  of  the 
conditions  necessary  for  the  development  of  Scottish  international  private  law 
rules  were  satisfied  in  the  Anglo-Scottish  context.  The  occurrence  of  conflicts 
between  Scots  and  English  law  in  this  period,  and  their  resolution,  will  be  studied. 
Events  of  the  seventeenth  century,  such  as  the  Union  of  the  Crowns  and  the  later 
Cromwellian  occupation,  had  the  potential  to  end  altogether  the  occurrence  of 
conflicts  between  the  Scottish  and  English  legal  systems.  The  reasons  for  this 
potential  not  being  realised  will  be  investigated,  and  the  consequences  explained. 
Once  Scotland  and  England  had  joined  to  form  the  state  of  Great  Britain  in  1707, 
arguably  three  main  methods  were  available  for  dealing  with  conflicts  arising 
between  the  two  countries:  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts;  the  internalising 
of  conflicts;  and  the  use  of  rules  of  international  private  law.  These  are  discussed 
in  turn. 
Chapter  Three,  therefore,  is  an  examination  of  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts, 
whereby  potential  clashes  of  jurisdiction,  or  laws,  and  questions  of  recognition, 
are  referred  to  constitutional  rules  rather  than  to  rules  of  international  private  law. 
There  will  be  an  analysis  of  how  far  this  took  place  in  the  context  of  the 
constitutional  relationship  obtaining  between  Scotland  and  England  from  1707  to 
1999.  The  question  of  whether  there  might  be  an  increase  in  the 
constitutionalisation  of  conflicts  following  the  devolution  settlement,  will  then  be 
addressed.  In  this  connection  the  Canadian  experience  will  be  drawn  upon: 
Canada  does  not  have  an  orthodox  written  constitution,  and  encompasses  the 
mixed  legal  system  of  Quebec.  Are  then  the  reasons  given  to  justify  the 
constitutionalisation  of  conflicts  in  Canada  equally  valid  in  a  devolved  Scotland? 
Finally,  the  important  question  of  whether  it  would  be  desirable  to  handle  intra- 
UK  conflicts  by  this  method  will  be  discussed. 
4 The  putting  in  place  of  special  rules  which  either  remove  an  Anglo-Scottish 
conflict  altogether,  or  which  provide  for  specified  consequences  to  follow  in  what 
would  otherwise  be  a  cross-border  conflicts  matter,  is  referred  to  in  this  thesis  as 
the  internalising  of  conflicts,  and  is  discussed  in  Chapter  Four.  The  areas  in 
which  the  internalisation  of  conflicts  within  the  UK  has  been  most  common  are 
identified.  It  is  also  questioned  whether  the  internalising  of  conflicts  can,  or  has, 
been  achieved  by  judge-made  law.  The  impact  of  devolution  upon  this 
phenomenon  is  then  examined. 
In  Chapter  Five  are  studied  those  areas  in  which  rules  of  Scottish  international 
private  law  have  been  used  to  resolve  intra-UK  conflicts,  just  as  they  would  be 
used  in  truly  international  conflicts.  The  reasons  for  the  use  of  international 
private  law  in  these  areas  are  discussed,  and  the  question  of  whether  any  of  the 
rules  would  profit  from  reform  is  also  considered.  The  extent  to  which  Scottish 
and  English  conflict  rules  are  the  same,  or  similar,  is  briefly  analysed.  The 
establishment  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  heralds  a  new  constitutional 
arrangement,  and  the  consequences  of  this  both  for  the  Scottish  conflict  rules 
themselves,  and  the  use  of  international  private  law  within  the  UK,  is  examined. 
The  possibility  of  increased  differences  between  the  laws  of  Scotland  and 
England  in  the  wake  of  devolution  also  renders  useful  a  discussion  of  what  is 
often  (critically)  referred  to  as  'forum  shopping'  within  the  UK. 
Based  as  it  is  on  the  relationship  between  conflicts  of  law  and  the  constitution 
there  is  a  further  important  constitutional  change,  which  took  place  in  the 
twentieth  century,  which  must  be  examined  in  this  thesis.  The  passing  of  the 
European  Communities  Act  197212  signalled  the  UK's  entry  into  the  then 
European  Economic  Community,  now  the  European  Union  (EU).  It  must  be 
recognised  that  it  also  wreaked  an  alteration  in  the  relationship  under  discussion, 
namely  that  between  the  legal  systems  of  Scotland  and  England,  by  interposing 
the  power  of  the  EU  over  the  UK  Parliament  at  Westminster,  heretofore 
considered  sovereign.  13  The  significance  of  UK  membership  of  the  EU  for  the 
subject-matter  of  this  thesis  is  increased  by  the  great  interest  shown  by  the  EU  in 
12  1972,  c.  68. 
13  Rv  Secretary  of  State  for  Transport,  exparte  Factortame  [1990]  2  AC  85. 
5 harmonising  conflict  rules,  possibly  as  a  step  towards  harmonisation  of 
substantive  law  itself.  In  Chapter  Six,  therefore,  the  impact  of  EU  legislation  on 
intra-UK  conflict  rules  is  analysed.  Examination  of  the  short-term  consequences 
for  intra-UK  international  private  law  encompasses  questions  such  as  whether  EU 
measures  on  jurisdiction,  choice  of  law,  and  recognition  have  applied 
automatically  within  the  UK,  with  or  without  an  opinion  for  special  treatment 
being  offered.  What  have  been  the  factors  behind  such  decisions?  A  study  of  the 
long-term  impact  raises  even  more  fundamental  questions:  it  is  considered  what 
Europeanisation  of  private  law  would  mean  for  intra-UK  conflict  of  laws. 
One  particularly  delicate  issue  for  the  conflicts  scholar  is  the  use  of  public  policy, 
usually  as  a  device  to  exclude  foreign  laws  or  judgments.  Chapter  Seven  is 
therefore  devoted  to  an  analysis  of  public  policy,  which  is  categorised  as 
underlying  public  policy,  internal  public  policy  and  external  public  policy.  It  is 
the  last  which  is  utilised  in  international  private  law.  However,  firstly,  the 
similarities  and  differences  between  underlying,  and  internal,  public  policy  in 
Scotland  and  England  are  examined.  This  leads  to  the  discussion  of  how  far 
external  public  policy  objections  may  be  relied  upon  in  Scotland  at  common  law 
in  respect  of  English  laws  or  judgments.  Furthermore,  has  the  legislator  sought  to 
restrict,  or  widen,  the  availability  of  external  public  policy  objections  when 
placing  certain  areas  of  intra-UK  international  private  law  on  a  statutory  footing? 
Lastly,  the  impact  of  devolution  upon  the  use  of  external  public  policy  by  Scots 
courts  in  an  intra-UK  case  is  examined. 
Chapter  Eight  is  the  concluding  chapter.  In  this,  the  matters  discussed  in  the 
thesis  are  brought  together.  An  opinion  is  expressed  on  the  basic  nature  of  the 
link  between  the  constitution  and  international  private  law,  as  revealed  by  the 
study  of  the  period  prior  to  1707.  Upon  the  union  of  the  Scottish  and  English 
Parliaments  in  1707,  and  the  establishment  of  a  devolved  Scottish  Parliament  in 
1999,  rests  the  constitutional  relationship  between  Scotland  and  England,  and 
conclusions  as  to  the  effect  of  this  on  the  Scottish  approach  to  the  resolution  of 
Anglo-Scottish  conflicts  of  laws  are  reached.  The  effect  of  entry  into  the  (then) 
EEC  on  the  international  private  law  rules  applying  to  intra-UK  conflicts  is  also 
summarised. 
6 A  note  on  the  use  of  terminology  and  authorities 
Terminology 
As  this  thesis  concerns  the  constitutional  relationship  of  Scotland  with  England, 
and  conflicts  arising  as  between  these  two  jurisdictions,  I  have  not  sought  to 
discuss  the  Welsh  position.  Since  Wales  is  subject  to  English  Common  Law,  and 
is  part  of  the  same  jurisdiction  as  England,  no  conflicts  can  arise  between  England 
and  Wales.  The  new  National  Assembly  for  Wales,  which  was  established  as  part 
of  the  same  broad  reforms  which  produced  the  setting  up  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament,  was  not  given  primary  legislative  powers.  14  Strictly  speaking,  indeed, 
the  English  jurisdiction  should  properly  be  described  as  'England  and  Wales'. 
Nairn  is  of  the  view  that: 
"  'England-and-Wales' 
...  conveys  a  bare  modicum  of  recognition  with  an 
associated  stress  on  functional  unity.  Whatever  gestures  may  be  needed 
elsewhere,  here  we  have  two  who  are  truly  as  one".  15 
However,  it  is  for  the  sake  of  convenience,  rather  than  any  other  reason,  that  I 
have  referred  to  'England'  throughout  rather  than  'England  and  Wales'.  No  slight 
is  intended,  and  it  is  hoped  that  none  will  be  perceived. 
Similarly,  although  Ireland  was  for  a  time  part  of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the 
province  of  Northern  Ireland  remains  so,  I  have  not  attempted  to  extend  this 
examination  to  include  conflict  of  laws  relations  with  Ireland.  The  law  applying 
in  Ireland,  and  now  in  Northern  Ireland,  is  clearly  part  of  the  Common  Law 
family.  Furthermore,  since  the  subject  of  study  of  the  thesis  is  Scotland  and 
England,  it  is  better  to  restrict  comments  to  that  subject,  than  to  confuse  matters 
by  considering  other  constitutional  links. 
That  being  said,  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  say  a  few  words  about  the  use  of  the 
terms  'Britain'  and  'United  Kingdom'  in  this  thesis.  'Britain'  is  sometimes  used  in 
the  thesis  in  a  general  sense  to  refer  to  the  main  island  comprising  the  territories 
14  See  Government  of  Wales  Act  1998,  c.  38. 
15  T.  Nairn,  After  Britain:  New  Labour  and  the  Return  of  Scotland  (Granta,  2000),  p81. 
7 of  Scotland  and  England  and  the  principality  of  Wales.  Generally,  however,  it  is 
used  in  its  technical  sense  of  Great  Britain,  as  created  by  the  parliamentary  union 
in  1707  between  Scotland  and  England  (or  indeed  'England-and-Wales').  The 
addition  of  Ireland  in  1801  established  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland.  16  Following  the  gaining  of  independence  by  the  Irish  Republic  in  the 
twentieth  century,  the  proper  term  is  now  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain 
and  Northern  Ireland.  However,  the  terms  'UK  and  'intra-UK  are  used  somewhat 
more  loosely  in  this  thesis.  Whereas  'British'  may  be  more  technically  accurate 
for  the  period  from  1707  to  1801,  it  is  just  as  plainly  incorrect  for  the  period 
thereafter,  up  until  the  present  day:  the  Parliament  which  sits  at  Westminster  is  a 
UK  Parliament.  I  have  taken  the  view  that  it  would  be  clumsy,  and  potentially 
confusing,  to  refer  always  to  'intra-Britain  and,  after  1801,  intra-UK'. 
Accordingly,  in  this  thesis,  'UK  and  'intra-UK'  are  sometimes  used  as  descriptive 
of  the  general  sweep  of  time  since  1707.  Furthermore,  the  term  'intra-UK'  is 
sometimes  used,  without  listing  minutely  the  slight  modifications  which  may  have 
been  made  for  Northern  Ireland.  It  is  submitted  that  England  and  Scotland  are  the 
major  partners  in  the  United  Kingdom.  Besides  which,  as  has  already  been 
explained,  the  situation  of  Ireland  falls  outwith  the  scope  of  the  present  work. 
The  focus  of  this  thesis  is  quite  deliberately  on  Scotland  and  England,  and 
therefore  it  is  the  changing  constitutional  relationship  between  these  two  countries 
which  is  of  interest.  'Intra-UK',  or  'within  the  UK'  serves  well  as  a  convenient 
shorthand  signifying  the  opposite  of  'international',  and  is  used  in  that  sense.  17 
Authorities 
Finally,  some  explanation  is  necessary  regarding  the  use  of  authorities.  Lord 
President  Clyde  once  bemoaned  that: 
"we  were  referred  to  a  number  of  English  authorities.  I  do  not  think  those 
authorities  afford  us  any  guidance,  because  we  must  decide  this  question 
according  to  the  law  of  Scotland;  and  ...  I  cannot  understand  why  the  light 
16  Welsh  records  a  use  of  the  even  more  descriptive:  "The  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain, 
Ireland,  the  Dominion  of  Wales  and  the  Town  of  Berwick  on  Tweed"  (F.  Welsh,  The  Four 
Nations:  A  History  of  the  United  Kingdom  (Harper  Collins,  2002),  p.  xxvi). 
17  The  term  'politically  foreign'  is  also  used  in  the  thesis  to  signify  a  foreign  jurisdiction  outwith 
the  UK. 
8 which  the  law  of  our  own  country  sheds  on  a  question  ...  should  be 
deliberately  hidden  under  a  bushel  of  alien  authority".  18 
For  a  variety  of  reasons,  Scottish  international  private  law  texts  often  make 
reference  to  English,  as  well  as  Scottish,  cases.  I  have  tried  not  to  do  so  without 
noting  the  English  provenance  of  the  case.  Even  then  such  cases  are  only  referred 
to  if  it  is  clear  that  the  principle  has  been  accepted  in  Scots  law,  or  if  it  is 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  the  analysis  to  discuss  the  position  in  English  law. 
Instead,  I  have  attempted  as  far  as  possible  to  rely  simply  upon  Scottish  cases. 
This  is  because  the  thesis  seeks  to  study  the  Scottish  approach  to  conflicts  of 
jurisdiction,  or  laws,  with  England,  and  also  to  the  recognition  of  English 
judgments:  it  would  therefore  distort  the  analysis,  it  is  submitted,  if  English  cases 
were  used  as  authority  without  murmur.  Indeed,  one  of  the  subjects  which  merits 
examination  is  how  far  Scots  and  English  international  private  law  are  the  same. 
18  MacKintosh's  Judicial  Factor  v  Lord  Advocate  1935  SC  406  at  409. 
9 2  HISTORICAL  PERSPECTIVE 
The  constitutional  relationship  between  Scotland  and  England  has  altered 
throughout  Scottish  history.  A  study  of  the  effect  of  this  constitutional  situation 
on  the  Scottish  rules  of  international  private  law  which  are  applied  when  a  factor, 
or  factors,  point  to  England,  can  only,  it  is  argued,  be  valid  if  it  contains  some 
analysis  of  the  historical  interaction  of  constitution  and  international  private  law 
in  Scotland.  This  chapter  sets  out  to  provide  such  an  analysis. 
Necessary  conditions  for  the  development  of  international  private  law 
This  raises  a  fundamental  question:  within  which  period  of  Scottish  history  can 
such  an  interaction  between  the  Anglo-Scottish  constitutional  relationship  and 
international  private  law  meaningfully  be  said  to  start?  It  is  contended  that  a 
certain  factual,  or  factual-legal,  matrix  must  be  in  existence  before  any  link 
between  constitution  and  international  private  law  can  be  established.  Thus,  in 
the  most  basic  and  general  terms,  four  distinct  strands  of  history  must  come 
together.  Firstly,  there  must  be  at  least  two  geographical  groupings  which  may  be 
recognised  as  comprising  what  may  be  described  as  separate  nations.  There  is, 
however,  no  need  for  the  geographical  boundaries  between  them  to  be  finally 
determined  in  every  particular.  The  nations  should  have  some,  at  least 
rudimentary,  form  of  government.  Secondly,  each  of  these  nations  must  have 
some  body  of  law,  which  is  recognisable  as  being  of  application  to  that  nation. 
This  is  not  to  insist  upon  a  written  constitutional  document  or  code  of  laws.  The 
third  pre-requisite  argued  for,  is  that  there  must  be  some  factual  contact  between 
the  peoples  of  the  two  nations.  The  forms  which  this  could  take  are  as  varied  as 
the  activities  of  human  life  itself.  In  earlier  times,  however,  we  might  expect  that 
such  contact  would  take  the  form  of  trade,  or  of  marriage,  or  perhaps  of  the 
ownership  of  property.  The  fourth  historical  fact  contended  for  is  less  self- 
evident  than  the  others.  This  is  the  existence  of  a  central  court.  Whilst  possibly 
not  essential  at  the  same  fundamental  level,  it  is  still  significant,  particularly  in 
questions  of  jurisdiction.  For  when  jurisdiction  is  dispersed  among  a  number  of 
different  courts,  whether  on  a  geographical,  or  hierarchical,  basis,  then  it  is 
10 submitted  that  there  will  be  less  distinction  between  international,  and  internal, 
jurisdictional  clashes:  if  a  court  has  a  limited  jurisdiction  within  a  country,  it  is  of 
little  consequence  whether  a  person  hails  from  another  area  of  the  nation,  or  from 
a  different  nation  altogether,  if  both  fall  outwith  the  court's  jurisdiction. 
Similarly,  jurisdictional  wrangles  are  just  as  likely  to  emerge  between  courts  from 
different  systems  within  the  nation,  than  between  courts  from  different  nations. 
Conversely,  once  a  central  court  is  in  existence,  with  a  jurisdiction  which  is 
largely  nationwide,  it  throws  into  much  sharper  relief  the  question  of  whether  a 
court  of  that  nation  has  jurisdiction  when  a  case  apparently  contains  some  foreign 
element. 
When  do  these  historical  facts,  or  legal  facts,  which  will  allow  an  interaction 
between  the  constitution  and  international  private  law,  come  into  existence  in 
terms  of  Scotland's  relationship  with  England? 
The  establishment  of  early  recognisable  nations  out  of  more  diverse  groupings  of 
peoples  often  took  place  imperceptibly  over  time,  and  the  development  of 
Scotland  was  no  different.  In  selecting  one  particular  point  in  time  in  history, 
there  is  always  an  element  of  arbitrariness,  often  informed  by  retrospection.  Thus 
an  event  which,  with  hindsight,  proved  decisive  in  national  history,  may  at  the 
time  have  been  seen  as  having  only  uncertain  or  temporary  effect.  Subject  to 
these  caveats,  however,  it  is  submitted  that  it  is  defensible  to  select  the  early 
eleventh  century  as  a  time  when  a  Scottish  nation  can  be  identified,  for  the 
purposes  of  this  thesis.  By  1018,  the  kingdoms  of  the  Picts  and  the  Scots  had  all 
become  vested  in  a  Scottish  king,  whilst  that  of  Strathclyde  had  passed  to  the 
king's  heir.  '  Equally  important  was  the  result  of  Malcolm  II's  victory  at  the  Battle 
of  Carham  in  1018.  This  brought  what  is  now  South-East  Scotland  under  his 
control,  and  settled  the  River  Tweed  as  the  boundary  between  Scotland  and 
Northumbria.  Whilst  at  the  time,  Scots  viewed  this  as  merely  one  further  step  in 
the  effort  to  control  the  Northumbrian  area,  2  they  did  not  meet  with  any  long-term 
success  in  pushing  the  border  southwards.  The  Tweed  now  became  a  changeable 
M.  Lynch,  Scotland:  A  New  History  (Pimlico,  1992),  ch  4;  I.  D.  Whyte,  Scotland  Before  the 
Industrial  Revolution:  An  Economic  and  Social  History  c1050-1750  (Longman,  1995),  pp7-8; 
W.  Ferguson,  Scotland's  Relations  with  England:  A  Survey  to  1707  (Saltire  Society,  1994),  p9. 
2  Lynch,  Scotland:  A  New  History,  p47. 
11 "frontier  zone"  3  between  Scotland  and  her  southern  neighbour.  Admittedly,  the 
Scottish  kingdom's  northern  and  north-western  boundaries  were  not  definitively 
set  until  much  later.  4  However,  since  it  is  the  Scottish  legal  attitude  to  England 
and  her  peoples  which  is  key  to  this  thesis,  it  is  submitted  that  the  fixing  of  an 
approximate  southern  boundary  is  of  more  significance  for  present  purposes. 
South  of  this  border,  an  English  nation  can  also  be  identified  by  the  eleventh 
century.  5 
When  did  this  Scottish  nation  develop  a  recognisable  body  of  law?  It  is  clear  that 
in  the  territorial  area  which  would  become  Scotland,  rules  of  Celtic  law,  and  also 
Anglo-Saxon  law,  had  relevance  prior  to  Scoto-Norman  times.  Information  on 
the  detail  of  such  rules  is  still  relatively  sparse,  and  often  resort  is  had  to  the 
similar  systems  prevailing  in  Ireland  and  England  respectively.  6  The  Leges  inter 
Brettos  et  Scotos,  a  Scottish  Celtic  legal  document,  indicates  that  there  was  a 
recognition  of  status  as  shaped  by  rank.  It  has  been  argued  that  under  Anglo- 
Saxon  laws  there  was  similar  acceptance  of  rank  as  an  important  factor  in 
determining  compensation  for  injury.  7  Under  the  Celtic  law  prevailing  in  Ireland 
there  is  some  legal  regulation  of  the  "deorad"  or  "outsider".  8  However,  there  is  no 
strong  proof  in  Scotland  of  Celtic  or  Anglo-Saxon  laws  distinguishing  between 
peoples  of  different  nations. 
A  body  of  law  applicable  throughout  most  of  the  Scottish  kingdom  can  arguably 
be  identified  in  Norman  times,  but  there  is  disagreement  as  to  how  far  this 
Norman  law  was  simply  rather  neatly  superimposed  on  the  pre-existing  systems 
of  law.  9  An  important  issue  in  the  context  of  this  thesis  is  how  far  this  Scoto- 
3  Ferguson,  Scotland's  Relations  with  England,  p10. 
4  These  were  settled  by  1266,  with  the  exception  of  Orkney  and  Shetland,  which  were  acquired 
in  1472.  For  some  discussion  of  the  relationship  between  the  udal  tenure  of  Orkney  and 
Shetland,  and  Scots  Law  see  D.  McGlashan,  "Udal  law  and  coastal  land  ownership"  2002  JR 
251. 
5  O.  F.  Robinson,  et  al.,  European  Legal  History,  3`d  edn.  (Butterworths,  2000),  paras  8.2.1-8.2.6. 
6  Ibid.,  para  9.1.2;  J.  Cameron,  "Celtic  law",  in  Various  authors,  An  Introductory  Survey  of  the 
Sources  and  Literature  of  Scots  Law  (Stair  Society,  Vol  1,1936),  p333  at  336;  J.  C.  Gardner, 
"An  historical  survey  of  the  law  in  Scotland  prior  to  the  reign  of  David  I"  1945,57  JR  34  at  65. 
7  Gardner,  "An  historical  survey  of  the  law  in  Scotland  prior  to  the  reign  of  David  I",  65-66. 
8  F.  Kelly,  A  Guide  to  Early  Iris/i  Law  (Dublin  Institute  for  Advanced  Studies,  1988),  pp5-6. 
9  Gardner,  "An  historical  survey  of  the  law  in  Scotland  prior  to  the  reign  of  David  I",  79;  J. 
Girvan,  "Feudal  law",  in  Various  authors,  An  Introductory  Survey  of  the  Sources  and 
Literature  of  Scots  Law  (Stair  Society,  Vol  1,1936),  p193  at  194. 
12 Norman  law,  established  in  the  twelfth  century,  was  markedly  Scottish  in 
comparison  to  Anglo-Norman  law,  with  the  consequent  potential  that  this  would 
have  for  legal  clashes  between  the  two  systems.  In  fact,  there  are  a  number  of 
similarities.  The  Regiani  Majestatem  of  the  fourteenth  century  is  an  adaptation  of 
the  English  work  Glanvill.  10  In  the  late  thirteenth  century  there  are  instances  of 
Scots  arguing  that  a  Scots  property  law  rule  was  the  exact  mirror  of  its  English 
counterpart,  and  of  a  jury  in  Ireland  finding  in  an  action  that  a  Scotsman  was  in 
the  habit  of  relying  upon  English  law.  I  l  Furthermore,  Cairns  has  argued  that: 
"there  can  be  little  doubt  that  great  landowning  families,  such  as  the  Bruces 
and  Balliols,  saw  their  holdings  north  and  south  of  the  border  as  subject  to 
much  the  same  rules  and  their  rights  as  enforced  by  a  similar  mechanism  -  the 
brieve  or  writ.  "  12 
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  Scoto-Norman  law  was  merely  a  carbon  copy  of  Anglo- 
Norman  law  in  every  particular:  it  was  not.  13  However,  it  is  submitted  that  the 
result  of  a  high  degree  of  similarity  between  the  two  systems  was  that  there  was 
no  pressing  need  for  Scottish  legal  rules  to  deal  with  the  conflict  of  laws  at  that 
time.  When  do  Scottish  and  English  law  begin  more  sharply  to  diverge?  There  is 
a  political  break  beginning  with  what  are  now  generally  referred  to  as  the  Wars  of 
Independence,  and  continuing  with  intermittent  outbreaks  of  open  hostility  in  the 
centuries  thereafter.  It  is  arguably  then  that  Scots  law  starts  in  earnest  its  long 
journey  to  the  distinctive  system  of  the  present  day.  It  eventually  begins  to  be 
distinguished  by  the  actors  within  it,  as  demonstrably  different  from  the  laws  of 
other  nations.  Thus  by  the  late  sixteenth  century  the  Scottish  Mary  Queen  of 
Scots  argued,  in  respect  of  her  forthcoming  trial  in  England,  that  "For  myself  I  do 
10  A.  Harding,  "Regiam  Majestatem  amongst  medieval  law-books"  1984  JR  97;  H.  L.  MacQueen, 
"Glanvill  resarcinate:  Sir  John  Skene  and  Regianm  Majestateni"  in  A.  A.  MacDonald,  et  al. 
(eds).,  The  Renaissance  in  Scotland:  Studies  in  Literature,  Religion,  History  and  Culture 
Offered  to  John  Durkan  (E.  J.  Brill,  1994),  p385. 
G.  W.  S  Barrow,  The  Anglo-Norman  Era  in  Scottish  History  (Oxford  University  Press,  1980), 
p119. 
12  J.  W.  Cairns,  "Historical  introduction"  in  K.  Reid,  &  R.  Zimmermann,  (eds),  A  History  of 
Private  Law  in  Scotland  (Oxford  University  Press,  2000),  Vol  1,  p14  at  32. 
13  Ibid.,  p32;  Lord  Cooper,  "David  Ito  Bruce,  1124-1329:  the  Scoto-Norman  law"  in  Various 
authors,  An  Introduction  to  Scottish  Legal  History  (Stair  Society,  Vol  20,1958),  p3  at  12; 
Harding,  "Regiam  Majestatem  amongst  medieval  law-books";  Robinson,  European  Legal 
History,  para  9.2.2. 
13 not  recognize  the  Laws  of  England  nor  do  I  know  or  understand  them".  14  The 
"proper  lawis  of  this  kingdome"  could,  by  1611,  be  contrasted  with  the  "foreyne 
lawis"  which  had  pertained  in  Orkney  and  Shetland  up  until  that  point.  15  Levack 
records  that  "the  substantive  laws  of  the  two  kingdoms  has  grown  so  far  apart  by 
the  seventeenth  century  that  the  subjects  of  each  could  freely  admit  that  they  were 
ignorant  of  the  law  of  the  other".  16 
Of  significance  to  both  future  constitutional  law  and  international  private  law  is 
the  manner  in  which,  as  it  develops,  Scots  law  comes  to  be  defined  by  reference 
to  its  sovereign  ruler.  In  the  mid-fifteenth  century  Scotland  was  said  to  "haif  bot  a 
king  and  a  lawe  universale  throu  out  the  Realme"  17.  The  link  between  king  and 
the  kingdom's  laws  becomes  more  explicit  in  later  legislation.  Thus,  an  Act  of 
Parliament  of  1503  states: 
"That  all  our  soverane  lords  lieges  beand  under  his  obesance  ... 
be  Reulit  be 
our  soverane  lords  avne  lawis  and  the  comon  lawis  of  the  Realme  And  be  nai 
other  lawis".  18 
An  Act  of  1579  complains  of  Scots  residing  in  the  Staple  but  choosing  to  rely  on 
their  foreign  residence  as  it  suited  them  and  "foirsaiking  the  obedience  to  the 
kingis  majestie  his  lawis  and  officiar".  19  By  the  turn  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
Stair  explained  the  development  of  law  in  all  nations  (including  Scotland)  as  a 
process  whereby  peoples  begin  to  approach  their  sovereigns  to  decide  their 
disputes,  and  defined  civil  law  as  "The  law  of  each  society  of  people  under  the 
same  sovereign  authority".  20  Thus  sovereignty  dictated  that  the  King's  laws  ran  in 
his  kingdom:  not  to  abide  by  Scots  law  was  not  to  obey  the  Scottish  sovereign.  It 
is  submitted  that  the  key  concept  of  status  was  not,  therefore,  nationality,  but  the 
fact  of  being  a  subject  of  a  certain  monarch. 
14  A.  Fraser,  Mary  Queen  of  Scots  (Panther,  1970),  p596. 
15  Quoted  in  Cairns,  "Historical  introduction",  p93. 
16  B.  P.  Levack,  The  Formation  of  the  British  State:  England,  Scotland,  and  the  Union  1603- 
1707  (Oxford  University  Press,  1987),  pp92-3. 
17  APS,  II,  50  (c.  18)(1458)  -  the  context  is  an  introduction  of  uniform  measures. 
18  APS,  II,  244  (c.  27)(1503). 
19  APS,  III,  152  (c.  34)(1579). 
20  Stair,  Inst.,  I,  i,  12;  and  see  also  ibid.,  I,  i,  16. 
14 It  has  been  argued  that  the  third  strand  of  the  matrix  necessary  for  an  interaction 
in  Scotland  between  the  constitution  and  international  private  law  as  regards 
England,  is  the  existence  of  factual  contact,  with  the  consequent  potential  for 
legal  contact,  between  the  peoples  of  the  two  nations.  The  period  of  Norman 
influence  in  Scotland  was  characterised  by  high-level  contacts,  in  terms  of 
marriage  and  land-holding,  to  the  extent  that  Lynch  has  posited  the  existence  of 
an  "Anglo-Scottish  aristocracy".  21  In  the  period  leading  up  to  the  Wars  of 
Independence  these  ties  began  to  wane,  in  line  with  a  greater  assertion  of  a 
Scottish  identity.  22  The  open  hostilities  of  the  years  which  follow,  and  their  effect 
on  popular  feeling  in  both  Scotland  and  England,  are  not  conducive  to  contact 
between  the  two  countries  occurring  on  a  large  scale.  23  The  fifteenth  and 
sixteenth  centuries  saw  numerous  statutory  attempts  to  prevent  the  import  of 
certain  goods  from,  or  export  of  particular  goods  to,  England.  24  However,  even  in 
the  teeth  of  such  measures  trade  between  Scotland  and  England  did  take  place:  a 
statute  of  1585  records  that  previous  prohibitions  on  the  export  of  certain  animals 
and  commodities  to  England  "daylie  ar  Contravenit".  25  Indeed  for  Riley,  "by  the 
end  of  the  seventeenth  century  the  Scots,  ... 
had  drifted  into  a  dangerous 
dependence  on  the  English  market".  26  Furthermore,  it  became  increasingly  clear 
that  the  language  of  lowland  Scots  was  very  similar  to  that  of  their  southern 
neighbours.  There  were  also  some  examples  of  regal  inter-marriage,  indeed  the 
marriage  of  James  IV  to  the  daughter  of  Henry  VII  led  to  a  Union  of  the  Crowns 
one  hundred  years  later  in  1603. 
21  Lynch,  Scotland:  A  New  History,  p58. 
22  Ibid.,  p91. 
23  Ibid.,  Chaps  9-10;  Ferguson,  Scotland's  Relations  with  England,  pp40-41  &  84;  M. 
Prestwich,  "Colonial  Scotland:  the  English  in  Scotland  under  Edward  I"  in  R.  A.  Mason,  (cd.  ), 
Scotland  and  England  1286-1815  (John  Donald,  1987),  p6  at  13. 
24  For  example:  APS,  II,  24  (c.  9)(1436);  APS,  II,  24  (c.  10)(1436);  APS,  II,  105  (c.  15)(1473); 
APS,  II,  346  (c.  25)(1535);  APS,  III,  426  (1585). 
25  APS,  III,  426  (1585);  and  see  too  A.  Stevenson,  "Trade  with  the  South,  1070-1513"  in  M. 
Lynch,  et  al.  (eds),  The  Scottish  Medieval  Town  (John  Donald,  1988),  p180  at  193. 
26  P.  W.  J.  Riley,  The  Union  of  England  and  Scotland:  A  study  in  Anglo-Scottish  politics  of  the 
eighteenth  century  (Manchester  University  Press,  1978),  p201;  and  see  also  Whyte,  Scotland 
Before  the  Industrial  Revolution:  An  Economic  and  Social  History  c1050-1750,  pp273  &  275; 
C.  Rose,  England  in  the  1690s:  Revolution,  Religion  and  Mar  (Blackwell,  1999),  pp233-234; 
T.  C.  Smout,  Scottish  Trade  on  the  Eve  of  Union  1660-1707  (Oliver  &  Boyd,  1963),  pp26-27  & 
148. 
15 In  order  to  gain  some  impression  of  the  scale  of  the  contact  between  the  two 
nations,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  place  it  within  the  wider  context  of  Scotland's 
foreign  links  between  1018  and  1707.  Politically,  the  most  significant  bond  was 
with  France.  This  'Auld  Alliance'  saw  not  just  royal  marriages,  but  also 
naturalisation  of  certain  of  the  other  country's  subjects.  27  Trade  forged  strong 
links  between  Scotland  and  the  Low  Countries.  28  There  was  a  Scottish  Staple 
town  at  various  towns  in  succession  in  the  Low  Countries  from  the  fourteenth  or 
fifteenth  century  until  after  the  Union  of  the  Scottish  and  English  Parliaments  in 
1707.  Substantial  trade  also  flowed  between  Scotland  and  the  Baltic,  especially 
with  the  town  of  Danzig.  29  Mercantile  links  can  also  be  traced  between  Scotland 
and  Spain,  France  and  Italy.  30  Interestingly,  when  trading  in  the  Baltic,  various 
currencies  appear  to  have  been  used  by  Scots,  including  their  own,  but  also 
English  currency,  or  local  currency. 
31  Scots  also  journeyed  to  the  continent  for 
their  law  studies,  to  towns  such  as  Paris,  Orleans  and  Cologne.  32  Levack  has 
argued  that  this  was  crucial  in  shaping  the  Scottish  legal  profession  in  a  different 
mould  from  that  of  its  southern  neighbour. 
33 
The  last,  and  most  tentative,  of  the  elements  of  the  necessary  factual,  or  factual- 
legal,  matrix  posited  at  the  outset  of  this  chapter  was  the  existence  of  a  central 
court.  Legal  cases  could  be  taken  to  the  Scottish  Parliament  or  the  King's 
Council,  or  groups  of  certain  nominated  members.  By  the  beginning  of  the 
sixteenth  century  the  emergence  of  a  Scottish  central  civil  court  can  be  seen,  and 
27  A.  C.  Evans,  "Nationality  law  in  pre-union  Scotland"  1983  JR  36  at  41;  APS,  II,  507 
(c.  6)(1558);  J.  Davidson  &  A.  Gray,  The  Scottish  Staple  at  Veere:  A  Study  in  the  Economic 
History  of  Scotland  (Longmans,  1909),  p103. 
28  Davidson  &  Gray,  The  Scottish  Staple  at  Veere:  A  Study  in  the  Economic  History  of  Scotland; 
Stevenson,  "Trade  with  the  South,  1070-1513". 
29  D.  Ditchburn,  "Trade  with  Northern  Europe,  1297-1540"  in  M.  Lynch,  et  al.  (eds),  The 
Scottish  Medieval  Town  (John  Donald,  1988),  p161  at  pp  166  &  169. 
30  Stevenson,  "Trade  with  the  South,  1070-1513". 
31  Ditchburn,  "Trade  with  Northern  Europe,  1297-1540",  p171.  Earlier,  in  the  thirteenth  century, 
it  seems  that  merchants  in  Scotland  were  reluctant  to  take  currency  from  continental  nations  in 
payment,  but  would  accept  English  money.  By  the  fourteenth  century,  English,  Flemish, 
French  and  Leon  currency  could  be  accepted  in  Scotland  (Stevenson,  "Trade  with  the  South, 
1070-1513",  pp184  &  193). 
32  Robinson,  European  Legal  History,  paras  14.1.7-14.1.8. 
33  Levack,  The  Formation  of  the  British  State:  England,  Scotland,  and  the  Union:  1603-1707, 
pp95-96. 
16 the  Court  of  Session  duly  was  established:  the  traditional  date  of  its  founding  is 
taken  as  1532.3a 
Supra-national  law  as  a  barrier  to  international  private  law 
Even  once  the  factual,  or  factual-legal,  conditions  existed  which  might  allow  the 
development  of  rules  of  what  we  now  understand  to  be  international  private  law,  a 
significant  barrier  was  raised  by  the  nature  of  legal  thinking:  specifically,  the 
existence  of  supra-national  bodies  of  law. 
By  the  late  1100s  the  disposal  of  certain  legal  matters  fell  uniquely  to  Officials  in 
the  Church  Courts,  or  Archdeacons.  In  these  years,  and  in  the  beginning  of  the 
following  century,  "the  Scottish  Church  was  fully  integrated  into  the  jurisdictional 
structure  of  Western  Christendom".  35  The  remit  of  the  Church  Courts  was  wide, 
including  marriage,  legitimacy,  wills,  moveable  succession,  defamation,  and  cases 
regarding  contracts  where  an  oath  had  been  sworn.  36  Castel  makes  the  basic,  but 
crucial,  point  that  the  Church  Courts  applied  a  single  standard  which  reflected  the 
Christian  position,  and  thus  there  was  no  room  for  a  conflict  of  laws  between 
Christian  countries  on,  for  example,  marriage. 
37  Mattingly  goes  so  far  as  to  state 
that  "for  medieval  Europe  canon  law  supplied,  in  large  part,  the  need  for  a  code  of 
private  international  law".  38  This  is  true  only  insofar  as  it  is  understood  that  the 
existence  of  a  body  of  law  with  such  universalist  claims  acts  to  remove  the  need 
for  conflict  of  laws  rules  in  those  subjects  within  its  jurisdiction.  Rules  of  canon 
law  did  not  have  the  same  aim  as  our  modern  rules  of  international  private  law. 
It  must  be  borne  in  mind  too  that  the  influence  of  canon  law  is  only  part  of  the 
phenomenon  of  the  jus  commune,  that  is  to  say,  the  reliance,  to  greater  or  lesser 
34  Robinson,  European  Legal  History,  paras  9.7.4-9.7.8;  and  for  the  consolidation  of  its 
jurisdiction  see  ibid.,  para  14.3.7. 
35  Cairns,  "Historical  introduction",  p29. 
36  Ibid.,  p30;  D.  B.  Smith,  "Canon  law",  in  Various  authors,  An  Introductory  Survey  of  the 
Sources  and  Literature  of  Scots  Law  (Stair  Society,  Vol  1,1936),  p183  at  185;  The  Laws  of 
Scotland:  Stair  Memorial  Encyclopaedia,  Vol  22,  para  511;  Stair,  Inst.,  I,  i,  14. 
31  J.  -G.  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  4t'  edn.  (Butterworths  Canada,  2002),  p132. 
38  G.  Mattingly,  Renaissance  Diplomacy  (Penguin,  1955),  p20. 
17 extent,  by  lawyers  across  Europe  on  a  mixture  of  canon,  roman,  and  feudal,  law 
principles,  which  persisted  in  Scotland  until  the  1600s.  39 
In  the  world  of  commerce  too,  supra-national  rules  of  law  played  a  part.  Again  it 
has  been  claimed  that  there  were  rules  which  dispensed  with  the  requirement  for 
any  concept  of  international  private  law.  Thus,  Dewar  Gibb  notes  that  the  "Law 
Merchant  has  been  called,  with  some  show  of  justification,  the  International 
40  Private  Law  of  the  Middle  Ages".  As  late  as  1695  a  Scottish  Court  refused  to 
rely  upon  a  Scottish  prescription  period  to  bar  a  claim  by  English  merchants  on 
the  grounds  that: 
"what  was  furnished  to  gentlemen  and  others,  that  were  not  actual  trafficking 
merchants,  ...  the  prescription  as  to  the  manner  of  probation  would  meet  these 
debts,  if  not  insisted  for  within  the  three  years;  but  as  to  merchants,  it  was 
against  the  faith  and  credit  of  the  nation,  to  obtrude  that  particular  law  against 
strangers  ignorant  thereof;  and  so  by  a  plurality,  seven  against  six,  they  found 
the  prescription  could  not  be  obtruded  against  these  pursuers,  it  being  in  re 
mercatoria,  and  between  merchants,  and  done  in  England".  41 
At  sea,  it  seems  that  general  rules  of  maritime  law  existed.  The  modern 
experience  of  this  area  of  law  as  a  topic  of  marginal  importance,  should  not  lead 
us  to  underestimate  its  significance  in  earlier  times.  Some  Scots  chose  to  travel 
by  sea  to  England,  and  there  was  no  choice  in  journeys  to  the  continent  and 
further  afield.  Even  in  the  latter  case,  bad  weather  might  cause  Scottish  ships  to  42 
anchor  temporarily  at  English  ports:  although  Ditchburn  describes  one  such 
fourteenth  century  visit  which  ended  in  the  arrestment  of  a  Scottish  ship  at 
Newcastle.  43  Finlay  has  argued  that  the  significance  of  maritime  trade  in  Scotland 
resulted  in  maritime  law  being  of  particular  relevance.  Indeed,  he  suggests  that 
39  Robinson,  European  Legal  History,  paras  14.2.2-14.2.8;  and  see  Cairns,  "Historical 
introduction",  pp46-47  &  71-74. 
40  A.  D.  Gibb,  "International  Private  Law  in  Scotland  in  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Centuries" 
1927,39  JR  369  at  380.  See  also  L.  E.  Trakman,  "From  the  medieval  law  merchant  to  e- 
merchant  law"  (2003)  53  U  Toronto  LJ  265  at  265-266  &  270-283. 
41  Philips  &  Short  v  Stmnfield  (1695)  Mor  4503. 
42  D.  Ditchburn,  Scotland  and  Europe:  The  Medieval  Kingdom  and  its  Contacts  with 
Christendom,  c.  1215-1545  (Tuckwell  Press,  2001),  Vol  1,  p2. 
43  Ibid.,  ppl5-16. 
18 maritime  trade  disputes  accounted  for  most  of  the  sixteenth  century  cases  before 
the  College  of  Justice  featuring  foreigners.  44  Balfour  includes  in  his  Practicks  a 
section  on  the  "Sea  lawis,  betwixt  Scotland  and  Ingland"  45  These  included  rules 
to  prevent  shipwrecked  goods  being  arrested,  or  taken  from  their  owners.  In 
1656,  in  the  case  of  Hog  v  Jack46  it  was  argued  that  maritime  law  only  applied  on 
voyages  outwith  Scotland.  However,  in  Mason  v  Fleming,  47  it  was  argued  for  the 
defender  that  maritime  law  should  apply  in  a  dispute  over  the  powers  of  an  agent. 
The  latter  had  entered  into  a  complex  agreement  involving  hypothec  of  a  ship, 
with  the  pursuer,  who  was  a  factor  from  La  Rochelle.  Interestingly,  the  pursuer's 
claim  was  for  "L.  3600,  at  24s.  the  livre".  48 
With  the  works  of  the  Institutional  writers,  a  clearer  picture  of  a  distinctive  body 
of  Scots  law  began  to  emerge:  a  body  of  law  which  drew  on,  but  was  not  part  of, 
supra-national  legal  rules.  However,  crucially,  particularly  around  the  time  of  the 
early  Institutional  writers,  disputes  between  the  subjects  of  different  nations  were 
often  still  not  seen  as  decided  by  Scots  law,  but  rather  to  be  decided  in  accordance 
with  universal  rules.  Thus,  Balfour  cites  the  case  of  Ane  Frenchman  v  ane 
Englishman  as  authority  for  the  proposition  that  whilst  the  Court  of  Session 
judges  may  hear  an  action  between  foreigners,  they  "should  decern  and  judge 
thairanent  conform  to  the  commoun  law,  and  not  efter  the  municipal  law  of  this 
realme"  49  It  is  submitted  that  by  the  common  law  what  is  meant  is  the  law  of 
nations,  or  as  it  was  also  known  the  ius  gentium. 
50  For  Craig,  the  law  of  nations 
determined  domestic  contract  disputes,  but  also  "applied  without  exception  to  all 
dealings  with  foreigners,  no  matter  how  little  it  may  accord  with  the  established 
as  J.  Finlay,  "Foreign  litigants  before  the  College  of  Justice  in  the  Sixteenth  Century"  in  Various 
authors,  Miscellany  Four  (Stair  Society,  Vol  49,2002),  p37  at  pp37  &  47. 
as  P.  G.  B.  McNeill,  (ed.  )  The  Practicks  of  Sir  James  Balfour  of  Pittendreich  (Stair  Society,  Vol 
21,1962  &  Vol  22,1963),  642-4. 
46  (1656)  Dec Usurp  31. 
a'  (1656)  Dec  Usurp  31. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Balfour,  Practicks,  269,  c.  x. 
so  Stair,  Inst.,  I,  i,  11;  see  also  E.  B.  Crawford,  International  Private  Law  (W.  Green/Sweet  & 
Maxwell,  1998),  para  2.08,  although  cf  Finlay,  "Foreign  litigants  before  the  College  of  Justice 
in  the  Sixteenth  Century",  p43;  Anton  suggests  this  was  a  reference  to  the  law  merchant  (A.  E. 
Anton  with  P.  R.  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law:  A  Treatise  fron:  the  Standpoint  of 
Scots  Law,  2nd  edn.  (W.  Green,  1990),  p10. 
19 law  of  the  land".  51  In  a  1739  case,  involving  an  English  debt  in  a  Scottish 
succession,  it  was  averred  that  "we  follow  the  law  of  nations".  52  Bankton 
analyses  the  need  for  what  we  would  now  recognise  as  public  international  law, 
such  as  rules  between  nations  as  to  wars  and  prisoners,  and  develops  sound 
reasoning  as  to  why  these  matters  should  be  regulated  by  the  law  of  nations.  53  He 
does  not,  however,  analyse  the  more  subtle  question  of  the  body  of  rules  which 
should  apply  as  between  the  private  citizens  of  different  nations.  Karnes  does 
grapple  with  this  problem.  However,  his  reasoning  is  that  in  respect  of  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  King  and  council,  and  subsequently  the  Court  of  Session,  over 
foreigners: 
"The  ordinary  courts  are  confined  to  common  law  but  with  respect  to  foreign 
matters  this  law  can  be  no  rule,  for  the  reason  above  given,  that  it  regulates 
nothing  extra  territoriumn.  The  King  and  council  accordingly,  judging  of 
foreign  matters,  could  not  be  governed  by  the  common  law  of  any  country:  the 
common  law  of  Britain  regulates  not  foreign  matters;  and  the  law  of  a  foreign 
country  hath  no  authority  here.  Whence  it  follows,  that  foreign  matters  must 
be  governed  by  the  rules  of  common  justice,  to  which  all  men  are  subjected,  or 
iure  gentium,  as  commonly  expressed". 
54 
He  is  witheringly  scornful  of  the  different,  English,  practice  of  proceeding  upon  a 
fiction  that  the  matters  giving  rise  to  the  action  took  place  in  England.  55 
Mercantile  matters  between  traders  of  different  nations  were  still  referred  by  Bell 
to  the  law  merchant,  which  he  regarded  as  merely  a  component  of  the  law  of 
nations.  56  For  this  reason  W.  Galbraith  Miller  concluded  that  the  rules  of  what 
was,  in  his  time,  the  newly  designated  university  subject  of  International  Private 
51  J.  A.  Clyde,  (transl.  ),  The  Jus  Feudale  by  Sir  Thomas  Craig  of  Riccarton  (William  Hodge  & 
Co.,  1934),  1,8,8. 
52  Kinloch  v  Fullerton  (1739)  Mor  4456. 
53  Bankton,  An  Institute  of  the  Laws  of  Scotland  (Kincaid  &  Donaldson,  1751),  I,  i,  30. 
54  Karnes,  Principles  of  Equity  4`h  edn.  (Bell  &  Bradfute  &  Creech,  1800),  III,  viii. 
ss  Ibid. 
56  Bell,  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  Scotland,  3`d  edn.  (Archibald  Constable  &  Co.,  1816), 
Preface  to  2nd  edn.,  xi. 
20 Law,  had  been  treated  as  part  of  "the  law  of  nature  and  nations"  until  the  early 
1800's.  57 
Before  passing  from  the  subject  of  these  general,  supra-national  laws,  one  related 
matter  must  also  be  discussed:  the  existence  of  any  special  rules  or  arrangements 
between  Scotland  and  England  solely,  which  transcended  their  general  bodies  of 
law.  The  only  significant  example  of  this  is  the  March  Laws. 
Traditionally  the  Scottish  Marches  stretched  from  the  border  with  England  to  just 
beyond  Peebles,  taking  in  towns  such  as  Kelso,  Roxburgh,  Jedburgh,  and  in  the 
west,  Dumfries.  The  English  Marches  reached  as  far  south  as  Kendal  and 
Newcastle.  Whilst  the  roots  can  be  traced  to  earlier  dates,  it  has  been 
convincingly  argued  that  by  the  mid-thirteenth  century,  something  approaching  a 
code  of  laws  applicable  only  in  the  Marches  had  been  established,  and  the 
separate  nature  of  March  jurisdiction  confirmed.  58  In  the  early  fourteenth  century, 
Wardens  were  established  in  each  country,  and  eventually,  in  each  March.  Whilst 
in  place,  the  March  Laws  comprised  three  layers:  agreed  rules  between  Scotland 
and  England;  agreements  between  individual  wardens;  and  laws  applying  only  to 
the  Scottish,  or  English,  border  lands.  Pollock  and  Maitland  described  the  system 
as  "a  true  international  law".  59  Dewar  Gibb,  however,  dismisses  them  as  "largely 
rules  of  war,  and  struck  out  under  the  severe  stress  of  very  peculiar 
circumstances",  60  and  thus  of  little  importance  in  a  study  of  international  private 
law.  It  is  submitted  that  a  brief  examination  of  the  March  Laws  is  of  relevance 
and  interest  in  this  thesis. 
In  the  early  times,  when  the  movement  of  persons  was  more  limited,  the  land 
border  with  England  would  be  one  of  the  few  areas  where  there  was  regular 
57  W.  G.  Miller,  The  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations  in  Scotland  (W.  Green  &  Sons,  1896),  p102. 
Miller  lectured  in  inter  alia  international  private  law  from  1878  to  1904  (D.  M.  Walker,  A 
History  of  the  School  of  Law,  the  University  of  Glasgow  (University  of  Glasgow,  1990),  pp64- 
66). 
S$  W.  W.  Scott,  "The  March  Laws  reconsidered"  in  A.  Grant,  &  K.  J.  Stringer,  (eds),  Medieval 
Scotland,  Crown,  Lordship  and  Conununity:  essays  presented  to  G.  W.  S.  Barrow  (Edinburgh 
University  Press,  1993),  p114  at  123;  D.  L.  W.  Tough,  The  Last  Years  of  a  Frontier:  A  History 
of  the  Borders  During  the  Reign  of  Elizabeth  (Oxford  University  Press,  1928),  p97. 
59  Sir  F.  Pollock,  &  F.  W.  Maitland,  The  History  of  English  Law  before  the  time  of  Edward,  2nd 
edn.  (Cambridge  University  Press,  1898),  Vol  I,  p222. 
60  Gibb,  "International  Private  Law  in  Scotland  in  the  Sixteenth  and  Seventeenth  Centuries",  372. 
21 contact  between  the  two  countries.  The  March  Laws  demonstrates  a  recognition 
that  cross-border  difficulties  in  this  area  might  best  be  resolved  by  special  rules, 
which  took  into  account  the  English  elements  in  a  Scottish  case,  and  vice  versa. 
Thus  in  1248  it  was  decided  that  a  question  between  Scots  and  English  borderers 
must  be  tried  at  the  March,  and  not  in  the  ordinary  English  courts.  61  For  Balfour, 
jurisdiction  generally  fell  to  the  Warden  of  the  March  where  the  pursuer  resided.  62 
It  seems  also  that  certain  crimes  were  punishable  in  Scotland  although  committed 
in  England,  and  the  reverse.  Importantly,  it  is  implicit  in  the  March  Laws  that  the 
outcome  of  March  cases  would  be  recognised  on  both  sides  of  the  border. 
Initially,  it  was  possible  to  poind  goods  across  the  border.  63  In  1562  there  is 
recorded  a  dispute  as  to  whether  damages  should  be  payable  in  Scottish,  or  in 
English,  currency,  64  and  Rae  has  argued  that  an  agreed  exchange  rate  was  in 
place.  65 
The  system  of  March  Laws  came  to  an  end  with  the  Union  of  the  Crowns.  The 
Laws  were  formally  abolished  in  1607,  but  Tough  has  bluntly  stated  that  after 
1603,  "there  is  really  no  more  Border  history".  66 
Effect  of  seventeenth  century  constitutional  changes 
Over  the  centuries,  therefore,  factual  conditions,  legal  conditions  and  legal 
thinking,  combined  to  create  the  conditions  in  which  rules  of  Scots  international 
private  law  might  develop  with  regard  to  subjects  of  the  English  nation,  but  also 
to  raise  barriers  to  the  development  of  such  a  legal  concept.  Before  turning  to  the 
actual  instances  of  conflict  rules  which  eventually  became  accepted  in  Scotland  in 
cases  containing  an  English  element,  however,  one  final  factor  must  be  examined. 
This  is  the  quite  remarkable  lack  of  impact  upon  the  development  of  conflict 
61  Scott,  "The  March  Laws  reconsidered",  pI21. 
62  Balfour,  Practicks,  602,  c.  xv. 
63  T.  I.  Rae,  (ed.  ),  "George  Neilson:  The  March  Laws;  Part  II:  The  March  Laws",  in  Various 
authors,  Miscellany  One  (Stair  Society,  Vol  26,1971),  pl  l  at  22. 
64  T.  I.  Rae,  The  Administration  of  the  Scottish  Frontier  1513:  1603  (Edinburgh  University  Press, 
1966),  p52. 
65  Ibid.,  p53. 
66  Tough,  The  Last  Years  of  a  Frontier:  A  History  of  the  Borders  During  the  Reign  of  Elizabeth, 
p277.  However,  Morison's  Dictionary  contains  references  to  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
century  cases  of  cross-border  arrestments,  and  border  warrants,  for  example:  Robertson  v  Bell 
(1676)  Mor  4827;  Potts  &  Hunter  v  Mitchelson  &  Robson  (1705)  Mar  4828;  Hardie  v  Liddel 
(1759)  Mor  4830.  See  also  on  border  warrants:  Erskine,  An  Institute  of  the  Law  of  Scotland, 
ist  edn.,  (ed.  )  D.  Erskine  (John  Bell,  1773),  I,  ii,  21. 
22 rules,  of  the  constitutional  upheavals  in  the  relationship  between  the  two  countries 
in  the  seventeenth  century.  Both  the  Union  of  the  Crowns  in  1603,  and  the 
Cromwellian  occupation  later  in  the  century,  had  the  potential  to  alter  forever  the 
legal  relationship  between  subjects  of  Scotland  and  England:  but,  as  will  be 
explained,  it  was  a  potential  largely  unfulfilled. 
Union  of  the  Crowns,  1603 
On  24  March  1603,  Elizabeth  I  of  England  died,  and  the  English  laws  of 
succession  identified  as  her  heir,  James  VI  of  Scotland,  who  became  the  monarch 
of  the  two  kingdoms.  In  itself,  this  had  no  theoretical  effect  on  Scottish,  or 
English,  independence.  In  theory,  it  did  not  signal  the  union  of  the  separate 
bodies  of  law  which  had  been  developing  in  each  nation  over  time.  Indeed, 
different  rules  of  royal  succession  north  and  south  of  the  border  did  not  even 
guarantee  that  the  dynastic  union  would  continue.  67 
In  practice,  however,  the  potential  consequences  were  great.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  nationality  was  not  at  this  time  defined  by  allegiance  to  the 
Scottish  country,  but  by  a  person's  status  as  a  subject  of  the  monarch.  The 
implications  were  not  lost  on  James  VI  &  I: 
"In  the  royall  persone  of  his  maist  excellent  majestic  ...  the  Inhabitantis  of  this 
haill  Ile  ar  equaly  subiect  to  his  sacred  persone  and  lawes".  68 
This  was  soon  borne  out  by  Calvin's  Case,  69  an  action  essentially  engineered  by 
James  to  decide  the  rights  of  those  born  after  1603  (the  post-nati).  Land  in 
London  was  acquired  in  the  name  of  a  two  year  old  Scots  boy.  A  case  was  then 
raised  in  the  Kings  Bench  claiming  that  he  had  been  ejected  from  the  land  and,  it 
seems,  a  succession  point  was  raised  in  Chancery.  The  defendants  argued  that  the 
boy  was  born  within  the  allegiance  of  King  James  of  Scotland,  but  outwith  the 
allegiance  of  King  James  of  England,  and  thus  was  an  alien  in  England,  unable  to 
avail  himself  of  the  rights  contained  in  English  law.  However,  the  competing, 
67  See  Ferguson,  Scotland's  Relations  with  England,  p97. 
68  APS,  IV,  285  (c.  4)(1606). 
69  (1608)  7  Co  Rep  in. 
23 and  ultimately  successful,  argument  was  that  allegiance  to  James  could  not  be 
divided,  and  all  Scots  and  English  people  were  subject  to  him.  Thus  a  Scottish 
subject  of  James  could  raise  an  action  in  respect  of  English  land.  It  seems  that 
English  law  and  taxes,  however,  would  apply  in  respect  of  that  land. 
For  James  then,  there  had  been  a  "partition  wall  which  ... 
in  my  blood  is  rent 
asunder".  70  He  desired  an  even  closer  union:  designs  for  a  flag  of  the  two  nations 
united  were  produced,  and  new  coins  were  issued  with  images  of  union,  which 
were  legal  tender  on  both  sides  of  the  border.  71  Perhaps  most  significant  of  all 
was  James'  perseverance  in  his  desire  to  use  the  term  Great  Britain.  72  Jonson 
picked  up  on  the  literary  theme  of  union  as  marriage,  and  spoke  of: 
"...  the  priest  a  king, 
73  The  spoused  pair  two  realms  .... 
Open,  parliamentary,  moves  were  also  made  towards  a  closer  union.  As  early  as 
1604  an  Anglo-Scottish  Union  Conference  was  set  up,  although  its 
recommendations  ultimately  foundered.  There  was,  however,  much  concern  and 
hostility  in  both  countries  as  to  the  effects  of  the  Union  of  the  Crowns.  74 
In  these  conditions,  it  is  submitted  that  there  were  five  possible  approaches  to  the 
regulation  of  the  interaction  of  the  Scottish  and  English  systems  of  law:  legal 
union;  anglicisation;  scotticisation;  harmonisation  of  substance;  or  the  use  of 
fledgling  rules  of  international  private  law.  Whilst  there  were  supporters  of,  or 
attempts  to  create,  each  of  the  first  four  options,  it  will  be  seen  from  an 
examination  of  each  in  turn,  that  none  succeeded. 
70  G.  P.  V.  Akrigg,  (ed.  ),  Letters  of  King  James  VI  &I  (University  of  California  Press,  1984), 
letter  104. 
'1  B.  Galloway,  The  Union  of  England  and  Scotland  1603-1608  (John  Donald,  1986),  pp82-83  & 
60;  M.  Lee,  Government  by  Pen:  Scotland  under  Janes  VI  and  I  (University  of  Illinois  Press, 
1980),  p30. 
72  R.  Lockyer,  James  VI  and  I  (Longman,  1998),  pp5  1,54-55  &  58. 
73  G.  Parfitt,  (ed.  ),  Ben  Jonson:  The  Complete  Poems  (Penguin  Education,  1975),  p35;  and  see 
also  S.  Orgel,  (ed.  ), Ben  Jonson:  The  Complete  Masques  (Yale  University  Press,  1969),  p142. 
74  Lee,  Government  by  Pen:  Scotland  under  James  VI  and  I,  p35;  Lynch,  Scotland:  A  New 
History,  pp239-240;  K.  M.  Brown,  Kingdom  or  Province?  Scotland  and  the  Regal  Union, 
1603-1715  (Macmillan,  1992),  p87. 
24 Firstly,  a  possible  legal  union.  There  were  those,  most  notably  Craig,  who  tried  to 
stress  what  they  saw  as  fundamental  similarities  between  the  Scottish  and  English 
systems  of  law.  5  James  himself  pressed  this  point  on  occasion,  76  but  he 
acknowledged  that  there  were  differences  between  the  Scottish  and  English  legal 
systems.  77  James'  goal,  it  seems  was  legal  union:  "one  uniformity  in  laws".  78 
Concrete  steps  were  taken.  Bacon  drafted  his  Preparation  toward  the  Union  of 
the  Laws  of  England  and  Scotland.  Interestingly,  however,  both  Bacon,  and  the 
subsequent  Conference  on  the  same  subject,  basically  envisaged  a  union  of  the 
two  nations'  public  laws,  and  not  private  laws.  In  any  event  the  project  failed, 
doomed  by  general  hostility  to  union,  and  a  feeling  that  the  laws  were  too 
disparate  to  unite.  One  pamphleteer  argued  that: 
"also  the  situation  of  the  place  is  to  be  respected,  for  lawes  are  lyke  to 
medecynes  and  must  be  quallefyed  with  sharpe  or  mylde  inflictions  as  the 
conditions  of  the  people  and  the  situation  of  the  place  shall  require  and 
therefore  yt  is  allmost  impossible  for  the  reasons  aforesaide,  to  make  one  lawe 
to  be  hollsome  for  dyvers  nations  lyvinge  in  sundrye  regions".  79 
For  those  in  Scotland,  the  line  between  legal  union,  and  anglicisation  may  have 
been  blurred:  it  was  felt  that,  over  time,  the  first  would  have  led  to  the  second.  80 
There  were  those  in  England  who  argued  that  the  English  Common  Law  should 
simply  be  introduced  into  Scotland.  81  Politically  this  had  little  chance  of  success, 
and  was  not  supported  by  James.  82  Whilst  some  English  measures  were 
introduced  in  Scotland  during  his  reign,  these  suggest  more  the  adoption  of 
75  Most  notably  in  de  Unione  Regnorum  Britanniae  Tractatus,  published  in  1604.  See  generally 
A.  Wijfells,  "A  British  his  commune?  A  Debate  on  the  Union  of  the  Laws  of  Scotland  and 
England  during  the  First  Years  of  James  VI/I's  English  Reign",  (2002)  6  EdinLR  315  at  332- 
337. 
76  A.  H.  Williamson,  Scottish  National  Consciousness  in  the  Age  of  James  VI.  the  Apocalypse, 
the  Union  and  the  Shaping  of  Scotland's  Public  Culture  (John  Donald,  1979),  p149. 
77  Lockyer,  James  VI  and  1,  p43. 
78  Quoted  ibid.,  p53. 
79  Quoted  in  Wijfells,  "A  British  his  commune?  ",  325. 
80  B.  P.  Levack,  "The  proposed  union  of  English  law  and  Scots  law  in  the  seventeenth  century", 
1975  JR  97  at  110;  B.  P.  Levack,  "English  law,  Scots  law  and  the  Union,  1603-1707"  in 
Harding,  A.  (ed.  ),  Law-Making  and  Law-Makers  in  British  History  (Royal  Historical  Society, 
1980),  p105  at  110. 
81  Levack,  "English  law,  Scots  law  and  the  Union,  1603-1707",  p106. 
82  T.  B.  Smith,  "British  Justice:  A  Jacobean  Phantasma"  1982  SLT  157  at  159. 
25 similar  solutions  to  comparable  problems,  rather  than  a  deliberate  policy  of 
anglicisation. 
To  modem  eyes  the  possibility  of  the  reverse  process  occurring,  i.  e.,  scotticisation 
of  English  law,  seems  quite  improbable.  However,  there  was  initial  support  for 
legal  union  from  the  minority  group  of  English  civil  lawyers  for  the  reason  that,  it 
was  hoped,  the  civilian  influence  in  English  law  would  thereby  be  strengthened.  83 
Common  Lawyers  feared  the  accession  of  James  would  mean  the  introduction  of 
civil  law,  or  at  least  the  adulteration  of  the  Common  Law  by  civil  law  elements.  84 
Although  great  concern  was  caused  when  a  Court  of  Session  judge  was  appointed 
Master  of  the  Rolls  by  James,  85  in  the  long  run  the  Common  Lawyers  fears  were, 
unsurprisingly,  unfounded. 
There  were  a  number  of  measures  which  can  very  loosely  be  classified  as 
harmonising  attempts.  The  so-called  hostile  laws  were  abolished:  these  were  a 
number  of  Scottish  and  English  Acts  of  Parliament  which  forbade  contact 
between  the  subjects  of  the  two  countries,  or  were  in  some  way  discriminatory  to 
subjects  of  the  neighbouring  country.  Galloway  has  argued  that  these  had,  in  any 
event,  been  largely  disregarded  except  at  times  when  the  relationship  between  the 
nations  had  reached  a  particular  nadir.  86  Thus  their  abolition  in  his  view  was 
mere  gesture  politics.  Some  more  effective  attempts  at  harmonisation  can, 
however,  be  identified.  Prior  to  1603,  a  Scottish  Act  of  Parliament  had 
prohibited,  under  pain  of  conviction  of  theft,  the  fishing  of  particular  types  of  fish, 
or  fishing  at  particular  times  of  year.  However,  the  Rivers  Tweed  and  Annan  had 
been  excepted,  since  unless  fishing  was  similarly  regulated  on  the  English  side, 
there  would  be  no  effect  on  the  preservation  of  fish  stocks.  In  1606  this  exception 
was  repealed,  87  presumably  since  appropriate  measures  had  now  been,  or  could 
be,  taken  in  England.  Some  attempt  was  also  made  at  harmonisation  in  the 
83  Levack,  "The  proposed  union  of  English  law  and  Scots  law  in  the  seventeenth  century", 
pp103-104;  Levack,  The  Formation  of  the  British  State:  England,  Scotland,  and  the  Union 
1603-1707,  pp8l-82. 
84  Levack,  "The  proposed  union  of  English  law  and  Scots  law  in  the  seventeenth  century",  p101; 
Brown,  Kingdom  or  Province?  Scotland  and  the  Regal  Union,  1603-1715,  p81;  Lockyer, 
James  VI  and  I,  p43. 
85  Lee,  Government  by  Pen:  Scotland  under  James  VI  and  I,  p36. 
86  Galloway,  The  Union  of  England  and  Scotland  1603-1608,  p65. 
87  APS,  IV,  285  (c.  4)(1606). 
26 bringing  in  of  navigation  rules  in  England  in  1615,  and  Scotland  in  1616.88  In  the 
long  term,  however,  they  were  not  particularly  well-used.  Lastly,  there  were 
changes  in  certain  rules  on  taxation  and  customs  duties.  By  the  middle  of  1603,  a 
Scottish  court  had  found  that  an  English  merchant,  as  a  subject  of  King  James  VI 
&  I,  was  not  liable  to  pay  the  export  tax  which  foreigners  were  then  required  to 
pay.  89  A  further  25  per  cent  tax  applied  in  England  to  imports  by  foreigners,  was 
lifted  in  respect  of  Scottish  items  by  1605.90  On  the  King's  authority,  no  customs 
were  applied  within  Great  Britain.  This  was  on  the  condition,  however,  that  duty 
free  goods  were  not  then  exported  out  of  the  country:  a  stricture  distinctly  more 
unpopular  with  merchants  than  the  previous  arrangements.  91  By  the  end  of  the 
first  decade  of  the  seventeenth  century,  Anglo-Scottish  customs  were  regulated  on 
the  same  basis  as  Anglo-Irish  trade  and,  as  the  years  progressed,  any  concessions 
merchants  had  enjoyed  in  Anglo-Scottish  trading  seem  to  have  disappeared 
entirely.  92 
The  Cromwellian  era 
Fundamental  constitutional  change  of  a  very  different  type  came  in  the  mid- 
seventeenth  century.  With  the  execution  of  Charles  I  in  1649,  the  regal  union  was 
abruptly  severed.  The  defeat  of  Scottish  royalist  forces  at  Dunbar  in  1650  and, 
one  year  later,  at  Worcester,  plunged  Scotland,  constitutionally  at  least,  into 
anarchy:  from  the  summer  of  1651  there  was  no  central  authority  controlling 
events  in  Scotland.  93  The  lack  of  an  executive  power  was  mirrored  by  the  lack  of 
a  judicial  body:  the  Court  of  Session  rose  on  28  February  1650,  and  would  not  sit 
again  until  after  the  Restoration.  94 
Cromwell's  control  over  Scotland,  however,  increased,  although  an  intention  to 
pass  an  Act  declaring  Scotland  essentially  to  be  an  English  possession  came  to 
88  Galloway,  The  Union  of  England  and  Scotland  1603-1608,  p14I. 
89  Lee,  Government  by  Pen:  Scotland  tinder  Jahres  VI  and  I,  p31. 
90  Ibid. 
91  Galloway,  The  Union  of  England  and  Scotland  1603-1608,  p141. 
92  Ibid. 
93  W.  C.  Dickinson,  &  G.  Donaldson,  (eds),  A  Source  Book  of  Scottish  History,  2"d  edn.  (Thomas 
Nelson  &  Sons,  1961),  Vol  3,  p146. 
9'  G.  Brunton,  &  D.  Haig,  A  Historical  Account  of  the  Senators  of  the  College  of  Justice  front  its 
Institution  in  1532  (Thomas  Clark,  1832),  pp345-346. 
27 nothing.  95  Eventually,  in  April  1654  an  Ordinance  was  passed  establishing  a  legal 
union  between  Scotland  and  England.  The  establishment  of  this  Commonwealth 
had  in  no  way  been  an  aim  of  the  Civil  War.  Union  was  simply  something  which 
was  dictated  by  events,  and  indeed  was  necessary  to  allow  Cromwell's 
government  in  England  to  survive.  96  The  terms  of  the  Ordinance,  prima  facie, 
seem  to  represent  Anglo-Scottish  agreement.  In  reality,  for  Scotland  it  was  an 
incorporating  union  only  in  the  sense  of  "when  the  poor  bird  is  embodied  into  the 
hawk  that  hath  eaten  it  up"  97  There  was  now  a  common  Parliament,  which 
included  inter  alia  English  and  Scottish  members.  Seven  Commissioners  for  the 
Administration  of  Justice  for  Scotland  were  appointed  in  1652,  and  initially 
Englishmen  were  in  the  majority  of  these  appointments.  98  In  the  eyes  of  the 
republican  authorities,  harmonisation  of  the  two  legal  systems,  or  anglicisation  of 
the  Scottish  system,  was  desirable. 
As  early  as  1651  the  Commonwealth  Parliament  felt  it  could  competently 
legislate  regarding  Scotland.  99  A  Protectorate  Act  was  applied  by  the 
Commissioners  in  the  1655  case  of  Scot  v  Teniants,  100  and  the  right  of  the 
Commonwealth  to  property  was  recognised  a  year  later  in  Carmichael  v  Muir  & 
c.  101  However,  the  initial  aims  of  the  Commonwealth  authorities  were  a  great 
deal  more  far-reaching.  An  active  desire  to  anglicise  the  Scottish  legal  system  is 
clear  from  the  Instructions  given  to  the  Executive  Commissioners  dispatched  to 
Scotland  to  take  up  their  posts.  All  statutes  which  did  not  accord  with  the  policies 
of  the  Commonwealth  were  to  be  repealed,  and  "the  Lawes  of  England  as  to 
matter  of  government  be  put  in  Execution  in  Scotland".  102  It  might,  however,  be 
questioned  from  the  form  of  wording  whether  only  what  is  now  classed  as  public 
law,  was  to  be  affected.  103  Further  instructions  in  1655  were  more  blunt:  the 
95  F.  D.  Dow,  Cromwellian  Scotland  1651-1660  (John  Donald,  1979),  p30. 
96  Ferguson,  Scotland's  Relations  with  England,  p137. 
97  Quoted  ibid.,  p137. 
98  And  were  paid  more!  See:  Dow,  Cronuwellian  Scotland  1651-1660,  p55 
99  See  the  1651  Declaration  of  the  English  Parliament  concerning  Scotland,  and  the  1652 
Explanation  and  addition  relating  to  the  foregoing  Declaration  (reproduced  in  part  in 
Dickinson  &  Donaldson,  A  Source  Book  of  Scottish  History,  Vol  3,  pp148-149). 
loo  (1655)  Dec  Usurp  2. 
101  (1656)  Dec  Usurp  36. 
102  Quoted  in  Dow,  Cromwellian  Scotland  1651-1660,  p33. 
103  See  Levack,  The  Formation  of  the  British  State:  England,  Scotland,  and  the  Union  1603- 
1707,  p74. 
28 Council  was  to  "promote  the  union  by  having  the  proceedings  in  courts  of 
judicature  conducted  agreeably  to  the  laws  of  England,  as  far  as  the  rules  of  the 
court  will  permit".  104  In  addition,  only  English  Justice  Commissioners  were 
allowed  to  sit  on  criminal  cases,  which  no  doubt  were  seen  as  more  politically 
explosive.  105 
English  debt  laws  were  enforced,  although  this  was  used  to  weaken  enemies  in 
Scotland.  106  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  English  Justice  Commissioners 
attempted  to  use  equity  in  their  decisions.  107  However,  given  that  this  is  a  concept 
woven  into  Scots  law,  it  is  perhaps  difficult  to  see  how  this  would  lead  to  any 
different  practical  results.  Decided  cases  from  this  period  may,  however,  bear 
some  traces  of  an  anglicisation  policy.  Thus  an  allegedly  established  Scottish 
practice  was  not  followed  in  the  purely  domestic  case  of  Lord  Brechin  v 
Tenants.  108  This  could,  of  course,  have  been  due  to  the  practice  contended  for 
being  controversial.  However,  in  Rutherford  v  Master  of  Rollo,  109  which  again 
had  no  apparent  foreign  element,  an  Act  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  seems  to  have 
been  ignored.  In  Hastie  v  Mariners,  110  an  English  advocate  appeared,  and  a 
Scottish  mode  of  proof  was  not  allowed. 
The  mode  of  this  anglicisation  programme  is  perhaps  unusual,  in  that  it  was  not  a 
product  of  parliamentary  act,  but  was  to  be  judicially  driven.  However,  whatever 
the  initial  intentions  of  the  Commonwealth,  or  the  chosen  means  of 
implementation,  it  was  a  failure,  with  little  impact  in  either  the  short-term  or  the 
long-term.  Thus  the  case  reports  of  the  time  contain  terminology  and  references 
one  would  expect  in  Scots  law.  l  l'  Although  in  Sydserf  v.  Mani  &  c112  the  English 
judges  heard  argument  on  a  point  of  English  law  as  being  within  their  field  of 
expertise,  in  other  respects  the  case  proceeded  as  one  might  expect  a  modern 
104  Quoted  in  Dow,  Cromwellian  Scotland  1651-1660,  p166. 
105  Ibid.,  p55. 
106  Ibid.,  pp57  &  61. 
107  Ibid.,  p177. 
108  (1655)  Dec Usurp  8. 
109  (1655)  Dec  Usurp  7. 
110  (1656)  Dec  Usurp  30.  The  pursuer,  however,  was  described  as  an  inn-dweller,  and  the  action 
arose  out  of  a  theft  which  had  occurred  on  an  internal  Scottish  voyage. 
11,  Thus  they  make  reference,  for  example,  to  Craig  and  Skene,  and  discuss  mails  and  duties,  and 
terce:  see  generally  The  Decisions  of  the  English  Judges  During  the  Usurpation. 
112  (1657)  Dec Usurp  68. 
29 international  private  law  case:  an  argument  was  put  forward  that  the  granter  of 
the  bond  at  issue  being  Scottish,  and  the  bond  being  capable  of  registration  in 
Scotland,  Scots  law  should  apply,  whilst  the  defender  successfully  founded  on  the 
granting  of  the  bond  in  England,  and  the  fact  that  the  creditors  were  English,  in 
arguing  that  English  law  was  applicable.  In  fact,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  debt 
law  was  very  much  the  exception,  and  that  otherwise  Scots  law  continued  to  be 
applied  throughout  the  Commonwealth  period.  113 
The  survival  of  Scots  law  in  the  face  of  stated  intentions  to  impose  English  law 
can  be  explained  by  a  number  of  factors.  Firstly,  there  was  in  reality  little  drive 
towards  anglicisation  from  the  central  authorities.  "4  Indeed,  latterly  Broghil 
made  it  clear  that  Scots  law  should  be  respected.  115  Secondly,  Scottish  legal 
personnel  remained  important  in  the  operation  of  the  justice  system.  The 
advocates  appearing  before  the  Commissioners  were  almost  entirely  Scots,  used 
to  presenting  Scots  legal  arguments. 
116  Whilst  the  Scotsmen  appointed  as  Justice 
Commissioners  were  those  who  marked  themselves  out  as  supporters  of  the 
Republic,  it  is  remarkable  how  many  of  them  had  already  held  legal  posts  before 
the  Cromwellian  era,  and  were  connected  with  prominent  Scots  lawyers.  A 
number  had  been  Lords  Ordinary;  117  and  Johnstone  of  Warriston  had  also  served 
as  King's  Advocate,  and  was  a  grandson  of  Craig.  118  Later  in  the  Cromwellian 
period,  James  Dalrymple,  later  Viscount  Stair,  was  appointed  a  Justice 
Commissioner.  There  was,  therefore,  no  real  break  from  the  established  order. 
Thirdly,  there  appears  to  have  been  a  feeling,  as  there  had  been  after  the  Union  of 
the  Crowns,  that  the  legal  systems  of  Scotland  and  England  were  simply  too 
different  to  be  successfully  united.  Thus  this  seemed  to  cause  initial  problems  in 
the  Commonwealth's  establishment  of  an  Exchequer  Court  in  Scotland.  "9 
113  Levack,  "The  proposed  union  of  English  law  and  Scots  law  in  the  seventeenth  century", 
pp112-113;  T.  M.  Cooper,  "Cromwell's  judges  and  their  influence  on  Scots  law"  1946,58  JR 
20  at  22-23. 
114  R.  Hutton,  The  British  Republic  1649-1660  (Macmillan,  1990),  p105;  Dow,  Crontwellian 
Scotland  1651-1660,  p166. 
11s  Dow,  Cronuwellian  Scotland  1651-1660,  p175. 
116  Ibid.,  p55;  Cooper,  "Cromwell's  judges  and  their  influence  on  Scots  law",  22. 
117  Brunton  &  Haig,  A  Historical  Account  of  the  Senators  of  the  College  of  Justice  from  its 
Institution  in  1532,  pp277,289-290,306-310,338-339  &  343-344. 
1)8  Ibid.,  pp308  &  306-307. 
119  Dow,  Cromtivellian  Scotland  1651-1660,  pp174-175. 
30 After  the  Restoration,  with  the  Court  of  Session  sitting  once  more,  provision  was 
made  for  the  decisions  of  the  Cromwellian  Justice  Commissioners  to  be  appealed, 
although  they  were  not  simply  overturned  by  statute.  120  Cooper  notes  that  none  of 
their  decisions  appear  in  any  of  the  Scottish  Institutional  works.  121  In  his  eloquent 
phrase,  the  time  under  Cromwell,  for  Scots  law,  "were  years  which  the  locusts 
had  eaten".  122 
The  development  of  Scottish  international  private  law  rules,  particularly  as 
regards  England 
From  as  early  as  Scoto-Norman  times  there  was  recognition  within  the  Scots  rules 
of  law,  of  the  existence  of  'strangers'.  For  example,  the  Leges  Quatuor  Burgorum 
refer  to  ships  "of  athir  strange  kynrykis",  123  and  a  statute  of  William  I  speaks  of 
It  124 
strangear  merchand  of  quhatsumever  nation".  Most  of  the  provisions, 
however,  were  in  reality  attempts  to  control  foreign  merchants.  125  Interestingly, 
there  is,  however,  an  assertion  of  Scottish  royal  jurisdiction.  Thus,  if  ships 
arrived  in  Scotland  from  foreign  parts,  and  there  were  dealings  with  locals,  then 
the  "kyngis  bailzeis  sail  halde  rycht  betuen  thaim"  in  all  complaints.  126 
Furthermore,  an  Act  of  William  I  warned  that  any  foreign  merchant  trading 
outwith  the  burghs  was  to  be  "apprehendit  ...  and  ...  punischit  as  ane  brekar  of 
the  Kingis  protection".  127 
Throughout  the  following  centuries  Scottish  courts  continued  to  be  content  to  hear 
cases,  even  although  there  might  be  a  foreign  element.  Thus  a  burgh  court  in 
Aberdeen  entertained  a  claim  for  money  by  a  Danzig  sailor  in  1475.128  A  case 
was  heard  in  1491  by  the  Lords  of  Council  which  concerned  goods  purchased  by 
120  Cooper,  "Cromwell's  judges  and  their  influence  on  Scots  law",  23. 
121  Ibid.,  24. 
122  Ibid.,  25. 
123  c.  xxv  (APS,  I,  25). 
124  APS,  I,  61  (c.  xli)(William). 
125  See  Hudson's  argument,  in  reference  to  Norman  England,  that  "There  was  a  considerable  fear 
of  outsiders,  of  those  for  whom  no  one  would  answer.  They  had  either  to  be  prevented  from 
entering  the  community  for  any  length  of  time,  or  to  find  people  to  answer  for  them"  (J. 
Hudson,  The  Formation  of  the  English  Common  Law:  Law  and  Society  in  England  from  the 
Norman  Conquest  to  the  Magna  Carta  (Addison  Wesley  Longman,  1996),  p62.  An  interesting 
modern  parallel  is  the  practice  of  sisting  a  mandatory,  discussed  at  p93  below. 
126  Leges  Quatuor  Burgonan,  c.  xxv  (APS,  I,  25). 
127  APS,  1,61  (c.  xli)(William). 
128  Ditchburn,  "Trade  with  Northern  Europe,  1297-1540",  p173. 
31 Scottish  merchants  in  Danzig.  129  In  King  v  Moffat,  130  on  the  pursuer's  non- 
appearance,  the  Lord  Conservator  of  Scottish  privileges  in  the  Low  Countries 
(against  whom  the  action  had  been  raised),  indicated  that  he  now  wished  to 
proceed  against  the  pursuer  for  injury  caused  by  defamation  in  Scotland  and  in 
the  Low  Countries.  In  a  passage  from  Balfour  already  cited,  he  asserted  that  the 
Lords  of  Council  could  hear  all  civil  cases  between  foreigners,  even  although  the 
actings  took  place  outwith  Scotland.  131  What  connection  with  Scotland  was 
required?  Balfour  embarks  on  a  discussion  under  the  heading  that  a  party  should 
only  "be  "summoundit 
...  within  his  awin  jurisdictioun".  132  However,  in  the  1564 
case  of  An  Englishman  v  Angelo  an  Italian,  133  there  is  no  indication  that  Angelo 
had  any  connection  with  Scotland  other  than  his  presence  there.  By  1657, 
however,  in  Tackit  and  Mein  v  Gilchrist,  134  it  was  a  matter  of  concession  that 
there  was  no  jurisdiction  over  an  Englishman,  born  and  resident  there,  simply  by 
virtue  of  his  presence  in  Scotland.  It  was  also  accepted  that  a  Scottish  court  had 
jurisdiction  if  the  action  impinged  on  Scots  heritage,  and  possibly  moveables  in 
Scotland.  In  a  case  of  1624,  a  Scots  court  had  been  content  to  take  jurisdiction 
over  an  English  defender,  because  the  heritable  property  which  was  the  subject  of 
the  dispute  was  in  Edinburgh.  135  The  Court,  however,  clearly  distinguished  from 
such  a  case,  personal  actions,  in  which  jurisdiction  would  not  have  been  taken. 
By  the  later  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Erskine  reasoned  that  in  a  dispute  over 
immoveable  property: 
"the  judge  of  the  territory  where  it  is  situated  is  the  sole  judge  competent,  ... 
for  things  that  are  immoveable,  are  incapable  of  shifting  places,  and  must 
therefore  be  restored  in  that  place  where  they  lie,  and  by  the  warrant  of  that 
judge  whose  jurisdiction  reacheth  over  them".  136 
129  Ibid.,  p174. 
130  I.  H.  Shearer,  (ed.  ),  Selected  Cases  fron:  Acta  Dominorun:  Goncilii  et  Sessions  (Stair  Society, 
vol14,1951),  170. 
131  Balfour,  Practicks,  269,  c.  x. 
132  Ibid.,  306,  c.  xvi. 
133  (1564)  Mor  4825. 
134  (1657)  Dec  Usurp  90. 
135  Lamb  v  Heath  (1624)  Mor  4812. 
136  Erskine,  Inst.,  I,  ii,  17.  He  also  notes  that  if  the  defender  is  foreign,  the  action  must  be  raised  in 
the  Court  of  Session:  Ibid.,  I,  ii,  18. 
32 He  was  clear,  however,  that  this  did  not  entail  acceptance  of  any  idea  that 
personal  jurisdiction  could  be  taken  over  a  foreign  defender  by  a  Scots  judge, 
simply  because  heritage  was  owned  in  Scotland.  137  Nor  did  the  existence  of 
moveables  in  Scotland  in  itself  confer  jurisdiction,  unless  the  property  had  been 
attached.  138 
Whilst  Scottish  courts  would,  then,  take  jurisdiction,  Balfour  states  that  the  action 
of  a  foreign  pursuer  "sould  be  heard  summarlie  upon  a  simpill  supplicatioun, 
without  the  rigorous  observatioun  of  the  form  and  ordour  of  uther  process".  139  it 
is  clear  from  the  cases  which  he  cites  as  authority  for  this  proposition  that  English 
pursuers  were  also  encompassed  in  this  rule.  At  one  time  a  special  day  was  set 
aside  for  cases  with  a  foreign  element.  140  However,  the  authority  cited  by  Balfour 
would  seem  to  suggest  that  English  and  other  foreign  defenders  were  required  to 
provide  caution.  141 
The  next  question  is,  once  a  Scots  court  heard  a  case  involving  a  foreigner,  would 
Scots  law  always  be  applied,  or  was  there  recognition  that  another  law  might  be 
applied  to  the  case?  The  case  of  De-La-Sause  v  Haddington142  seems  to  indicate 
application  of  a  territoriality  principle.  The  defender  sought  to  rely  on  a  decision 
of  the  Paris  Parlement  which  divorced  the  pursuer,  and  also  dealt  with  consequent 
property  ownership  issues.  The  pursuer  argued  that  "the  acts  of  the  parliament  of 
Paris  cannot  reach  beyond  the  limits  of  France,  no  more  than  our  laws  can  reach 
to  them".  '43 
There  are  instances,  however,  where  it  seems  to  have  been  accepted  that  foreign 
law  had  a  role  in  the  decision  of  a  case.  In  the  seventeenth  century,  there  are 
recorded  cases  before  Scottish  courts  where  there  was  a  dispute  over  whether 
137  Erskine,  Inst.,  I,  ii, 18. 
138  Ibid.,  I,  ii, 19.  Times  change:  by  modern  thinking  this  is  an  exorbitant  jurisdiction. 
139  Balfour,  Practicks,  292,  c.  xiv. 
140  Ibid.,  272,  c.  xvii;  Finlay,  "Foreign  Litigants  before  the  College  of  Justice  in  the  Sixteenth 
Century",  p42. 
141  Balfour,  Practicks,  192,  c.  iv.  Finlay  suggests  that  caution  also  had  to  be  provided  by  foreign 
pursuers  (Finlay,  "Foreign  Litigants  before  the  College  of  Justice  in  the  Sixteenth  Century", 
p40). 
142  (1657)  Dec  Usurp  54. 
143  Ibid. 
33 Scots  or  English  law  should  be  applied  to  a  bond,  or  bill  of  exchange.  144  As  has 
been  seen,  it  seems  that  the  application  of  English  law  was  countenanced,  for 
example,  where  a  bond  was  granted  in  England,  in  respect  of  English  creditors.  '45 
In  Laird  of  Balbirizie  v  Laird  ofArkhill  and  Relltrees146  it  was  held  that  an  English 
bond,  between  English  people,  should  be  proved  under  an  English  mode  of  proof. 
Similarly,  it  was  later  held  that  the  English  method  of  proof  on  oath  was  sufficient 
to  prove  that  a  debt  had  been  discharged,  even  when  the  debtor  was  a  Scot  who 
was  merely  resident  in  England.  147  This  case,  however,  seems  then  to  have  run 
into  practical  problems,  since  the  cedent  was  a  quaker  "and  would  not  swear  at 
all"  !  148  Stair  felt  confident  enough  to  assert  as  a  general  principle  that 
subscription,  and  the  manner  of  proof,  was  a  question  for  the  law  of  the  place, 
presumably  meaning  the  place  of  subscription.  149  An  attempt  to  argue  that  an 
exception  should  be  made  to  the  rule  that  form  was  governed  by  the  place  of 
contracting  (meaning,  it  seems,  the  place  where  the  bond  was  granted:  in  this 
case  England),  where  the  bond  was  to  be  executed  (in  the  sense  of  registration  of 
the  bond)  in  Scotland,  met  with  no  success-150  Similarly,  the  Court  rejected  the 
suggestion  that  an  assignation  between  two  Scotsman  regarding  Scottish  debts 
required  to  be  formally  valid  by  Scots  law,  rather  than  the  law  of  England,  which 
was  where  the  assignation  had  been  made-151  A  somewhat  unusual  case  is  that  of 
Gib  v  Ballantyne.  152  The  pursuer,  an  English  soldier  claimed  that  the  defender 
had  promised  him  £100  for  "saving  of  his  life  at  the  battle  of  Worchester  (sic)".  153 
Under  Scots  law  such  a  promise  had  to  be  proved  by  writ  or  oath,  whereas  in 
England  promises  up  to  £1000  sterling  were  provable  by  witnesses.  It  seems  that 
the  contract  had  been  entered  into  in  England,  and  English  law  was  applied.  Stair 
144  For  example:  Sydserf  v  Adam  &  c.,  (1657)  Dec  Usurp  68;  Craig  v  Traquair  (1656)  Dec  Usurp 
33;  Tackit  and  Mein  v  Gilchrist,  (1657)  Dec  Usurp  90;  McMorland  v  Melvill  (1666)  Mor 
4447. 
º45  Sydserf  v  Adam  &  c.,  supra,  and  see  Fortoun  v  Shewan  (1610)  Mor  4429,  in  which  it  is  stated 
that  a  bond  will  be  valid  if  in  accordance  with  the  form  of  the  place  of  granting. 
146  (1633)  Mor  4446. 
147  McMorland  v  Melvill,  supra. 
148  Ibid. 
149  Stair,  Inst.  I,  i,  16.  Note,  however,  the  case  of  Chatto  v  Ord  (1702)  Mor  4447,  in  which  the 
Court  allowed  some  flexibility  as  to  the  manner  of  proof  of  an  English  bond,  for  reasons  of 
practicality. 
150  Junquet  La  Pine  v  Creditors  of  Lord  Semple  (1721)  Mor  4451. 
15,  Sinclair  v  Murray  (1636)  Mor  4501.  It  was  noted  that  the  cedent  was  resident  in  England  at 
the  relevant  time. 
152  (1655)  Dec Usurp  1. 
153  Ibid. 
34 notes  that  "the  law  of  England  and  other  foreign  nations  being  matter  of  fact  to  us 
tsa  Success  of  an  argument  that  a  claim  had  prescribed  under  English  law  is 
also  recorded.  155  However,  the  English  prescription  period  was  ignored  in  respect 
of  a  bond  in  Scots  form,  where  all  parties  were  Scotsmen,  even  although  certain 
of  the  parties  had  been  resident  in  England  at  the  time  when  the  bond  was 
granted.  156  The  conflict  rules  in  this  area  were  thus  beginning  to  emerge  in  a 
reasonably  consistent,  though  fledgling,  form. 
In  matters  of  succession  Stair  was  plain  that  Scots  law  applied,  even  to  Scotsmen 
who  were  resident  abroad,  and  then  died  in  that  foreign  country.  A  form  of 
testament,  valid  in  a  country  where  a  Scotsman  is  "residing  aninio  remarzendi" 
and  later  dies,  but  invalid  in  Scotland,  would  not  regulate  the  Scottish 
succession.  157  His  authority  is  the  case  of  Schaw  v  Lewens,  in  which  the  deceased 
had  made  a  nuncupative  will  in  England.  Stair  also  stresses  that: 
"The  effect  of  testaments  is  no  greater,  though  made  in  England,  the  testator 
residing  there,  and  so  extends  not  to  an  heritable  sum  due  in  Scotland,  left  in 
legacy  by  the  testator,  being  a  Scotsman,  July  3,1634,  Melvil  contra 
Drummond;  Hope,  Testaments,  Purves  contra  Chisholm;  Executors  of 
Colonel  Henrison,  ibid".  158 
From  the  context  of  this  passage,  it  seems  clear  that  Stair  is  discussing  formal 
validity.  159  Conversely,  a  Scottish  executor  to  the  estate  of  a  deceased  who  had 
died  in  Scotland  did  not  need  to  confirm  to  debts  in  England  or  any  other  foreign 
154  Stair,  Inst.  I,  i,  16.  For  a  view  from  the  other  side  of  the  border,  see  the  complaint  from  an 
English  merchant  (who  was  said,  however,  to  be  Scottish!  )  contesting  Scottish  jurisdiction, 
that  "he  can  no  more  be  supposed  acquainted  with  the  laws  and  customs  of  it,  than  of  any  other 
country  in  Europe"  (Anderson  v  Hodgson  &  Ornziston  (1747)  Mor  4779). 
iss  Mosely  v  Harper  (1656)  Dec  Usurp  45;  Bicliie  v  Harper  (1657)  Dec  Usurp  61. 
156  Graden  v  Ramsay  (1664)  Mor  4503. 
157  Stair,  Inst.,  I,  i,  16;  IIl,  viii,  35. 
158  Ibid.,  III,  viii,  35. 
159  Interestingly,  however,  an  examination  of  the  report  in  Morison's  Dictionary  suggests  that  one 
of  the  cases  upon  which  Stair  relies  is  perhaps  more  concerned  with  essential  validity.  In 
Colonel  Henderson's  Children  v  Murray  (1623)  Mor  4481,  the  deceased  had  attempted  to 
dispose  of  heritage  amongst  his  children,  as  was  permitted  in  the  Low  Countries,  where  he 
died.  In  Scotland,  however,  heritage  was  not  carried  by  will  until  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Titles  to  Land  Consolidation  (Scotland)  Act  1868  (31  &  32  Viet),  c.  101. 
35 countries.  160  An  English  pursuer  was  allowed  to  rely  upon  confirmation  in  an 
English  form,  in  an  action  for  payment  under  an  English  bond  in  Lawson  v 
Ke11o.  161  Legatars  were  not,  however,  allowed  to  proceed  on  the  basis  of  an 
English  confirmation  of  a  Scottish  will,  where  the  deceased  had  died  in  England, 
but  the  (Scottish)  executor  was  now  wishing  to  renounce  his  office.  162 
However,  of  particular  interest  in  Stair's  discussion  of  succession  where  the 
deceased  died  abroad,  is  his  reference  to  the  concept  of  residence  abroad  aniino 
rennanendi.  Stair  does  not  explicitly  discuss  domicile,  but  arguably  the  seeds  of 
the  concept  are  already  there-'63  In  1711,  an  argument  was  advanced  that  a 
planter  who  had  set  out  for  Darien,  but  died  in  Scottish  waters,  should  be  held 
either  to  have  a  domicile  in  Darien,  or  to  have  had  no  domicile.  164  In  reply,  it  was 
argued  that,  to  acquire  a  domicile  in  Darien,  the  deceased  would  require  to  have 
"settled",  and  decided  to  stay,  there.  The  Court  ultimately  found  the  deceased  to 
be  domiciled  in  Scotland.  By  the  later  Institutional  works  of  Erskine  and  Karnes, 
there  is  explicit  reference  to  the  rule  that  forty  days  residence  leads  to  the 
acquisition  of  a  domicile  for  the  purposes  of  jurisdiction.  165  Erskine  also  states, 
rather  strikingly: 
"those  who  are  born  within  the  kingdom,  though  they  should  be  afterwards 
settled  abroad,  without  an  intention  of  returning  home,  cannot  shake 
themselves  loose  from  the  obligations  naturally  due  by  them,  either  to  the  laws 
or  to  the  courts  of  their  mother-country".  166 
160  Archbishop  of  Glasgow  v  Bruntsfield  (1683)  Mor  4449.  It  was  later  suggested  that  an  executor 
would  usually  only  require  to  account  to  the  court  from  which  his  powers  were  derived:  White 
v  Skene  (1732)  Mor  4844. 
62  (1627)  Mor  4497. 
62  Rob  v  French  (1637)  Mor  4497.  Interestingly,  this  case  was  not  thought,  in  its  circumstances, 
to  establish  a  "consuetude"  in  the  later  case  of  Brown  &  Duff  v  Bizet  (1666)  Mor  4498. 
163  See  the  reference  to  "domicils"  in  Brown  &  Duff  v  Bizet,  supra;  and  see  also  Vernor  v  Elvies 
(1610)  Mor  4788;  Douglas  v  Cunninghame  (1642)  Mor  4816;  McMorland  v  Melvill  (1666) 
Mor  4447. 
164  Cordiner  v  Glassels  (1711)  Mor  4852. 
165  Erskine,  Inst.,  I,  ii,  16;  Karnes,  Equity,  IIl,  viii. 
166  Erskine,  Inst.,  I,  ii,  19. 
36 Lastly,  it  is  of  interest  to  note  that  by  1745,  a  Scots  court  can  be  seen  criticising  an 
English  court  for  lack  of  comity  in  not  recognising  a  Scottish  decree.  167 
Conclusion 
As  the  centuries  progressed  therefore,  factual  and  legal  conditions  combined  to 
bring  the  subjects  of  Scotland  and  England,  into  contact  with  each  other.  The 
development  of  different  nations,  each  with  its  own  body  of  law,  on  either  side  of 
the  border  meant  that  such  contact  also  brought  potential  clashes  between  the  two 
systems  of  law.  Constitutional  development  therefore  had  a  role  in  creating  the 
setting  in  which  conflict  of  laws  could  arise  as  between  Scotland  and  England. 
Whilst  there  was  eventually  an  appreciation  that  such  cases  were  different  from 
straight-forward  domestic  cases,  resort  was  often  had  to  special  rules,  or  supra- 
national  bodies  of  law,  such  as  the  lure  gentiuin.  Morison  dedicated  a  section  of 
his  Dictionary  to  "Foreign"  cases  and,  indeed,  examination  of  case  law  eventually 
reveals  (particularly  in  the  seventeenth  century)  an  increasingly  sophisticated 
approach  to  questions  of  jurisdiction,  together  with  a  recognition  that  sometimes 
the  law  of  another  country,  for  example,  England,  ought  more  appropriately  to  be 
applied.  Rules  of  what  we  would  now  class  as  international  private  law  are 
dispersed  through  the  Scottish  Institutional  writings,  although  generally  not 
gathered  together  into  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  subject.  Although 
constitutional  changes  in  the  seventeenth  century  could  have  removed  altogether 
the  need  for  rules  to  govern  Anglo-Scottish  conflicts  of  laws,  for  a  variety  of 
reasons  these  alterations  in  the  two  countries'  constitutional  relationship  did  not 
have  this  effect. 
As  a  postscript,  it  should  be  noted  that  by  1832,  an  advocate  editing  a  new  edition 
of  Stair  had  added  a  Notes  section,  which  contains  a  section  headed  "International 
Law",  with  the  sub-headings  one  would  expect  to  find  today  in  an  international 
private  law  text.  168  In  the  late  nineteenth  century,  however,  as  we  have  seen, 
international  private  law  was  still  a  relatively  recent  addition  to  the  University  of 
Glasgow's  courses  on  Scottish  law.  169 
167  Dodds  v  6Vestconnb  (1745)  Mor  4793. 
168  Stair,  Inst.,  5`h  edn.,  (cd.  )  More,  J.  S.  (Bell  &  Bradfute,  1832). 
169  Miller,  The  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations  in  Scotland,  p102. 
37 3  CONSTITUTIONALISING  CONFLICTS 
Defining  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts 
The  phrase  'constitutionalising  conflicts'  is  used  as  a  shorthand  description  of  a 
relatively  recent  phenomenon.  It  describes  the  view  that,  within  a  nation,  the 
legal  issues  traditionally  solved  by  the  application  of  rules  of  jurisdiction,  choice 
of  law  and  recognition  of  judgments  should,  instead,  be  governed  by 
constitutional  rules.  A  brief  foray  into  Canadian  and  Australian  law  provides 
some  examples  of  this  school  of  thought.  ' 
In  the  case  of  Tolofson  v  Jensen,  2  La  Forest  J  referred  to  the  "Canadian 
constitutional  imperativesi'  which  in  his  opinion  had  been  left  out  of 
consideration  in  the  application  of  an  international  private  law  rule  to  an 
interprovincial  delictual  matter.  Earlier,  in  the  case  of  Morguard  Investments  Ltd 
v  De  Savoye,  4  he  had  argued  that  treating  Canadian  provinces  as  different 
countries  in  a  conflict  of  laws  context  seemed  "to  fly  in  the  face  of  the  obvious 
intention  of  the  Constitution  to  create  a  single  country",  5  and  further  that  "the 
rules  of  comity  or  private  international  law  as  they  apply  between  the  provinces 
must  be  shaped  to  conform  to  the  federal  structure  of  the  Constitution".  6  Hogg 
has  complained  that: 
"The  conflicts  law  of  each  Canadian  province  has  developed  with  little  regard 
for  the  idea  that  there  are  constitutional  limits  on  provincial  extraterritorial 
I  Indeed,  in  terms  of  nomenclature,  I  am  indebted  to  Castel,  who  uses  the  term 
"constitutionalization"  (Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p21).  See  also  its  use  in  the 
title  of  a  recent  Scots  article:  Lord  Reed,  "The  constitutionalisation  of  private  law  in  Scotland" 
2002  JR  65. 
2  (1994)  120  DLR  (4t')  289. 
3  Ibid.  at  301;  see  also  the  reference  by  Kirby  J  to  "constitutional  imperatives"  in  the  Australian 
case  of  John  Pfeffer  Pty  Limited  v  Rogerson  [2000]  HCA  36  at  para  120. 
°  [1990]  3  SCR  1077. 
S  Ibid.  at  1099. 
6  Ibid.  at  1101. 
38 competence,  or  the  idea  that,  within  a  federal  state,  conflicts  law  rules  might 
require  modification  upon  constitutional  grounds".  7 
As  Blom  has  observed  "[i]f  the  solutions  are  constitutionally  required,  private 
international  law  becomes  a  branch  of  constitutional  law".  8  Indeed,  taken  to  its 
extreme,  this  argument  entails  the  jettisoning  of  rules  of  international  private  law 
within  a  sovereign  state,  even  although  it  may  comprise  a  number  of  jurisdictions 
(whether  these  be  states,  provinces,  or  separate  legal  jurisdictions).  Such  a  radical 
approach  is  perhaps  best  demonstrated  by  the  opinions  rendered  in  interstate  cases 
by  a  number  of  Australian  judges,  in  particular  Deane  J.  In  Breavington  v 
Godleman,  9  Deane  J  expressed  the  view  that: 
"to  apply  private  international  law  principles  to  resolve  competition  or 
inconsistency  between  the  laws  of  the  Australian  States  seems  to  me,  however, 
to  be  objectionable  on  three  overlapping  grounds.  It  ignores  the  significance 
of  the  federation  of  the  former  Colonies  into  one  nation.  It  frustrates  the 
manifest  intention  of  the  Constitution  to  create  a  unitary  national  system  of 
law.  It  discounts  the  completeness  of  the  Constitution  which,  by  the  national 
legal  structure  which  it  establishes  and  by  its  own  provisions,  itself  either 
precludes  or  provides  the  means  of  resolving  competition  and  inconsistency 
between  the  laws  of  different  States".  '° 
Thus,  for  Deane  J,  if  Australian  states  were  to  treat  sister-states  as  if  they  were  a 
foreign  country  in  conflicts  of  law  terms,  then  "the  national  law  would  provide  for 
its  own  disunity".  i'  Gaudron  J  was  similarly  blunt  in  McKain  v  R.  W.  Miller  and 
Company  (South  Australia)  Pty  Limited: 
"The  constitutional  solution  operates  at  two  stages.  At  the  first  stage,  it 
eliminates  'conflict  of  laws'.  More  precisely,  it  brings  about  a  situation  such 
7  P.  W.  Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  Student  Edition  2002  (Carswell,  2002),  para 
13.5(a). 
$  J.  Blom,  "Private  international  law  in  a  globalizing  age:  the  quiet  Canadian  revolution"  (2002) 
4  YPIL  83  at  115. 
9  (1988)  169  CLR  41. 
10  Ibid.  at  124-125. 
11  Ibid.  at  127. 
39 that,  as  between  the  States,  the  Territories  and  the  Commonwealth,  there  is 
only  one  body  of  law  which  applies  to  any  given  set  of  facts. 
... 
The  second 
stage  of  the  constitutional  solution  eliminates  'choice  of  law'.  The  Constitution 
does  not  permit  of  the  possibility  that  the  legal  consequences  attaching  to  a  set 
of  facts  occurring  in  Australia  might  be  determined  other  than  by  application 
of  the  body  of  law  governing  those  facts".  12 
Those  attracted  to  such  views  have  argued  that  a  constitutional  dimension  informs 
all  the  main  areas  normally  associated  with  international  private  law.  13 
In  Canada  this  school  of  thought  has  had  a  practical  impact.  In  Australia,  it  was 
the  opinion  of  certain  of  the  judges  in  Breavington  v  Godleman14  and  McKain  v 
R.  W.  Miller  and  Company  (South  Australia)  Pty  Linzited,  15  that  the  section  of  the 
Australian  constitution16  which  directed  that  "full  faith  and  credit"  be  given  to 
laws  and  judgments  of  other  states  operated  so  as  to  remove  the  need  for  rules  of 
international  private  law.  There  is  no  such  explicit  clause  in  the  Canadian 
constitution.  However,  an  implicit  concept  of  "full  faith  and  credit"  was,  in 
effect,  read  into  the  constitution  in  Morguard  Investments  Ltd  v  De  Savoye.  '7 
Consequently  it  was  held  that  Canadian  provinces  should  recognise  judgments 
emanating  from  sister-provinces  provided  that  jurisdiction  had  been  properly 
taken  by  the  original  court.  18  The  test  for  taking  jurisdiction  of  "real  and 
substantial  connection",  has  also  been  said  to  have  a  constitutional  basis.  19  Courts 
12  (1992)  174  CLR  I  at  55. 
13  J.  Swan,  "The  Canadian  Constitution,  federalism  and  the  conflict  of  laws"  (1985)  63  Can  Bar 
Rev  271. 
14  (1988)  169  CLR41. 
15  (1992)  174  CLR  1. 
16  s118. 
17  [1990]  3  SCR  1077  per  La  Forest  J  at  1100.  Tetley  suggests  that  this  concept  has  also  now 
had  some  influence  in  international  cases;  however,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  cases  which 
he  discusses  bear  this  out:  W.  Tetley,  "Current  developments  in  Canadian  private  international 
law"  (1999)  78  Can  Bar  Rev  152  at  198. 
1s  See  also  Hunt  v  7'&N  plc  [1993]  4  SCR  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  321:  "the  courts  must  consider 
appropriate  policy  in  relation  to  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments  issued  in  other 
provinces  in  light  of  the  legal  interdependence  under  the  scheme  of  confederation  established 
in  1867". 
19  Spar  Aerospace  Ltd  v  American  Mobile  Satellite  Corp.  2002  SCC  78  per  LeBel  J  at  para  51; 
and  see  too  Muscutt  v  Courcelles  (2002)  213  DLR  (4'h)  577  per  Sharpe  JA  at  608:  "The 
decisions  in  Morguard,  Tolofson  and  Hunt  suggest  that  the  assumption  of  jurisdiction  is  more 
easily  justified  in  interprovincial  cases  than  in  international  cases.  The  jurisdictional  standards 
developed  in  Morguard  and  Hunt  were  strongly  influenced  by  the  need  to  adapt  the  rules  of 
40 in  Canada  can  now  determine  that  legislation  from  other  provinces  is 
unconstitutional,  and  thus  should  not  be  applied.  20  I  will  argue  in  a  later  chapter 
that  this  is  tantamount  to  a  constitutional  substitute  for  a  public  policy 
exception.  21  The  application  of  different  choice  of  law  rules  in  an  interprovincial 
context  also  sprang  from  the  adoption  of  this  constitutional  perspective.  22  For 
Tetley,  there  is  now  a  preliminary  classification  issue  arising  in  Canada,  namely 
whether  constitutional  law  or  conflict  of  laws  is  to  be  applied.  23  Castel  fears  that 
before  long  there  will  be  two  different  bodies  of  law  dealing  with  interprovincial 
and  international  conflicts.  24 
Interestingly,  it  is  clear  that  the  proponents  of  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts 
feel  that,  despite  the  existence  of  different  legal  jurisdictions  within  one  political 
state,  the  experience  of  the  UK  had  nothing  to  teach  Canada  or  Australia.  25  But  is 
this  correct?  Have  traditional  international  private  law  problems  between 
Scotland  and  England  ever  been  subject  instead  to  a  constitutional  analysis? 
Further,  might  the  use  of  a  constitutional,  rather  than  a  conflict  of  laws,  approach 
increase  with  the  advent  of  the  Scottish  Parliament? 
private  international  law  to  the  demands  of  the  Canadian  federation.  "  But  see  Blom,  "The 
quiet  Canadian  revolution",  94.  He  notes  that  although  the  "Supreme  Court  laid  heavy 
emphasis  on  a  constitutional  rationale  in  interprovincial  cases  ...  the  non-constitutional  side  of 
its  reasoning  has  proved  sufficiently  compelling  on  its  own  that  lower  courts,  with  surprisingly 
little  qualification,  have  applied  the  same  solutions  to  international  as  to  interprovincial  cases" 
(Blom,  "The  quiet  Canadian  revolution",  114). 
20  Hunt  v  T&Nplc  [1993]  4  SCR  289. 
21  See  pp202-205  below. 
22  Tolofson  v  Jensen,  (1994)  120  DLR  (4`h)  289;  and  see  too  Leonard  v  Houle  (1997)  154  DLR 
(0)  640;  and  Michalski  v  Olson  (1997)  123  Man  R  (2d)  101,  (1997)  32  MVR  (3d)  9  (Man  Ct 
App)  discussed  in  Tetley,  "Current  developments",  p160.  Castel  argues  that  the  flexible 
exception  disapproved  of  in  the  interprovincial  context  by  the  majority  in  Tolofson  has  in  fact 
now  been  utilised  by  a  provincial  court  in  a  case  involving  two  provinces  (Castel,  Introduction 
to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p212).  In  Australia  a  different  rule  existed  for  interstate  torts  as  a  result  of 
Breavington  v  Godleman,  (1988)  169  CLR  41;  McKain  v  R.  W.  Miller  and  Company  (South 
Australia)  Pty  Limited,  (1992)  174  CLR  1;  and  John  Pfeffer  Pry  Limited  v  Rogerson,  [2000] 
HCA  36;  cf  P.  Nygh,  "Choice  of  law  in  torts  in  Australia"  (2000)  2  YPIL  55.  Eventually, 
however,  the  international  rule  was  harmonised  so  that  the  lex  loci  delicti  also  applied  in  these 
situations,  although  opinion  was  reserved  upon  whether  the  boundary  between  substantive  and 
procedural  matters  should  be  drawn  differently  in  international  cases:  Regie  National  des 
Usines  Renault  SA  v  Zhang  [2002]  HCA  10. 
23  W.  Tetley,  "The  on-going  saga  of  Canada's  conflict  of  law  revolution  -  theory  and  practice" 
http:  //tetley.  law.  mcgill. ca/conflicts/confsaga.  pdf  (1998-2001)  p4. 
24  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Lativs,  pp2l-22. 
25  See,  for  example,  Morguard  Investments  Ltd  V  De  Savoye  [  1990]  3  SCR  1077  per  La  Forest  J 
at  1101. 
41 Constitutionalising  conflicts  in  the  period  1707  to  1999? 
The  constitutional  status  of  the  Acts  of  Union  of  1707  &  1706 
The  creation  of  the  kingdom  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  framework  of  the  new  state, 
are  in  fact  to  be  found  in  legislation  emanating  from  its  predecessor  Parliaments: 
the  Scottish  Parliament's  Union  with  England  Act  1707,  and  the  English 
Parliament's  Union  with  Scotland  Act  1706.26  In  terms  of  Article  III,  one 
Parliament  was  to  represent  the  new  nation,  and  that  was  the  Parliament  of  Great 
Britain.  Two  provisions  of  the  Acts  of  Union  are  critical  in  the  development  of 
the  legal  relationship  between  Scotland  and  England  within  Great  Britain.  Article 
XVIII  directed  the  harmonisation  of  "the  Laws  concerning  Regulation  of  Trade, 
Customs  and  such  Excises  to  which  Scotland  is  by  virtue  of  this  Treaty  to  be 
lyable".  However: 
"all  other  Lawes  in  use  within  the  Kingdom  of  Scotland  do  after  the  Union  and 
notwithstanding  thereof  remain  in  the  same  force  as  before  (except  such  as  are 
contrary  to  or  inconsistent  with  this  Treaty)  but  alterable  by  the  Parliament  of 
Great  Britain  With  this  difference  betwixt  the  Laws  concerning  publick  Right 
Policy  and  Civil  Government  may  be  made  the  same  throughout  the  whole 
United  Kingdom  but  that  no  alteration  be  made  in  Laws  which  concern  private 
Right  except  for  evident  utility  of  the  subjects  within  Scotland". 
By  virtue  of  Article  XIX,  the  existence  of  the  Court  of  Session  and  the  Court  of 
Justiciary  are  protected.  Furthermore: 
"no  Causes  in  Scotland  be  cognoscible  by  the  Courts  of  Chancery,  Queens- 
Bench,  Common-Pleas  or  any  other  Court  in  Westminster-hall  And  that  the 
said  Courts  or  any  other  of  the  like  nature  after  the  Unions  shall  have  no  power 
to  Cognosce  Review  or  Alter  the  Acts  or  Sentences  of  the  Judicatures  within 
Scotland  or  stop  the  Execution  of  the  same". 
26  1707,  c.  7;  (6  Anne),  c.  11;  respectively.  The  apparent  discrepancy  in  date  is  due  to  the 
continuing  use  of  the  Julian  calendar  in  England  at  this  date:  Lord  Gray's  Motion  2000  SC 
(HL)  46  per  Lord  Hope  of  Craighead  at  56. 
42 Thus  the  Acts  of  Union  preserve  a  separate  body  of  Scots  law,  although  allowing 
harmonisation  in  matters  broadly  coincident  with  modern-day  public  law.  In  also 
keeping  clearly  separate  the  jurisdictions  of  the  Scottish  and  English  courts,  the 
Acts  of  Union  created  a  legal  landscape  where  clashes  of  jurisdiction,  and  of  laws, 
could  arise  within  one  political  country.  There  are  no  provisions  setting  out 
detailed  guidance  on  the  allocation  of  jurisdiction  between  Scotland  and  England, 
or  laying  down  rules  on  the  recognition  of  judgments.  This  is  not  to  be  critical. 
In  the  context  of  the  Acts  of  Union,  and  given  the  stage  of  development  which 
rules  of  international  private  law  had  reached  at  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  27  it  would  probably  be  surprising  were  it  otherwise.  However,  are  there 
areas  where  the  effect  of  the  Acts  of  Union  is  the  imposition  of  a  constitutional, 
rather  than  a  conflicts,  approach  to  such  issues?  Before  exploring  this,  it  is 
necessary  to  briefly  examine  the  constitutional  status  of  the  Acts  of  Union 
themselves. 
This  has  been  a  matter  of  great  controversy  over  many  years.  It  is  an  issue  which 
has  received  greater  attention  in  Scotland,  than  in  England,  however,  this  may  not 
be  particularly  surprising.  The  in-built  protections  which  the  Acts  of  Union 
purport  to  contain  are  largely  attempts  to  protect  Scottish  institutions,  as  the 
nation  had  entered  into  a  union  with  a  larger  neighbour,  of  greater  wealth  and 
influence.  It  will  clearly  always  be  of  more  interest  to  the  weaker  party  in  such  a 
relationship  whether  these  protections  can,  in  fact,  be  utilised. 
At  the  most  basic  level,  it  seems  intuitively  correct  that  the  two  documents  which 
set  up  a  new  nation,  with  a  new  Parliament,  and  contain  certain  protections  for 
existing  Scottish  institutions  for  "all  time  coming",  28  should  be  regarded  as  the 
founding  constitutional  document  of  Great  Britain.  29  Indeed,  in  the  recent  English 
case  of  Thoburn  v  Sunderland  City  Council,  30  Laws  LJ  compiled  a  list  of 
constitutional  statutes,  and  within  this  included  the  Union  with  Scotland  Act 
27  See  Chap.  2. 
28  Acts  of  Union,  Art  XIX  (regarding  the  Court  of  Session). 
29  See  C.  M.  G.  Himsworth  &  C.  M.  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution:  Law  &  Practice 
(LexisNexisUK,  2003),  pp152-153;  C.  Ashton  &  V.  Finch,  Constitutional  Law  in  Scotland 
(W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2000),  para  4.34. 
30  [2003]  QB  151. 
43 1706.31  The  normal  corollary  to  this  statement  would  be  that  the  Acts  of  Union 
therefore  limit  the  power  of  the  (now)  UK  Parliament  such  that  it  may  only  act 
compatibly  with  the  Acts  of  Union.  However,  such  a  theory  has  been  thought  to 
be  incompatible  with  the  doctrine  of  parliamentary  sovereignty.  Thus  Laws  LJ 
makes  it  plain  that  the  only  consequence  of  the  Union  with  Scotland  Act  being  a 
constitutional  statute  is  that  it  may  not  be  impliedly  repealed:  there  is,  for  him,  no 
question  that  Parliament  may  not  expressly  legislate  in  breach  of  the  Acts  of 
Union.  32  Lord  President  Cooper  spoke  out  strongly  against  the  assumption  that 
the  British  Parliament  inherited  from  the  old  English  Parliament  a  doctrine  which 
was  not  a  feature  of  the  Scottish  Parliament.  33  His  opinion  was  that  the  UK 
Parliament  could  not  pass  legislation  which  breached  the  Acts  of  Union.  34 
However,  thus  far  no  Scottish  court  has  identified  a  method  by  which  such  a  limit 
on  parliamentary  powers  could  be  enforced  by  the  courts,  although  unwilling  to 
rule  out  that  such  a  mechanism  might  exist.  In  MacCormick  v  Lord  Advocate 
Lord  President  Cooper  did  not  think  the  particular  issue  before  him,  as  a  matter  of 
public  right,  was  justiciable,  but  appeared  to  reserve  his  position  insofar  as  private 
right  was  concerned.  35  In  the  Outer  House  case  of  Gibson  v  Lord  Advocate36 
Lord  Keith  reserved  his  position  on  the  ability  of  the  Westminster  Parliament  to 
abolish  the  Court  of  Session,  or  indeed,  Scots  law  itself,  but  expressed  the  obiter 
view  that  whether  a  measure  was  for  the  evident  utility  of  the  Scots  was  not 
justiciable.  37  This  latter  was  not  accepted  by  the  sheriff  in  Stewart  v  Henry;  38 
however,  uncertainty  over  the  ability  successfully  to  challenge  Acts  of  the  UK 
Parliament  continued  unresolved  in  Murray  v  Rogers,  39  and  Fraser  v 
MacCorquodale  40  The  matter  was  recently  canvassed  once  more  in  Lord  Gray's 
Motion,  41  in  which  Lord  Hope  reached  the  conclusion  that  "the  argument  that  the 
31  Ibid.  at  186. 
32  Ibid.  at  186-187. 
33  MacCormick  v  Lord  Advocate  1953  SC  396  at  411. 
34  Ibid.  at  411-412. 
35  Ibid.  at  412,  although  see  the  dicta  at  413.  Lord  Russell  clearly  reserves  his  position  on  this 
issue  (ibid.  at  417). 
36  1975  SC  136. 
37  Ibid.  at  144. 
38  1989  SLT  (Sh  Ct)  34  at  38. 
39  1992  SLT  221  per  Lord  President  Hope  at  226;  per  Lord  Kirkwood  at  228. 
40  1992  SLT  229  per  Lord  President  Hope  at  230.  It  was,  however,  clear  that  such  a  challenge 
could  not  be  mounted  by  way  of  a  petition  to  the  nobile  offici  ni:  Pringle,  Petitioner  1991 
SLT  330. 
41  2000  SC  (HL)  46. 
44 legislative  powers  of  the  new  Parliament  of  Great  Britain  were  subject  to  the 
restrictions  expressed  in  the  Union  Agreement  by  which  it  was  constituted  cannot 
42  be  dismissed  as  entirely  fanciful".  Whilst  he  did  not  consider  that  the  House  of 
Lords  Committee  for  Privileges  could  advise  that  a  government  bill  was  ultra 
vires  in  that  it  breached  the  Acts  of  Union,  he  expressed  no  view  on  whether  a 
court  could  do  so.  43 
It  is  submitted  that  the  Acts  of  Union  do  have  a  special  status  within  both  Scots 
and  English  law.  The  precise  consequences  of  that  special  status,  however, 
remain  unclear.  Levack  has  argued  that: 
"The  Treaty  of  Union  of  1707  guaranteed  that  a  union  of  English  law  and 
Scots  law  would  not  take  place.  It  did  not,  however,  fully  protect  the  integrity 
of  Scots  law  or  the  autonomy  of  the  Scottish  judicial  system".  44 
The  existence  of  a  single  UK  Parliament,  and  the  powers  invested  in  that 
Parliament  to  harmonise  or  reform,  have  had  a  significant  impact  on  Scots  law. 
However,  the  unwillingness  of  the  Scottish  courts  to  enforce  that  measure  of 
protection  which  was  inserted  into  the  Acts  of  Union  has  prevented  the  latter  from 
being  successfully  drawn  upon  by  Scottish  citizens  in  the  manner  that  one  might 
expect  of  a  constitutional  document.  Despite  this,  it  is  submitted  that  there  has 
been  a  constitutional  impact,  albeit  limited,  on  the  rules  of  international  private 
law.  This  can  be  seen  in  two  particular  areas,  which  will  be  examined  in  turn. 
The  geographical  reach  of  statutes  within  the  United  Kingdom 
It  is  generally  assumed  that  a  country  may  not  legislate  extra-territorially.  One 
consequence  of  this  is  the  argument  that  foreign  legislation  generally  cannot  be 
relied  upon  in  the  Scottish  courts.  Thus,  for  example,  the  case  of  Government  of 
the  Republic  of  Spain  v  National  Bank  of  Scotland45  suggests  that  foreign 
42  Ibid.  at  59. 
43  Ibid.  at  62  cf  the  opinions  expressed  by  Lord  Slynn  of  Hadley  (ibid.  at  49). 
as  Levack,  The  Formation  of  the  British  State:  England,  Scotland  and  the  Union  1603-1707, 
p98. 
45  1939  SC  413. 
45 legislation  will  have  no  effect  over  property  in  Scotland.  46  Lord  Wark  quoted 
Dicey  to  the  effect  that: 
"A  State's  authority  in  the  eyes  of  other  States  and  the  Courts  that  represent 
them  is  speaking  very  generally  coincident  with,  and  limited  by,  its  power.  It 
is  territorial.  It  may  legislate  for,  and  give  judgments  affecting,  things  and 
persons  within  its  territory.  It  has  no  authority  to  legislate  for,  or  adjudicate 
upon,  things  or  persons  (unless  they  are  its  subjects)  not  within  its  territory".  7 
The  last  phrase  in  parenthesis  indicates  that  there  are  some  limited  exceptions  to 
the  principle  of  extra-territoriality,  such  as  legislation  as  to  the  status  and  capacity 
of  a  state's  domiciliaries.  48 
It  is  submitted,  however,  that  the  question  of  the  application  in  Scotland  of 
English  legislation  must  be  analysed,  and  answered,  quite  differently.  The  key 
lies  in  the  political  framework  of  the  UK  state  and  constitutional  doctrines,  rather 
than  any  concept  of  extra-territoriality.  The  UK  Parliament  has  the  power  to 
legislate  within  its  own  territory.  Indeed,  it  lays  claim  to  the  ability  to  legislate 
outwith  its  territory:  in  the  oft-quoted  example,  Parliament  could  pass  legislation 
to  ban  smoking  in  Paris.  49  Whilst  French  courts  are  clearly  under  no  obligation  to 
enforce  such  a  statute,  50  it  would  be  effective  in  respect  of  those  offenders  who 
were  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Scottish  or  English  court,  despite  the  extra- 
territorial  nature  of  the  legislation.  When  confining  its  legislative  attention  to  the 
UK,  the  Westminster  Parliament  legislates  in  four  modes:  solely  for  the  Scottish, 
English  and  Welsh,  or  Northern  Irish  legal  systems,  or  for  a  combination  of  any 
of  them.  Whether  a  statute  may  be  relied  upon  in  Scotland  is  a  question  of 
46  Ibid.  per  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Aitchison  at  426-427;  per  Lord  Mackay  at  434;  per  Lord  Wark  at 
438. 
47  Ibid.  at  438. 
48  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p94.  For  a  criticism  of  the  territoriality 
approach  see  R.  D.  Leslie,  "The  applicability  of  domestic  law  in  cases  with  a  foreign  element" 
in  D.  L.  C.  Miller  &  D.  W.  Meyers,  Comparative  and  Historical  Essays  in  Scots  Law:  A  Tribute 
to  Professor  Sir  Thomas  Smith  QC  (Butterworths/The  Law  Society  of  Scotland,  1992),  p57; 
and  see  the  English  case  of  Re  Cohn  [  1945]  1  Ch  5. 
49  Sir  W.  I.  Jennings,  The  Law  and  the  Constitution,  50'  edn.  (University  of  London  Press,  1959), 
p170.  The  UK  Parliament  has  passed  extra-territorial  legislation,  e.  g.,  War  Crimes  Act  1991, 
c.  13. 
50  Indeed,  this  was  Jennings'  point  (ibid.,  pp170-171). 
46 statutory  interpretation,  not  of  territoriality.  Thus  in  Rv  Treacy,  51  in  considering 
the  reach  of  an  English  criminal  statute,  Lord  Diplock  remarked  "I  can  leave  aside 
the  question  of  territorial  limitation  as  between  the  different  jurisdictions 
(England  and  Wales,  Scotland  and  Northern  Ireland,  etc.  )  within  the  United 
Kingdom,  for  this  depends  on  constitutional  practice,  not  on  international 
comity".  52 
Accordingly,  a  Scottish  court  will  only  be  bound  by  statutes  which  apply  to 
Scotland  alone,  or  Scotland  together  with  other  parts  of  the  UK.  This  is  a 
question  of  interpretation  for  the  courts,  although  by  no  means  always  an  easy 
one.  Confusingly,  the  practice  for  long  was  that,  whilst  statutes  applying  only  to 
Scotland  would  contain  the  word  'Scotland'  in  parenthesis  in  the  short  title  of  the 
Act,  statutes  applying  only  to  England  and  Wales,  as  well  as  those  applying  to  the 
whole  of  the  UK,  were  not  qualified  in  the  short  title.  53  Fortunately,  the  end  of 
the  twentieth  century  saw  some  erosion  of  this  practice.  54  There  is  also  a 
presumption  that  statutes  of  the  Westminster  Parliament  extend  to  all  parts  of  the 
UK.  55  In  the  past  when  construing  statutes  to  discover  their  extent,  Scottish 
courts  gave  great  weight  to  the  existence  of  express  words  including  Scotland. 
Much  significance  was  also  attached  to  a  lack  of  express  words  excluding 
Scotland  in  the  legislation.  A  statute  which  contained  words  suggesting  that  it 
applied  to  the  whole  of  the  UK,  has  been  held  to  cover  Scotland,  even  although 
the  earlier  legislation  which  it  was  amending  had  applied  only  in  England 
. 
56  The 
use  of  an  English  term  in  a  statutory  provision  did  not  prevent  that  section  from 
being  applied  to  Scotland  by  the  court  in  Murray  v  Comptroller-General  of 
s'  [1971]  AC  537. 
52  Ibid.  at  564;  endorsed  in  Clements  v  HMA  1991  JC  62  per  Lord  Justice-General  Hope  at  69. 
In  the  early  case  of  Grove  v  Gordon  (1740)  Mor.  4510,  although  the  ratio  is  unclear,  there 
were  arguments  addressed  to  territoriality.  However,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  English 
limitation  statute  in  question  pre-dated  the  Union  of  1707  and,  in  any  event,  the  case  seems  to 
be  more  concerned  with  the  distinction  between  rules  of  substance  and  procedure,  and  the 
effects  thereof. 
53  The  rare  exceptions  are  the  Census  (England  and  Wales)  Act  1890  (53  &  54  Viet),  c.  61,  and 
the  Import  of  Live  Fish  (England  and  Wales)  Act  1980,  c.  27. 
54  In  1986  the  Pensions  Appeal  Tribunals  (England  and  Wales)  (Amendment)  Rules  1986,  SI 
1986/366  were  passed,  and  since  then  a  number  of  statutory  instruments  applying  to  England 
and  Wales  only  have  been  so  qualified  in  the  short  title. 
55  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p95.  56  Bridges  v  Fordyce  (1844)  6D  968.  This  was  an  opinion  of  the  Full  Court  (the  original  Bench 
being  equally  divided),  with  the  issues  clearly  being  ones  of  statutory  construction  rather  than 
extra-territoriality. 
47 Patents.  57  With  more  modern  statutes  it  may  only  be  necessary  to  make  reference 
to  the  commencement  and  extent  provisions  of  the  statute.  The  important  point, 
however,  is  that  it  is  rules  of  statutory  interpretation  which  are  relevant,  not  any 
principles  of  international  private  law.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  recent  case 
of  Atlantic  Computing  Services  (UK)  Ltd  v  Burns  Express  Freight  Ltd.  58  The 
defenders  had  contracted  with  the  pursuers  to  take  goods  from  England  to 
Glasgow.  Whilst  on  the  London  Orbital,  disaster  struck:  the  lorry  carrying  the 
goods  caught  fire.  In  the  subsequent  action  for  the  loss  suffered  by  the  pursuers 
due  to  the  damage  occasioned  to  the  goods,  the  pursuers  sought  to  rely  upon  the 
Mercantile  Law  Amendment  (Scotland)  Act  1856.59  Section  17  imposed  liability 
for  accidental  fire  on  "[a]ll  carriers  for  hire  of  goods  within  Scotland".  The  1856 
Act  was  stated  only  to  apply  to  Scotland.  In  the  lower  court,  and  in  the  Inner 
House,  both  parties  largely  approached  the  case  as  an  international  private  law 
problem.  However,  the  Division  made  it  clear  that  this  was  a  wholly  incorrect 
approach.  Rather,  it  was  simply  a  matter  of  how  section  17  was  to  be  construed. 
The  correct  interpretation  of  the  statute  was  that  it  only  came  into  play  if  goods 
were  damaged  by  fire  whilst  in  carriage  in  Scotland,  and  thus  it  had  no  application 
to  the  facts  of  the  case  before  them. 
The  revenue,  penal  and  other  public  laws  exception 
Traditionally  the  Scottish  courts  will  not  enforce  certain  laws  of  other  countries, 
such  as  revenue  and  penal  laws.  The  scope  of,  and  rationale  for,  this  rule  must  be 
examined,  before  its  applicability  within  the  UK  can  be  assessed. 
It  has  often  been  said  that  the  unwillingness  to  give  effect  to  foreign  revenue  laws 
is  simply  part  of  a  general  rule  against  the  enforcement  of  the  penal  laws  of 
another  country.  60  The  penal  and  revenue  law  exceptions  are  either  stated 
expressly,  or  can  be  inferred,  to  be  driven  by  the  same  rationale.  The  roots  of  the 
rule  that  English  and  Scottish  courts  will  not  enforce  the  tax  laws  of  another  state 
S'  1932  SC  726.  See  also  Perth  Water  Commissioners  v  McDonald  (1879)  6R  1050. 
58  2004  SLT  132. 
59  1856  (19  &  20  Viet),  c.  60. 
60  The  Attorney-General  for  Canada  v  William  Schulze  &  Co.  (1901)  9  SLT  4;  Municipal 
Council  of  Sydney  v  Bull  [  1909]  1  KB  7  per  Grantham  J  at  12;  Government  of  India  v  Taylor 
[1955]  AC  491  per  Viscount  Simonds  at  506-507;  Peter  Buchanan  Ltd  and  Macharg  v  McVey 
[1955]  AC  516  per  Kingsmill  Moore  J  in  the  High  Court  of  Justice  at  526. 
48 are  not  clear.  61  However,  its  existence  was  accepted  in  a  case  which  is  seminal  in 
both  countries:  the  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  Government  of  India  v 
Taylor.  62  There  seem  to  be  two  bases  for  the  rule,  and  both  are  set  out  in  the 
judgment  of  Lord  Keith  of  Avonholm.  Firstly,  it  is  argued  that  a  foreign  country's 
attempt  at  "enforcement  of  a  claim  for  taxes  is  but  an  extension  of  the  sovereign 
power  which  imposed  the  taxes",  63  and  so  cannot  be  maintained  in  the  UK.  A 
contrast  is  drawn  with  actions  between  private  persons  which  simply  draw  upon 
foreign  laws.  Another  facet  of  this  rationale  is  to  view  revenue  laws  as  part  of  a 
foreign  state's  administration. 
64  Secondly,  it  can  be  argued  that  public  policy 
issues  dictate  the  non-enforcement  of  revenue  laws.  65  An  example  of  this 
reasoning  is  found  in  the  judgment  of  Kingsmill  Moore  J  in  the  lower  court,  in  the 
Irish  case  of  Peter  Buchanan  Ltd  and  Macharg  v  McVey.  66  The  defendant  in  that 
case  was  a  director  of  a  company  registered  in  Scotland,  who  moved  to  Ireland  as 
part  of  a  scheme  to  avoid  (retro-active)  tax  legislation  which  had  been  introduced 
in  Scotland.  Kingsmill  Moore  J  was  of  the  view  that  revenue  laws  did  not 
measure  against  a  moral  standard,  but  were  dictated  by  political  expediency,  and 
accordingly  could  be  designed  to  help  effect  policies  repugnant  to  Irish  citizens. 
The  Irish  court  therefore  should  not  enforce  any  revenue  laws,  since  to  only 
enforce  some  would  be  "publicly  to  censure  the  behaviour  of  a  foreign  State,  a 
procedure  dangerous  and  possibly  arrogant". 
67  The  difficulty  with  this  reasoning 
is  that  many  other  rules,  such  as  family  and  property  laws,  could  be  used  to 
pursue  government  programmes.  Refusing  to  recognise  a  foreign  divorce  may  be 
equally  offensive  to  the  other  nation  involved,  as  would  be  non-enforcement  of  its 
revenue  laws.  It  is  therefore  submitted  that  the  first  argument,  as  to  sovereignty, 
is  the  more  convincing  of  these  analyses.  It  certainly  seems  to  inform  the 
reasoning  of  the  modem  cases  of  Re  State  of  Norway's  Applications  (Nos  1  and 
2),  68  and  Lord  Advocate  v  Tursi,  69  and  it  appears  to  be  preferred  by  the  editors  of 
61  See  the  arguments  put  forward  by  the  ultimately  unsuccessful  party  (represented  by,  inter  alia, 
J.  H.  C.  Morris)  in  Government  of  Lidia  v  Taylor,  supra. 
62  [1955]  AC  491.  This  was  an  English  House  of  Lords  decision. 
63  Ibid.  per  Lord  Keith  of  Avonholm  at  511. 
64  Ibid.  per  Lord  Somervell  of  Harrow  at  514. 
65  Ibid,  per  Lord  Keith  of  Avonholm  at  511. 
66  [1955]  AC  516  at  529. 
67  Ibid.  at  530. 
68  [1989]  1  All  ER  745. 
69  1998  SLT  1035. 
49 Dicey  &  Morris,  70  and  by  Anton.  71  In  sum,  such  rules  are  held  to  be  internal  and 
limited  by  the  bounds  of  the  state  which  enacted  them.  Consequently,  it  is 
contended  that  the  exception  can  be  said  to  be  wider  than  penal  and  revenue  laws, 
extending  also  to  what  Lord  Denning  described  as  "other  public  laws".  72  If  the 
rationale  behind  the  rule  is  that  foreign  states  cannot  assert  sovereign  powers 
within  the  UK,  then  logically  the  rule  must  strike  at  all  direct  actions  by  a  state 
against  its  citizens,  such  as  administrative  law  provisions.  73 
Are  the  Scottish  courts  bound  by  the  revenue,  penal  and  other  public  laws 
exception  when  confronted  with  an  English  revenue,  penal  or  other  public  law? 
In  Government  of  India  v  Taylor  it  was  irrelevant  in  the  question  as  to 
enforcement  of  an  Indian  revenue  law,  that  India  was  still  a  member  of  the 
Commonwealth.  4  Earlier,  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  it  was  held  that  Canadian 
revenue  laws  would  not  be  enforced  by  a  Scottish  court,  despite  that  fact  that 
Canada  was  part  of  the  British  Empire.  75  Lord  Stormonth-Darling  remarked: 
"It  is  no  doubt  rather  anomalous  that  the  King  through  his  Courts  in  Scotland, 
should  refuse  to  recognise  a  debt  due  to  himself  in  Canada,  merely  because  it 
arises  out  of  the  execution  of  a  Revenue  Statute.  But  it  was  not  maintained, 
and  I  think  is  not  maintainable,  that  in  the  sense  of  international  law,  the 
mother  country  and  herself-governing  (sic)  colonies  stand  in  different 
relationship  from  that  which  exists  between  two  foreign  states".  76 
The  key  lies  in  the  existence  within  the  UK  (prior  to  1999)  of  one  parliament. 
The  ties  binding  the  monarch  to  his  subjects,  be  they  ties  of  Empire  or 
Commonwealth,  were  irrelevant  in  the  face  of  the  existence  of  separate  law- 
making  parliamentary  bodies  in  Canada  and  India  at  the  relevant  times.  In 
70  L.  Collins  (gen.  ed.  ),  Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  13th  edn.  (Sweet  &  Maxwell, 
2000),  pp89-90  &  94-100. 
71  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Lawv,  pp103-105. 
72  Attorney  General  of  New  Zealand  v  Ortiz  [1982]  3  All  ER  432,  CA,  per  Lord  Denning  MR  at 
455-460,  and  see  also  Collins,  Dicey  and  Morris,  paras  5R-018  &  5-030  to  5-037;  A.  Briggs, 
The  Conflict  of  Lawvs  (Oxford  University  Press,  2002),  pp43-44. 
73  CfAnton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p  106. 
74  [1955]  AC  491,  per  Viscount  Simonds  at  507-508;  per  Lord  Somervell  of  Harrow  at  515. 
75  The  Attorney-General  for  Canada  v  William  Schulze  &  Co.  (1901)  9  SLT  4. 
76  Ibid.  at  5. 
50 contrast  (and  despite  Lord  Cooper's  criticisms),  the  sovereignty  of  the  UK 
Parliament  extends  to  the  whole  of  the  UK.  In  Government  of  India  v  Taylor, 
Viscount  Simonds,  and  Lords  Keith  and  Somervell  observed  that  the  situation 
may  be  different  in  a  federal  country,  77  a  model  which  is  more  comparable  to  the 
political  situation  of  the  UK.  It  is  submitted  that  this  points  towards  the  answer 
thrown  up  by  the  logical  application  of  principle.  Since  the  UK  Parliament  can 
legislate  for,  and  thus  its  sovereignty  extends  over,  the  whole  of  the  UK,  it  cannot 
be  said  to  be  an  extra-territorial  assertion  of  sovereignty  to  enforce  the  revenue 
laws  of  the  UK  state  in  Scotland,  even  if  it  concerns  a  tax-payer  most  closely 
connected  with  England.  78  Thus  it  is  submitted  that  the  UK  government  could, 
for  example,  make  a  claim  in  a  Scottish  multiple-poinding  for  contributions  due 
by  the  owner  under  a  provision  confined  solely  in  its  application  to  England.  79 
The  same  logic  applies  to  statutes  enacted  by  the  UK  Parliament  which  could  be 
characterised  as  penal,  or  as  falling  under  the  heading  of  'other  public  laws'. 
Similarly,  in  Canada,  it  has  become  increasingly  clear  that  the  concept  of 
sovereignty  is  the  key  to  understanding  the  revenue  law  exception.  80  In  the  past, 
provinces  have  tended  to  be  content  to  enforce,  in  effect,  revenue  laws  of  sister- 
provinces.  The  Quebec  courts  in  theory  will  not  enforce  any  rights  arising  from  81 
such  rules  of  other  provinces,  but  in  reality,  recognition  and  enforcement  is 
afforded  on  a  reciprocal  basis.  82  However,  it  has  now  been  argued  that  the 
Canadian  constitution  might  require  interprovincial  recognition  and  enforcement 
of  revenue  laws  and  judgments.  83 
77  [1955]  AC  491  per  Viscount  Simonds  at  507;  per  Lord  Somervell  of  Harrow  at  515;  per  Lord 
Keith  of  Avonholm  at  511-512. 
78  This  accords  with  Crawford's  view  (Crawford,  International  Private  Law  in  Scotland,  para 
3.06  (footnote));  and  see  also  Lord  Advocate  v  Tursi  1998  SLT  1035  per  Lord  Penrose  at 
1044.  Note  too,  the  ability  to  take  action  in  Scotland  for  duty  owing  elsewhere  in  the  United 
Kingdom  in  terms  of  the  Exchequer  Court  (Scotland)  Act  1856  (19  &  20  Viet),  c.  56,  s40. 
79  Such  were  the  facts  of  Metal  Industries  (Salvage)  Ltd  v  Owners  of  the  S.  T.  "Narle"  1962  SLT 
114,  which  involved  a  claim  by  the  French  Government  in  a  Scottish  multiple-poinding  of  a 
French  ship. 
80  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  pp62-63. 
81  Ibid.,  p63. 
82  Civil  Code  of  Quebec,  LQ  1991,  c.  64,  arts  3155,3162. 
83  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p63;  and  see  J.  Blom,  "Public  policy  in  private  international  law  and  its  evolution  in  time"  2003  NILR  373  at  379. 
51 Constitutionalising  conflicts  in  a  devolved  Scotland? 
The  Scotland  Act  1998  as  a  constitution? 
The  Scotland  Act  199884  which  established  a  form  of  devolution  for  Scotland  was 
not  intended  to  form  a  new,  and  written,  constitution  for  Scotland.  85  Initially, 
moreover,  it  was  accepted  that  it  did  not  do  so.  The  Scotland  Act  was  not  itself,  it 
must  be  remembered,  even  the  product  of  a  Scottish  Parliament,  but  simply  "a 
single  piece  of  technical  legislation  emanating  from  a  still-sovereign  UK 
Parliament".  86  However,  Canada,  for  example,  has  fashioned  a  concept  of  a 
'Canadian  constitution',  from  the  starting-point  of  the  British  North  America  Act, 
which  was  passed  by  the  Westminster  Parliament  in  1867,87  and  is:  "a  strictly 
business-like  document.  It  contains  no  metaphysics,  no  political  philosophy  ... 
"$g 
It  is  submitted  that,  in  any  event,  the  initial  view  of  the  Scotland  Act  is  changing. 
Himsworth  and  O'Neill  now  take  the  approach  that  "although  this  terminology  is 
not  widely  used,  that  Act  [the  Scotland  Act]  can  quite  reasonably  be  described  as 
a  constitution  for  Scotland".  89  Significantly,  it  sets  justiciable  limits  on  the 
Scottish  Executive  and  on  the  Scottish  Parliament.  Neither  can  act  incompatibly 
with  European  Convention  rights,  nor  European  Community  law,  and  both  are 
bound  by  the  terms  of  the  devolution  settlement  set  out  in  the  Act.  90  It  is  the 
method  by  which  were  incorporated  in  the  devolution  settlement  the  human  rights 
guarantees,  which  have  attracted  most  attention  in  the  early  years  of  the  devolved 
84  1998,  c.  46. 
85  Ashton  &  Finch,  Constitutional  Law  in  Scotland,  para  8.05;  S.  Veitch,  "Transitional 
jurisprudence  in  the  UK:  a  very  Scottish  coup?  "  in  L.  Farmer  &  S.  Veitch  (eds),  The  State  of 
Scots  Law:  Law  and  Government  after  the  Devolution  Settlement  (Butterworths,  2001),  p121 
at  126-127. 
86  Veitch,  "Transitional  jurisprudence  in  the  UK",  p127. 
87  Now  officially  the  Constitution  Act  1867.  The  Act  arose  from  confederation  conferences 
between,  and  drafts  by,  representatives  of  the  components  of  the  then  Province  of  Canada  (J-F. 
Cardin,  A  History  of  the  Canadian  Constitution  from  1864  to  the  Present,  transl.  D.  Halfpenny 
(Global  Vision,  1996),  ppl-3).  A  comparison  might  be  made  with  the  influence  of  the  Scottish 
Constitutional  Convention  on  the  Scotland  Act  (for  which,  see  A.  Myles,  "Scotland's 
Parliament  White  Paper",  and  A.  Myles,  "The  Scotland  Bill  and  Act",  both  in  G.  Hassan  (ed.  ), 
A  Guide  to  the  Scottish  Parliament:  The  Shape  of  Things  to  Corte  (The  Stationery  Office, 
1999)  at  p31  and  p37  respectively).  The  Canadian  Constitution  is  now  also  comprised  of,  inter 
alia,  the  Canada  Act  1982,  c.  11  (also  passed  by  the  Westminster  Parliament),  and  the 
Constitution  Act  1982  (Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  paras  1.2-1.4). 
$$  W.  I.  Jennings,  "Constitutional  interpretation:  the  experience  of  Canada"  (1937)  51  Harv  LR  I 
at  1. 
89  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  p20. 
90  Scotland  Act  1998,  ss29,57(2),  53-54  &  63. 
52 settlement.  In  this  field,  the  case  of  Rv  HMA91  pointed  up  most  sharply  the 
differing  effect  of  human  rights  north  and  south  of  the  border: 
The  conclusion  must  therefore  be  that,  whenever  a  member  of  the  Scottish 
Executive  does  an  act  which  is  incompatible  with  Convention  rights,  the  result 
produced  by  all  the  relevant  legislation  is  not  just  that  his  act  is  unlawful  under 
section  6(1)  of  the  Human  Rights  Act.  That  would  be  the  position  if  the 
Scotland  Act  did  not  apply.  When  section  57(2)  is  taken  into  account, 
however,  the  result  is  that,  so  far  as  his  act  is  incompatible  with  Convention 
rights,  the  member  of  the  Executive  is  doing  something  which  he  has  no  power 
to  do:  his  "act"  is,  to  that  extent,  merely  a  purported  act  and  is  invalid,  a 
nullity.  In  this  respect  Parliament  has  quite  deliberately  treated  the  acts  of 
members  of  the  Scottish  Executive  differently  from  the  acts  of  Ministers  of  the 
Crown".  92 
Thus,  in  contrast  to  the  uncertain  possibilities  of  challenge  to  Westminster 
legislation  under  the  Acts  of  Union,  the  Scottish  courts  clearly  have  the  power  to 
strike  down  Acts  of  the  Scottish  Parliament,  and  actings  of  the  Scottish  Executive, 
on  a  number  of  grounds,  including  contravention  of  human  rights  guarantees,  and 
straying  into  powers  reserved  to  Westminster.  93  It  was  argued  that  this  was  a  role 
more  appropriately  filled  by  judges,  rather  than  politicians. 
4  However,  even  as 
the  Scotland  Bill  was  launched,  it  was  reported  that  "Scottish  judges  are 
apparently  concerned  that  ...  the  whole  emphasis  of  the  work  of  the  courts  will 
change  so  that,  in  reality,  we  will  have  a  constitutional  court  interpreting  a  written 
91  2003  SC  (PC)  21. 
92  Ibid.  per  Lord  Rodger  of  Earlsferry  at  63-64.  Interestingly,  in  this  case  the  division  of  opinion 
was  on  somewhat  national  lines,  with  the  three  Scottish  judges  forming  the  majority,  and 
Lords  Walker  of  Gestingthorpe  and  Steyn  dissenting. 
93  For  Lord  Reed,  "this  is  the  first  time  (other  than  in  areas  governed  by  European  Community 
law)  that  we  have  had  fundamental  rights  given  a  special  status  in  our  law"  (Lord  Reed,  "The 
constitutionalisation  of  private  law",  67). 
94  C.  Boyd,  "Parliaments  and  Courts:  Powers  and  Dispute  Resolution"  in  T.  StJ.  N.  Bates  (ed.  ), 
Devolution  to  Scotland:  The  Legal  Aspects:  Contemplating  the  Imponderable  (T&T  Clark, 
1997),  p21  at  25. 
53 constitution".  95  Later,  O'Neill  foresaw  a  development  along  the  lines  of  the 
United  States'  Supreme  Court: 
"Possible  conflict  between  the  Westminster  Parliament  and  the  Holyrood 
Parliament  on  claims  that  the  new  body  is  exceeding  its  limited  powers  is  thus 
made  into  a  juridical  rather  than  a  nakedly  political  matter.  The  danger  is,  of 
course,  that  in  giving  the  task  of  policing  the  Scottish  Parliament  to  the  courts, 
the  judges  come  to  be  seen  or  to  be  presented  as  acting  in  a  broadly  political 
role,  holding  the  ring  between  the  demands  of  the  Westminster  Parliament  and 
the  expectations  of  the  Holyrood  Parliament.  The  juridicalisation  of  what  is 
essentially  political  conflict  will,  it  is  suggested,  inevitably  lead  to  a  perception 
of  the  politicisation  of  the  judiciary".  96 
Whether  it  is  to  be  welcomed,  or  feared,  it  is  submitted  that  Scottish  judges  have 
indeed  been  entrusted  by  the  Scotland  Act  with  powers  akin  to  those  exercised  by 
courts,  such  as  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  97  in  the  interpretation  of  written 
constitutions. 
A  review  of  the  major  cases  since  these  powers  were  bestowed  on  the  courts 
reveals  a  similar  shift  of  opinion  as  to  the  constitutional  nature,  or  otherwise,  of 
the  Scotland  Act.  Initially,  it  was  stated  explicitly  that  the  Scottish  Parliament 
was  simply  a  creature  of  statute,  and  not  a  sovereign  body.  98  Conversely,  this 
meant  that  the  courts  could,  and  should,  intervene  if  the  Parliament  overstepped 
its  powers,  99  and  a  specific  comparison  was  made  to  the  many  other  parliamentary 
democracies  where  courts  wielded  this  power.  '°°  Whilst  the  courts  have  not 
foresworn  this  latter  duty  to  intervene,  subsequent  cases  do,  it  is  submitted, 
95  B.  McKain,  "A  green  and  fertile  field  for  the  lawyers",  The  Herald,  19  December  1997.  See 
also  H.  L.  MacQueen,  "Quis  custodies?:  the  Scotland  Bill,  human  rights  and  the  judges"  (1998) 
Scotland  Forum  (Issue  1)  8  at  9;  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  p465. 
96  A.  O'Neill,  "The  Scotland  Act  and  the  government  of  judges"  1999  SLT  (News)  61  at  61-62. 
For  a  contrary  view  see  Veitch,  "Transitional  jurisprudence  in  the  UK",  p  128. 
97  And  also  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada,  which  can  strike  down  laws  that  are  not  consistent 
with  the  Constitution,  with  a  great  number  of  cases  being  brought  in  respect  of  alleged 
breaches  of  the  Charter  of  Rights  (Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  5.5(a)). 
98  Whaley  v  Lord  Watson  2000  SC  340  per  Lord  President  Rodger  at  348-350;  per  Lord  Prosser 
at  357-358. 
99  Ibid.  per  Lord  President  Rodger  at  348-350;  per  Lord  Prosser  at  357-358. 
100  Ibid.  per  Lord  President  Rodger  at  349. 
54 indicate  recognition  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  as  having  a  different  status  from 
other  bodies  subject  to  the  Court  of  Session's  power  of  review.  Thus  in  Av  The 
Scottish  Ministers,  101  Lord  President  Rodger  considered  it  "right  that  the  court 
should  give  due  deference  to  the  assessment  which  the  democratically  elected 
legislature  has  made  of  the  policy  issues  involved".  102  This  was  built  upon  in 
Adams  v  Advocate  General,  103  in  which  the  Lord  Ordinary  considered  that  it  was 
"appropriate  for  this  court  to  defer  to  a  greater  rather  than  to  a  lesser  extent  to  the 
Scottish  Parliament  in  respect  of  legislation  such  as  the  Protection  of  Wild 
Mammals  Act" 
. 
104  Even  more  significantly,  the  Lord  Ordinary  was  of  the  view 
that  "despite  the  reference  in  the  Human  Rights  Act  to  Acts  of  the  Scottish 
Parliament  being  subordinate  legislation,  such  Acts  have  in  my  opinion  far  more 
in  common  with  public  general  statutes  of  the  United  Kingdom  Parliament  than 
with  subordinate  legislation  as  it  is  more  commonly  understood",  105  and  also 
noted  that  "the  Scotland  Act  is  clearly  intended  to  provide  a  comprehensive 
scheme,  not  only  for  the  Parliament  itself,  but  also  for  the  relationship  between 
the  courts  and  the  Parliament".  106  By  the  time  of  the  decision  in  Whaley  v  Lord 
Advocate107  in  the  summer  of  2003,  Lord  Brodie  agreed  that  one  of  the  petitioners 
was: 
"correct  to  say  that  the  Scottish  Parliament  is  governed  by  what  is,  in  effect,  a 
mini-constitution.  By  that  I  took  him  to  mean  that,  in  the  Scotland  Act,  the 
Convention  and  Community  law,  there  are  written  sources  of  law  which  have 
primacy  over  what  the  Scottish  Parliament  may  purport  to  enact.  In  other 
systems,  that  of  the  United  States,  for  example,  the  primary  source  of  law  is 
the  written  Constitution.  In  such  systems,  statutes  may  be  held  by  the  courts  to 
be  invalid,  as  being  contrary  to  the  Constitution.  By  his  use  of  the  expression 
'mini-constitution',  I  understood  [the  petitioner]  to  be  drawing  an  analogy  as 
10,2001  SC  1. 
102  Ibid.  at  21. 
103  2003  SC  171. 
104  Ibid.  per  Lord  Nimmo  Smith  at  211. 
io5  Ibid.  per  Lord  Nimmo  Smith  at  201. 
106  Ibid.  per  Lord  Nimmo  Smith  at  201. 
107  2004  SLT  425. 
55 between  the  Scotland  Act  and  the  Convention,  on  the  one  hand,  and  such  a 
written  Constitution,  on  the  other".  108 
Similarly,  the  Northern  Ireland  Act  1998109  has  been  described  in  a  House  of 
Lords  judgment  as  a  constitution  for  Northern  Ireland.  '  10  Scottish  courts  have  not 
shrunk  from  using  their  powers  to  strike  down  actings  of  the  Lord  Advocate  (as  a 
member  of  the  Scottish  Executive),  on  human  rights  grounds.  Indeed  on  a 
number  of  occasions,  the  High  Court  of  Justiciary  has  taken  a  more  radical  stance 
than  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy  Council  (JCPC)  ultimately  took  on 
appeal.  111 
The  Scotland  Act  may  not  be  a  constitution  in  the  traditional  sense.  Furthermore, 
whilst  it  allows  the  policing  of  the  boundaries  between  devolved  and  reserved 
matters,  once  a  matter  is  adjudged  to  be  reserved,  the  constitutional  rules  of 
Westminster  come  into  play.  Despite  this,  it  is  submitted  that  academics  and 
judges  are  correct  to  sense  that  the  Scotland  Act  has  a  constitution-like  quality. 
The  Scotland  Act  puts  the  relationship  between  Scotland  and  the  rest  of  the  UK 
on  a  constitutional  footing,  112  and  this  is  particularly  significant  in  the  context  of 
the  subject-matter  of  this  thesis.  Territorial  controls  are  also  placed  on  the 
legislative  competence  of  the  Scottish  Parliament.  113  The  Acts  of  Union  and  the 
Scotland  Act  are  written  documents,  about  which  a  constitutional  structure  for 
Scotland  could  be  built.  Whilst  uncertainty  about  the  justiciability  of  the  Acts  of 
Union  may  continue,  the  Scotland  Act  has  clearly  put  in  place  a  mechanism  for 
the  courts  to  enforce  constitutional  controls,  including  human  rights  guarantees, 
against  the  Scottish  government  of  the  day. 
i°  Ibid.  at  438. 
109  1998,  c.  47. 
110  Robinson  v  Secretary  of  State  for  Northern  Ireland  [2002]  UKHL  32  per  Lord  Bingham  of 
Cornhill  at  para  11;  per  Lord  Hoffmann  at  para  25. 
11,  Brown  v  Stott  2001  SC  (PC)  43;  McIntosh,  Petitioner  2001  SC  (PC)  89;  Dyer  v  Watson  2002 
SC  (PC)  89.  In  cases  which  have  not  progressed  to  the  JCPC  or  the  House  of  Lords,  Scottish 
courts  have  also  sounded  the  death  knell  for  temporary  sheriffs  (Starrs  v  Ruxton:  2000  JC  208) 
and  automatic  warrants  in  writs  for  diligence  on  the  dependence  (Advocate  General  for 
Scotland  v  Taylor  2003  SLT  1340). 
1)2  Note  also  the  disappearance  of  the  Scotland  Office  and  the  Wales  Office  into  a  Department  for 
Constitutional  Affairs  (Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  p257).  113  Scotland  Act  1998,  ss29(l),  (2)  &  126. 
56 The  thistle  and  the  maple  leaf 
From  an  Act  of  the  Westminster  Parliament  in  the  late  nineteenth  century,  the 
Canadians  have  constructed  a  Canadian  constitution,  to  the  extent  that  by  the  end 
of  the  twentieth  century,  it  was  suggested  that  issues  between  the  provinces 
traditionally  adjudicated  through  conflict  rules,  were  in  fact  more  properly  dealt 
with  by  constitutional  rules.  It  has  been  suggested  above  that  the  Scotland  Act 
has  qualities  akin  to  a  constitution,  particularly  in  terms  of  Scotland's  relations 
with  England.  This  raises  two  questions.  Could  issues  of  jurisdiction,  choice  of 
law,  or  recognition  now  be  resolved  through  the  application  of  constitutional 
rules?  This  will  be  the  subject  of  the  present  section.  A  number  of  justifications 
which  have  been  advanced  in  Canada  for  adopting  a  constitutional  approach  will 
be  examined,  to  see  if  they  remain  valid  and  feasible  in  the  context  of  the  legal 
relations  between  Scotland  and  England.  Only  then  can  the  second  question, 
whether  such  an  approach  would  be  desirable,  be  answered. 
Common  laws 
One  of  the  factors  which  was  said  to  make  the  adoption  of  a  strict  lex  loci  delicti 
rule  between  the  Canadian  provinces  constitutionally  appropriate  was  the 
similarity  of  the  domestic  content  of  the  various  provincial  legal  systems.  114 
Firstly,  only  the  federal  Canadian  Parliament  may  legislate  in  the  fields  of 
interprovincial  trade,  criminal  law,  marriage  and  divorce,  and  thus  the  law  on 
these  subjects  can  be  made  the  same  across  Canada.  115  The  powers  of  the 
provincial  legislatures  are  confined  to  matters  of  property  and  civil  rights, 
although  this  is  accepted  to  encompass  most  areas  of  private  law,  such  as  contract, 
tort,  property,  much  commercial  law  and  labour  law.  116  All  but  one  of  the 
Canadian  provinces  have  a  legal  system  based  on  the  Common  Law,  and  among 
these  provinces  the  differences  in  private  law  rules  are  not  great.  117  The 
exception  is,  of  course,  the  province  of  Quebec.  As  New  France,  the  area  had 
been  governed  by  the  law  of  their  colonial  masters.  After  the  British  conquest  in 
the  eighteenth  century,  there  was  a  brief  spell  where  English  law  was  supposed  to 
114  Tolofsan  v  Jensen  (1994)  120  DLR  (4a')  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  312-313  &  315-316;  see  also 
Hunt  v  TdNplc  [1993]  4  SCR  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  328. 
"S  Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  5.1(g);  J.  Willis,  "Securing  uniformity  of  law  in  a 
116 
federal  system  -  Canada"  (1943-44)  5U  Toronto  LJ  352  at  361-362. 
Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  5.1(g). 
117  Tolofson  vJensen,  supra  at  312-313;  Willis,  "Securing  uniformity",  352. 
57 be  applied.  However,  as  early  as  1774,  it  was  allowed  that  French  law  might 
apply  in  matters  of  property  and  civil  rights!  18  English  law  was  still  to  supply  the 
rules  of  criminal  law,  and  as  we  have  seen,  today  this  is  a  matter  for  the  federal 
Parliament.  Quebec's  separate  legal  system,  meanwhile,  survived  through 
confederation  with  the  other  provinces,  and  all  that  has  followed.  In  modem 
times,  the  law  of  Quebec  province  is  generally  classed,  like  Scots  law,  as  a  mixed 
legal  system.  l  t9  In  the  1940's,  when  Montreal  was,  in  many  ways,  the 
commercial  centre  of  Canada,  the  existence  of  a  different  Quebecois  legal  system 
was  thought  by  some  to  be  problematic. 
120  The  intervening  years,  however,  have 
seen  a  change  in  the  economic  geography  of  Canada,  with  the  rise  of  Toronto. 
Furthermore,  in  Tolofsoni  v  Jensen,  La  Forest  J  questioned  how  far  Quebec  law 
does  in  truth  diverge  from  that  of  the  common  law  provinces.  121  Brady  has 
described  Quebec  as  "a  cultural  island  within  the  nation,  but  an  island  now  with 
numerous  bridges  that  diminish  its  isolation",  122  and  it  is  submitted  that  this 
analogy  assists  in  understanding  how  the  situation  of  Scotland  and  England  within 
the  UK  differs  from  that  of  Canada  in  this  regard.  With  nine  common  law 
provinces,  there  is  a  high  degree  of  legal  uniformity  within  Canada:  Quebec  is  an 
exception,  an  island.  123  This  is  reinforced  by  the  reservation  of  important  topics 
such  as  marriage,  divorce,  and  criminal  law  to  the  federal  Parliament.  It  might 
also  be  questioned  whether  language  is  now  more  important  than  law  in 
distinguishing  Quebec  from  the  rest  of  Canada.  124  In  contrast,  the  UK  really 
consists  solely  of  two,  differing,  legal  systems125  albeit  with  a  degree  of  legal 
118  Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  2.3(b);  H.  P.  Glenn,  "Quebec:  mixite  and  monism" 
in  E.  Örücü  et  al.  (eds),  Studies  in  Legal  Systems:  Mixed  and  Mixing  (Kluwer,  1996)  p1;  J-G. 
Castel,  The  Civil  Law  System  of  the  Province  of  Quebec:  Notes,  Cases,  and  Materials 
(Butterworths,  1962),  pp20-22. 
119  Reeves  J,  "The  Quebec  Legal  System"  in  G.  L.  Gall,  The  Canadian  Legal  System  (Carswell, 
1990),  p165  at  165. 
120  Willis,  "Securing  uniformity",  p367. 
121  (1994)  120  DLR  (4t')  289  at  316,  cf  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p22- 
122  A.  Brady,  "Quebec  and  Canadian  Federalism"  in  J.  P.  Meekison  (ed.  ),  Canadian  Federalism: 
Myth  or  Reality  (Methven,  1968)  p337  at  341-342. 
123  This  pattern  is  reflected  in  the  conflict  of  laws:  "[a]lthough  in  strict  theory  the  system  of 
private  international  law  could  ... 
differ  from  province  to  province,  in  reality  there  are  only 
two  systems,  that  of  Quebec  and  the  common  law  system  that  applies  everywhere  else"  (Blom, 
"The  quiet  Canadian  revolution",  85). 
124  M.  Richler,  Oh  Canada!  Oh  Quebec!  Requiem  for  a  Divided  Country  (Chatto  &  Windus, 
1992),  p8;  S.  M.  Arnopoulos  &  D.  Clift,  The  English  Fact  in  Quebec,  2°d  edn.  (McGill- 
Queen's  University  Press,  1984),  p51;  R.  Levesque,  An  Option  for  Quebec  (McClelland  and 
Stewart,  1968),  p14. 
125  Leaving  aside,  for  the  moment,  the  position  of  Northern  Ireland. 
58 inter-dependence.  There  is  thus  no  general  legal  uniformity  within  the 
jurisdictions  of  the  UK  to  which  Scotland  is  an  exception,  and  so  this  factor  is  not 
as  relevant  as  it  is  in  Canada. 
Common  legal  education 
A  related  factor  is  one  identified  in  a  United  States  context  by  von  Mehren:  the 
great  similarities  in  legal  education  across  all  states,  and  the  existence  of  nation- 
wide  professional  bodies.  126  This  is  also  relevant  in  Canada,  where  problems  of 
movement  of  lawyers  across  provincial  boundaries  are  easing,  127  lawyers  may  be 
qualified  in  the  law  of  a  number  of  provinces,  128  and  there  is  a  nation-wide  ethical 
code.  129  Once  again,  this  factor  is  less  relevant  in  the  UK,  130  partly  as  a 
consequence  of  the  separate  legal  systems  therein.  The  protection  of  the  Scottish 
education  system  by  the  Acts  of  Union  also  contributes  to  the  differing  structures, 
and  lengths,  of  law  degrees  in  Scotland  and  England.  The  professional  bodies 
governing  solicitors,  and  advocates  or  barristers,  in  Scotland  and  England  are  also 
distinct  from  each  other.  '3' 
The  Supreme  Court 
A  crucial  factor  in  the  application  of  constitutional  rules  within  Canada  is  "the 
essentially  unitary  nature  of  Canada's  court  system",  132  with  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Canada  at  its  apex.  The  Supreme  Court  hears  all  Canadian  appeals.  '33 
126  A.  T.  von  Mehren,  "Recognition  and  enforcement  of  sister-state  judgments:  reflections  on 
general  theory  and  current  practice  in  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the  United 
States"  (1981)  81  Columbia  LR  1044  at  1046. 
127  J.  van  Rhijn,  "Multi-jurisdictional  practice  for  in-house  counsel"  2001  (June)  Canadian 
Lawyer  13. 
128  Tolofson  v  Jensen  (1994)  120  DLR  (4`h)  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  313;  Morguard  Investments 
Ltd  v  De  Savoye  [1990]  3  SCR  1077  per  La  Forest  J  at  1100.  See,  however,  on  the  need  to 
qualify  in  civil  law  to  practise  at  the  Quebec  Bar,  Reeves,  "The  Quebec  Legal  System",  pp180- 
181. 
129  Morguard  Investments  Ltd  v  De  Savoye,  supra,  per  La  Forest  J  at  1100. 
130  T.  Weir,  "Divergent  legal  systems  in  a  single  member  state"  (1998)  6  ZeuP  564  at  572. 
131  Ibid.,  573.  However,  the  Clementi  review,  which  was  confined  to  the  subject  of  the  regulation 
of  lawyers  in  England  and  Wales  has  triggered  an  investigation  of  the  position  in  Scotland  (see 
Consultation  Paper  on  the  Review  of  the  Regulatory  Framework  for  Legal  Services  in  England 
and  Wales,  March  2004;  D.  Mill,  "New  model  army"  (2004)  49  ASS  no  4,20). 
132  Tolofson  v  Jensen,  (1994)  DLR  (0)  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  315;  see  also  Morguard 
Investments  Ltd  v  De  Savoye  [1990]  3  SCR  1077  per  La  Forest  J  at  1100;  Swan,  "The 
Canadian  Constitution,  federalism  and  the  conflict  of  laws"  p310.  133  Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  8.5(a). 
59 Legislation  ensures  that  three  of  the  nine  judges  are  drawn  from  Quebec.  134  By 
convention,  Ontario  contributes  three  judges,  the  Western  provinces  two,  and  the 
Atlantic  provinces,  one.  135  It  is  a  strongly  unifying  body: 
"The  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  does  not  tolerate  divergences  in  the  common 
law  from  province  to  province,  or  even  divergences  in  the  interpretation  of 
similar  provincial  statutes.  Such  divergences  do  develop  from  time  to  time,  of 
course,  but  they  are  eventually  eliminated  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada. 
The  assumption  of  the  Court,  which  is  shared  by  the  Canadian  bar,  is  that, 
wherever  variations  can  be  avoided,  Canadian  law,  whether  federal  or 
provincial,  should  be  uniform".  136 
The  existence  of  the  Supreme  Court  ensures  that  there  can  be  no  doubts  as  to  what 
might  be  termed  natural  justice  guarantees  within  Canada.  137 
In  the  past  this  has  resulted  in  the  introduction  of  a  number  of  concepts  by  the 
Supreme  Court,  including  the  'double  rule'  in  tort,  which  have  had  to  be  reversed 
or  altered  by  the  Quebec  provincial  legislature,  in  order  to  cohere  with  the  law  of 
Quebec.  138  For  a  time,  "il  s'agissait  d'une  harmonisation  unidirectionelle:  la 
solution  de  la  common  law  etait  toujours  imposee  au  droit  quebecois,  jamais 
l'inverse".  139  Jobin,  however,  is  convinced  that  this  time  has  passed,  and  sees  the 
Supreme  Court  now  as  a  more  benign  influence.  too  It  may  be  that  the  unifying 
goal  of  the  Supreme  Court  is  pursued  with  rather  less  vigour  where  the  law  of 
134  Supreme  Court  Act,  RSC  1985,  s6.  A  certain  level  of  Quebecois  representation  has  always 
135 
been  required  (Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  8.3). 
Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  8.3. 
136  Ibid.,  para  8.5(a).  See  also  Hunt  v  T&N  plc  [1993)  4  SCR  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  318;  Willis, 
"Securing  uniformity"  356;  D.  Greschner,  "The  Supreme  Court,  federalism  and  metaphors  of 
moderation"  (2000)  79  Can  Bar  Rev  47  at  69. 
137  Morguard  brvestm  ents  Ltd  v  De  Savoye,  [1990)  3  SCR  1077  per  La  Forest  J  at  1099-1100. 
138  P-G  Jobin,  "La  Cour  Supreme  et  la  reforme  du  Code  Civil"  (2000)  79  Can  Bar  Rev  27  at  38- 
40. 
139  Ibid.,  pp42-43. 
140  He  notes,  for  example,  the  willingness  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  look  at  jurisprudence  from 
civilian,  or  civilian  influenced,  systems,  such  as  France,  Belgium  and  Scotland  (ibid.,  p45). 
Bogart,  however,  detected  the  emergence  of  a  less  sympathetic  approach  to  Quebec  by  the 
Supreme  Court  in  recent  times  (W.  A.  Bogart,  Courts  and  Country:  The  Limits  of  Litigation 
and  the  Social  and  Political  Life  of  Canada  (Oxford  University  Press,  1994),  pp224-225  & 
245-248). 
60 Quebec  is involved.  141  However,  for  example,  the  judgment  in  Hunt  v  T&Nplc'42 
held  a  Quebec  statute,  which  would  have  prevented  the  removal  of  documents  on 
the  order  of  a  court  of  another  province,  to  be  constitutionally  inapplicable. 
For  many  years  the  closest  analogy  to  a  Supreme  Court  in  the  UK  was  the  House 
of  Lords.  However,  unlike  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada,  the  House  of  Lords  was 
not  a  final  court  of  appeal  for  the  whole  country.  Although  it  acquired 
jurisdiction  over  Scottish  civil  appeals  (in  somewhat  controversial 
circumstances),  143  there  is  no  appeal  from  Scotland  to  the  House  of  Lords  in 
criminal  matters.  Moreover,  on  the  introduction  of  devolution,  it  was  decided  that 
devolution  issues  should  be  heard  not  by  the  House  of  Lords,  but  by  the  JCPC.  144 
In  theory,  another  difference  from  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  is  that  the  House 
of  Lords  is  not  avowedly  a  unifying,  or  harmonising  court.  When  sitting  for  a 
Scottish  appeal,  Scots  law  must  be  applied:  the  law  of  England  and  Wales  will  be 
applied  in  an  appeal  from  that  jurisdiction.  A  decision  of  the  House  of  Lords  in 
an  English  appeal  is  unlikely  to  be  binding  on  a  Scottish  court,  unlike  its  decision 
in  a  Scottish  appeal.  145  A  House  of  Lords  decision  in  an  English  case  may, 
however,  be  found  to  be  persuasive.  146  In  certain  periods  of  its  history,  the 
position  in  practice  has  borne  rather  more  resemblance  to  Jobin's  'harmonisation 
unidirectionelle'.  Initially,  after  the  jurisdiction  in  civil  appeals  had  been 
established,  Scottish  appeals  were  dealt  with  by  English  judges,  or  Scots  judges 
trained  solely  in  English  law,  and  indeed  might  have  been  argued  by  English 
barristers.  Judges  often  sought  to  equiparate  a  Scots  law  concept  with  its  'match' 
in  English  law,  or  relied  on  English  authority  to  the  exclusion  of  relevant  Scottish 
141  Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  8.5(a) 
142  [1993]  4  SCR  289. 
143  See  generally,  A.  D.  Gibb,  Law  from  over  the  Border:  a  short  account  of  a  strange  jurisdiction 
(W.  Green  &  Son,  1950). 
144  Scotland  Act  1998,  Sch.  6. 
145  Dalgleisli  v  Glasgow  Corporation  1976  SC  32  per  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Wheatley  at  51-53; 
Glasgow  Corporation  v  Central  Land  Board  1956  Sc  (HL)  I  per  Lord  Normand  at  16-17. 
146  See  Robertson  v  Watt  &  Co.  (4  July  1995,  unreported)  IH;  and  Holmes  v  Bank  of  Scotland 
2002  SLT  545,  preferring  the  reasoning  and  result  of  the  English  appeal  of  White  v  Jones 
[1995]  2  AC  207  to  the  much  earlier  Scottish  House  of  Lords  decision  of  Robertson  v  Fleming 
(1861)  4  Macq  167.  In  Commerzbank  Aktiengesellschaft  v  Large  1977  SC  375,  the  Inner 
House  agreed  with  criticism,  expressed  in  the  English  House  of  Lords  decision  of  Miliangos  v 
George  Frank  (Textiles)  Ltd  [1976]  AC  443,  of  dicta  from  an  earlier  Scottish  House  of  Lords 
case.  For  contrasting  views  of  the  effect  of  the  Miliangos  case  on  Scots  law,  compare  A.  D.  M. 
Forte,  "Questions  of  general  jurisprudence:  a  case  in  point"  (1977)  22  JLSS  377;  and  E.  A. 
Marshall,  "Decrees  in  foreign  currency:  a  need  for  reform?  "  1977  SLT  (News)  230. 
61 cases.  It  was  sometimes  assumed  that  English  law  applied,  that  the  laws  of  the 
two  countries  "must  be  the  same",  147  or  that  it  would  be  unfortunate  were  that  not 
so.  This  arguably  resulted  in  cases  which  were  decided  erroneously,  or  the 
introduction  of  foreign  concepts  into  Scots  law.  148  Whilst  matters  improved  with 
the  introduction  of  Scots  judges  from  the  late  nineteenth  century,  the  arrangement 
is  still  beset  with  certain  difficulties.  Some  modern  judgments  might  be  argued  to 
be  the  result  of  a  belief  that  it  would  be  inequitable  if  things  were  done  differently 
on  either  side  of  the  border.  149  However,  as  Jobin  had  observed  in  the  context  of 
Quebec,  such  equity  rarely  seems  to  demand  the  imposition  of  a  Scottish  solution 
in  England,  but  rather  the  reverse-150  Harmonisation  by  the  introduction  of 
English  concepts  is  a  challenge  to  the  structure  and  consistency  of  Scots  law. 
Furthermore,  it  has  been  correctly  observed  that  the  idea  that  "it  is  appropriate  to 
have  a  UK  wide  court  with  the  power  to  impose  uniformity  where  lower  courts 
are  unwilling  ... 
is  wholly  inconsistent  with  the  devolution  settlement".  '5' 
Perhaps  most  radically,  it  has  now  been  suggested  that  the  current  composition  of 
the  House  of  Lords,  involving  as  it  does  judges  not  qualified  in  Scots  law  sitting 
in  Scots  appeals,  is  a  breach  of  Article  6  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights.  152  Put  so  bluntly,  it  is  hard  to  argue  with  the  proposition  that  such  an 
arrangement  is,  at  best,  undesirable.  153  Perhaps  fortunately,  relatively  few  appeals 
are  taken  from  Scotland  to  the  House  of  Lords,  and  an  even  smaller  number 
succeed.  Weir  is  probably  correct  in  his  conclusion  that: 
147  Gibb,  Law  frone  over  the  Border,  p57. 
14$  For  example,  Brand  v  Mackenzie  (1710)  Robertson  8;  Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v  Reid  3  MacQ 
278;  Brand's  Trustees  v  Brand's  Trustees  (1876)  3R  (HL)  16. 
149  See,  for  example,  Sharp  v  Thomson  1997  SC  (HL)  66;  Smith  v  Bank  of  Scotland  1997  SLT 
1061  per  Lord  Clyde  at  1066  &  1067-1068. 
150  One  of  the  few  examples  of  the  ultimate  acceptance  by  the  House  of  Lords  of  a  gift  from 
Scotland  to  England  is  in  relation  to  the  plea  of  forum  non  conveniens  (Spiliada  Maritime 
Corporation  v  Cansulex  [1987]  AC  460;  and  see  earlier  The  Atlantic  Star  [1974]  AC  436; 
The  Abidin  Daver  [1984]  AC  398. 
15,  J.  Chalmers,  "Scottish  appeals  and  the  proposed  Supreme  Court"  (2004)  8  EdinLR  4  at  24. 
152  R.  G.  Anderson,  "Appeals  to  London  and  human  rights"  2003  SLT  (News)  297. 
153  Indeed,  the  Scottish  National  Party  have  proposed  the  abolition  of  Scottish  appeals  to  the 
House  of  Lords  (H.  L.  MacQueen,  "Scotland  and  a  Supreme  Court  for  the  UK?  "  2003  SLT 
(News)  279).  See  also  the  thoughtful  criticisms  of  the  existence  of  this  civil  appellate 
jurisdiction  in  Chalmers,  "Scottish  appeals". 
62 "It  would  be  absurd  to  assert  that  the  law  of  the  two  countries  would  not  be 
more  different  if  there  were  no  common  supreme  court,  still  it  can  hardly  be 
said  that  having  one  has  produced  very  much  common  law".  '54 
Another  body  which  must  now  be  considered  is  the  JCPC,  because  of  its  role  as 
an  appeal  court  for  devolution  issues,  which  includes  the  power  to  strike  down 
legislation  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  or  actings  of  the  Scottish  Executive.  The 
JCPC  hears  cases  from  other  Commonwealth  countries,  but  has  no  appellate  role 
for  England  and  Wales,  155  although  its  decisions  are  binding  on  the  House  of 
Lords.  156  In  fact,  when  dealing  with  devolution  issues,  the  JCPC  draws  on  largely 
the  same  personnel  as  the  House  of  Lords.  157  There  is  also  a  commonality  in  the 
substance  of  the  natural  justice  guarantees  which  are  being  adjudicated  upon  by 
the  JCPC  and  the  House  of  Lords,  but  as  has  been  pointed  out,  the  enforcement 
mechanisms  are  very  different.  158  In  all  the  circumstances,  however,  it  is 
submitted  that  the  combination  of  the  House  of  Lords  and  the  JCPC  do  not 
equiparate  to  the  unifying  function  and  role  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada.  The 
existence  of  such  a  court  therefore,  whilst  such  a  strong  factor  in  Canada,  is  not  of 
the  same  force  as  far  as  Scotland  and  England  are  concerned. 
Could  this  change?  The  current  UK  Government  is  proposing  the  establishment 
of  a  Supreme  Court  in  the  UK,  which  would  have  jurisdiction  over  Scottish  civil 
appeals,  devolution  issues,  and  all  civil  and  criminal  appeals  from  England,  Wales 
and  Northern  Ireland.  159  It  has  been  stressed  that  such  a  court  would  not  be 
modelled  on  the  United  States  Supreme  Court,  or  a  continental  constitutional 
court.  160  It  is  noted  in  the  consultation  paper  that  the  distinctiveness  of  the  Scots 
legal  system  is  guaranteed,  16  1  and  there  has  been  some  suggestion  that  it  would  sit 
154  Weir,  "Divergent  legal  systems  in  a  single  member  state",  569. 
155  Unless  a  devolution  issue  arises  in  a  court  in  England  and  Wales. 
156  Scotland  Act  1998,  s103(1). 
I"  However,  judges  from  the  Inner  House  can  also  sit  on  the  JCPC,  and  thus  a  majority  of  Scots 
judges  may  sit  (Scotland  Act  1998,  s103(2),  and  see  Rv  HMA  2003  SC  (PC)  21). 
158  Scotland  Act  1998;  Human  Rights  Act  1998,  c.  42;  and  see  pp52-53  above. 
159  Department  for  Constitutional  Affairs,  Constitutional  Reform:  A  Supreme  Court  for  the 
United  Kingdom,  Consultation  Paper,  July  2003. 
160  Ibid.,  paras  22-23. 
161  Ibid.,  para  60. 
63 as  a  Scots  court  in  determining  Scots  appeals,  as  at  present.  162  Despite  such 
apparently  reassuring  words,  however,  there  are  very  worrying  aspects  to  this 
reform.  The  Supreme  Court  would  be  "a  single  apex  to  the  UK's  judicial  system", 
and  prevent  conflict  between  the  House  of  Lords  and  the  JCPC.  163  It  is  suggested 
that  the  President  of  such  a  court  might  eventually  become  a  spokesperson  for  all 
judges  in  the  UK.  164  Concerns  have  been  raised  about  the  naming  of  judges, 
funding,  and  location,  of  the  proposed  court,  with  the  fear  in  all  cases  being 
integration  into  the  English  judicial  system,  contrary  to  the  Acts  of  Union.  165  it 
will  be  necessary,  of  course,  to  scrutinise  the  final  proposals  if  they  come  to 
fruition.  It  would  appear  that  currently  (2004)  the  pace  at  which  this  proposed 
development  is  to  proceed  has  slowed.  At  present,  it  is  submitted  that  the  doubts 
and  concerns  expressed  by  Scottish  judges  and  legal  practitioners  are  well- 
founded.  For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  however,  it  is  enough  to  remark  that  any 
development  of  a  unifying  Supreme  Court  in  the  UK  such  as  that  which  exists  in 
Canada,  may  also  have  the  unexpected  result  of  an  altered  approach  to  conflict 
issues  within  the  UK,  on  the  Canadian  model. 
Need  for  certainty 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  has  also  opined  that  the  Canadian  constitutional 
arrangements  require  there  to  be  a  high  degree  of  certainty  within  Canada, 
meaning  for  example  that  a  lex  loci  delicti  rule  should  be  applied  in  questions  of 
choice  of  law  in  tort  arising  as  between  its  provinces.  166  Similarly,  Australian 
judges  have  also  argued  that  certainty  is  a  more  desirable  result  in  conflict  of  laws 
issues  arising  within  a  country,  than  it  is  if  such  issues  involve  foreign 
countries.  167  Certainty  has  sometimes  been  used  as  a  justification  for  introducing 
162  C.  MacLeod  &  L.  Adams,  "Why  the  time  has  come  for  change",  The  Herald,  12  February 
2004;  Inaugural  Falconer  Lecture,  "Constitutional  reform:  strengthening  rights  and 
democracy",  given  by  Lord  Falconer  of  Thoroton,  Edinburgh,  20  February  2004. 
163  Constitutional  Reform,  Consultation  Paper,  para  20. 
164  Ibid.,  para  62. 
165  Faculty  of  Advocates,  Response  to  the  Consultation  Paper  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Constitutional  Affairs  and  Lord  Chancellor:  Constitutional  Reform:  A  Supreme  Court  for  the 
United  Kingdo,  n,  November  2003;  F.  Gibb,  "New  court  must  adhere  to  1707  union,  says  law 
lord"  The  Times,  19  June  2003;  J.  Rozenberg,  "Law  lords  give  thumbs  down  to  Supreme 
Court",  The  Telegraph,  5  November  2003;  R.  C.  Connal,  "For  the  United  Kingdom?  "  (2004) 
49  JLSS  no  3,9. 
166  Tolofson  v  Jensen  (1994)  120  DLR  (4th)  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  315  &  307-308. 
167  Breavington  v  Godlentan  (1988)  169  CLR  41  per  Dawson  J  at  147-148;  McKain  v  R.  TV.  Miller 
and  Company  (South  Australia)  Pty  Limited  (1992)  174  CLR  I  per  Brennan,  Dawson,  Toohey 
64 different  international  private  law  rules  within  the  UK,  instead  of  those  which 
would  otherwise  apply.  168  Of  course,  if  taken  to  extremes,  this  principle  changes 
from  a  laudable  aim  of  providing  litigants  with  certainty,  to  the  injustice  of 
imposing  a  completely  inflexible  rule  on  parties  to  the  court  process.  169  The  more 
fundamental  criticism,  however,  is  that  it  is  hard  to  understand  why  litigants  in 
cases  with  a  foreign  element  should  not  be  just  as  desirous,  and  deserving,  of 
certainty  in  their  actions.  Even  if  it  were  accepted  that  certainty  was  a  more 
important  goal  in  respect  of  jurisdictions  with  a  high  degree  of  contact,  this 
rationale  is  not  confined  to  jurisdictions  within  a  political  state.  Castel  questions, 
it  is  submitted  correctly,  whether  it  is  proper  for  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  to 
take  this  type  of  differential  approach.  170 
Movement  of  persons 
Another  factor  which  has  been  cited  in  the  Canadian  context,  but  which  does  not 
seem  to  have  such  great  force,  is  the  high  degree  of  movement  of  persons  within 
Canada.  171  It  can,  of  course,  be  imagined  that  within  a  country  there  will  be  much 
movement  of  its  citizens.  However,  it  is  submitted  that  this  simply  creates  a  need 
for  rules  of  international  private  laws,  or  results  in  the  frequent  use  of  such  rules. 
It  does  not  require  that  these  rules  are  constitutionally  prescribed.  Furthermore, 
as  has  already  been  argued,  the  level  of  contact  between  jurisdictions  is  a  factual 
matter,  which  does  not  necessarily  follow  legal  boundaries:  in  Canadian 
provinces  which  border  with  the  United  States,  there  may  be  as  high  a  degree  of 
contact  with  citizens  of  the  US,  as  with  those  of  other  Canadian  provinces.  172 
There  could,  therefore,  be  equal  justification  for  a  modification  of  the  conflict 
rules  in  a  particular  international,  as  in  an  interprovincial,  situation. 
and  McHugh  JJ  at  38;  John  Pfeffer  Pty  Limited  v  Rogerson  [2000]  HCA  36  per  Kirby  J  at 
para  123. 
168  For  example  the  system  of  obligatory  and  discretionary  stays  in  England  in  divorce  actions 
(the  equivalent  of  Scottish  mandatory  and  discretionary  sists):  Law  Com.  No  48,  Report  on 
Jurisdiction  in  Matrimonial  Causes  (1972),  para  82. 
169  See,  for  example,  the  doubts  expressed  in  J.  Walker,  "Choice  of  law  in  tort:  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Canada  enters  the  fray"  [1995]  111  LQR  397;  Blom,  "The  quiet  Canadian 
revolution",  113. 
170  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p22. 
171  Tolofson  v  Jensen,  (1994)  120  DLR  (4t')  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  315;  Morguard  Investments 
Ltd  v  De  Savoye  [  1990]  3  SCR  1077  per  La  Forest  J  at  1099. 
172  One  such  incidence  resulted  in  Babcock  VJackson  [1963]  2  Lloyd's  Rep  286. 
65 The  political  factor:  conflict  rules  a  threat  to  union? 
Perhaps,  however,  the  most  important  factor  in  the  drive  to  constitutionalise 
conflicts  is  one  which  is  not  always  explicitly  stated:  the  political  factor.  This 
underlies  sentiments  such  as  that  of  La  Forest  J,  already  quoted,  that  "the  English 
rules  seem  to  me  to  fly  in  the  face  of  the  obvious  intention  of  the  Constitution  to 
create  a  single  country",  173  or  that: 
"It  is  inconceivable  that  in  devising  a  scheme  of  union  comprising  a  common 
market  stretching  from  sea  to  sea,  the  Fathers  of  Confederation  would  have 
contemplated  a  situation  where  citizens  would  be  effectively  deprived  of 
access  to  the  ordinary  courts  in  their  jurisdiction  in  respect  of  transactions 
flowing  from  the  existence  of  that  common  market".  174 
Similarly,  in  the  Australian  cases  earlier  cited,  reference  is  made  to  the  aim  of  the 
Australian  Constitution  being  to  create  one  nation  from  the  various  colonies.  175  it 
was  argued  by  Deane  J  that  this  is  threatened  by  the  application  of  rules  of 
international  private  law.  176  In  the  field  of  delict,  these  were  rules  which  were 
"adopted  to  resolve  competition  between  the  tort  laws  of  different  independent 
nations  and  which  are  the  antithesis  of  a  single  system  of  law".  177  Kirby  J,  in 
discussing  the  treatment  of  states  as  foreign  countries  in  international  private  law, 
opines  that  "the  whole  purpose,  character  and  organisation  of  a  federation  (at  least 
one  such  as  Australia)  is  inconsistent  with  such  an  approach".  178 
This  political  factor  can  be  more  precisely  defined  as  the  elevation  of  political 
unity  over  legal  diversity.  It  is  seen  to  be  of  more  significance  that  the  country  is 
a  political  whole,  than  that  it  is  made  up  of  different  legal  jurisdictions,  and  thus 
the  latter  fact  must  be  played  down.  This  may  also  be  allied  with  a  centralising 
tendency.  It  is  submitted  that  this  political  factor  is  significant  in  Canada.  As  a 
former  dominion,  which  has  moved  into  statehood  in  its  own  right,  it  is  important 
173  Morguard  Investments  Ltd  v  De  Savoye,  [1990]  3  SCR  1077  at  1099 
174  Hunt  v  T&N  plc  [1993]  4  SCR  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  330. 
175  Breavington  v  Godleman  (1988)  169  CLR  41  at  121-122. 
176  Ibid.  at  124-125. 
"'  McKain  v  R.  W.  Miller  and  Company  (South  Australia)  Pty  Limited  (1992)  174  CLR  1  per 
Deane  J  at  45. 
178  John  Pfeiffer  Pty  Limited  v  Rogerson  [2000]  HCA  36  per  Kirby  J  at  para  121. 
66 to  cement  a  common  (Canadian)  identity,  separate  from  the  old  mother- 
country.  179  This  can  be  seen  in  the  "patriation  of  the  Constitution",  which  is  to 
say  "bringing  it  home  to  Canada".  180  In  the  wider  context,  it  is  also  evident  in  the 
adoption  of  the  (now  distinctive)  maple  leaf  flag,  and  perhaps,  in  marketing  terms, 
the  creation  of  a  Canadian  'brand'.  Furthermore,  against  this  background  it  is 
important  not  only  to  underline  the  political  unity  of  Canada  by  minimising  the 
differences  between  the  provinces,  but  also  to  be  able  to  provide  apparently 
distinctively  Canadian  solutions  which  spring  from  the  machinery  of  the 
Canadian  state  itself,  i.  e.,  the  Constitution.  181  This  is  not  to  ignore  the  separatist 
movement  in  Quebec.  However,  even  here,  referenda  have  failed  so  far  to 
produce  a  majority  for  separation.  182  In  any  event,  insofar  as  Quebec  is  an 
exception,  183  it  is  submitted  that  Brady's  above-mentioned  characterisation  of  the 
province  as  an  island  within  the  Canadian  nation  is  apposite.  184  Moreover,  it  is 
significant  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  posited  the  existence  of  a 
constitutional  solution  for  this  problem,  viz.,  that  the  Canadian  constitution  would 
not  allow  Quebec  to  unilaterally  secede  from  Canada.  '85 
In  the  past,  sentiments  have  been  expressed  within  the  UK  which  might  appear  to 
value  political  unity  over  the  legal  diversity  of  its  jurisdictions.  This  is  arguably 
at  least  a  factor  in  expressed  desires  for  uniformity,  186  and  certainly  in  the  feeling 
that  "conflicts  between  different  law  districts  of  the  British  Isles  are  ...  when  they 
occur,  more  embarrassing  judicially  than  conflicts  between  English  and  foreign 
proceedings".  187  It  is  submitted,  however,  that  whatever  validity  this  political 
factor  might  once  have  had  in  the  UK,  it  is  of  much  less  significance  in  the 
context  of  the  present  constitutional  set-up.  The  advent  of  devolution  was  for 
Scotland  the  culmination  of  a  process  of  the  shifting  of  power  away  from  the 
centre.  Scotland's  existence  as  a  separate  legal  jurisdiction  is  buttressed  by  the 
179  See  C.  B.  Picker,  "  'A  Light  unto  the  Nations'  -  the  new  British  federalism,  the  Scottish 
Parliament,  and  constitutional  lessons  for  multiethnic  states"  (2002)  77  Tulane  Law  Rev,  no  1, 
1  at  79. 
180  Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  para  3.5. 
181  It  is  submitted  that  this  also  broadly  describes  the  Australian  situation.  182  Hogg,  Constitutional  Law  of  Canada,  pars  5.7(a). 
183  See  Greschner,  "The  Supreme  Court,  federalism  and  metaphors  of  moderation",  p72. 
184  See  p58  above. 
185  Reference  re  Secession  of  Quebec  [  1998]  2  SCR  217. 
186  For  example,  Law  Com.  No  48,  Report  on  Jurisdiction  in  Matrimonial  Causes  (1972),  para  81. 
1B7  Ibid.,  para  82. 
67 creation  of  a  Scottish  legislative  body.  There  may,  as  a  result,  be  a  strengthening 
of  a  separate  Scottish  identity  in  the  wider  context,  and  indeed  the  concept  of  a 
'Scottish  constitution'  may  simply  be  part  of  this.  In  very  broad  terms,  the  current 
constitutional  developments  in  Scotland  are  almost  the  reverse  of  the  Canadian 
situation.  It  is  therefore  submitted  that  the  political  factor,  so  significant  in 
Canada,  is  of  much  less  importance  in  the  UK. 
Conclusion 
Of  the  various  reasons  which  may  lie  behind  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts  in 
Canada,  the  most  significant  seem  to  be  the  political  dimension,  the  relative 
commonality  of  law  across  the  provinces,  and  the  existence  of  an  avowedly 
unifying  Supreme  Court.  It  is  submitted  that,  for  the  reasons  outlined  above  in 
respect  of  each  of  these  points,  these  factors  have  much  less  force  as  between 
Scotland  and  England.  Thus,  despite  the  growing  acceptance  of  there  being  to 
some  extent  a  Scottish  constitution,  it  is  not  thought  that  the  conditions  are  ripe 
for  such  a  constitution  to  usurp  the  functions  of  international  private  law  in 
Scotland. 
The  undesirability  of  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts  in  Scotland 
If  the  conditions  are  indeed  not  ripe  for  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts  in 
Scotland,  this  is  not,  it  is  submitted,  a  cause  for  concern:  quite  the  reverse.  It  is 
contended  that  the  constitutionalising  approach  is  based  on  a  fundamental 
misunderstanding  of  the  purpose,  and  effect,  of  international  private  law  rules. 
International  private  law  rules  do  not  create  conflicts  of  law  within  a  country.  It 
is  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  existence  of  different  legal  jurisdictions  within 
a  country  that  issues  of  jurisdiction,  choice  of  law  and  recognition  of  judgments, 
will  arise.  Conflict  rules  simply  acknowledge  that  these  conflicts  do  exist,  and 
provide  tools  whereby  they  may  be  resolved.  The  term  'conflict  of  laws'  is  not  a 
rallying  call  to  foment  conflict:  the  aim  is  rather  to  make  an  enlightened  choice 
between  the  claims  of  contending  laws.  Whilst  the  traditional  nomenclature  of 
the  topic  in  Scotland  speaks  of  an  international  dimension,  the  tools  provided  by 
conflict  rules  are  in  no  way  inherently  unsuitable  for  intra-UK  jurisdiction, 
recognition,  or  choice  of  law  issues.  On  the  other  hand,  constitutional  rules  are 
rarely  drafted  to  incorporate  specific  rules  on  clashes  of  jurisdiction  or  laws,  and 
68 attempting  to  bring  such  issues  under  rules  designed  for  different  purposes  would 
seem  generally  undesirable.  Ultimately,  if  it  is  thought  that  a  diversity  of  legal 
jurisdictions  within  one  political  nation  is  a  hindrance,  then  the  solution  is  total 
harmonisation,  not  the  abolition  of  international  private  law  rules  in  intra-UK 
situations. 
Such  criticisms  have  also  been  advanced  by  those  in  Canada,  and  Australia,  who 
are  unconvinced  by  the  drive  to  constitutionalise  conflicts.  Thus  Castel  sees  no 
justification  for  having  different  sets  of  rules  for  interprovincial  and  international 
cases.  The  rules  which  have  been  developed  in  cases  such  as  Tolofson  vJensen  188 
"can  stand  on  their  own  merits"  and  "do  not  require  the  support  of  the 
Constitution"!  89  Blom  fears  that  in  its  reliance  on  the  Constitution,  "the  Supreme 
Court 
...  may  have  gone  further  than  it  needed  to,  and  further  than  is 
desirable".  190  In  Australia,  in  discussing  the  suggestion  that  the  doctrine  of  'full, 
faith  and  credit'  had  a  role  in  choice  of  law  questions,  Dawson  J  noted  that: 
"the  requirement  that  full  faith  and  credit  be  given  to  the  laws  of  a  State, 
statutory  or  otherwise,  throughout  the  Commonwealth,  affords  no  assistance 
where  there  is  a  choice  to  be  made  between  conflicting  laws 
... 
The  conflict 
rules  ...  unlike  the  full  faith  and  credit  requirement,  provide  a  basis  upon 
which  the  selection  can  be  made".  191 
Furthermore,  in  concurring  with  Brennan,  Toohey  and  McHugh,  JJ,  in  McKain  v 
R.  W.  Miller  and  Company  (South  Australia)  Pty  Limited,  he  recognised  that 
differing  legal  results  within  Australia  "may  or  may  not  be  thought  to  be 
desirable,  but  it  is  the  hallmark  of  a  federation  as  distinct  from  a  union",  192  and 
that  it  was  the  common  law  and  not  the  Constitution  which  determined  which  law 
was  to  be  applied. 
188  (1994)  120  DLR  (4`s)  289. 
1ß9  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p22. 
190  Blom  "The  quiet  Canadian  revolution"  115. 
19,  Breavington  v  Godleman  (1988)  169  CLR  41  at  150. 
192  (1992)  174  CLR  1  at  36-37. 
69 It  has  been  contended  that  the  factors  which  were  said  to  justify  the 
constitutionalising  of  conflicts  in  Canada  do  not  have  the  same  force  in  the 
Scottish  context.  More  importantly,  it  is  submitted,  this  whole  approach  is 
fundamentally  misconceived.  It  is  not  a  path  which  Scotland  should  seek  to 
follow. 
70 4  INTERNALISING  CONFLICTS 
Defining  the  internalising  of  conflicts 
It  was  submitted  in  the  previous  chapter  that  there  has  not  been,  in  the  UK,  a 
constitutionalising  of  conflicts  on  any  significant  scale,  and  also  that  such  a 
development  would  not  be  beneficial.  However,  there  has  been  much  evidence  of 
another  phenomenon,  which  can  be  described  as  'internalising'  conflicts. 
The  most  obvious  examples  of  internalising  conflicts  are  the  use  of  legislation  by 
the  Westminster  Parliament  in  one  of  two  ways.  Firstly,  statute  can  be  used  to 
remove  a  conflict  altogether  by  changing  one,  or  both,  of  the  rules  which  cause  a 
cross-border  conflict  between  Scotland  and  England.  Secondly,  statutes  may  be 
passed  which  regulate  an  area  of  law  in  the  UK,  and  contain  rules  providing  for 
certain  cross-border  consequences,  rather  than  leaving  the  matter  to  be  dealt  with 
by  way  of  (usually  common  law)  international  private  law  rules.  Such  an 
approach  is  well  illustrated  by  the  remarks  of  the  erstwhile  Commissary  Court 
judge,  James  Fergusson: 
"In  the  relative  situation  also  of  Scotland  to  the  sister  kingdoms,  it  is  obvious, 
that  the  delicacy,  difficulty,  and  importance,  of  those  legal  questions  which 
have  been  under  review,  are  infinitely  augmented  by  the  complete  political 
incorporation  of  all  their  subjects  as  one  people,  while  the  municipal  law  of 
their  country,  as  well  as  that  of  England,  is,  by  its  national  compact  of  union, 
maintained  in  perfect  sovereignty  and  independence.  But  the  same 
arrangement  has  bestowed  a  Parliament  common  to  the  whole,  which  can,  by 
statute,  remove  collision,  and  reconcile  their  different  interests,  whenever  the 
slow  and  still  feeble  operation  of  international  law,  the  sole  mediator  between 
the  conflicting  jurisdictions  of  unconnected  States,  is  found  to  be  insufficient 
for  that  purpose". 
J.  Fergusson,  Reports  of  some  Recent  Decisions  by  the  Consistorial  Court  of  Scotland  in 
actions  of  divorce  concluding  for  dissolution  of  marriages  celebrated  under  the  English  law 
(Archibald  Constable  &  Co.,  1817),  pp20-21. 
71 "I  am  going  to  Gretna  Green,  and  if  you  cannot  guess  with  who,  ...  ,2 
The  so-called  "runaway  marriages"3  provide  a  relatively  early  example  of  an 
internalising  approach  to  a  cross-border  conflict  of  laws  between  Scotland  and 
England.  One  of  the  effects  of  the  Acts  of  Union  was  to  leave  the  laws  of 
marriage  in  England  and  Scotland  un-harmonised.  In  1753,  the  Act  for  the  better 
preventing  of  clandestine  Marriages,  4  more  commonly  known  as  Lord 
Hardwicke's  Act,  was  passed,  and  prevented  marriages  in  England  taking  place 
other  than  in  a  church,  or  without  pronouncement  of  banns  or  a  licence  of 
marriage.  5  Furthermore,  parental  consent  was  required  in  England  in  a  marriage 
by  licence  if  one  of  the  parties  was  under  twenty-one.  6  Marriages  celebrated  in 
contravention  of  the  Act  were  void.  7  In  comparison,  irregular  marriages  remained 
possible  in  Scotland,  one  type  of  marriage  requiring  only  simple  consent,  without 
the  necessity  of  a  religious  celebrant  being  present.  There  was  no  need  in  Scots 
law  for  parental  consent.  The  differences  in  the  law  between  the  two  countries, 
together  with  the  increasing  ease  of  travel  within  Britain,  made  elopement  to 
Scotland  seem  an  attractive  proposition  to  certain  young  English  couples,  and 
Gretna  Green  achieved  notoriety.  8 
For  international  private  lawyers,  such  marriages  raise  difficult  questions:  were 
such  unions  valid  notwithstanding  the  lack  of  a  true  Scots  domicile,  the  use  of  a 
form  of  ceremony  impermissible  in  the  country  of  true  domicile,  and  a  possible 
lack  of  capacity  by  that  law?  The  Scots  courts  of  the  time  seem  to  have  been 
content  that  such  marriages  were  valid.  Thus  in  actions  of  divorce,  the  granting 
2  J.  Austen,  Pride  and  Prejudice,  edition  used:  T.  Tanner  (ed.  ),  (Penguin,  1972),  p307. 
3  The  term  is  used,  for  example,  in  the  contributed  article  "Runaway  marriages"  1954  SLT 
(News)  217;  A.  E.  Anton  and  Ph.  Francescakis,  "Modern  Scots  'runaway  marriages'  "  1958  JR 
253;  and  The  Marriage  Law  of  Scotland  (Cmnd  4011)  (1969)  ("The  Kilbrandon  Report"),  p25. 
°  Clandestine  Marriages  Act  1753  (26  Geo  II),  c.  33. 
5  Ibid.,  ssl,  4&8  (subject  to  the  special  licence  which  could  be  granted  by  the  Archbishop  of 
Canterbury  to  hold  the  marriage  in  any  place:  s6). 
6  Ibid.,  sl1. 
7  Ibid.,  ss8  &  11. 
Lamberton  on  the  east  coast  was  also  the  scene  of  runaway  marriages  (L.  Wood,  The 
Berwickshire  Coast  (Stenlake  Publishing,  1998),  p84),  and  it  seems  that  Portpatrick  was  the 
equivalent  for  couples  coming  from  Ireland  (C.  Norton,  "A  Letter  to  the  Queen  on  Lord 
Chancellor  Cranworth's  Marriage  and  Divorce  Bill"  (1855)  reproduced  in  M.  M.  Roberts  and  T. 
Mizuta  (eds),  The  (fives:  The  Rights  of  Married  Women  (Routledge/Thoemmes  Press,  1994), 
p99,  and  see  Butler  v  Forbes  (1816)  19  Fac  Coll  139). 
72 of  such  a  remedy  presumes  that  a  valid  marriage  was  in  existence.  9  Furthermore, 
in  Gordon  v  Pye,  10  Lord  Meadowbank  explicitly  suggested  that  a  marriage 
between  English  domiciliaries,  lacking  capacity  under  English  law,  would  be 
valid  if  celebrated  in  Scotland.  "  The  English  courts  appear  to  have  taken  a 
similar  view.  In  the  1769  case  of  Compton  v  Bearcroft,  12  the  Court  of  Delegates 
refused  to  find  a  Gretna  Green  runaway  marriage  void  as  an  attempt  to 
circumvent  Lord  Hardwicke's  Act.  13  By  1802,  however,  the  case  was  interpreted 
by  the  Consistory  Court  in  London  as  clear  authority  for  the  proposition  that  the 
validity  of  the  marriage  was  determined  by  the  lex  loci  celebration  is.  14  Thus 
since  the  marriage  was  valid  under  Scots  law,  this  sufficed,  despite  the  prohibition 
on  the  marriage  in  England.  '5 
A  comparison  can  be  drawn  with  the  judgment  in  the  later  case  of  Brook  v 
Brook,  16  which  concerned  the  validity  of  a  marriage  in  Denmark  between  an 
English  domiciliary  and  his  English-domiciled  sister-in-law.  The  English  court 
now  drew  a  distinction  between  form  and  capacity,  the  latter  being  governed  by 
the  lex  domicilii.  Lord  Hardwicke's  Act  was  characterised  as  pertaining  to  matters 
of  form,  and  thus  the  Gretna  Green  runaway  marriages  distinguished.  '?  It  is 
submitted,  however,  that  the  significance  of  Lord  Hardwicke's  Act  is  downplayed, 
and  there  is  no  satisfactory  explanation  as  to  why  the  requisite  parental  consent 
can  be  said  to  be  a  matter  of  form.  '8  For  whatever  reason,  it  might  seem  that  the 
judges  simply  found  such  a  marriage  more  objectionable  than  had  their 
9  In  Wyche  v  Blount  (1801)  Ferg  Cons  263  a  divorce  was  granted  of  a  marriage  between  two 
English  people  which  had  taken  place  at  Gretna,  and  Wilcox  v  Parry  (1811)  Ferg  Cons  267 
was  an  undefended  action  of  divorce  of  an  irregular  marriage  at  Annan  between  two  English 
domiciliaries. 
10  (1815)  Ferg  Cons  276. 
11  Ibid.  at  361-362. 
12  The  case  is  incompletely  reported,  the  report  consisting  of  the  libel  and  a  note,  incorporated 
within  the  report  of  the  later  case  of  Middleton  v  Janverin  (1802)  2  Hagg  Con  437  (at  444). 
13  Similarly  in  Harford  v  Morris  (1776)  2  Hagg  Con  423,  a  marriage  on  the  continent  was  argued 
to  be  an  attempt  to  circumvent  English  law,  but  was  found  not  to  be  void.  The  judge  did  not, 
however,  appear  to  apply  the  lex  loci  celebrationis. 
14  Middleton  v  Janverin  (1802)  2  Hagg  Con  437. 
15  Conversely  a  marriage  illegal  in  France  had  been  held  to  be  null  by  the  English  courts  in 
Scrimshire  v  Scrimshire  (1752)  2  Hagg  Con  395  (although  it  was  also  illegal  in  England). 
16  (1861)  9  HL  Cas  193. 
17  Ibid.  per  Lord  Campbell  LC  at  214-215;  per  Lord  Cranworth  at  228-229. 
18  Dicey  and  Morris  describe  the  characterisation  as  "logically  doubtful"  (Collins,  Dicey  and 
Morris  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  para  17-015). 
73 predecessors  adjudicating  on  Gretna  Green  runaway  marriages.  19  However,  there 
were  many  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century  that  disapproved  of  the  practice  of 
elopement  to  Gretna  Green,  and  legislation  was  in  fact  drawn  up  to  put  an  end  to 
the  practice  2°  Thus,  the  Marriage  (Scotland)  Act  1856  was  passed,  which 
demanded  that  for  a  marriage  in  Scotland  to  be  valid,  at  least  one  of  the  parties 
must  have  resided  there  for  a  minimum  of  twenty-one  days.  21  Given  that  Brook  v 
Brook  was  decided  only  a  few  years  later  in  1861,  this  may  point  to  another 
reason  for  the  willingness  of  the  judges  to  characterise  Lord  Hardwicke's  Act,  and 
the  Gretna  Green  runaway  marriages  in  defiance  of  it,  as  relating  to  matters  of 
form:  the  phenomenon  of  the  Gretna  Green  runaway  marriages  having  been 
diminished  by  the  1856  Act,  there  was  now  no  need  for  judicial  action  on  this 
score.  The  important  point  for  this  thesis,  however,  is  the  ability  of  the 
Westminster  Parliament  to  use  legislation  to  solve  the  perceived  cross-border 
problem,  rather  than  leaving  the  issue  to  be  resolved  by  rules  of  international 
private  law. 
Interestingly,  the  pattern  of  the  Gretna  Green  runaway  marriages  was  mirrored  in 
the  twentieth  century.  Once  again,  there  was  a  spate  of  couples  coming  to 
Scotland  to  marry.  22  The  Court  of  Session  made  it  clear  that  it  "never  has 
regarded  itself  as  bound  or  its  decision  foreclosed"  by  an  order  from  the  English 
Chancery  Court,  23  for  example  forbidding  marriage  by  an  English  domiciliary. 
However,  the  existence  of  such  an  order  would  be  particularly  persuasive  in  the 
19  Comments  of  Lord  Campbell  LC  make  clear  the  moral  disapprobation:  Brook  v  Brook  (1861) 
9  HL  Cas  193  per  Lord  Campbell  LC  at  212.  Perhaps  by  way  of  comparison,  both  the  English 
Lord  Chancellors  Eldon  and  Brougham  married  in  Scotland  after  an  elopement  (T.  P.  R., 
"Gretna  Green:  a  romantic  retrospect"  1925  SLT  (News)  214  at  215).  Fawcett  argues  that 
there  were  not  such  powerful  policy  objections  to  the  Gretna  Green  runaway  marriages,  as  to 
marriages  such  as  that  in  Brook  v  Brook,  supra  (J.  J.  Fawcett,  "Evasion  of  law  and  mandatory 
rules  in  private  international  law"  (1990)  49  CLI  44  at  45-46,50  &  54-55). 
20  See  T.  P.  R.,  "Gretna  Green";  and  M.  C.  Meston's  annotations  to  the  Marriage  (Scotland)  Act 
1977;  and  note  also  the  penalty  of  transportation  for  celebrants  who  solemnised  English 
marriages  in  contravention  of  Lord  Hardwicke's  Act  (Lord  Hardwicke's  Act,  s8). 
21  1856,  (19  &  20  Viet),  c.  96,  sl.  Miller  v  Deakin  1912  SLT  253  is  an  example  of  a  marriage 
contravening  this  requirement  being  declared  null  by  the  Court  of  Session.  Ironically  the  Act 
was  brought  into  force  under  the  stewardship  of  Lord  Brougham  (see  note  19  above). 
22  For  example,  in  1967  1,036  marriages  took  place  in  Scotland  in  which  neither  of  the  spouses 
were  Scottish  residents.  One  or  more  of  the  spouses  were  under  21  in  around  three-quarters  of 
these  marriages,  and  of  these  cases  more  brides  came  from  England  than  from  any  other  single 
country  (The  Kilbrandon  Report,  Appendix  6,  p57). 
23  Hoy  v  Hoy  1968  SLT  413  per  Lord  President  Clyde  at  416;  and  see  also  Stuart  v  Moore 
(1861)  23  D  902  per  Lord  Campbell  LC  at  904. 
74 decision  to  grant  an  interim  interdict  preventing  marriage  in  Scotland,  if  one  party 
was  a  Chancery  ward  who  had  been  in  England  at  the  time  of  the  making  of  the 
Chancery  order.  24  It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  consideration  of 
such  cases  in  the  context  of  the  granting  of  an  interim  interdict  necessitates  the 
application  of  a  different  test  by  the  court.  These  cases  are  not  therefore  authority 
for  the  proposition  that  such  marriages  are  invalid,  rather  that  it  was  not  possible 
for  the  court  at  that  stage  to  say  that  they  were  undoubtedly  unobjectionable: 
therefore  the  balance  of  convenience  favoured  preventing  the  marriage  taking 
place.  Furthermore,  in  Bliersbach  v  MacEwe,  i25  it  had  been  held  by  the  Court  that 
lack  of  parental  consent  to  marry  was  merely  a  prohibitive  impediment,  the  effect 
of  which  was  determined  by  the  lex  loci  celebration  is.  By  contrast,  an  irritant 
impediment  by  the  law  of  the  party's  domicile  would  have  resulted  in  that  party 
lacking  capacity  to  marry  in  Scotland. 
As  was  the  case  in  the  nineteenth  century,  however,  sections  of  the  public  found 
the  incidence  of  runaway  marriages  objectionable.  Questions  were  asked  in  the 
House  of  Commons  as  to  whether  the  government  would  take  action,  since  there 
was  a  "general  anxiety  that  Scotland  is  becoming  a  sort  of  inverted  Reno  to  which 
young  people  from  other  parts  of  the  world  can  come  to  evade  their  own  laws".  26 
The  General  Assembly  of  the  Church  of  Scotland  also  pushed  for  changes  in  the 
law  to  prevent  such  marriages.  27  Accordingly,  one  of  the  aims  of  the  Kilbrandon 
Committee  was  to  reduce  the  number  of  couples  coming  to  Scotland  to  marry 
without  parental  consent28  and  the  result  was  the  Marriage  (Scotland)  Act  1977.29 
24  Hoy  v  Hoy,  supra;  Pease  v  Pease  1967  SC  112. 
25  1959  SC  43. 
26  Mr  G.  M.  Thomson,  HC  Debs  vol  570,  col  1008. 
27  Anton  &  Francescakis,  "Modern  Scots'runaway  marriages"',  255-256. 
28  The  Kilbrandon  Report,  pp  29-30  &  32. 
29  1977,  c.  15.  As  well  as  dealing  with  the  domestic  law  of  marriage  the  Act  also  has  provisions 
which  touch  upon  international  private  law  matters.  It  provides  that  no  Scots  domiciliary  may 
marry,  and  no  foreign  domiciliary  may  marry  in  Scotland,  if  he  or  she  is  below  a  certain  age  or 
if  the  parties  are  within  certain  prohibited  degrees  of  relationship  (ibid.,  ssl  &  2).  A 
requirement  is  introduced  for  a  certificate  confirming  capacity  for  those  domiciled  in  a 
politically  foreign  country  (ibid.,  s3(5)).  It  is  also  confirmed  that  a  legal  impediment  to 
marriage  in  Scotland  exists  if  such  a  marriage  would  be  void  ab  initio  by  the  law  of  a  party  to 
the  marriage  (that  party  being  a  foreign  domiciliary)  (s5(4)(f)).  In  fact,  however,  in  1969,  the 
law  in  England  was  changed,  so  that  parental  consent  was  only  needed  up  to  the  age  of  18, 
rather  than  21  (Family  Law  Reform  Act  1969,  c.  46,  s2(1)(c)),  and  there  were  also  changes  to 
the  requirement  for  parental  consent  in  other  jurisdictions,  which  eased  the  perceived  problem 
(annotations  by  M.  C.  Meston  to  the  Marriage  (Scotland)  Act  1977).  Indeed,  a  certificate 
confirming  capacity  to  marry  is  not  required  if  the  party  is  domiciled  in  another  part  of  the  UK 
75 Again,  the  Westminster  Parliament  had  attempted  to  remove  a  problem  from  the 
sphere  of  international  private  law,  to  resolve  it  on  its  own  terms. 
UK  common  market  law 
Introduction  and  back  rý  ound 
One  of  the  areas  reserved  to  the  UK  Parliament  at  Westminster  under  the 
devolution  settlement  was  the  law  relating  to  "Common  markets  for  UK  goods 
and  services",  30  dubbed  by  MacQueen  "common  market  lawi31  (an  allusion  to  the 
UK,  not  the  European,  common  market).  This  was  said  by  the  White  Paper  to 
encompass  "the  law  on  companies  and  business  associations,  insurance,  corporate 
insolvency  and  intellectual  property,  regulation  of  financial  institutions  and 
financial  services,  competition  policy  ...  consumer  protection".  32  It  is  submitted 
that  the  reservation  of  this  area  to  the  UK  Parliament  is  significant,  since  this  is 
also  the  area  where  the  internalisation  of  conflicts  has  been  most  apparent. 
Whilst  debates  rage  about  the  real  importance  of  arguments  based  on  trade  in 
achieving  the  passing  of  the  Acts  of  Union,  33  Lord  Hope  of  Craighead  records 
how  the  Union  has  been  seen  as  a  significant  stage  "in  the  long  story  of  Scotland's 
absorption  into  a  wider  Britain,  which  created  an  Anglo-Scottish  common  market 
that  was  the  biggest  customs-free  zone  in  Europe  and  gave  Scotland  access  to  one 
of  the  largest  empires  in  the  world".  34  Levack  stresses  how  unusual  such  an 
arrangement  was  in  Europe  at  that  time.  35  In  seventeenth  century  Great  Britain, 
those  in  power  believed  that  "trade  and  patriotism  were  inseparably  linked".  36 
Colley  has  explored  the  extent  to  which  participation  in  the  Empire  by  Scots  was 
(Marriage  (Scotland)  Act  1977,  s3(5)(d),  and  see  E.  M.  Clive,  "The  Marriage  (Scotland)  Act 
1977"  1977  SLT  (News)  213  &  225  at  229). 
30  "Scotland's  Parliament",  para  3.3.  Note  too  in  the  Canadian  case  of  Hunt  v  T&N  plc,  the 
reference  to  "the  common  market  created  by  the  union"  (Hunt  v  T&N  plc  [1993]  4  SCR  289 
per  La  Forest  J  at  322  (and  see  also  ibid.  per  La  Forest  J  at  330). 
31  H.  L.  MacQueen,  "The  Scotland  Bill  and  private  law"  1998  Scotland  Forum  (Issue  2)  3. 
32  "Scotland's  Parliament",  para  3.3. 
33  See  Riley,  The  Union  of  England  and  Scotland,  Chap  6;  Levack,  The  Formation  of  the  British 
State:  England,  Scotland  and  the  Union  1603-1707,  Chap  5. 
34  Lord  Gray's  Motion  2000  SC  (HL)  46  per  Lord  Hope  of  Craighead  at  55-56;  and  see  Levack, 
The  Formation  of  the  British  State:  England,  Scotland  and  the  Union  1603-1707,  p138. 
35  Levack,  The  Formation  of  the  British  State:  England,  Scotland  and  the  Union  1603-1707, 
pp167-168. 
36  L.  Colley,  Britons:  Forging  the  Nation  1707-1837,2  °d  Pimlico  edn.  (Pimlico,  2003),  p120. 
76 important  in  the  development  of  a  British  identity.  37  The  Empire,  it  should  be 
noted,  was  always  clearly  described  as  British  rather  than  English.  38  Indeed, 
recent  studies  have  convincingly  argued  that  Scots  were  often  at  the  forefront  of 
the  many  manifestations  of  the  Empire,  and  some  have  spoken  of  a  Scottish 
Empire.  9  Colley  concludes  that  "The  Scots,  in  particular,  ... 
became  British  after 
1707  in  part  because  it  paid  such  enormous  commercial  and  imperial 
dividends".  40 
However,  this  close  relationship  for  Scots  between  Britain,  and  commerce  or 
trade,  has  had  an  effect  on  Scots  law.  Miller  goes  so  far  as  to  state  that  "in 
mercantile  law  the  laws  of  the  three  countries  have  been  so  much  assimilated  that 
conflicts  do  not  arise".  41  In  the  seventeenth  century  the  English  law  of  insurance 
became  of  great  authority  in  Scotland,  and  English  barristers  would  sometimes  be 
consulted  on  this  matter.  42  The  succession  of  Companies  Acts  have  governed, 
and  govern,  companies  both  in  Scotland,  and  in  England  and  Wales. 
Furthermore,  it  has  been  said  that  "it  is  clearly  desirable  that  the  construction  of 
statutes  which  affect  the  United  Kingdom  should  be  the  same  both  north  and 
south  of  the  border,  particularly  statutes  such  as  the  Companies  Act".  3  In  such  a 
scheme  little  room  is  left  for  the  application  of  rules  of  international  private  law.  44 
It  is  interesting  that  both  the  growth  of  the  company  as  a  commercial  institution, 
and  legal  regulation  of  such  bodies,  are  features  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
45  which 
was  also  a  time  of  industrial  pre-eminence,  and  of  Empire.  The  nineteenth 
century  also  saw  the  passing  of  the  Partnership  Act  1890,46  and  the  Sale  of  Goods 
Act  189347  (the  latter  area  now  governed  by  the  Sale  of  Goods  Act  1979,48  as 
3,  Ibid.,  p130;  see  also  D.  W.  Urwin,  "Territorial  Structures  and  Political  Developments  in  the 
United  Kingdom"  in  S.  Rokkan  &  D.  N.  Urwin  (cds),  The  Politics  of  Territorial  Identity: 
Studies  In  European  Regionalism  (Sage  Publications,  1982),  p19  at  37. 
33  Colley,  Britau,  p130;  "Death  and  the  Reinvention  of  Scotland",  lecture  given  by  T.  Devine, 
Glasgow,  9  April  2003. 
39  M.  Fry,  Tue  Scottish  Empire  (Tuckwcll  Press  &  Birlinn,  2001);  T.  Devine,  Scotland's  Empire 
1600-1815  (Penguin,  2003);  Welsh,  The  Four  Nations,  p246. 
40  Colley,  Britons,  p374  cf  Devine,  Scotland's  Empire,  pp62-63. 
Aliller,  The  Law  of  Nature  and  Nations  in  Scotland,  pp125-126. 
Cairns,  "Historical  introduction",  ppl6l-162. 
43  Inland  Revenue  v  Highland  Engineering  Ltd  1975  SLT  203  per  Lord  Grieve  at  205. 
"  Indeed  international  private  law  rules  were  not  considered  in  the  apparently  UK  cross-border 
case  of  Afacc  Builders  (Glasgow)  Ltd  v  Lunn  [  1987]  BCLC  55. 
4sS.  Griffin,  Company  Law:  Fundamental  Principles,  3`J  cdn.  (Longman,  2000),  pp3-9. 
76  1890  (53  &  54  Viet),  c.  39. 
47  1893  (56  &  57  Viet),  c.  71. 
77 amended).  As  a  result,  partnership  law  and  the  law  of  sale  are,  in  effect,  governed 
by  statutory  codes,  which  apply  to  the  UK  as  a  whole,  and  largely  harmonise  the 
substantive  law  of  its  jurisdictions.  49  The  Bills  of  Exchange  Act  1882 
distinguishes  between  inland  (or  UK)  bills,  and  foreign  bills,  50  and  also  between 
inland  and  foreign  promissory  notes,  51  although  the  distinction  is  of  little 
consequence  in  practical  terms.  The  major  taxes,  such  as  income  tax,  also  apply 
in  both  Scotland  and  England.  In  the  field  of  insolvency  law,  the  Cork 
Committee  argued  that  the  insolvency  systems  within  the  UK  were  not 
sufficiently  harmonised.  S2  In  the  context  of  discussing  the  (then)  European 
Economic  Community,  the  Committee  noted  "we  are  convinced  that  the  ultimate 
hannonisation  of  insolvency  laws  in  a  trading  community  is  essential". 
53  In 
addition  to  Victorian,  and  British,  ideals  of  free  trade  and  expansive  commerce, 
there  is  now  a  newer  principle  at  work,  which  can  be  described  as  paternalistic,  or 
consumerist.  In  the  modern  age  of  large  multinational  corporations,  business  can 
be  characterised  not  as  agreements  between  parties  of  equal  bargaining  power,  but 
in  terms  of  big  business  and  consumers.  In  such  a  climate,  governments 
formulate  policies  to  protect  the  weaker  party,  for  example,  to  prevent  the 
imposition  of  unfair  contracts,  54  or  mis-selling  of  financial  products,  or  to  protect 
the  public  from  unscrupulous  traders.  55  It  is  difficult  for  a  government  with 
power  over  the  UK  as  a  whole  to  justify  not  extending  consumer  protection 
measures  to  all  parts  of  the  country,  notwithstanding  the  different  legal  systems 
which  obtain  in  its  component  parts.  Indeed  it  has  been  argued  that  even  on  a 
global  level,  private  international  law  "has  proved  inadequate  for  consumer 
56  laws". 
't  1979,  c.  54. 
49  l  lowevcr,  harmonisation  of  the  law  of  sale  by  nineteenth  century  legislation  was  at  the  expense 
of  the  old  Scots  rules  (R.  Brown,  Treatise  on  the  Sale  of  Goods,  2d  cdn.  (W.  Green,  1911), 
so 
pp2-4). 
1882  (45  &  46  Viet),  c.  61,  s4. 
s2  Ibid.,  s83(4). 
s=  Insolvency  Law  and  Practice  (Cmnd  8558)  (1982)  ('The  Cork  Report"),  paras  1903-1904. 
s'  Ibid.,  para  1921. 
s'  For  example,  the  Unfair  Contract  Terms  Act  1977,  c.  50,  in  respect  of  exemption  clauses. 
ss  This  could  influence,  for  example,  the  rules  on  insolvency,  and  breach  of  directors'  duties. 
56  N.  Cox,  "The  extraterritorial  enforcement  of  consumer  legislation  and  the  challenge  of  the 
intcrnet"  (20(4)  8  EdinLR  60  at  61. 
78 In  addition  to  actual  harmonisation  of  substantive  laws,  however,  it  is  submitted 
that  there  has  also  been  much  internalisation  of  conflicts  in  UK  common  market 
law,  and  some  examples  of  this  in  the  context  of  insolvency  law  will  be  examined 
in  turn.  57 
Intenialising  conflicts  in  IJK  insolvency  legislation 
Individual  insolvency 
To  take  as  a  starting  point  the  insolvency  of  an  individual,  an  earlier  consolidating 
statute,  the  Bankruptcy  (Scotland)  Act  1913  provided  that  the  notour  bankruptcy 
of  a  person  would  be  established  in  Scots  law,  inter  alia,  by  the  granting  of  a 
receiving  order  in  England  or  Ireland.  58  In  terms  of  the  Bankruptcy  (Scotland) 
Act  1985,  apparent  insolvency  (which  will  trigger  sequestration)  will  be 
constituted  by,  inter  alia,  the  sequestration  of  the  person's  estate  in  England  and 
Wales  or  Northern  Ireland,  or  being  adjudged  bankrupt  in  one  of  these 
jurisdictions,  9  or  the  making  of  a  receiving  order  against  the  person  in  England 
and  Wales.  G°  The  methods  of  taking  the  creditor's  oath  depend  on  whether  or  not 
he  is  within  the  UK.  6'  A  warrant  may  be  obtained  to  arrest  the  debtor  wherever 
he  may  be  staying  in  the  UK.  62  Furthermore,  for  the  purposes  of  offences 
committed  by  debtors,  a  debtor  includes  a  person  who  has  been  adjudged 
bankrupt  in  England  and  Wales.  63  Lastly,  the  discharge  of  the  debtor  operates  so 
as  to  free  him  of  all  debts  and  obligations  in  the  UK  at  the  time  that  he  was 
sequestrated:  64  an  example,  observes  Fletcher,  of  "a  special  approach"  arising 
from  "the  constitutional  affinities  between  the  three  parts  of  the  United 
Kingdom".  65 
37  Left  aside,  for  the  moment,  in  examining  the  terms  of  the  insolvency  legislation  drawn  up  by 
the  Westminster  Parliament,  is  the  effect  of  the  new  European  Regulation  on  insolvency 
matters  (Council  Regulation  1346/2000)  which  will  be  dealt  with  in  Chap.  6. 
1913(3&4GcoV),  c.  20,  s5.  s'  1985,  c.  66,  s7(1)(a). 
60  Ibid.,  s7(1)(c)(vi). 
61  Ibid.,  sl  l(2). 
62  Ibid.,  s46(l). 
63  Ibid.,  s67(10)(ii).  This  was  not  the  case  in  some  prior  bankruptcy  legislation  (Kaye  v  HMA 
1957  JC  55). 
Bankruptcy  (Scotland)  Act  1985,  s55(1). 
as  I.  F. Fletcher,  Insolvency  in  Private  International  Law:  National  and  International  Approaches 
(Oxford  University  Press,  1999),  p109;  and  see  also  P.  StJ.  Smart,  Cross-Border  Insolvency, 
2"d  cdn.  (Buttcrworths,  1998),  pp142-143. 
79 Corporate  insolvency 
At  base,  it  has  been  argued,  there  is  a  common  approach  towards  the  conflict  rules 
of  corporate  insolvency,  different  from  that  on  the  continent.  66  Thus,  for  the 
Scottish  and  English  courts,  the  domicile  of  the  company  equates  with  the  place 
of  registration,  and  dictates  the  law  by  which  the  company  should  be  wound  up. 
lt  is  of  no  moment  that  the  company  may  latterly  have  been  run  from,  or  that 
those  in  charge  of  the  company  operate  out  of,  a  different  jurisdiction.  By 
contrast,  the  continental  approach  is  more  akin  to  a  concept  of  habitual  residence. 
The  Insolvency  Act  1986  provides  that  if  an  unregistered  company  has  its 
principal  place  of  business  in  Scotland,  and  England  and  Wales,  the  company  is 
deemed  to  be  registered  in  both  jurisdictions  for  the  purpose  of  its  winding  up.  67 
There  are  also  provisions  concerning  property  situated  in  England  and  Wales, 
belonging  to  a  company  registered  in  Scotland.  68 
In  terms  of  section  72(l)  of  the  Insolvency  Act  1986: 
"A  receiver  appointed  under  the  law  of  either  part  of  Great  Britain  in  respect  of 
the  whole  or  any  part  of  any  property  or  undertaking  of  a  company  and  in 
consequence  of  the  company  having  created  a  charge  which,  as  created,  was  a 
floating  charge  may  exercise  his  powers  in  the  other  part  of  Great  Britain  so  far 
as  their  exercise  is  not  inconsistent  with  the  law  applicable  there". 
The  wording  of  the  section  raises  a  number  of  questions  for  the  conflicts  lawyer. 
Does  the  reference  to  applicable  law  mean  simply  domestic  law,  or  does  it  include 
the  international  private  law  rules?  What  is  the  term  "not  inconsistent  with" 
intended  to  signify?  The  case  of  Gordon  Anderson  (Plant)  Ltd  v  Cainpsie 
Construction  Ltd  &  Anglo  Scottish  Plant  Ltd69  concerned  a  forerunner  of  section 
72:  section  15(4)  of  the  Companies  (Floating  Charges  and  Receivers)  (Scotland) 
66  J.  13.  St  Clair  &  J.  E.  Drummond  Young,  The  Law  of  Corporate  Insolvency  in  Scotland,  2"d  edn. 
61 
(ßutcrworths,  1992),  pp383-364. 
s221(3)(b). 
as  Ibid.,  s128(2). 
69  1977  S  LT  7. 
80 Act  197270  However,  section  15(4)  restricted  the  powers  of  the  receiver  to  "such 
part  of  that  property  as  is  attached".  The  case  was  therefore  largely  concerned 
with  the  argument  (ultimately  unsuccessful)  that  the  appointment  of  a  receiver  to 
an  English  company  did  not  cause  the  floating  charge  to  attach  to  Scottish 
property.  On  this  view,  since  the  charge  had  not  attached,  the  section  could  be  of 
no  assistance  to  the  English  receiver.  At  first  instance,  the  sheriff  did  suggest  that 
"[i]t  may  well  be  that  some  receivers  to  companies  incorporated  in  England  have 
powers  in  relation  to  property  there  which  would  be  wholly  inappropriate  for 
them  to  have  in  relation  to  property  in  Scotland",  71  but  he  does  not  give  examples 
of  what  such  powers  might  be.  Some  light  was  eventually  thrown  on  the  matter 
by  Norfolk  House  plc  (in  receivership)  v  Repsol  Petroleum  Ltd.  72  Giving  an  oral 
judgment  from  the  Bench,  Lord  Penrose 
"said  that  the  intent  and  effect  of  s.  72  of  the  1986  Act  was  the  same  as  the 
earlier  statutory  provision  which  had  been  discussed  in  the  Gordon  Anderson 
(Plant)  Ltd.  case,  which  was  to  see  that  cross  border  procedural  problems  in 
receivership  were  limited  as  much  as  possible.  Section  72  bridged  the 
transaction  from  the  original  creation  of  the  floating  charge  to  the  appointment 
of  the  receiver  in  order  to  ensure  that  a  receiver  could  exercise  his  powers 
under  Sched.  1  to  the  1986  Act  in  relation  to  Scottish  property  untrammelled 
by  Scottish  conveyancing  and  property  law".  73 
Thus  it  would  seem  that,  although  referring  to  the  applicable  law,  section  72  is 
concerned  only  with  domestic  law,  and  that  the  section  simply  sets  out  to 
establish  a  further  special  UK  rule:  in  this  instance  to  ease  the  cross-border  use  of 
powers  by  receivers. 
Section  426  of  the  Insolvency  Act  1986 
A  further  provision  of  the  Insolvency  Act  1986,  however,  makes  an  explicit,  if 
hard  to  fathom,  reference  to  international  private  law.  Section  426(1)  provides  for 
70  1972,  c.  67. 
71  1977SLT7at9. 
72  1992  SLT  235. 
71  Ibid.  at  236-237 
81 the  automatic  enforcement  in  the  UK  of  orders  regarding  insolvency.  74  Smart 
argues  convincingly  that  such  enforcement  must  be  through  a  court  in  the  part  of 
the  UK  where  an  order  is  sought  to  be  put  into  effect.  75  Section  426(4)  dictates 
that  UK  courts  "shall  assist  the  courts  having  the  corresponding  jurisdiction  in  any 
other  part  of  the  United  Kingdom  or  any  relevant  country  or  territory".  76  In  doing 
so,  section  426(5)  allows  the  court: 
"to  apply  ...  the  insolvency  law  which  is  applicable  by  either  court  in  relation 
to  comparable  matters  falling  within  its  jurisdiction. 
In  exercising  its  discretion  under  this  subsection,  a  court  shall  have  regard 
in  particular  to  the  rules  of  private  international  law". 
A  prior  provision,  section  117  of  the  Bankruptcy  Act  1883,77  was  not  sufficient  to 
assist  an  English  House  of  Lords  in  Galbraith  v  Grimshaw.  78  In  this  case  a 
Scottish  money  decree  had  been  extended  into  England,  and  an  appropriate  order 
served  by  the  holder  of  the  decree  on  a  firm  who  owed  a  sum  of  money  to  the 
debtor.  Subsequently,  the  debtor  was  sequestrated  in  Scotland,  and  the  entire 
estate  of  the  debtor,  wherever  it  may  be,  was  purportedly  vested  in  the  trustee.  A 
dispute  then  arose  between  the  trustee  and  the  holder  of  the  decree:  it  was  found 
that  the  latter  had  successfully  attached  the  debt  held  by  the  English  firm.  It  was 
acknowledged  frankly  that  this  would  not  have  been  the  outcome  if  it  had  been  an 
79  English  bankruptcy,  or  if  the  attachment  had  been  in  Scotland.  Furthermore,  it 
was  conceded  that: 
"It  may  have  been  intended  by  the  Legislature  that  bankruptcy  in  one  part  of 
the  United  Kingdom  should  produce  the  same  consequences  throughout  the 
whole  kingdom.  But  the  Legislature  has  not  said  so.  The  Act  does  not  say  that 
74  There  is  an  exception  regarding  heritage,  and  a  power  to  make  regulations  to  apply  the  general 
rule  in  this  area  has  not  been  acted  upon  (s426(2),  (3));  see  Fletcher,  Insolvency  in  Private 
International  Law,  pp64-65  &  100. 
75  Smart,  Cross-Border  Insolvency,  pp213-215. 
76  Either  in  response  to  a  request  from  the  other  court,  or  a  claim  to  property  submitted  by  a 
trustee  or assignee  (s426(6)). 
77  1883  (46  &  47  Viet),  c.  52.  This  section  allowed  Scottish  court  orders  in  bankruptcy  matters  to 
be  enforced  in  England,  and  vice  versa. 
78  [1910]  AC  508. 
79  Ibid.  per  Lord  Macnaghten  at  511. 
82 a  Scotch  sequestration  shall  have  effect  in  England  as  if  it  were  an  English 
bankruptcy  of  the  same  date.  It  only  says  that  the  Courts  of  the  different  parts 
of  the  United  Kingdom  shall  severally  act  in  aid  of  and  be  auxiliary  to  each 
other  in  all  matters  of  bankruptcy".  80 
In  Scotland,  however,  later  courts  have  been  prepared  to  offer  far-reaching 
assistance  under  section  426,  without  such  clarity  of  wording  as  Lord  Macnaghten 
seemed  to  believe  might  be  necessary.  Thus  a  Scottish  liquidator  was  appointed 
in  the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce  International  case  at  the  request  of  an 
English  court,  although  no  Scottish  winding  up  was  in  existence.  81  The  Keeper  of 
the  Registers  has  been  given  authority  to  allow  the  cancelling  out  of  a  transaction 
concerning  Scottish  heritage  at  the  behest  of  an  English  court.  82  Indeed,  Aird  and 
Jamieson  suggest  that  as  far  as  the  Scottish  courts  are  concerned,  "there  are 
examples  where  the  degree  of  assistance  may  have  extended  beyond  the  confines 
83  of  established  principle  and  authority"  . 
But  what  of  the  exhortation  to  have  regard  to  rules  of  private  international  law? 
The  view  of  Aird  and  Jamieson  is  that  the  section  "invites  the  court  to  make  a 
choice  of  law  in  cross-border  insolvencies".  84  However,  Fletcher  notes  that  whilst 
this  may  have  been  what  was  envisaged  by  the  legislature,  it  is  only  one  of  two 
possible  ways  of  reading  section  426(5).  85  In  practice,  the  English  courts  have 
applied  Irish  law  on  one  occasion,  since  there  was  no  mechanism  for  putting  in 
place  a  particular  scheme  under  English  law.  86  However,  in  another  case,  an 
English  court  would  not  give  effect  to  Australian  law,  because  English  law  came 
80  Ibid.  per  Lord  Macnaghten  at  511-512.  Lord  Dunedin  noted  the  ability  of  the  Westminster 
Parliament  to  pass  suitable  legislation  to  remedy  the  situation  (ibid.  at  513).  Both  Fletcher  and 
Smart  are  of  the  view  that  the  wording  of  s426  would  not  necessitate  the  same  result,  were  the 
case  to  be  decided  today  (Fletcher,  Insolvency  in  Private  International  Law,  p101;  Smart, 
Cross-Border  Insolvency,  pp216-217). 
$t  BCCI,  unreported,  1991  &  1992,  but  noted  in  St  Clair  &  Drummond  Young,  The  Law  of 
Corporate  Insolvency  in  Scotland,  p409. 
82  Carman,  Petr,  unreported,  April  1995,  but  noted  in  R.  E.  Aird  &  J.  N.  StC.  Jamieson,  The  Scots 
Dimension  to  Cross-Border  Litigation  (W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  1996),  paras  21.42-21.43. 
83  Aird  &  Jamieson,  The  Scots  Dimension  to  Cross-Border  Litigation,  para  21.42;  and  see  also 
St  Clair  &  Drummond  Young,  The  Law  of  Corporate  Insolvency  in  Scotland,  p410. 
84  Aird  &  Jamieson,  The  Scots  Dimension  to  Cross-Border  Litigation,  para  21.44. 
85  Fletcher,  Insolvency  in  Private  International  Law,  ppl94-195. 
86  Re  Business  City  Express  Ltd  [1997]  2  BCLC  510  (although  see  Smart,  Cross-Border 
Insolvency,  p415). 
83 to  a  quite  opposite  result,  based  on  reasons  of  policy.  87  However,  it  does  not 
seem  that  these  decisions  as  to  which  law  to  apply  are  the  product  of  a  strict 
application  of  rules  of  international  private  law.  The  fact  that  English  law  would 
have  reached  a  different  result,  for  example,  should  not  necessarily  prevent  the 
application  of  English  law.  Dawson  admits  that  the  wording  of  the  section  is 
somewhat  obscure.  88  The  Cork  Committee  seemed  to  suggest  that  the  immediate 
predecessor  of  section  426  was  to  be  read  in  the  context  of  private  international 
law,  thus  transposing  the  revenue  law  exception  into  the  statute.  89  It  is  submitted 
that  once  again  section  426(4),  (5)  is  intended  to  introduce  a  special  rule  between 
Scotland  and  England  in  insolvency  law.  90  It  attempts,  for  example,  to  iron  out 
procedural  differences  between  the  two  jurisdictions,  by  allowing  the  courts  to 
take  a  very  flexible  approach,  rather  than  be  bound  by  the  detailed  rules  of 
international  private  law.  It  is  recognised,  however,  that  some  reference  to  the 
broad  principles  of  the  subject  may  assist  a  judge  in  deciding  when  it  may  be 
appropriate  to  turn  to  a  foreign  law  to  assist  in  the  aims  of  the  bankruptcy.  91  This 
is  supported,  it  is  submitted,  by  the  view  of  the  English  judge  Rattee  J.  that: 
"this  court  should  exercise  its  discretion  in  favour  of  giving  the  particular 
assistance  requested  ...  unless  there  is  some  good  reason  for  not  doing  so.  As 
the  concluding  words  of  s426(5)  make  clear,  one  such  reason  could  in  some 
cases  be  found  in  the  rules  of  private  international  law,  "  92 
The  fate  of  property  law  principles  under  common  market  law 
The  strength  of  the  internalising  drive  in  the  field  of  common  market  law  is,  it  is 
submitted,  plain  from  the  outcome  when  differing  Scottish  and  English  property 
87  Re  J.  N.  Taylor  Finance  Ltd,  England  v  Purves  [1998]  BPIR  347;  and  sec  the  criticisms  in 
Smart,  Cross-Border  Insolvency,  pp418-419. 
88  K.  Dawson,  "International  co-operation  under  section  426  of  the  Insolvency  Act  1986:  recent 
developments"  1999  (4)  Palmner's  in  company  I  at  3;  sec  also  R.  E.  Aird,  "Winding  up  across 
the  legal  borders  of  the  United  Kingdom  -  and  beyond"  1997  SLT  (News)  241  at  242. 
89  The  Cork  Report,  para  1910  (discussing  Bankruptcy  Act  1914  (4  &5  Geo  V),  c.  59,  s122);  and 
see  Smart's  suggestion  that  considerations  of  public  policy,  or  the  revenue  law  exception,  as 
well  as  other  factors,  could  influence  the  exercise  of  discretion  under  s426  (Smart,  Cross- 
Border  Insolvency,  p417). 
90  The  section  can  also  be  applied  with  respect  to  certain  foreign  countries  specified  in  secondary 
legislation. 
91  Thus,  an  ability  to  take  into  account  a  number  of  matters,  including  international  private  law 
rules,  in  deciding  which  law  is  to  be  applied,  is  the  second  possible  reading  of  s426(5)  noted 
by  Fletcher  (Fletcher,  Insolvency  in  Private  International  Law,  p195). 
92  Re  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce  International  SA  (No  9)  [1994]  2  BCLC  636  at  657-658. 
84 laws  seem  to  create  a  friction  in  commercial  transactions.  These  situations  often 
involve  security  over  property.  Gretton  has  noted  that  the  UK: 
"is  a  financial  market  with  a  high  degree  of  unity  but  a  lower  degree  of  legal 
unity.  If  secured  lending  were  to  be  substantially  more  difficult  in  Scotland 
than  in  England  it  is  arguable  that  financial  institutions  would  shift  their 
lending  from  Scotland  to  England.  Or  they  would  lend  in  Scotland  only  at 
higher  average  interest  levels,  in  order  to  compensate  for  the  increased  risk  that 
a  lower  degree  of  security  would  entail  ... 
Why  should  credit  be  more 
expensive  to  Scottish  businesses  than  to  English  ones?  ... 
One  cannot  treat  the 
Scottish  economy  in  isolation".  93 
It  is  submitted  that  such  fears94  have  been  crucial  in  developing  the  law,  when 
property  law  principles  and  commercial  transactions  overlap.  Thus,  as  will  be 
demonstrated  by  reference  to  the  law  relating  to  floating  charges,  retention  of  title 
clauses  and  security  over  moveable  property,  international  private  law  solutions 
which  protected  the  fabric  of  Scots  property  law  have  been  rejected  in  favour  of 
commercially-driven  internalising  solutions. 
Floating  charges 
A  floating  charge  is  a  form  of  security  which,  on  the  appointment  of  a  receiver, 
will  attach  to  all  assets  within  its  scope.  The  charges  do  not  appear  in  the  Register 
of  Sasines  or  the  Land  Register.  In  the  context  of  English  property  law,  which 
recognises  many  unregistered  rights,  such  a  form  of  security  is  unremarkable.  It 
was,  however,  an  anathema  to  many  Scots  lawyers,  and  it  was  not  possible  to 
create  such  a  charge  in  Scotland  prior  to  1961.95  The  cross-border  effect  of  a 
floating  charge  came  before  the  First  Division  in  the  case  of  Carse  v  Coppen.  96  A 
company  registered  in  Scotland  had  purported  to  create  a  charge  over  its  assets  in 
93  G.  L.  Gretton,  "The  Reform  of  Moveable  Security  Law"  1999  SLT  (News)  301  at  304. 
94  Although  see  J.  Hamilton  et  al.,  Business  Finance  and  Security  over  Moveable  Property 
(Scottish  Executive  Central  Research  Unit,  2002),  which  suggests  that  these  fears  may  not  be 
justified,  at  least  insofar  as  Small  and  Medium  sized  Scottish  Enterprises  are  concerned. 
95  Collins  characterises  Scots  law  prior  to  1961  as  "positively  hostile"  to  the  concept  of  the 
floating  charge  (L.  Collins,  "Floating  Charges,  Receivers  and  Managers  and  the  Conflict  of 
Laws"  in  Essays  in  International  Litigation  and  the  Conflict  of  Laws  (Oxford  University  Press, 
1996),  p433  at  439). 
96  1951  SC  233. 
85 Scotland  and  England.  It  was  accepted  at  the  outset  that  the  floating  charge  was 
ineffective  as  regards  the  Scottish  property.  Lord  Keith  was  of  the  view  that  the 
floating  charge  should  be  enforceable  in  England  in  respect  of  the  assets  there.  97 
However,  his  opinion  was  a  dissenting  one,  the  majority  opinion  thus  constituting 
one  of  the  few  occasions  on  which  another  law  was  preferred  to  the  lex  situs.  98 
Lords  Carmont  and  Russell  queried  whether  there  may  be  circumstances  in  which 
a  Scottish  company  could  create  such  a  security  over  English  assets,  but  were  of 
the  opinion  that  the  charge  in  the  instant  case  was  ineffective  99  Lord  President 
Cooper,  however,  could  not  conceive  of  any  such  eventuality.  He  remarked 
obiter  that  "it  is  clear  in  principle  and  amply  supported  by  authority  that  a  floating 
charge  is  utterly  repugnant  to  the  principles  of  Scots  law  and  is  not  recognised  by 
us  as  creating  a  security  at  all".  100  However,  commercial  pressure  led  to  the 
introduction  of  floating  charges  into  Scots  law  under  the  Companies  (Floating 
Charges)  (Scotland)  Act  1961.101  Rules  of  international  private  law  could  no 
longer  be  used  as  a  barrier  to  the  concept  and  effectiveness  of  a  floating  charge  or, 
indeed,  to  provide  any  other  solution  to  this  clash  between  the  different 
underlying  principles  of  Scots  and  English  property  law.  Arguably,  however,  the 
legislation  which  removed  the  problem  of  floating  charges  from  the  arena  of 
international  private  law,  simply  transferred  the  friction  between  the  charges  and 
Scottish  property  law  rules  into  a  domestic  setting.  This  came  to  somewhat  of  a 
head  in  the  case  of  Sharp  v  Thon:  son102  which,  as  Gordon  comments,  "illustrates 
clearly  how  unsatisfactory  it  was  to  introduce  a  form  of  security  over  land  which 
becomes  real  without  recording  or  registration  as  required  for  other  heritable 
securities". 
103 
Retention  of  title  clauses 
Under  Scots  domestic  law  it  was  clear  that  it  was  perfectly  legitimate  for  a  seller 
to  insist  on  a  simple  retention  of  title  clause,  which  meant  that  the  buyer  would 
97  Ibid.  at  247. 
98  Crawford,  International  Private  Lawv,  para  14.11. 
99  Carse  v  Copper:  1951  SC  233  per  Lord  Carmont  at  242-244;  per  Lord  Russell  at  244. 
ioo  Ibid.  at  239;  for  a  criticism  of  Lord  President  Cooper's  conclusion  see  Collins,  "Floating 
Charges",  pp442-443. 
101  1961,  c.  46. 
102  1997  SC  (HL)  66. 
103  W.  M.  Gordon,  Scottish  Land  Law,  2  °d  edn.  (W.  Green,  1999),  para  20-206. 
86 not  become  the  owner  of  the  property  in  question  until  he  had  paid  for  it. 
However,  in  other  jurisdictions,  including  England,  it  was  possible  to  insist  upon 
a  more  far-reaching  type  of  retention  clause,  by  which  the  buyer  did  not  become 
owner  of  the  goods  until  he  had  paid  all  sums  owing  to  the  seller  from  any 
transactions  between  them  (often  therefore  described  as  'all  sums'  retention  of  title 
clauses).  104  Again  this  causes  no  difficulty  of  principle  in  England,  but  in 
Scotland  was  regarded  as  tantamount  to  allowing  a  security  to  be  constituted  over 
moveables  without  possession.  For  Smith,  the  concept  was  "contrary  to  the 
principles  of  Scots  law".  105  Must  such  clauses  be  afforded  recognition  under  the 
rules  of  international  private  law  when  purportedly  imposed  by  a  foreign  seller? 
Many  of  the  cases,  which  came  before  the  courts  in  quick  succession,  involved 
German  sellers.  But  the  issue  was  no  less  thorny  in  a  UK  cross-border  setting.  In 
Emerald  Stainless  Steel  Ltd  v  South  Side  Distribution  Ltd106  there  were  no 
averments  as  to  the  content  of  English  law,  which  was  therefore  presumed  to  be 
the  same  as  Scots  law.  Consequently,  Lord  Ross  found  the  'all  sums'  retention  of 
title  clause  to  be  "contrary  to  principle".  107  Averments  as  to  West  German  law, 
under  which  such  clauses  were  enforceable,  were  made  in  Hammer  and  Solute  v 
HWTRealisations  Ltd.  108  The  sheriff,  however,  found  that  the  issue  was  one  for 
the  lex  situs,  which  he  considered  to  be  Scots  law,  and  thus  the  clause  did  not 
have  its  intended  effect.  He  appeared  also  to  be  mindful  of  considerations  of 
public  policy,  referring  to  dicta  that  "an  agreement  which  was  opposed  to  a 
fundamental  principle  of  the  Law  of  Scotland  founded  on  considerations  of  public 
policy  could  not  be  relied  upon  and  insisted  upon  in  the  Courts  of  Scotland".  109  It 
seemed  that  the  Scottish  courts  were  nearing  the  point  where  they  might  have  to 
declare  a  clause,  routine  under  English  law,  unenforceable  in  Scotland  as  contrary 
to  public  policy.  Once  more,  however,  the  issue  was  removed  from  the  sphere  of 
international  private  law,  by  means  of  an  apparent  change  in  Scots  domestic  law, 
on  this  occasion  effected  by  the  House  of  Lords.  In  Armour  v  Thyssen 
104  For  a  discussion  of  the  different  types  of  Romalpa  clauses  sec  M.  Sweeney,  "The 
rationalisation  of  the  Romalpa  clause  within  the  framework  of  the  Scottish  law  of  property  and 
obligations"  1987  JR  62. 
los  T.  B.  Smith,  "Retention  of  title:  Lord  Watson's  legacy"  1983  SLT  (News)  105  at  105. 
106  1982  SC  61. 
107  Ibid.  at  64. 
108  1985  SLT  (Sh  Ct)  21. 
109  Ibid.  at  23. 
87 Edelstahlwerke  AG11°  their  Lordships  took  the  view  that  'all  sums'  retention  of 
title  clauses  did  not  constitute  a  security  over  moveables  without  possession.  On 
a  true  construction  of  the  contract,  there  could  not  be  held  to  have  been 
constituted  a  type  of  security  unacceptable  to  Scots  law:  since  property  in  the 
goods  remained  with  the  seller  until  all  debts  due  to  him  had  been  paid,  the  buyer 
had  merely  possession  and  not  ownership  of  the  steel  in  question,  and  had  no 
capacity  to  grant  a  security  over  it.  "'  Since  the  clauses  then  became  effective 
domestically,  the  international  private  law  dimension  disappeared.  For  Miller 
"[t]he  development  seems  to  reflect  the  claimed  interests  of  commerce  leading  but 
the  law  hesitating  in  its  response  because  of  concern  to  maintain  the  integrity  of 
established  principles  of  property".  112 
Security  over  incorporeal  moveable  property 
Commercial  interests  within  the  UK  may  be  attracted  to  the  English  methods  of 
creating  a  security  over  what  would  be  described  in  Scotland  as  incorporeal 
moveable  property.  In  England  it  may  be  possible  to  effect  such  a  security 
without  parting  with  ownership  of  the  asset,  nor  intimation  being  required.  By 
contrast,  in  Scotland,  the  main  method  of  creating  such  a  security  remains  the 
device  of  assignation.  In  this,  once  again,  can  be  seen  the  importance  attached  in 
Scots  law  to  public  transparency,  set  against  the  flexible  approach  to  property 
rights  characteristic  of  the  English  system.  In  the  field  of  intellectual  property, 
Guthrie  and  Orr  have  sought  to  argue  that  an  English  company  lending  to  a  Scots 
firm  could  secure  the  investment  by  way  of  an  English-style  security  over 
intellectual  property.  113  They  accept,  however,  that  there  is  dissent  as  to  how 
reliable  such  a  security  would  be  in  the  event  of  the  Scottish  firm  going  into 
receivership  or  liquidation.  Similarly,  Sellar  has  submitted  that  English  forms  of 
security  could  be  used  in  certain  situations  in  relation  to  patents,  but  admits  that 
the  position  is  unclear  should  the  company  become  insolvent.  114  Recent  research 
suggested  that  practitioners  in  Scotland  would  arrange  for  a  particular  incorporeal 
asset  of  a  client  to  be  domiciled  in  England,  so  that  securities  permitted  under 
110  1990  SLT  891. 
I  Ibid.  per  Lord  Keith  of  Kinkel  at  894. 
112  D.  L.  C.  Miller,  Corporeal  Moveables  in  Scots  Law  (W.  Green,  1991),  p285. 
113  T.  Guthrie  &  A.  Orr,  "Fixed  security  rights  over  intellectual  property  in  Scotland"  [1996]  11 
EIPR  597  at  600-601. 
114  D.  P.  Sellar,  "Rights  in  security  over'Scottish  patents"'  1996  SLPQ  137. 
88 English  law  could  be  utilised.  "5  However,  what  is  significant,  it  is  submitted,  is 
the  commercial  response  to  the  situation.  The  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry 
produced  a  consultation  paper,  which  argued  for  the  introduction  of  a  new  type  of 
fixed  security  into  Scots  law  that  did  not  result  in  ownership  being  transferred  to 
the  security-holder.  116  Thus  far,  the  recommendations  have  not  borne  fruit. 
However,  it  would  seem  that  in  the  future  difficult  cross-border  issues  regarding 
securities  over  moveables  could  well  be  resolved,  not  by  the  application  of 
international  private  law  rules,  but  through  internalisation  of  the  conflict  whether 
by  changes  to  Scots  domestic  law  or  the  imposition  of  special  cross-border  rules. 
Conclusion 
In  all  three  of  the  areas  discussed  above,  the  strength  of  the  commercial  concerns 
bound  up  in  UK  common  market  law,  can  be  seen  by  the  importance  of  the 
property  law  principles  which  were,  however,  subordinated  to  the  drive  to 
internalise  cross-border  conflicts  within  the  UK  in  this  field. 
Break  downs  in  internalising  rules  in  UK  common  market  law 
Whilst,  however,  it  is  submitted  that  UK  common  market  law  is  an  area  which 
has  seen  much  internalisation  of  conflicts,  such  attempts  have  not  always  been 
wholly  successful. 
Thus  it  was  thought  necessary  to  make  all  those  residing  outwith  the  Court  of 
Session's  jurisdiction  ineligible  to  be  appointed  permanent  trustee  in  a 
sequestration,  "?  and  there  are,  it  is  submitted,  good  practical  reasons  for  such  a 
rule.  There  is  no  equivalent  statutory  provision  in  respect  of  liquidators,  although 
an  English  liquidator  was  removed  by  the  court  in  the  case  of  Skinner  (Hannah's 
Development  and  Finance  Corporation  Ltd).  118  Lord  Stormonth  Darling  was  of 
the  view  that  "[t]he  liquidator  is  truly  the  hand  of  the  Court",  '  19  and  thus  it  was 
1  15  Hamilton  et  al.,  Business  Finance  and  Security  over  Moveable  Property,  para  4.27. 
116  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry,  Security  over  Moveable  Property  in  Scotland:  A 
Consultation  Paper  (1994).  See  also  A.  L.  Diamond,  A  Review  of  Security  Interests  in 
Property  (1989)  on  the  view  that  the  law  on  security  for  moveable  property  should  ideally  be 
alike  in  Scotland  and  England. 
117  Bankruptcy  (Scotland)  Act  1985,  s24(2)(d). 
I18  (1898)  6  SLT  388 
119  Ibid.  at  388. 
89 preferable  that  he  should  be  in  the  court's  jurisdiction.  Whilst  the  appointment  of 
an  English  liquidator  has  been  allowed  in  some  cases,  120  it  was  frowned  upon,  and 
indeed  remains  rare  to  this  day.  121 
Furthermore,  whatever  the  intention  behind  the  rules,  poor  draughtsmanship  can 
result  in  an,  unintentional,  survival  of  rules  of  international  private  law  which  are 
used,  along  with  principles  of  statutory  interpretation  to  make  sense  of  the 
legislation.  A  good  example  of  this  is  provided  by  the  Insolvency  Act  1986.  The 
lack  of  clarity  in  the  drafting  of  section  426  has  already  been  noted.  122  Smart  has 
also  raised  concerns  about  the  fact  that  Scottish  and  English  insolvency  law,  as 
defined  for  the  purposes  of  section  426,  is  limited  to  legislative  measures,  123  thus 
taking  common  law  measures  outwith  the  assistance  provisions  of  section  426.124 
More  generally,  however,  a  Scottish,  and  an  English,  winding  up  are 
distinguished  in  the  Act,  but  then  different  sections  refer  variously  to  those 
sections  applying  to  Scotland,  or  to  property  or  events  in  Scotland,  or  the  winding 
up  of  a  company  registered  in  Scotland,  or  to  winding  up  by  the  court  in 
Scotland.  125  This  sloppiness  in  the  drafting  of  the  Act  has  been  the  subject  of,  it  is 
submitted,  justified  criticism.  126  One  particularly  troublesome  issue  is  whether 
the  provisions  which  are  said  to  apply  to  Scotland  in  respect  of  gratuitous 
alienations  and  unfair  preferences,  could  apply  to  a  transaction  entered  into  by  an 
English  company  being  wound  up  in  England,  or  could  cover  a  transaction 
entered  into  outside  Scotland  by  a  Scottish  company  being  wound  up  in  Scotland. 
In  respect  of  the  first,  there  seems  agreement  that  the  section  in  question  is  not 
habile  to  encompass  this  type  of  situation,  127  and  this  would  seem  to  be  the  correct 
approach.  The  second  matter,  for  this  writer,  must  be  resolved  through  the 
application  of  principles  of  statutory  interpretation.  This  is  no  easy  matter,  and 
120  The  Barberton  Development  Syndicate  (1898)  25  R  654. 
121  St  Clair  &  Drummond  Young,  The  Law  of  Corporate  Insolvency  in  Scotland,  p384. 
122  See  pp81-84  above. 
123  Insolvency  Act  1986,  s426(10). 
124  Smart,  Cross-Border  Insolvency,  pp412-413. 
125  See  D.  P.  Sellar,  "The  Insolvency  Act  1986  and  cross-border  winding  up:  which  law  applies 
and  where"  (1995)  40  JLSS  102. 
126  Ibid.;  Aird  &  Jamieson,  The  Scots  Dimension  to  Cross-Border  Litigation,  para  21.35;  E.  B. 
Crawford,  "A  question  of  jurisdiction  in  respect  of  sequestration:  Reid  v  Randort  Ltd,  1998 
GWD  20-1040  and  29-1504"  1999  JR  203  at  208. 
127  Sellar,  "The  Insolvency  Act  1986  and  cross-border  winding  up"  at  103;  Aird  &  Jamieson,  The 
Scots  Dimension  to  Cross-Border  Litigation,  para  21.35. 
90 the  case  of  Reid  v  Ramlort  Ltd128  illustrates  the  difficulties  which  arose  when  a 
Scottish  judicial  factor  attempted  to  challenge  a  transaction  as  a  gratuitous 
alienation  under  the  Bankruptcy  (Scotland)  Act  1985,  where  the  recipient  was 
domiciled  in  England.  What  is  significant  is  that,  despite  the  obvious  desire  to 
internalise  the  rules  referable  to  these  situations,  the  result  of  poor  legislative 
drafting  was  to  throw  practitioners  and  academics  back  onto  international  private 
law  rules,  as  well  as  the  rules  on  the  interpretation  of  statutes,  in  order  to  try  to 
make  sense  of  the  provisions.  129 
Common  market  law  on  a  larger  scale 
The  twentieth  century  saw  the  development  of  a  much  larger  economic  area, 
indeed  one  initially  often  referred  to  as  the  Common  Market,  and  now  more 
properly  as  the  European  Union.  The  effect  of  European  legislation  on  the 
international  private  law  rules  between  Scotland  and  England  will  be  examined  in 
a  later  chapter.  130  However,  what  is  interesting  to  note  in  the  present  context,  is 
the  EU  concern  that  the  lack  of  harmonisation  of  contract  laws  within  the  Union 
may  be  hampering  trade.  131  It  has  been  argued  that  such  economic  reasons  are 
being  used  to  justify  the  introduction  of  a  European  contract  law.  132  It  is 
submitted  that  this  merely  serves  to  demonstrate,  albeit  on  a  larger  scale,  the 
power  of  commerce,  and  the  ability  of  business  concerns  to  displace  traditional 
international  private  law  rules  within  a  common  market,  or  trading  area. 
Internalising  conflicts  with  administrative  rules 
In  a  number  of  areas  legislation  from  the  Westminster  Parliament  has  served  to 
remove  the  need  for  traditional  international  private  law  rules  by  the  introduction 
of  rules  for  cross-border  recognition,  enforcement  or  execution,  which  are  almost 
akin  to  administrative  procedures. 
128  1998  GWD  20-1040  &  29-1504. 
129  See  Crawford,  "A  question  of  jurisdiction". 
130  See  Chap.  6. 
131  J.  Smits,  The  Making  of  European  Private  Law:  Toward  a  Ius  Commune  Europaeum  as  a 
Mixed  Legal  System,  transl.  N.  Kornet  (Intersentia,  2002),  pp2-3;  "Discussion  Paper  on  the 
Law  of  Contract",  paper  given  by  H.  L.  MacQueen  at  Franco-British  Lawyers  Society 
Conference,  Glasgow,  19  September  2003. 
132  Eighth  Wilson  Lecture,  "Harmonisation  of  Contract  Law  in  Europe"  given  by  H.  M.  Watt, 
Edinburgh,  20  November  2003. 
91 Administration  of  the  succession 
Unlike  continental  civilian  systems,  in  which  property  usually  devolves  to  the  heir 
(or  similar)  himself,  both  Scots  and  English  law  have  a  neutral  figure  interposed, 
known  in  Scotland  as  the  executor.  133  There  are,  however,  subtle  differences  such 
as  the  power  of  personal  representatives  in  England  to  commence  ingathering  the 
estate  and  to  carry  out  certain  other  functions  prior  to  the  granting  of  probate,  in 
cases  of  testate  succession.  134  Nevertheless,  legislation  has  been  used  to  make  the 
administration  of  cross-border  estates  in  the  UK  very  much  an  administrative 
matter.  Thus  if  the  deceased  died  domiciled  in  Scotland,  the  Inventory  will  show 
estate  in  Scotland,  followed  by  estate  in  England  and  Wales,  and  Northern 
Ireland,  respectively.  Estate  from  outwith  the  UK  is  noted  after  the  summary  for 
confirmation.  The  confirmation  then  granted  gives  the  executor  sufficient  title  to 
the  property.  There  is  no  need  for  resealing,  135  nor  any  need  to  lead  evidence  in 
England  to  prove  that  the  document  is  a  Scottish  confirmation.  136  Similar  rules 
exist  in  England  to  allow  English  personal  representatives  to  deal  with  Scottish 
property  of  the  deceased.  137  In  contrast,  if  the  deceased  was  domiciled  in  a 
Commonwealth  country  or  South  Africa  at  the  time  of  his  death,  resealing  will  be 
required  before  the  personal  representative  may  deal  with  Scottish  property  of  the 
deceased.  138  If  the  deceased  was  domiciled  in  a  country  which  is  not  a  member  of 
the  Commonwealth  or  South  Africa,  then  the  resealing  procedure  is  not  available. 
In  these  circumstances,  the  foreign  executor  must  prove  his  legal  entitlement  to 
deal  with  any  asset  of  the  deceased  in  Scotland,  and  confirmation  solely  in  respect 
of  the  Scottish  asset  will  have  to  be  obtained.  139 
These  rules  (which  ante-date  modern  EU-inspired  commercially  driven 
harmonisation)  can  be  characterised  as  representing  ever-decreasing  circles  of 
convenience.  Within  the  UK,  since  there  is  much  cross-border  movement  and 
cross-border  property  holding,  it  is  felt  that  inconvenience  should  be  at  a 
133  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p648;  P.  North  &  J.  J.  Fawcett,  Cheshire 
and  North's  Private  International  Law,  130'  edn.  (Butterworths,  1999),  p975. 
134  J.  G.  Currie,  The  Confirmation  of  Executors  in  Scotland,  8`h  cdn.,  by  E.  M.  Scobbie  (W. 
Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  1995),  para  14.25. 
135  Administration  of  Estates  Act  1971,  c.  25,  sl. 
136  Ibid.,  s4(1). 
137  Ibid.,  s3. 
138  Colonial  Probates  Act  1892  (55  &  56  Viet),  c.  6. 
139  Currie,  Confirmation,  paras  14.12-14.13. 
92 minimum:  recognition  of  confirmation-type  documentation  is  automatic  and  no 
additional  paperwork  is  required.  The  nature  of  inheritance  tax  as  a  UK-wide 
system  no  doubt  eases  this  approach.  Within  the  Commonwealth,  perhaps  as  a 
throwback  to  Empire,  or  perhaps  in  recognition  of  'ex-pats'  dispersed  across  the 
former  Empire,  a  concession  is  made  in  the  availability  of  the  resealing 
procedure.  Outwith  these  areas,  however,  the  number  of  estates  with  a  UK 
dimension  is  not  sufficient,  or  the  clamour  is  not  loud  enough,  for  the 
Westminster  Parliament  to  introduce  an  easier  method  of  dealing  with  the  estate 
of  the  deceased.  140 
Recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments 
A  somewhat  similar  pattern  can  be  traced  in  respect  of  cross-border  recognition 
and  enforcement  of  judgments.  Initially  in  order  to  enforce  a  foreign  decree  in 
personam  in  Scotland  it  was  necessary  to  obtain  decree  conform.  '41  However,  the 
Westminster  Parliament  passed  legislation  such  as  the  Crown  Debts  Act  1801,142 
and  the  Judgments  Extension  Acts  of  1868  and  1882,143  which  made  provision  for 
the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  decrees  within  the  various  jurisdictions  of  the 
UK.  144  Such  legislation  perhaps  reflects  the  sentiments  of  Lord  President  Inglis 
that  "I  can  conceive  nothing  more  anomalous  or  indecent  than  that  any  Court  in 
Great  Britain  or  Ireland  should  scrutinise  the  decrees  of  another  Court  of  the 
United  Kingdom,  as  if  they  were  those  of  a  foreign  country"  . 
145  Later  a  need 
developed  for  wider  recognition  provisions,  encompassing  the  countries  of  the 
Empire:  the  Administration  of  Justice  Act  1920,  Part  Il.  146  Eventually  a  scheme 
was  enacted  which  extended  to  countries  outwith  the  dominions,  in  the  Foreign 
Judgments  (Reciprocal  Enforcement)  Act  1933.1aß 
140  The  UK  chose  not  to  ratify  Hague  Conventions  of  1973  and  1989  on  succession.  Contrast, 
perhaps,  the  attitude  of  European  legislators:  there  are  currently  proposals  (known  as 
"Brussels  IV")  for  an  EU  Regulation  on  succession  matters. 
141  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  19.10. 
142  1801  (41  Geo  III),  c.  90. 
143  Judgments  Extension  Act  1868  (31  &  32  Viet),  c.  54;  Inferior  Courts  Judgments  Extension  Act 
1882  (45  &  46  Viet),  c.  31. 
144  This  also  gave  rise  to  the  subsidiary  result  that,  except  in  special  circumstances,  the  court  will 
not  require  an  English  party  to  a  court  action  to  sist  a  mandatory  (Lawson's  Trs  v  British  Line,  i 
Co.  (1874)  1R  1065),  since  a  Scottish  decree  for  expenses  can  be  enforced  in  England. 
ias  Wilkie  v  Cathcart  (1870)  9M  168  at  171. 
146  1920  (10  &I1  Geo  V),  c.  81  (it  was open  to  dominions  to  transfer  to  the  1933  Act  scheme). 
147  1933  (23  &  24  Geo  V),  c.  13. 
93 These  schemes  worked  by  replacing  the  necessity  of  obtaining  a  new  decree  in 
Scotland,  with  administrative-type  provisions  whereby  a  foreign  judgment  could 
be  registered  in  Scotland.  However,  although  registration  is,  in  certain 
circumstances,  compulsory  under  the  1933  Act,  there  remain  certain  grounds  on 
which  the  registration  can  be  set  aside,  such  as  a  lack  of  jurisdiction  in  the 
original  court,  fraud  or  a  breach  of  natural  justice.  148  Within  Europe  the 
harmonisation  of  rules  on  jurisdiction  in  the  Brussels  Convention,  and  now 
Council  Regulation  44/2001  ("the  Brussels  I  Regulation"),  allowed  the  inclusion 
of  rules  easing  the  enforcement  of  judgments  within  the  states  of  the  European 
Union.  Indeed  securing  the  "  'free  movement'  of  judgments"  149  within  the  (then) 
EEC  was  the  principal  aim  of  the  Brussels  Convention,  in  which  aim  the  securing 
of  agreement  on  acceptable  grounds  of  jurisdiction  was  a  pre-requisite  and 
concomitant.  It  is  notable  that  it  is  the  jurisdictional  rules  which  have  proved  a 
richer  source  of  litigation.  There  are,  however,  limited  grounds  on  which 
recognition  of  a  judgment  may  be  denied.  '50 
By  contrast,  over  time,  the  enforcement  of  judgments  awarding  sums  of  money 
within  the  UK  had  become  more  or  less  automatic.  The  Civil  Jurisdiction  and 
Judgments  Act  1982,  which  implemented  the  Brussels  Convention,  was  also  used 
as  an  opportunity  to  codify  and  to  innovate  upon  the  existing  rules  for  enforcing 
judgments  within  the  UK.  The  preceding  report  prepared  by  the  Maxwell 
Committee  demonstrated  the  Committee's  concern  that  enforcement  should  not  be 
easier  as  between  the  (then)  EEC  states,  than  the  jurisdictions  of  the  UK,  and 
suggested  an  "even  more  'automatic'  "  system.  '5'  For  civil  judgments  falling 
148  Ibid.,  s4  (or,  in  cases  falling  under  the  Administration  of  Justice  Act  1920,  justifying  refusal  of 
registration). 
149  Jenard  Report  [1979]  OJ  C59/1  at  59/7. 
150  These  are,  in  terms  of  the  Brussels  I  Regulation,  Art.  34,  failure  to  serve  certain  documentation 
in  sufficient  time  to,  or  in  a  manner  which  allows  one  to,  prepare  one's  defence; 
irreconcilability  with  certain  prior  judgments;  and  public  policy  (on  which  see,  e.  g., 
Krombach  v  Bomberski  [2001]  All  ER  (EC)  584;  SA  Marie  Brizzard  et  Roger  International  v 
William  Grant  &  Sons  Ltd  (No  2)  2002  SLT  1365).  The  Brussels  I  Regulation,  Art.  35  also 
allows  non-recognition  if  any  of  the  insurance,  consumer  contracts  and  exclusive  jurisdiction, 
provisions  have  not  been  followed,  as  well  as  containing  a  transitional  provision. 
ist  Report  of  the  Scottish  Committee  on  Jurisdiction  and  Enforcement  (1980)  ("The  Maxwell 
Report"),  para  15.5.  It  was  suggested  that  "there  seems  little  harm  in  enforcing  the  occasional 
judgment  founded  on  exorbitant  jurisdiction 
...  pronounced  in  another  law  district"  of  the  UK 
(The  Maxwell  Report,  para  15.59),  but  generally  the  endorsement  of  the  proposed  enforcement 
procedures  seems  to  have  been  dependent  on  suitable  jurisdiction  rules  being  arrived  at:  "We 
would  not  find  it  tolerable  that  over  the  wide  range  of  judgments  to  which  our  proposals  ... 
94 within  the  ambit  of  the  scheme,  there  is  a  straightforward  procedure  for  the  cross- 
border  enforcement  of  money  judgments.  152  An  interested  party  obtains  a 
certificate  from  the  court  which  pronounced  the  original  judgment,  and  presents 
this  to  the  appropriate  court  in  the  jurisdiction  in  which  the  decree  is  to  be 
enforced.  As  a  general  rule  registration  of  the  judgment  by  the  latter  court  will 
present  little  difficulty.  The  grounds  of  challenge  are  very  limited,  the 
registration  only  requiring  to  be  set  aside  if  the  procedure  has  not  been  correctly 
followed,  and  there  being  a  discretion  to  do  so  if  res  judicata  is  successfully 
argued.  '53  A  similar  scheme  for  non-money  judgments  is  put  in  place  by 
Schedule  7  of  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act.  The  Maxwell  Committee 
pulled  back,  however,  from  proposing  that  English  money  judgments  should  be 
enforceable  in  Scotland  without  the  need  for  a  judicial  or  administrative 
procedure  of  any  kind,  and  vice  versa.  The  Committee  was  concerned  about  the 
difficulties  for  sheriff  officers  in  satisfying  themselves  that  a  judgment  was 
genuine  and  felt,  in  any  event,  that  it  should  continue  to  be  the  case  that  only  a 
Scottish  court  may  bestow  authority  on  its  officers  to  enforce  decrees  within  its 
territory.  '54  These  practical  objections  are  indeed  well-founded.  However,  it  is 
submitted  that  there  is  a  more  fundamental  difficulty  with  such  a  proposal:  it 
would  represent  the  first  step  on  a  road  which  leads  to  assimilation,  if  not  the 
submersion  of  the  Scottish  legal  system  within  the  English  system. 
Family  law 
The  ease  with  which  decrees  of  divorce  are  recognised  within  Britain  nowadays 
belies  the  troubled  history  of  this  subject.  From  the  time  of  the  Reformation  it 
was  possible  in  Scotland  to  obtain  a  divorce  on  the  grounds  of  adultery,  and 
divorce  on  the  basis  of  desertion  was  permitted  by  legislation  of  1573.155  By 
contrast,  in  England  there  was  no  means  of  divorcing,  unless  a  private  Act  of 
Parliament  was  passed,  until  the  passing  of  the  Matrimonial  Causes  Act  1857.156 
relate  the  Scottish  courts  would  be  obliged  to  give  automatic  recognition  or  enforcement  of  for 
example  judgments  given  in  England  and  Wales  on  a  jurisdiction  based  solely  on  the  service  of 
a  writ  on  a  Scotsman  momentarily  present  in  England  and  Wales"  (The  Maxwell  Report,  para 
15.5). 
152  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982,  c.  27,  Sch.  6. 
153  Ibid.,  Sch.  6,  para  10. 
154  The  Maxwell  Report,  pars  15.64. 
155  APS,  III,  81  (1573). 
156  1857  (20  &  21  Vict),  c.  85,  ss27  &  31. 
95 Inevitably,  English  parties  sought  to  take  advantage  of  the  more  liberal  Scottish 
position.  For  their  part,  Scots  courts  were  content  to  take  jurisdiction  on  the  basis 
of  residence,  157  and  possibly  also  if  the  matrimonial  offence  was  committed  in 
Scotland.  158  Scots  law  was  applied,  even  although  the  marriage  had  taken  place 
in  England.  '59  However,  in  Lolley's  Case160  an  Englishman  who  had  divorced  his 
wife  in  Scotland,  and  then  remarried  in  England  was  convicted  of  bigamy  there. 
It  was  stated  that  English  marriages  could  not  be  terminated  by  divorce,  and  the 
courts  of  another  country  could  not  purport  to  do  so.  It  was  confirmed  in  Shaw  v 
Gould161  that,  unless  the  parties  to  the  marriage  were  domiciled  in  Scotland,  a 
Scots  divorce  would  be  held  by  the  English  courts  to  be  of  no  effect.  162  A 
domicile  established  by  forty  days  residence  (which  might  be  sufficient  for  the 
Scots  courts  to  take  jurisdiction)  would  not  suffice  to  establish  a  Scottish  domicile 
for  the  purposes  of  recognition  by  the  English  courts.  163 
The  situation  eased  with  the  wider  availability  of  divorce  in  English  domestic  law 
after  1857,  and  the  acceptance  in  both  Scots  and  English  law  of  the  husband's 
domicile  as  the  appropriate  ground  of  jurisdiction.  164  In  the  1942  divorce  action 
of  Sellars  v  Sellars,  165  Lord  President  Normand  noted  that: 
"We  are  now  less  embarrassed  in  cases  of  this  kind  than  formerly,  because  the 
oblique  motive  which  sometimes  induced  a  pursuer  in  an  action  of  divorce  to 
157  See,  for  example,  Utterton  v  Tewsh  (1811)  Ferg  Cons  23. 
158  See  J.  Hosack,  A  Treatise  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws  of  England  and  Scotland  (William 
Blackwood  and  Sons,  1847),  pp283-284.  This  was  eventually  rejected  in  the  later  case  of 
Stavert  v  Stavert  (1882)  9R  519. 
159  There  is  interesting  discussion  of  the  appropriate  law  to  be  applied  in  such  cases,  and  the  basis 
for  this,  in  the  judgments  of  Edruonstone  v  Lockhart;  Butler  v  Forbes;  Duntze  v  Levert  (1816) 
19  Fac  Coll  139.  In  Gordon  v  Pye  (1815)  Ferg  Cons  276  at  361,  Lord  Meadowbank  posed  the 
colourful  question:  "Would  a  husband  in  this  country  be  permitted  to  keep  his  wife  in  an  iron 
cage,  or  beat  her  with  rods  the  thickness  of  a  Judge's  finger,  because  he  had  married  her  in 
England,  where  it  is  said  this  may  be  done?  ". 
160  (1812)  Russ  &  Ry 237. 
161  (1868)  LR  3  HL  55:  this  case  is  discussed  in  greater  detail  at  pp127-128  below. 
162  See  also  the  English  cases  of  Conway  v  Beazley  (1831)  3  Hagg  Ecc  Rep  639;  Dolphin  v 
Roberts  (1859)  7  HL  Cas  39. 
163  Shaw  v  Gould  (1868)  LR  3  HL  55.  It  was  accepted  that  limping  marriages  might  therefore 
result  (ibid.,  per  Lord  Cranworth  at  72). 
164  Le  Mesurier  v  Le  Mesurier  [  1895]  AC  517;  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  paras  10.03- 
10.05. 
165  1942  SC  206. 
96 assert  a  Scottish  domicile  in  preference  to  an  English  domicile  has  been 
removed,  since  the  statutory  amendment  of  the  law  has  for  practical  purposes 
brought  the  law  of  divorce  for  desertion  in  England  and  in  Scotland  into  close 
agreement". 
166 
By  the  time  legislation  on  the  recognition  of  foreign  divorces  was  contemplated 
later  in  the  twentieth  century,  the  Law  Commissions  had  concluded  that  easier 
recognition  of  divorces  emanating  from  politically  foreign  countries,  than  of 
British  divorces  would  be  "an  absurdity".  167  The  scheme  originally  contained  in 
the  Recognition  of  Divorces  and  Legal  Separations  Act  1971,168  and  now  the 
Family  Law  Act  1986,169  reflects  such  thinking.  A  clear  distinction  is  drawn 
between  divorces  granted  by  courts  within  the  British  Isles  and  those  outwith 
Britain.  There  is  automatic  recognition  in  Scotland  of  divorces  in  the  former 
category.  170  The  grounds  on  which  recognition  of  a  British  divorce  may  be 
refused  are  limited:  this  will  be  examined  in  a  later  chapter  in  the  context  of 
public  policy.  171  As  will  later  be  seen,  the  advent  of  the  Brussels  II  Regulation 
has  added  an  extra  layer  in  terms  of  the  recognition  of  divorce  decrees  from  EU 
members,  but  does  not  affect  the  intra-UK  internalising  rules  laid  down  in  the 
Family  Law  Act.  172 
The  recognition  and  enforcement  of  custody  decisions  within  the  UK  has  been 
placed  on  an  almost  administrative  footing.  Again,  this  was  for  a  long  time  a 
fraught  area  of  the  law,  with  conflicting  conclusions  as  to  the  appropriate  custody 
arrangements  for  a  child  being  reached  on  both  sides  of  the  border.  173  However, 
the  Family  Law  Act  1986,  Part  I,  provided  that  custody  decrees  emanating  from 
166  Ibid.  at  210. 
167  Law  Com.  No  34/Scot.  Law  Com.  No  16,  Hague  Convention  on  Recognition  of  Divorces  and 
Legal  Separations  (1970),  para  1  of  Notes  to  Clause  1  of  draft  Bill. 
168  1971,  c.  53. 
169  1986,  c.  55. 
170  Ibid.,  s44. 
171  See  p199  below. 
172  See  Chap.  6. 
173  See  pp120-121  below.  The  first  battle  was  on  jurisdiction,  the  historical  basis  of  which  was 
different  in  each  of  the  two  legal  systems  (stress  being  laid  in  Scotland  on  the  father's  domicile, 
and  in  England  on  residence  or  nationality).  It  was  suggested  by  one  English  judge  that 
"Neither  court  is  avid  of  jurisdiction,  and  neither  court  will  disclaim  the  jurisdiction  with 
which  it  is  entrusted"  (Re  X's  Settlement  [1945]  1  Ch  44  per  Vaisey  J  at  47),  but  it  might  be 
doubted  whether  the  latter  clause  of  the  dictum  was more  accurate  than  the  first.  See  also  Re  P 
(GE)  (an  infant)  [1964]  3  All  ER  977  per  Lord  Denning  MR  at  980-981. 
97 UK  courts  should  be  recognised  automatically  throughout  the  UK.  174 
Furthermore,  once  such  a  judgment  is  registered  in  another  part  of  the  UK,  it  may 
be  enforced  by  that  court.  175  This  has  even  allowed  an  English  court  to  enforce  an 
interim  order  of  the  Scottish  courts,  when  the  action  for  divorce  and  custody 
would  ultimately  be  heard  in  England.  176  The  path  of  the  legislative  scheme  has 
not  been  quite  so  smooth  in  Scotland,  as  is  witnessed  by  the  First  Division 
decision  of  Woodcock  v  Woodcock.  177  The  court  in  this  case  effectively  found 
that  there  remained  an  inherent  jurisdiction  to  refuse  to  enforce  English  custody 
orders  despite  the  provisions  of  the  Family  Law  Act:  a  conclusion  which  seems 
to  go  against  the  clear  terms  of  the  legislation.  178 
In  terms  of  the  status  of  adopted  children,  an  order  which  has  the  effect  of  an 
adoption  in  England  and  Wales  is  placed  on  a  par  with  a  Scottish  adoption 
order.  179  Unlike  overseas  adoption  orders,  the  relevant  legislation  did  not  allow 
for  an  English  adoption  order  to  be  annulled  or  made  invalid  in  Scotland  . 
180  The 
consequence  of  all  this  is  that  English  adoption  orders  are  automatically 
recognised  in  Scotland.  '8'  Recent  legislation  to  allow  the  implementation  of  a 
new  Hague  Convention  in  this  area  does  not  change  the  position  as  between 
Scotland  and  England.  182 
Execution  of  criminal  warrants  across  the  border 
A  special  statutory  procedure  also  exists  which  allows  for  the  enforcement  of 
warrants  for  apprehension  and  imprisonment  within  the  UK.  Thus  a  warrant 
issued  in  England  and  Wales  (or  Northern  Ireland)  can  be  executed  by  a  Scottish 
police  constable,  or  by  a  constable  from  the  jurisdiction  in  which  the  warrant  was 
174  Family  Law  Act  1986,  s25. 
175  Ibid.,  ss25  &  29. 
176  Re  M  (Minors)  (Custody:  Jurisdiction)  [1992]  2  FLR  382. 
"'  1990  SLT  848. 
178  See  D.  J.  Edwards,  "A  domestic  muddle:  custody  orders  in  the  United  Kingdom"  (1992)  41 
ICLQ  444. 
179  Adoption  (Scotland)  Act  1978,  c.  28,  s38(1). 
180  Ibid.,  s47.  This  may  be  based  on  a  public  policy  objection  (Ibid.,  s47(2)(a)).  The  common  law 
rules  as  to  recognition  may  sometimes  still  be  relevant  in  respect  of  adoptions  in  politically 
foreign  countries  (Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  11.15). 
18,  See  too  A.  B.  Wilkinson  &  K.  McK.  Norrie,  The  Law  Relating  to  Parent  and  Child  in  Scotland, 
2°d  edn.,  by  K.  McK.  Norrie  (W.  Green,  1999),  para  5.40. 
182  Adoption  (Intercountry  Aspects)  Act  1999,  c.  18,  in  implementation  of  the  1993  Hague 
Convention  on  Protection  of  Children  and  Co-operation  in  respect  of  Intercountry  Adoption. 
98 issued.  183  Similarly,  a  Scottish  warrant  may  be  enforced  in  England  and  Wales 
(or  Northern  Ireland)  by  a  constable  from  Scotland,  or  the  jurisdiction  in  which 
the  warrant  is  to  be  executed.  184  There  is  no  need  in  either  circumstance  for 
endorsement  of  the  warrant.  There  are  also  provisions  allowing  for  cross-border 
arrests  to  be  made  without  a  warrant,  and  detailing  the  powers  available  to 
constables  in  such  a  situation.  185  Proposals  to  sanction  the  giving  of  assistance  by 
one  police  force  to  another  were  ultimately  abandoned,  186  but  it  is  interesting  to 
note  that  these  proposals  arose  from  a  report  by  the  Lothian  and  Borders, 
Dumfries  and  Galloway,  Northumbria  and  Cumbria  police  forces.  '87 
Notwithstanding  the  international  nature  of  modem  crime,  there  is  perhaps  still  an 
acute  awareness  of  the  difficulties  when  two  jurisdictions  meet,  at  the  border  of 
those  jurisdictions.  '88 
Recognition  of  previous  convictions 
Traditionally,  previous  convictions  from  a  foreign  country  are  not  put  before  a 
Scottish  criminal  court  at  sentencing,  since  the  behaviour  in  question  may  not 
have  been  such  as  to  secure  a  conviction  in  Scotland  and,  in  any  event,  it  could  be 
difficult  to  provide  the  necessary  proof  of  the  conviction.  189  The  current 
'codification'  by  means  of  statute  of  the  criminal  procedure  rules  in  Scotland  does 
not  explicitly  allow  the  prosecutor  to  refer  to  English  convictions,  nor  does  it 
define  a  previous  conviction.  However,  it  is  provided  that  a  previous  conviction 
can  be  proved  by,  inter  alia,  "extract  conviction  of  any  crime  committed  in  any 
part  of  the  United  Kingdom".  190  An  extract  conviction  and  extract  of  previous 
conviction  are  defined  so  as  to  encompass  a  "document  lawfully  issued  from  any 
court  of  justice  of  the  United  Kingdom  as  evidence  of  a  conviction". 
191  This 
apparent  ability  to  refer  to  English  convictions  when  sentencing  in  Scotland  is 
183  Criminal  Justice  and  Public  Order  Act  1994,  c.  33,  s136(1),  (7). 
184  Ibid.,  s136(2),  (7). 
185  Ibid.,  ss137,138  &  140. 
186  Ibid.,  s141  (now  repealed). 
187  Annotations  by  H.  H.  J.  R.  May  &  J.  J.  McManus  to  the  Criminal  Justice  and  Public  Order  Act 
1994. 
188  Indeed  it  was  remarked  during  the  parliamentary  debates  that  "I  am  bound  to  say  that  I  am 
surprised  that  we  have  got  to  1994,  after  nearly  300  years  of  union  between  Scotland  and 
England,  and  have  not  managed  until  this  Bill  to  put  in  place  proper  arrangements  for  cross- 
Border  policing"  (Lord  Fraser  of  Carmyllie,  HL  Debs,  vol  554,  col  504). 
189  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  20.11. 
190  Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  1995,  c.  46,  s285(1),  (6). 
191  Ibid.,  s307(l). 
99 borne  out  by  the  Crown  Book  of  Regulations,  which  confirms  that  only  previous 
convictions  arising  from  Scottish  or  English  and  Welsh  proceedings  should  be 
raised  by  the  prosecutor  in  Scotland.  192  However,  these  provisions  of  the 
Criminal  Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  1995  in  effect  only  deal  with  the  second  of  the 
traditional  objections  to  raising  foreign  previous  convictions,  that  of  proof.  Thus, 
in  practice,  it  may  be  that  an  English  previous  conviction  is  of  little  assistance  to  a 
sentencing  judge  in  Scotland  if  the  substance  of  the  English  offence  is  unclear. 
Perhaps  the  most  dramatic  impact  of  an  English  conviction  is  to  be  found  in  the 
case  of  Herd  v  HMA.  193  The  accused  had  committed  a  number  of  offences  of  the 
same  nature  in  England  and  Scotland  over  a  period  of  time.  In  1991,  he  was  duly 
convicted  and  sentenced  by  an  English  court,  which  imposed  a  period  of  six 
months  imprisonment.  Having  been  convicted  by  a  court  in  Scotland  in  respect  of 
the  Scottish  offences,  the  Scottish  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  reduced  the  resultant 
sentence  of  imprisonment  to  take  account  of  the  fact  that  "if  all  the  offences  had 
taken  place  in  England,  they  would  all  have  been  dealt  with  in  1991".  194  This 
case  would  seem  very  much  to  depend  on  its  own  facts. 
Internalising  conflicts  by  judge-made  law? 
The  examples  of  the  internalising  of  conflicts  discussed  thus  far  have,  almost 
without  exception,  195  been  carried  out  by  the  use  of  legislation.  Is  it  possible  for 
the  internalisation  of  conflicts  to  be  brought  about  through  case  law? 
There  certainly  have  been  some  judicial  dicta  that  might  be  thought  to  display 
internalising  sentiments.  As  well  as  the  words  of  Lord  President  Inglis  in  Wilkie  v 
Cathcart  quoted  above,  196  there  have  been  more  modern  examples.  In  Davenport 
v  Corinthian  Motor  Policies  at  Lloyds197  the  pursuer  had  earlier  raised  an  action 
for  damages,  and  obtained  decree,  following  a  road  traffic  accident.  Having 
192  The  Laws  of  Scotland:  Stair  Memorial  Encyclopaedia,  Vol  17,  para  794.  In  the  case  of 
Mawhinney  v  HMA  1948  JC  44,  previous  convictions  from  England  and  Ireland  were  libelled 
as  an  aggravation  of  the  offence  committed.  Successful  objection  was  taken  to  the  inclusion  of 
the  Irish  conviction,  but  none  to  the  reference  to  the  English  conviction. 
193  1993  GWD  24-1503. 
194  Ibid. 
195  That  exception  being  the  House  of  Lords  decision  in  Armour  v  Thyssen  Edelstahlwerke  AG 
1990  SLT  891. 
196  See  p93  above. 
197  1991  SLT  774. 
100 failed  to  recover  the  sum  from  the  defender,  she  sought  to  take  advantage  of  a 
statutory  provision,  and  raised  an  action  against  the  defender's  insurers.  She  did 
so  in  Scotland,  where  she  had  successfully  raised  the  first  action.  The  insurers, 
however,  were  domiciled  in  England,  and  therefore  entered  a  plea  of  no 
jurisdiction.  The  pursuer  failed  to  convince  the  sheriff  and  an  Extra  Division  of 
the  Inner  House  that  her  claim  was  one  relating  to  delict  in  terms  of  Schedule  4  of 
the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982.  Lord  Prosser  felt  that  the  general 
spirit  of  Schedule  1  of  the  Act  had  to  be  adhered  to, 
"notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  Sched.  4  version  is  concerned  with  allocation 
of  jurisdiction  within  the  United  Kingdom,  where  it  might  be  easier  to  regard 
jurisdiction  based  on  domicile  as  less  a  matter  of  principle,  and  the  'special' 
jurisdictions  not  as  derogations  from  any  such  sensible  (and  perhaps  the 
obviously  sensible)  basis  for  jurisdiction".  198 
Lord  Milligan  was  even  more  blunt: 
"I  add  only  a  note  of  regret  in  that  there  seems  to  me  much  to  be  said  for  there 
being  jurisdiction  to  pursue  an  action  such  as  the  present  in  a  court  where  there 
was  jurisdiction  in  the  delictual  action,  and  rather  less  to  be  said  against  this 
being  so,  at  least  within  the  United  Kingdom".  199 
Such  regrets,  however,  did  not  prevent  the  Division  finding  against  the  pursuer. 
Soklia  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Honte  Department200  was  an  immigration  case, 
in  which  the  petitioner  brought  a  petition  for  judicial  review  to  challenge  his 
detention.  Although  he  had  no  links  with  Scotland,  it  appeared  that  such 
challenges  were  far  more  likely  to  meet  with  success  in  the  Scottish  courts  as 
opposed  to  the  English  courts.  The  question  of  forum  non  conveniens  was 
accordingly  under  consideration.  Lord  Prosser  opined  that: 
198  Ibid.  at  780-781. 
199  Ibid.  at  782. 
200  1992  SLT  1049. 
101 "I  am  disposed  to  think  that  where  the  alternative  jurisdiction  is  another  part  of 
the  United  Kingdom,  rather  than  a  wholly  foreign  country,  and  at  least  where 
the  ground  of  jurisdiction  is  a  normal  one  such  as  domicile,  and  not  an  oddity 
such  as  arrestment  ad  fundandam  jurisdictionem,  a  strong  preference  might 
201  indeed  be  given  to  the  forum  chosen  by  the  petitioner". 
Ultimately,  however,  Lord  Prosser  found  that  England  was  the  appropriate  forum. 
Clements  v  HMA202  was  a  criminal  appeal  against  convictions  of  being  concerned 
in  the  supply  of  drugs  contrary  to  the  Misuse  of  Drugs  Act  1971:  203  a  UK  statute. 
Whilst  the  two  appellants  had  been  found  to  be  involved  in  the  chain  of  supply 
which  ended  in  Scotland,  neither  had  actually  carried  out  any  of  the  relevant  acts 
in  Scotland,  indeed  the  position  of  the  second  appellant  was  that  he  did  not  know 
that  it  was  Scotland  for  which  the  drugs  were  bound.  It  was  argued  before  the 
Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  that  the  trial  court  had  accordingly  had  no  jurisdiction, 
however,  the  appeal  met  with  no  success.  For  Lord  Justice-General  Hope  it  was 
"sufficient  to  look  only  to  the  situation  within  the  United  Kingdom  and  to  ask 
why  the  courts  of  one  part  of  it  should  be  denied  jurisdiction  if  the  activities  of 
persons  elsewhere  in  the  United  Kingdom  are  seen  to  have  their  harmful  effects  in 
that  part".  204  He  was  attracted  to  the  idea  that  everyone  who  had  taken  part  in  the 
chain  of  supply  should  be  prosecuted  in  the.  UK  jurisdiction  to  which  the  chain 
led.  205  It  is  submitted  that  the  majority  opinion  in  Clements  v  HMA  constitutes  a 
very  subtle  internalising  approach  to  the  difficulties  which  the  case,  at  first 
glance,  presented.  Any  perceived  need  for  an  intention  to  commit  the  crime  in 
Scotland  under  the  normal  jurisdictional  rules206  (which  would  have  caused 
particular  difficulties  in  respect  of  the  second  appellant)  was  avoided  by  the 
characterisation  of  certain  actings  within  the  UK  as  constituting  concern  in  the 
201  Ibid.  at  1054. 
202  1991  JC 62. 
203  1971,  c.  38. 
204  Ibid.  at  69. 
205  Ibid.  at  70.  He  noted  that  this  would  avoid  a  multiplicity  of  trials,  and  differences  in 
sentencing,  where  such  groups  of  offenders  were  involved.  See  also  per  Lord  Wylie  at  76-77; 
cf  Lord  Coulsfield  at  74;  and  compare  also  P.  W.  Ferguson,  "Jurisdiction  and  criminal  law  in 
Scotland  and  England"  in  R.  F. Hunter  (ed.  ),  Justice  and  Crime  (T&T  Clark,  1993),  p96. 
206  Clements  v  HMA,  supra,  per  Lord  Justice-General  Hope  at  70-71. 
102 supply  of  drugs  to  Scotland,  irrespective  of  where  those  acts  took  place,  and  thus 
a  crime  under  the  law  of  Scotland. 
However,  it  is  submitted  that  Clements  v  HMA  is  a  rare  example  of  the  judicial 
internalisation  of  conflicts.  For  the  most  part,  in  those  few  cases  where 
internalising  sentiments  have  been  voiced,  such  as  Davenport  and  Sokha,  they 
have  had  no  effect  on  the  ultimate  judicial  decision.  The  internalising  of  conflicts 
within  the  UK  is  generally  carried  out  by  means  of  legislation,  not  judicial  dicta. 
This  is  partially  because  of  the  lack  of  any  mechanism  to  give  vent  to 
internalising  impulses  in  the  Scottish  courts.  207  It  is  significant  that  the  backdrop 
to  Clements  v  HMA  was  a  statute  with  UK-wide  application.  A  comparison  can 
be  drawn  with  the  constitutionalisation  of  conflicts,  208  which  could  be  advanced 
judicially  since  judges  can  call  upon  general  aims  and  themes  of  the  constitution 
to  give  legitimacy  to  the  decision  they  reach.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  submitted 
that  economic  and  commercial  concerns  have  been  of  vital  importance  in 
prompting  the  passing  of  internalising  legislation.  Arguably  such  pressure  is  less 
likely  either  to  be  brought  to  bear  on,  or  to  be  given  effect  to,  the  judiciary  in 
Scotland.  Perhaps,  indeed,  a  quite  opposite  concern  will  constitute  a  greater 
influence  on  Scottish  judges,  and  that  is  the  (even  subconscious)  impulse  to 
preserve  the  separate  Scots  legal  system. 
The  effect  of  devolution  on  the  internalising  of  conflicts 
The  devolution  settlement  brings  opposing  forces  to  work  on  the  concept  of 
internalising  conflicts.  On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  submitted  that  the  impetus 
for  the  internalising  of  conflicts  has  in  the  past  generally  come  from  the 
legislature  rather  than  the  judiciary.  Devolution  involves  the  fragmentation  of 
legislative  power,  with  one  of  the  wielders  of  legislative  power  (the  Scottish 
Parliament)  only  having  competency  within  Scotland.  209  On  a  purely  technical 
level  this  could  affect  the  ability  to  pass  internalising  legislation.  Furthermore,  on 
a  broader  level,  the  existence  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  gives  added  legitimacy  to 
207  The  somewhat  unusual  position  of  the  House  of  Lords  allows  for  some  internalising  of 
conflicts  in  that  forum:  reference  has  already  been  made  to  Armour  v  Thyssen 
Edelstahlewerke  AG  1990  SLT  891. 
208  See  Chap.  3. 
209  Scotland  Act  1998,  s29. 
103 notions  of  Scotland  as  a  separate,  and  different,  entity.  There  may,  therefore,  be 
less  acceptance  of  the  view  that  the  UK  is  a  political  whole,  and  that  conflicts 
should  be  avoided  by  internalisation.  It  is  interesting  to  note  in  this  connection 
the  disquiet  in  Scotland  over  the  use  of  the  Sewel  Convention,  the  method  by 
which  the  Westminster  Parliament  passes  legislative  schemes  applying  to  the  UK 
as  a  whole  even  although  the  subject-matter  is  one  which  is  devolved  to  the 
Scottish  Parliament.  210  In  this  context,  many  people  have  seen  use  of  the  Sewel 
Convention  to  introduce  UK-wide  schemes  as  a  failure  in  itself,  or  certainly  as  a 
procedure  which  is  being  over-used:  "the  United  Kingdom  Government  should 
not  legislate  on  devolved  matters;  they  are  devolved  precisely  because  it  is  our 
job  to  legislate  on  them";  211  "This  is  Scotland's  Parliament;  let  Scotland's 
Parliament  legislate".  212  In  the  context  of  the  Civil  Partnership  Bill  2004,  it  was 
argued  that  the  Scottish  Executive,  in  supporting  a  Sewel  motion  was  "ducking 
controversial  moral  issues 
... 
People  do  not  send  us  here  to  Edinburgh  ...  so  that 
we  can  pick  and  choose  what  bits  of  the  job  we  want  to  do".  213  Such  sentiments 
militate  against  UK-wide  schemes,  and  foster  peculiarly  Scottish  legislative 
solutions. 
However,  there  are  other  considerations  to  be  set  against  the  factors  outlined 
above.  It  has  been  submitted  that  much  of  the  internalising  of  conflicts  has  taken 
place  in  the  area  of  UK  common  market  law.  As  was  stated  earlier,  from  the 
outset,  the  White  Paper  on  Devolution  made  it  clear  that  UK  common  market  law 
would  be  reserved  to  the  Westminster  Parliament,  and  this  intention  has  been 
carried  through  into  the  Scotland  Act  1998.214  Thus  the  UK  Parliament  retains 
the  ability  to  pass  UK-wide  legislative  schemes,  incorporating  internalising  rules, 
in  the  subject  area  which,  in  the  past,  it  has  perhaps  been  most  likely  so  to  do. 
Furthermore,  the  fact  that  UK  common  market  law  is  reserved,  in  stark  contrast  to 
the  many  devolved  areas  of  law,  may  strengthen  the  conviction  of  the  UK 
Government  that  it  is  appropriate  to  treat  of  such  commercial  law  areas  on  a  UK- 
210  See  pp147-149  below. 
211  A.  Morgan,  SPOR,  vol  1,  no  8,  col  361  (9  June  1999). 
212  R.  Cunningham,  SPOR,  vol  10,  no  4,  col  403  (18  January  2001). 
213  N.  Sturgeon,  SPOR,  vol  2,  no  6,  col  8950  (3  June  2004).  See  also  M.  Fraser,  SPOR,  vol  2,  no 
6,  cols  8961-8963  (3  June  2004). 
214  s29  &  Sch.  5. 
104 wide  basis,  rather  than  make  separate  provision  for  Scotland.  215  In  addition,  even 
within  the  Scottish  Parliament,  the  dominance  of  Labour  in  the  current  ruling 
coalition,  coupled  with  that  party  holding  power  in  the  UK  Parliament,  might  lead 
to  some  similar  legislative  objectives.  The  Mortgage  Rights  (Scotland)  Act 
2001216  is  an  example  of  Scottish  legislation  which  brings  Scots  law  closer  to 
rules  of  English  commercial  law  in  that  area.  217  The  existence  of  administrations 
dominated  by  the  same  political  party  in  both  the  Scottish  and  Westminster 
Parliaments,  together  with  the  existence  of  the  Sewel  Convention,  may  allow  a 
pan-UK  agenda  to  be  followed  on  particular  policy  issues.  A  Sewel  motion  was 
successfully  carried  in  the  Holyrood  Parliament  by  the  Scottish  Executive  in 
respect  of  the  Civil  Partnership  Bill  2004.18  In  its  current  form,  the  Bill  provides 
for  automatic  recognition  throughout  the  UK  of  dissolutions  or  annulments  of  a 
civil  partnership219  (or  legal  separations  of  its  partners)  which  emanate  from  a  UK 
court,  220  subject  to  very  few  exceptions.  22'  This  can  be  contrasted  with  the 
provisions  in  respect  of  overseas  dissolutions,  annulments  or  legal  separations.  22 
On  balance,  therefore,  the  conclusion  is  that  the  advent  of  devolution  may  do  very 
little  to  staunch  the  flow  of  legislative  internalisation  of  conflicts  within  the  UK. 
215  Thus  Himsworth  questions  "whether  the  ...  reservation  of  certain  matters  to  the  Westminster 
Parliament  will,  over  time,  have  the  effect  of  persuading  the  courts  that  such  reservation 
implies  an  intended  uniformity  of  provision  across  the  United  Kingdom"  (Himsworth, 
"Devolution  and  the  mixed  legal  system  of  Scotland",  124). 
216  2001,  asp  11.  Disappointingly,  the  Act  also  adopts  an  English  term  of  art  in  its  short  title. 
217  M.  Higgins,  "2001  -a  base  (rate)  odyssey"  2001  SLT  (News)  273. 
218  SPOR,  vol  2,  no  6,  cols  8978-8980. 
219  This  being  defined  as  a  relationship  between  two  persons  of  the  same  sex  (Civil  Partnership 
Bill  2004,  cl.  1(1)). 
220  Ibid.,  cl.  225(2). 
221  These  are  irreconcilability  (ibid.,  cl.  225(3)),  and  the  lack  of  an  actual  civil  partnership  in  the 
view  of  the  law  of  the  court  asked  to  recognise  the  dissolution,  annulment  or  legal  separation 
(ibid.,  cl.  225(4)). 
222  Ibid.,  cls.  226-228.  Clause  211  allows  for  special  provision  to  be  made  for  the  recognition  of 
judgments  of  courts  of  member  states  of  the  EU. 
105 5  APPLICATION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  PRIVATE 
LAW  RULES  WITHIN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM 
Purpose  of  chapter 
Having  examined  the  extent  to  which  there  is  any  constitutionalising,  or 
internalising,  of  the  conflicts  arising  as  between  Scotland  and  England,  the 
present  chapter  turns  to  the  situations  in  which  traditional  international  private 
law  rules  are  applied.  Lasok  and  Stone  posit  that: 
"the  political-legal  status  of  a  territory,  although  relevant  in  certain  respects, 
such  as  state  and  diplomatic  immunity  and  treaty-making  power,  is  not  the  sole 
factor  determining  the  need  for  conflict  rules.  What  matters  is  the  existence  of 
an  autonomous  legal  order  pertaining  to  a  territory  ...  as  in  the  case  of 
Scotland".  1 
However,  it  is  submitted  that  it  is  the  political-legal  status  of  Scotland  (as  set  out 
in  the  Acts  of  Union)  which  has  allowed  for  the  existence  of  an  autonomous  legal 
order. 
In  this  chapter,  it  will  be  sought  to  identify  the  areas  in  which  rules  of  jurisdiction, 
choice  of  law,  and  on  the  recognition  of  judgments,  are  applied  in  the  Scottish 
courts  indiscriminately,  i.  e.,  making  no  differentiation  as  between  England  or  a 
politically  foreign  jurisdiction.  The  reasons  for  such  use  of  international  private 
law  rules  will  be  analysed,  with  one  eye  always  on  the  desirability,  or  otherwise, 
of  reform.  The  effect  of  devolution  on  Scottish  conflict  rules,  and  on  the  reliance 
upon  such  rules  for  resolving  intra-UK  conflicts,  will  also  be  examined. 
D.  Lasok  &  P.  A.  Stone,  Conflict  of  Laws  in  the  European  Community  (Professional  Books, 
1987),  p4. 
106 Proof  of  English  law 
The  status  of  English  law  in  Scots  courts 
English  law,  like  any  foreign  law,  is  a  matter  of  fact,  which  must  be  proved  in  the 
Scottish  courts  if  it  is  to  be  relied  upon.  This  flows  from  the  fact  that:  "the 
judicatories  of  Scotland  and  England  are  as  independent  of  each  other,  within 
their  respective  territories,  as  if  they  were  the  judicatories  of  two  foreign  states". 
Indeed,  it  is  submitted  that  the  treatment  of  English  law  as  any  other  foreign  law 
is  a  cornerstone  of  the  Scottish  legal  system  preserved  by  the  Acts  of  Union.  If 
Scots  law  is  to  remain  a  separate  system,  it  is  crucial  that  English  law  is  seen  to  be 
different,  and  thus  requiring  of  explication  by  English  practitioners.  It  is 
sometimes  argued,  however,  that  while  this  is  the  general  rule,  there  are  certain 
limited  exceptions  to  it.  3  It  is  submitted  that,  as  will  become  clear,  on  closer 
analysis  the  examples  commonly  given  are  not  true  exceptions  to  the  rule. 
Firstly,  English  charity  law  is  often  said  to  be  within  judicial  knowledge  in 
Scotland.  4  This  can  be  traced  back  to  the  English  House  of  Lords  decision  in 
Commissioners  for  Special  Purposes  of  Income  Tax  v  Pemsel,  s  in  which  the 
meaning  of  the  word  'charitable'  in  the  context  of  the  Income  Tax  Act  18426  was 
in  issue.  Lord  Herschell  recognised  that,  in  a  UK  statute,  it  was  not  acceptable 
simply  to  apply  English  law.  7  However,  both  he  and  Lord  Watson  were  of  the 
view  that  Scots  and  English  law  on  this  point  were  very  similar.  8  One  could  be 
critical  of  this  conclusion,  as  demonstrating  too  ready  a  willingness  on  the  part  of 
the  House  of  Lords  to  find  Scots  and  English  law  to  be  the  same.  The  words  of 
Lord  Macnaghten  (who  was  also  of  the  opinion  that  Scots  and  English  law  in  this 
matter  were  broadly  similar)  are  particularly  disturbing: 
2  Orr  Ewing  &cv  Orr  Ewing's  Trs  (1884)  11  R  600  per  Lord  President  Inglis  at  629.  The  same 
position  is  adopted  in  England  towards  Scots  law  (T.  Hodgkinson,  Expert  Evidence:  Law  and 
Practice  (Sweet  &  Maxwell,  1990),  p294,  and  note,  for  example,  the  giving  of  evidence  on  the 
content  of  Scots  law  in  Shaw  v  Gould  (1868)  LR  3  HL  55). 
3  I.  D.  Macphail,  Evidence:  A  Revised  Version  of  a  Research  Paper  on  the  Law  of  Evidence  in 
Scotland  (The  Law  Society  of  Scotland,  1987),  paras  2.04-2.05;  F.  Raitt,  Evidence,  3rd  edn. 
(W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2001),  para  4.08;  M.  L.  Ross  with  J.  Chalmers,  Walker  and 
Walker:  The  Law  of  Evidence  in  Scotland,  2°d  edn.  (T&T  Clark,  2000),  para  16.5.1. 
°  Macphail,  Evidence,  para  2.04;  Raitt,  Evidence,  para  4.08;  Ross  with  Chalmers,  Walker  and 
Walker,  para  16.5.1. 
5  [1891]  AC  531. 
6  1842  (5  &6  Viet),  c.  35. 
7  [1891]  AC  531  at  570-571. 
8  Ibid.  at  573  &  563;  cf  Lord  Chancellor  Halsbury  at  548-550. 
107 "A  simpler  plan  is  now  recommended.  Though  the  words  have  a  definite  legal 
meaning  in  England,  you  must  not,  it  is  now  said,  look  at  that  meaning  unless 
it  be  in  vogue  north  of  the  Tweed.  You  must  put  out  the  light  you  have,  unless 
it  penetrates  directly  to  the  furthest  part  of  the  room".  9 
However,  the  reason  for  being  critical  of  the  judgment  is  because  the  case  may 
seem  to  be  another  historical  example  of  the  House  of  Lords  introducing  English 
legal  concepts  into  Scots  law.  1°  These  then  become  a  part  (however  ill-fitting)  of 
Scots  law.  Thus  as  Lord  Normand  later  recognised: 
"their  Lordships 
...  are  technically  not  bound  by  the  decisions  of  the  English 
courts  in  the  matter  of  charities,  and  it  is  not  improper  for  them  to  discuss  or 
criticise  English  decisions.  The  Court  of  Session  is  not  reduced  to  the  role  of 
an  obsequious  follower  of  decisions  either  of  a  Judge  of  first  instance  or  of  the 
Court  of  Appeal,  though  it  is  only  good  sense  to  pay  special  regard  and  respect 
to  the  decisions  and  opinions  pronounced  by  the  English  Courts  on  a  branch  of 
the  law  built  up  by  English  Judges,  and  familiar  to  them  by  long  training  and 
experience".  11 
It  is  submitted  that  Lord  Reid  correctly  states  the  position  in  giving  judgment  in 
the  same  case: 
"It  has  commonly  been  accepted  since  Pemsel's  case  that  the  words  charity  and 
charitable  in  income  tax  legislation  must  be  interpreted  according  to  English 
law,  but  I  do  not  think  that  that  is  a  full  or  accurate  statement  of  the  position. 
In  my  judgment,  holding  that  those  words  must  be  interpreted  according  to 
English  law  must  mean  that  it  is  to  be  held  that  Parliament  enacted  that  on  that 
matter  the  law  of  England  should  also  become  the  law  of  Scotland,  and  it  must 
follow  that  Parliament  must  be  held  to  have  placed  on  the  Courts  of  Scotland 
'  Ibid.  at  580.  Lord  Morris  concurred  with  Lord  Macnaghten. 
10  See  pp61-63  above. 
11  Inland  Revenue  v  Glasgow  Police  Athletic  Association  1953  SC  (HL)  13  at  22. 
108 the  duty  of  administering  what  was  formerly  only  the  law  of  England  but  what 
has  been  made  by  Act  of  Parliament  the  law  of  both  countries".  12 
The  definition  of  charity  for  the  purposes  of  the  law  relating  to  income  tax  is  now 
set  out  in  the  Income  and  Corporation  Taxes  Act  1988,13  a  statute  which  applies 
inter  alia  to  both  England  and  Scotland.  Accordingly,  the  Scottish  courts  are 
simply  being  asked  to  interpret  a  UK  statutory  provision,  not  apply  English  law. 
In  looking  to  English  cases  to  assist  in  that  interpretation,  the  courts  are  sensibly 
drawing  guidance  from  the  source  of  the  definition,  but  that  does  not  mean  that 
the  English  law  of  charities  is  being  applied,  nor  that  it  must  fall  within  judicial 
knowledge.  A  modem  parallel  might  be  the  ability  of  judges  to  look  at  human 
rights  cases  from  other  jurisdictions  to  assist  in  interpreting  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights,  or  cases  emanating  from  other  EU  members  in 
interpreting  EU  legislation.  14 
Similarly,  whilst  it  is  often  said  that  the  English  law  of  treason  is  within  judicial 
knowledge,  15  it  is  submitted  that  this  is  another  example  of  English  concepts 
being  imported  into  Scots  law,  on  this  occasion  by  legislation  in  the  form  of  the 
Treason  Act  1708.16  Accordingly,  whatever  its  initial  source,  this  is  now  merely  a 
part  of  Scots  law. 
Scottish  judges  are  also  said  to  take  judicial  notice  of  English  substantive  and 
procedural  criminal  law  when  sitting  in  Courts  Martial  appeals.  '7  However,  it  is 
submitted  that  in  such  appeals  judges  are  simply  applying  a  particular  code,  which 
applies  in  what  is  effectively  an  internal  military  situation.  In  practice  this  code  is 
derived  from  English  law  and  procedure,  but  it  is  perhaps  an  exaggeration  to  say 
that  English  law  is  within  judicial  knowledge  in  this  context. 
12  Ibid.  at  29.  Jackson's  Trs  v  Inland  Revenue  1926  SC  579  is  an  example  of  an  earlier  case 
displaying  the  attitude  which  Lord  Reid  here  criticised. 
13  1988,  c.  1,  s506(1).  Certain  statutes  provide  that  "charitable"  is  to  be  construed  as  it  is  in  the 
income  tax  legislation:  Consumer  Credit  Act  1974,  c.  39,  s189;  Local  Government  (Financial 
Provisions,  etc.  )  (Scotland)  Act  1962,  c.  9,  s4(10)(a). 
14  Roy  v  M.  R.  Pearlman  Limited  2000  SLT  727  per  Lord  Hamilton  at  734. 
15  Macphail,  Evidence,  para  S2.04. 
16  1708  (7  Anne),  c.  21,  s7. 
17  Macphail,  Evidence,  para  2.05;  Raitt,  Evidence,  para  4.08. 
109 The  last  example  commonly  offered  as  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  that 
English  law  is  within  judicial  knowledge,  is  English  maintenance  law  in  the 
context  of  certain  legislation  on  maintenance  orders.  '8  This  is  moving  into  the 
territory  of  international  private  law.  A  Scottish  court  is  empowered  to  take 
notice  of  the  law  of  another  part  of  the  UK  when  varying  the  rate  of  periodical 
payments  set  down  in  a  judgment  from  that  part  which  has  been  registered  in 
Scotland.  19  The  varied  payment  may  not  exceed  the  maximum  in  the  jurisdiction 
whence  the  judgment  was  issued.  2°  It  is  therefore  submitted  that  the  provision 
only  allows  the  court  to  refer  to  the  current  maximum  rates  of  payment,  and  there 
is  obiter  dicta  to  this  effect  in  Thompson  v  Thompson.  21  The  Maintenance  Orders 
(Reciprocal  Enforcement)  Act  1972  allows  the  application  of  the  law  in  force  in  a 
reciprocating  country  relating  to  sufficiency  of  evidence.  22  However,  this  clearly 
need  not  be  confined  to  English  law  and,  in  any  event,  would  seem  simply  to  be  a 
choice  of  law  provision.  23  Once  again,  therefore,  it  is  submitted  that  these  are  not 
in  reality  examples  of  English  law  being  a  special  case,  and  thus  admitting  of 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule  that  foreign  law  is  not  within  judicial  knowledge. 
Introduction  of  English  law  into  a  Scots  action 
It  is  generally  accepted  that  English  law,  like  any  foreign  law,  must  be  raised  by 
one  of  the  parties  to  the  action  in  the  pleadings  if  it  is  to  be  relied  upon.  If  not,  it 
seems  that  the  case  will  proceed  on  the  basis  that  Scots  law  applies.  24 
Furthermore,  even  if  a  foreign  law  is  said  to  apply,  in  the  absence  of  averments  as 
to  the  content  of  that  law,  it  would  appear  that  it  will  be  presumed  to  be  the  same 
as  Scots  law.  25  Accordingly,  the  introduction  of  English,  or  any  other,  law  into  an 
18  Macphail,  Evidence,  para  2.05. 
19  Maintenance  Orders  Act  1950  (14  Geo  VI),  c.  37,  s22. 
20  Ibid. 
21  (1953)  69  Sh  Ct  Rep  193;  in  which  case  evidence  was  also  led  from  an  expert  as  to  the  powers 
of  the  English  courts  (cf  Cowan  v  Cowan  1952  SLT  (Sh  Ct)  8). 
22  1972,  c.  18,  s7(7)(c). 
23  cfKillen  v  Killen  1981  SLT  (Sh  Ct)  77. 
24  Pryde  v  Proctor  and  Gamble  Limited  1971  SLT  (Notes)  18;  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private 
International  Law,  pp411  &775;  Macphail,  Evidence,  para  2.08. 
25  See  Rodden  v  Whatlings  Limited  1961  SC  132;  Bonnor  v  Balfour  Kilpatrick  Ltd  1975  SLT 
(Notes)  3,  although  compare  MacKinnon  v  Iberia  Shipping  Co.  1955  SC  20  per  Lord  Carmont 
at  33  and  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  pp774-775. 
110 action  becomes  very  much  a  tactical  decision  to  be  taken  by  the  pleaders  and  their 
clients.  26 
In  this,  Scots  law  adopts  a  similar  position  to  English  law,  where  the  introduction 
of  foreign  law  can  be  described  as  voluntary.  27  Mandatory  introduction  of  foreign 
law  into  an  action  is  usually  associated  with  the  civilian  systems,  although  in  truth 
there  is  a  certain  amount  of  variation  between  these.  28  Within  Canada,  however, 
it  has  been  argued  that  a  court  is  constitutionally  obliged  to  apply  the  true  content 
of  the  law  of  a  sister  province  where  that  would  govern  the  matter.  29 
It  has  already  been  argued  that  the  constitutionalising  of  conflicts  within  the  UK 
is  not  desirable,  30  and  thus  that  basis  for  such  a  Canadian  rule  would  not 
recommend  itself.  However,  it  is  submitted  that  there  are  other  powerful  reasons 
why  the  Scots  courts  should  adopt  a  mandatory  approach  to  the  introduction  of 
any  foreign  law  into  an  action,  including  English  law.  Choice  of  law  rules  allow 
the  application  of  the  rules  of  a  legal  system  closely  connected  to  the  factual 
matters  from  which  the  case  arises,  and  this  seems  desirable.  31  Concern  has  been 
expressed  in  France  that  "French  choice-of-law  will  remain  a  pure  theoretical 
masterpiece,  as  long  as  courts  are  not  ready  to  consider  it  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
French  law  for  purposes  of  application"  . 
32  Scottish  international  private  law  rules 
are  part  of  Scots  law,  and  it  seems  inappropriate  that  they  may  be  ignored  on  the 
basis  of  the  two  presumptions  outlined  at  the  beginning  of  this  section.  Arguably, 
judges  could,  and  should,  raise  the  question  of  whether  a  foreign  law  applies  ex 
proprio  motu,  since  the  content  of  Scots  conflict  rules  is  within  judicial 
knowledge.  Scotland  is  a  mixed  legal  system,  and  one  which  has  long  been 
26  As  Fentiman  notes,  this  may  amount  to  a  choice  of  law  in  favour  of  the  lex  fori  (R.  Fentiman, 
Foreign  Law  in  English  Courts:  Pleading,  Proof  and  Choice  of  Law  (Oxford  University  Press, 
1998),  pp19,22,60-61  &  95). 
27  See  Fentiman,  Foreign  Law;  S.  Geeroms,  Foreign  Law  in  Civil  Litigation:  A  Comparative 
and  Functional  Analysis  (Oxford  University  Press,  2004). 
28  Fentiman,  Foreign  Law,  Chap.  9;  T.  C.  Hartley,  "Pleading  and  proof  of  foreign  law:  the  major 
European  systems  compared"  (1996)  45  ICLQ  271;  Georoms,  Foreign  Law. 
29  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p58;  although  see  Tetley,  "On-going  saga",  40-41, 
discussing  the  case  of  Belliveau  v  Royal  Bank  of  Canada  (2000)  224  NBR  (2d)  354. 
30  See  Chap.  3. 
31  As  Fentiman  observes  "a  case's  foreign  elements  are  important  because  they  allow  courts  to 
arrive  at  results  which  reflect  a  case's  true  nature"  (Fentiman,  Foreign  Law,  p308). 
32  Geeroms,  Foreign  Law,  para  2.57;  and  see  Fentiman:  "the  obligation  to  introduce  foreign  law 
connotes  more  than  a  duty  to  rely  upon  foreign  law.  It  implies  a  requirement  that  a  case  should 
be  fought  as  a  conflicts  case"  (Fentiman,  Foreign  Law,  p70). 
111 receptive  to  other  systems  of  law.  It  is  not  theoretically  problematic  to  place  a 
duty  upon  the  judge  within  an  adversarial  system,  to  introduce  the  question  of 
applicability  of  foreign  law,  where  prima  facie  indicated  by  choice  of  law  rules.  33 
The  judge  has  available  as  a  sanction  the  power  to  dismiss  cases  which  ignore  a 
conflicts  issue.  34  The  move  towards  greater  judicial  case  management  in  certain 
types  of  action35  would  also  lend  itself  to  the  exercise  of  such  a  judicial  duty. 
Methods  of  proof  of  English  law 
The  content  of  English  law,  like  that  of  any  other  foreign  law,  can  be  admitted  by 
the  opposing  party,  36  or  can  be  proved  by  leading  an  expert  witness,  37  or  remitting 
to  a  foreign  lawyer.  38  English  statute  law  cannot  simply  be  interpreted  by  a  Scots 
court  as  if  it  were  a  UK  statute.  39  There  is  legislation  allowing  a  court  within  the 
Crown's  dominions  to  give  its  opinion  on  the  application  of  its  law  to  certain 
facts,  40  and  arguably  the  terms  of  the  statute  would  not  prevent  it  applying  as 
between  the  jurisdictions  of  the  UK.  There  is  evidence  of  its  use  in  just  such  a 
fashion.  1  The  usefulness  of  such  a  provision  should  not  be  overlooked. 
Fentiman  has  described  the  Act  as  requiring  "effectively,  a  mini-trial  abroad",  42 
but  it  might  be  questioned  whether  the  expense  of  carrying  out  such  an  exercise  in 
England  is  necessarily  much  more  costly  or  time-consuming  than  hearing 
evidence  from  English  experts  in  the  Scottish  courts.  In  certain  cases,  this  may  be 
a  worthwhile  method  of  proceeding,  and  is  at  least  an  option  which  should  not  be 
rejected  out  of  hand. 
33  Fentiman,  Foreign  Law,  pp63  &  267;  Georoms,  Foreign  Law,  paras  2.121-2.126.  Nor  is  the 
mandatory  introduction  of  foreign  law  incompatible  with  that  law  being  a  factual  matter  which 
requires  to  be  proved  (Fentiman,  Foreign  Law,  pp267-268). 
34  See  Fentiman,  Foreign  Law,  p68. 
35  For  example  commercial  actions  in  the  Court  of  Session. 
36  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p776;  Crawford,  International  Private  Law, 
para  4.12. 
37  Ross  with  Chalmers,  Walker  and  Walker,  para  16.5.4.  See,  for  example,  McKeand  v  Dorian 
2000  GWD  15-578. 
38  Ross  with  Chalmers,  Walker  and  Walker,  para  16.5.3. 
39  Higgins  v  Ewing's  Trs  1925  SLT  329. 
40  British  Law  Ascertainment  Act  1859  (22  &  23  Viet),  c.  63. 
41  Earl  of  Eglinton  v  Laib  (1867)  15  LT  657  (case  to  be  stated  for  the  opinion  of  Scots  court); 
Duncan  v  Lawson  (1889)  41  ChD  394  (a  remit  from  the  Court  of  Session);  a  reference  to  the 
Scottish  courts  was  also  suggested  as  a  possible  course  in  Re  Stirling  [1908]  2  Ch  344. 
42  Fentiman,  Foreign  Law,  p239. 
112 Are  there  grounds  for  altering  the  rules  on  the  methods  of  proving  English  law  in 
Scotland?  It  has  been  argued  that  the  content  of  foreign  law  is  now  so  easily 
ascertainable  that  it  should  be  possible  in  Scots  courts  for  parties  to  research 
foreign  law  and  place  the  relevant  information  before  a  judge,  thus  dispensing 
with  the  need  to  lead  expert  evidence.  3  It  may  be  thought  that  this  reasoning  is 
particularly  valid  with  respect  to  English  law.  Scottish  lawyers  have  often  in  the 
past  had  to  make  reference  to  English  legal  writing,  44  and  often  still  rely  on 
English  cases  which  are  effectively  authoritative  in  Scotland.  However,  it  is  45 
submitted  that  this  would  be  a  path  fraught  with  danger.  There  would  be  practical 
difficulties  with  legal  aid  rules,  46  and  the  professional  indemnity  insurance  of 
counsel  and  agents,  although  neither  of  these  should  be  insurmountable.  The 
more  fundamental  objection  is  that  whilst  English  law  might  be  similar  to  Scots 
law  and  accessible  to  Scots  lawyers  in  some  areas,  in  others  it  is  quite  different. 
The  potential  for  misunderstanding  a  system  in  which  the  Scots  lawyer  has  not 
been  trained,  and  consequently  misapplying  the  law,  is  great.  As  Dewar  Gibb  has 
pointed  out: 
"Each  system  has  an  idiom  and  the  genius  of  a  language.  Just  as  a  language  is 
best  expounded,  not  by  the  ignorant  foreigner  who  has  never  studied  it  but  by  a 
person  steeped  in  it  for  a  lifetime,  so  is  it  with  the  law  of  a  country"  47 
More  recently,  Lord  Reed  has  perceptively  noted  that: 
"a  legal  system  is  more  than  an  accumulation  of  solutions  to  problems:  even  if 
two  legal  systems  provided  identical  solutions  to  all  the  most  common 
43  Macphail,  Evidence,  para  2.08,  commenting  on  proposals  from  the  Canadian  Law  Reform 
Commission. 
44  Although  over  the  years  there  has  been  a  welcome  increase  in  the  quantity  of  legal  texts 
dealing  specifically  with  aspects  of  Scots  law:  see  C.  McDiarmid,  "Scots  law:  the  turning  of 
the  tide"  1999  JR  156  at  165-166. 
45  For  example,  Carlill  v  Carbolic  Smoke  Ball  Co.  [1893]  1  QB  256;  Henderson  v  Merrett 
Syndicates  Ltd  [1995]  2  AC  145;  Associated  Picture  Houses  v  Nednesbury  Corporation 
[1948]  1  KB  233;  and  see  McDiarmid,  "Scots  law:  the  turning  of  the  tide",  161-163. 
46  See,  for  example,  The  Scottish  Legal  Aid  Board,  The  Scottish  Legal  Aid  Handbook,  60,  cdn. 
(Scottish  Legal  Aid  Board,  2001),  pA:  17,  para  1.11.8. 
47  Gibb,  Law  from  over  the  Border,  p2. 
113 problems  of  life,  they  could  nevertheless  remain  profoundly  foreign  to  each 
other's  practitioners". 
48 
A  slightly  different  response  has  been  adopted  in  England.  Generally,  foreign  law 
is  a  matter  of  fact,  which  requires  to  be  proved.  However,  if  a  point  of  foreign 
law  has  been  the  subject  of  a  decision  by  a  higher  civil  or  criminal  court,  the 
report  of  that  case  provides  proof  of  foreign  law  in  subsequent  civil  cases,  unless 
disputed  by  a  party  to  the  action.  49  Macphail  has  argued  that  such  a  provision 
could  usefully  be  introduced  into  Scots  law.  50  However,  this  is  to  make  the 
(unrealistic)  assumption  that  foreign  law  is  static  and  unchanging.  If  a  foreign 
law  is  to  be  applied,  it  is  desirable  that  that  law,  in  its  current  form,  is  accurately 
applied.  51  Otherwise,  the  rule  becomes  an  artificial  presumption,  somewhat 
ridiculously  allowing  historic  rules,  which  may  no  longer  be  the  law,  to  be  relied 
upon  in  the  absence  of  challenge  by  the  opposing  party. 
If  Scots  lawyers  are  required  to  prove  English  law  by  the  leading  of  evidence,  are 
there  any  grounds  for  allowing  English  lawyers  to  appear  in  Scots  courts  in  a 
representative  capacity  to  deal  with  such  points?  In  Hoekstra  v  HMA52  both 
Dutch  and  Scots  advocates  were  allowed  to  appear  for  the  appellants.  It  is  also 
understood  that  English  barristers  have  attempted  to  assert  rights  of  audience 
before  the  Inner  House,  in  an  appeal  from  an  Employment  Tribunal.  It  is 
submitted  that  allowing  English  counsel  to  appear  in  Scots  courts  would  have 
serious,  and  damaging,  consequences.  It  would  be  a  short  step  to  allowing 
barristers  to  argue  points  thought  to  be  common  to  the  whole  of  the  UK.  Larger 
corporations,  or  English-based  parties,  may  simply  instruct  English  counsel, 
thereby  putting  Scots  practices  at  risk.  There  is  also  a  risk  that  points  of 
48  Lord  Reed,  "The  constitutionalisation  of  private  law",  69. 
49  Civil  Evidence  Act  1972,  c.  30,  s4.  This  is  not  possible  in  Scotland  at  common  law  (Kille:  v 
Killen  1981  SLT  (Sh  Ct)  77  at  82). 
so  Macphail,  Evidence,  para  2.07. 
51  Insofar  as  any  application  of  foreign  law  can  be  described  as  accurate.  Fentiman  makes  the 
point  well  that  "We  need  not  expect  the  proof  of  foreign  law  to  produce  a  correct  result,  any 
more  than  the  process  of  adjudication  ever  does  so.  But  we  may  insist  that  the  process  be 
authentic,  capturing  the  assumptions,  reasoning  and  idiom  of  the  foreign  forum"  (Fentiman, 
Foreign  Law,  p20). 
52  (28  January  2000,  unreported). 
114 difference  between  the  two  systems  become  lost,  as  the  Scots  system  becomes 
swamped  by  the  personnel  of  our  larger  neighbour. 
It  is  therefore  submitted  that  there  is  no  reason  why,  in  principle,  English  law 
should  be  any  easier  to  prove  than  the  laws  of  a  politically  foreign  jurisdiction. 
The  possibility  of  agreeing,  in  effect,  to  proceed  upon  a  version  of  the  law  which 
may  be  out  of  date  (as  with  the  English  Civil  Evidence  Act  1972),  seems  to 
undermine  the  goal  of  reaching  a  conclusion  on  the  foreign  law,  such  as  would 
have  been  arrived  at  by  a  court  of  that  foreign  country.  Nor,  for  the  reasons 
outlined  above,  would  it  be  of  benefit  to  allow  English  lawyers  to  appear  in  a 
Scots  court  and  present  cases  in  which  a  question  of  English  law  arises  (as 
opposed  to  the  unobjectionable  practice  of  leading  such  lawyers  as  expert 
witnesses  in  the  course  of  a  proof).  In  appropriate  cases,  however,  the  procedure 
under  the  British  Law  Ascertainment  Act  1859  might  be  worth  adopting,  and  thus 
its  potential  in  intra-UK  cases  should  not  be  forgotten  by  practitioners. 
One  quirk  in  the  system  is,  however,  provided  by  the  position  of  the  House  of 
Lords.  The  laws  of  all  parts  of  the  UK  are  deemed  to  be  within  their  Lordships' 
judicial  knowledge.  53  Hence,  what  has  been  a  matter  of  fact  and  proof  below, 
may  become  a  matter  of  law  and  argument  above.  Moreover,  if  evidence  of 
English  law  has  been  led  in  the  Scottish  courts,  the  House  of  Lords  may  rely  on 
their  own  knowledge  of  English  law  to  find  the  opinion  evidence  mistaken.  54  The 
extent  to  which  the  ability  of  the  House  of  Lords  to  call  upon  English  and  Scottish 
law  has  resulted  in  the  introduction  of  English  concepts  into  Scots  law  has  already 
been  noted.  55 
The  connecting  factor  in  matters  of  status 
The  connecting  factor  may  provide  the  basis  on  which  a  court  takes  jurisdiction  in 
areas  such  as  divorce,  or  dictate  which  law  is  to  be  applied,  for  example,  to 
questions  of  capacity  to  marry.  Despite  increasing  encroachment  by  the  use  of 
53  Presumably  this  would  also  be  the  case  in  the  Supreme  Court  proposed  by  the  current 
government  (see  pp63-64  above). 
54  Macpherson  v  Macpherson  (1852)  1  Macq.  243  per  Lord  Chancellor  St.  Leonards  at  248. 
55  See  pp61-63  above. 
115 concepts  such  as  habitual  residence,  56  domicile  remains  perhaps  the  most 
important  connecting  factor  in  matters  of  status  within  both  jurisdictions  of  the 
UK.  57  Traditionally,  however,  domicile  has  been  seen  as  a  badge  of  a  Common 
Law  system,  whereas  the  use  of  nationality  as  a  connecting  factor  is  more  closely 
linked  to  civil  law  countries.  58  Why  then  has  the  former  been  favoured  in 
Scotland?  Why,  indeed,  is  a  connecting  factor  required  to  link  persons  to 
Scotland,  rather  than  to  the  UK? 
The  answers  to  these  questions  can  be  traced  back  to  the  Acts  of  Union.  As  has 
been  seen,  the  system  of  the  Acts  was  to  establish  one  nation  state  (Britain),  but  to 
preserve  two  legal  systems.  This  constitutional  set-up  was  already  in  place  when 
the  use  of  nationality  as  a  connecting  factor  gained  significant  ground.  59 
Accordingly  nationality  could  not  operate  as  an  adequate  connecting  factor  in  the 
UK,  since  this  would  not  indicate  which  system  of  private  law  should  govern,  for 
example,  issues  of  capacity  to  marry,  or  choice  of  law  in  succession.  Instead  a 
connecting  factor  was  required  to  link  persons  to  a  particular  legal  system  within 
Britain,  and  the  concept  of  domicile  could  fulfil  this  role.  Thus  whilst  shorthand 
references  are  often  made  to  a  Scots  domicile,  it  must  be  remembered  that  this 
domicile  does  not  connect  a  person  to  Scotland  per  se,  but  rather  to  the  Scots 
legal  system.  Even  proponents  of  the  use  of  nationality  as  a  connecting  factor, 
such  as  Mancini,  recognised  that  domicile  was  more  appropriate  where  a  state 
consisted  of  a  number  of  legal  systems.  60 
The  nature  of  domicile  in  both  England  and  Scotland,  with  the  persistence  of  the 
domicile  of  origin,  is  often  said  to  spring  from  the  position  of  Britain  as  the 
headquarters  of  an  Empire,  and  the  consequent  desire  to  preserve  ties  between  the 
56  See,  for  example,  Child  Abduction  and  Custody  Act  1985,  c.  60;  the  Brussels  II  Regulation. 
Ordinary  residence  can  also  be  of  relevance.  See  P.  North,  Private  International  Law 
Problems  in  Compton  Law  Jurisdictions  (Martinus  Nijhoff,  1993),  pp8-9. 
57  It  remains,  for  example,  of  significance  in  questions  of  choice  of  law  in  succession,  capacity  to 
marry,  and  status  generally. 
58  K.  H.  Nadelmann,  "Mancini's  nationality  rule  and  non-unified  legal  systems:  nationality  versus 
domicile"  in  K.  H.  Nadelmann,  Conflict  of  Laws:  International  and  Interstate  (Martinus 
Nijhoff,  1972),  p49  at  49. 
59  Crawford,  International  Private  Lativ,  para  6.28. 
60  Nadelmann,  "Mancini's  nationality  rule  and  non-unif  ied  systems",  p49. 
116 Empire's  servants  and  their  homeland.  61  As  has  already  been  noted,  the  British 
Empire  was  an  enterprise  in  which  Scots  are  now  recognised  to  have  played  a 
significant  part,  62  and  thus  this  rationale  is  as  important  for  Scotland,  as  for 
England,  in  the  development  of  domicile  rules.  Both  before,  and  after,  she  gained 
access  to  a  British  Empire,  Scotland  saw  periods  of  mass  emigration.  63  Again, 
this  may  tend  to  buttress  a  concept  of  domicile  which  retains  links  with  its 
peoples,  however  far  they  may  have  travelled.  64  A  contrast  can  be  made  with  the 
United  States,  which  over  the  centuries  has  been  a  receiver  of  immigrants,  and 
thus  logically  favours  domicile  rules  which  lay  emphasis  on  easy  changes  of 
domicile.  65  In  fact,  cases  now  regarded  in  England  and  Scotland  as  seminal  on 
the  continuance  of  the  domicile  of  origin,  66  and  the  revival  of  the  domicile  of 
origin,  67  were  actually  Scottish  cases  heard  by  the  House  of  Lords  on  appeal. 
It  has  been  suggested  in  the  past  that  it  may  be  easier  for  a  person  to  change  his 
domicile  as  between  the  jurisdictions  of  the  UK,  than  between  Scotland  and  a 
politically  foreign  country.  Is  this  so?  The  connecting  factor  of  nationality  is 
"state-centred":  68  nationality  is  in  the  gift  of  a  state,  and  will  generally  only  be 
gained  or  lost  as  a  result  of  application  by  the  citizen  to  the  state.  Political 
changes  to  the  state  may  affect  a  person's  nationality,  69  but  less  commonly  his 
domicile.  Indeed  domicile,  by  contrast,  is  "person-centred".  70  It  has  been  well- 
described  as  a  person's  "'legal'  centre  of  gravity"  7'  Based  as  it  is  on  a  number  of 
factors  concerning  a  person's  residence,  intention  and  state  of  mind,  it  is  open  to  a 
person  to  change  his  domicile  at  his  own  hand.  It  is  not  dependent  on  acceptance 
by  a  state.  At  their  most  general  level,  the  rules  of  domicile  are  designed  to 
61  J.  G.  Collier,  Conflict  of  Laws,  3`d  edn.  (Cambridge  University  Press,  2001)  pp5l-52;  R.  H. 
Graveson,  "The  law  of  domicile  in  the  twentieth  century"  in  R.  H.  Graveson,  Comparative 
Conflict  of  Laws  (North-Holland,  1977),  Vol  I,  p160  at  160. 
62  See  pp76-77  above. 
63  See,  for  example,  Devine,  Scotland's  Empire,  Chaps  1,5  &  6. 
64  C.  Robertson,  "International  succession  law:  a  co-ordinated  approach?  "  (1989)  34  JLSS  377  at 
379. 
63  Ibid.;  Collier,  Conflict  ofLaivs,  p51. 
66  Bell  v  Kennedy  (1868)  6M  (HL)  69. 
67  Udny  v  Udny  (1869)  7M  (HL)  89. 
68  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p  123. 
69  See  Re  O'Keefe  [1940]  Ch  124,  in  which  a  British  national  who  had  a  domicile  of  origin  in  the 
south  of  Ireland  (and  had  acquired  an  Italian  domicile  of  choice)  was  held  to  be  a  national  of 
the  new  Republic  of  Ireland,  on  her  death. 
70  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p123. 
71  K.  McK.  Norrie,  "Personal  law:  concept  and  development"  1983  SLT  (News)  53  at  53. 
117 identify  the  legal  system,  rather  than  the  political  state,  with  which  the  propositus 
is  most  closely  linked.  It  is  therefore  submitted  that,  in  theory,  the  fact  that  the 
competing  legal  systems  in  a  question  of  domicile  are  part  of  one  political  country 
should  make  no  difference  to  the  application  of  the  rules  on  domicile.  Domicile 
eschews  the  political  influence  of  the  state  implicit  in  a  nationality-based 
connecting  factor.  The  factors  which  are  taken  into  account  in  determining 
whether  a  person  has  altered  his  domicile  are  not  tied  inseparably  to  notions  of 
political  state.  Whilst  it  may  in  the  past  have  been  easier  to  move  from  Scotland 
to  England,  than  to  a  country  outwith  the  UK,  72  in  principle,  this  touches  only  on 
the  residence  component  of  domicile,  which  factually  and  legally  is  easily 
changed  within  one  sovereign  state.  Furthermore,  such  practical  ease  of 
movement  is  not  available  only  within  a  politically  unified  nation.  The  existence 
in  the  past  of  a  large  Empire,  together  with  certain  government  encouragement  of 
migration,  allowed  inexpensive  movement  to  English-speaking  countries,  where 
newly-arrived  immigrants  remained  under  the  protection  of  the  British  Crown.  In 
modem  times,  the  European  Union  has  introduced  measures  to  allow  workers  to 
move  within  Europe,  with  certain  minimum  rights  guaranteed.  In  theory  then,  it 
should  be  no  easier  to  change  domicile  as  between  Scotland  and  England,  than 
Scotland  and  other  countries. 
It  is  submitted  that  this  is  supported  by  the  case  law.  In  the  case  of  Liverpool 
Royal  Infirmary  v  Ranisay73  a  Scotsman  lived  in  Liverpool  for  almost  forty  years, 
and  showed  no  desire  to  return  to  Scotland.  However,  it  was  found  that  his  move 
to  Liverpool  was  motivated  by  a  wish  to  obtain  support  from  his  family  in 
Liverpool,  and  that  his  long  residence  there  was  not  coupled  with  the  requisite 
intent  to  effect  a  change  of  his  Scottish  domicile.  There  is  no  suggestion  in  the 
72  See  the  comments  of  Sir  Jocelyn  Simon  P  in  the  English  case  of  Henderson  v  Henderson 
[1967]  P  77  at  79-80:  "England  and  Scotland  have  distinctive  legal  systems.  But  the  high 
roads  between  the  two  countries  are  not  barred  by  any  frontier;  there  is  merely  a  border  to  be 
crossed.  A  common  tongue  is  spoken  on  either  side.  Many  English  people  go  to  work  in 
Scotland  and  even  more  Scotsmen  come  to  work  in  England.  They  settle  down  in  a  new  home 
near  the  place  where  they  are  working.  Intermarriage  is  frequent.  But  most  people,  and  not 
least  Scotsmen,  retain  a  pride  of  ancestry  and  a  sentiment  of  attachment  to  the  land  of  their 
fathers.  It  is  often  difficult  to  determine  whether  they  have  settled  in  their  new  place  of 
residence  with  the  intention  of  making  it  their  permanent  home;  or  whether  they  intend  to 
return  at  some  time  to  live  permanently  in  their  country  of  origin;  or  whether,  thirdly,  the 
residence  is  quite  indeterminate  in  character,  no  clear  intention  as  to  ultimate  permanent 
residence  being  formed". 
73  1930SC(HL)83. 
118 judgments  of  a  less  stringent  test  for  acquisition  of  a  new  domicile  within  the 
UK.  74  The  more  recent  cross-border  case  of  Reddingtorz  v  Riach's  Executor75  may 
have  found  there  to  be  a  loss  of  Scottish  domicile,  but  again  there  is  no  indication 
that  the  judge  directed  himself  to  a  different  test  because  the  issue  was  whether 
the  propositus  had  a  Scottish  or  English  domicile.  76  Furthermore,  as  Lord  Sands 
once  observed  "[r]esidence  in  England,  or  other  relations  with  England,  will  never 
establish  a  domicile  in  Scotland".  77 
Some  nations  which  make  use  of  domicile  as  a  connecting  factor  do  appear  to 
allow  easier  alteration  of  domicile  within  a  country,  but  this  effect  has  been 
achieved  by  legislation.  In  New  Zealand  there  are  rules  to  assign  domicile  when  a 
person  arrives  in  the  country  with  a  clear  intention  to  stay  in  New  Zealand,  but  is 
as  yet  uncertain  as  to  the  part  of  the  country  in  which  he  will  settle.  78  Such 
legislation,  however,  only  affects  new  arrivals  to  the  country.  Australian 
legislation  on  this  topic  is  more  far-reaching.  Anyone  who  is  "domiciled  in  a 
union,  but  is  not  ... 
domiciled  in  any  particular  one  of  the  countries  that  together 
form  the  union",  will  be  assigned  the  domicile  of  the  country  "with  which  he  has 
for  the  time  being  the  closest  connection".  79  It  might  be  speculated  that  this 
legislation  makes  it  easier  to  assign  to  an  immigrant  the  domicile  of  one  of  the 
Australian  states,  even  if  it  is  not  yet  clear  in  which  state  he  will  ultimately  settle. 
Perhaps  the  legislation  reflects  Australia's  status,  like  the  United  States,  as  a 
receiver  of  immigrants.  In  the  past,  the  Law  Commissions  have  recommended 
legislation  on  the  Australian  model,  although  alert  to  the  very  real  danger  that  a 
domicile  may  be  allocated  which  does  not  spring  from  particularly  close  ties  with 
74  See  also  Sellars  v  Sellars  1942  SC  206,  in  which  an  English  domiciliary  posted  in  Scotland 
during  the  Second  World  War  was  unable  to  establish  the  acquisition  of  a  Scottish  domicile  of 
choice. 
75  2002  SLT  537. 
76  It  might,  however,  be  thought  after  comparison  of  Liverpool  Royal  Infirmary  v  Ramsay  1930 
SC (HL)  83;  and  Reddington  v  Riach's  Executor  2002  SLT  537,  that  the  task  of  dislodging  the 
domicile  of  origin,  whatever  it  be,  has  become  easier  in  modem  times. 
77  Grant  v  Grant  1931  SC  238  at  254. 
7$  Law  Com.  No  168/Scot.  Law  Com.  No  107,  Private  International  Laiv:  the  Law  of  Domicile 
(Cm  200)  (1987),  para  7.6.  Note,  for  historical  interest,  what  was  effectively  the  allocation  of 
a  domicile  within  the  UK  to  refugees  in  the  Guardianship  (Refugee  Children)  Act  1944  (7  &8 
Geo  VI),  c.  8,  s2. 
79  Domicile  Act  1982,  sl1. 
119 the  jurisdiction  in  question.  80  Looked  at  solely  in  terms  of  alteration  of  domicile 
as  between  the  jurisdictions  of  the  UK,  it  is  submitted  that  there  is  no  good 
theoretical  reason  for  the  introduction  of  such  legislation.  The  concept  of 
domicile  is  sufficiently  subtle,  and  flexible,  to  deal  with  movement  of  persons 
between  Scotland  and  England. 
However,  modem  times  have  seen  a  weakening  of  the  claims  of  both  domicile81 
and  nationality82  to  be  pre-eminent  connecting  factors  within  the  law  of  persons. 
There  is  now  a  range  of  connecting  factors,  mostly  variations  on  residence,  for 
example,  habitual  residence  or  ordinary  residence.  Poland  once  had  two  different 
connecting  factors,  one  for  conflicts  with  other  countries  and  one  for  conflicts 
within  Poland.  83  Scots  law  has  never  embraced  such  an  approach.  Whilst  it  now 
recognises  a  number  of  possible  connecting  factors,  the  applicability  of  these  is 
determined  on  a  topical,  rather  than  geographical,  basis.  More  recently,  however, 
the  possibility  of  different  connecting  factors  being  used  within  the  UK,  from 
those  relevant  to  foreign  states,  has  arisen.  Conventions  and  legislation  from  the 
European  Union  may  prescribe  a  connecting  factor  between  members  states,  but 
the  UK  may  be  free  to  choose  whether  to  apply  the  European  rules  as  between  its 
constituent  parts.  This  issue  will  be  examined  in  a  later  chapter.  84 
It  would  also  be  possible  for  different  connecting  factors  to  be  adopted  by  the 
Scots  and  English  legal  systems  respectively  in  a  particular  area.  Were  this  to 
occur,  would  it  be  desirable?  It  is  instructive  to  look  at  jurisdiction  in  custody 
matters  prior  to  the  passing  of  the  Family  Law  Act  1986.  Scottish  courts  would 
assume  jurisdiction  on  the  basis  of  the  child's  domicile  as  a  matter  of  status, 
whereas  English  courts  were  prepared  to  take  jurisdiction  if  the  child  was 
80  Law  Com.  No  168/Scot.  Law  Com.  No  107,  Private  International  Law:  the  Law  of  Domicile 
(Cm  200)  (1987),  paras  7.8  &  7.4. 
81  See,  for  example,  North  &  Fawcett,  Cheshire  and  North's  Private  International  Law,  pp160- 
162;  Law  Commission/Scottish  Law  Commission,  Custody  of  Children  -  Jurisdiction  and 
Enforcement  within  the  United  Kingdom  (Working  Paper  No  68/Memorandum  No  23)  (1976), 
paras  3.44-3.52. 
82  Nadelmann,  "Mancini's  nationality  rule  and  non-unified  systems",  p81;  Th.  M.  dc  Boer  &  R. 
Kotting,  "Private  international  law"  in  J.  M.  J.  Chorus  et  al.,  Introduction  to  Dutch  Law,  3`d 
revised  edn.  (Kluwer  Law  International,  1999),  p265  at  276. 
83  Nadelmann,  "Mancini's  nationality  rule  and  non-unified  systems",  p74;  Lasok  &  Stone, 
Conflict  of  Laws  in  the  European  Community,  pp126-127. 
84  See  Chap.  6. 
120 resident,  or  present,  in  England  as  a  matter  of  protection.  The  use  of  these 
different  connecting  factors  meant  that  both  courts  might  claim  jurisdiction  in  the 
same  case.  This  occurred  in  Stuart  v  Moore,  85  and  having  both  assumed 
jurisdiction,  the  Court  of  Session  and  the  English  Chancery  Court  delivered 
opinions,  each  at  variance  with  the  other.  In  Babington  v  Babington86  the  Court 
of  Session  considered  it  had  jurisdiction  based  on  the  child's  domicile,  and  would 
not  decline  jurisdiction  in  favour  of  an  English  court  which  took  jurisdiction  on 
the  ground  of  the  child's  presence.  The  ultimate  result  was  two  irreconcilable 
decrees.  This  is  as  undesirable  within  the  UK,  as  it  is  on  a  wider  stage. 
Interestingly,  in  modem  times  a  proposed  bill  on  civil  partnerships  in  England  and 
Wales  required  only  the  residence  of  one  of  the  parties  in  the  UK  for  cohabitants 
to  be  able  to  register  their  relationship,  and  thus  obtain  particular  rights  in  law.  87 
A  later  bill  on  this  subject  altered  the  connecting  factor  to  habitual  residence  or 
domicile  (of  one  partner),  and  narrowed  the  territory  indicated  by  that  connecting 
factor  to  England  and  Wales.  88  This  raised  the  possibility  of  a  Scottish 
domiciliary,  unable  by  virtue  of  Scots  common  law  to  enter  into  a  marriage  with 
someone  of  the  same  gender,  entering  into  a  statutory  civil  partnership  under  such 
an  English  statute.  Would  Scots  law  recognise  the  relationship?  89  It  now  seems, 
however,  that  this  matter  is  to  be  dealt  with  by  UK  wide  legislation:  another 
potential  conflict  internalised?  90 
Perhaps  the  most  radical  suggestion  in  the  field  of  connecting  factors  in  questions 
of  status  is  the  argument  that  connecting  factors,  in  the  sense  of  a  link  to  a  legal 
system  other  than  the  one  in  which  a  person  is  present,  should  be  abolished 
altogether.  Raeburn  has  argued  that  it  should  be  acknowledged  that  public  policy 
considerations  dictate  the  use  of  these  connecting  factors  91  This  may  well  be  one 
85  (1860)  22  D  1504;  (1861)  23  D  51,446,595,902. 
86  1955  SC  115. 
87  Relationships  (Civil  Registration)  Bill  2001,  cl.  1(1). 
88  Civil  Partnerships  Bill  2002,  cl.  2(1)(b). 
89  Examining  similar  Scandinavian  legislation,  Norrie  reasoned  that  a  registered  homosexual 
partnership,  entered  into  by  a  Scots  couple  abroad,  would  not  be  recognised  in  Scotland 
(K.  McK.  Norrie,  "Reproductive  technology,  transsexualism  and  homosexuality:  new  problems 
for  international  private  law"  (1994)  43  ICLQ  757). 
90  See  pp105  above  &  150-151  below,  and  on  the  internalisation  of  conflicts  generally,  Chap.  4. 
91  W.  Raeburn,  "Dispensing  with  the  personal  law"  (1963)  12  ICLQ  125.  Such  considerations 
are  certainly  apparent  in  Law  Com.  No  168/Scot.  Law  Com.  No  107,  Private  International 
Law:  the  Law  of  Domicile  (Cm  200)  (1987),  para  3.6,  in  the  comment  that  habitual  residence 
121 aspect  of  the  development  and  application  of  connecting  factors.  Since  it  will  be 
argued  in  a  later  chapter  that  despite  the  union  of  Scotland  and  England  in  a  single 
political  framework,  reliance  on  public  policy  objections  within  the  UK  remains 
possible  in  Scots  law,  92  this  does  not  undermine  the  case  for  retaining  these 
connecting  factors  within  the  UK.  In  any  event,  it  is  submitted  that  the  use  of 
such  connecting  factors  is  still  valuable  in  the  quest  to  identify  the  most 
appropriate  legal  system  to  determine  important  matters  such  as  status. 
Property  law 
Property  law  has  traditionally  been  seen  as  an  area  of  the  law  where  the  civilian 
influences  on  Scots  law  are  much  in  evidence.  Reid  has  opined  that: 
"Scots  law  is  a  mixed  legal  system,  but  it  is  a  mixture  in  which  the  ingredients 
are  unevenly  distributed 
... 
Property  law  is  nine  parts  Roman  to  one  part 
feudal  and,  except  in  the  related  field  of  the  law  of  trusts,  English  law  has  little 
or  no  place".  93 
In  Scots  law  property  rights  are  generally  easily  verifiable  through  public  records, 
and  matters  are  usually  'black  and  white':  one  either  possesses  a  real  right  to 
property  which  can  be  ascertained,  or  one  does  not,  and  has  only  a  personal  right. 
English  law,  however,  contains  rather  more  shades  of  grey,  the  influence  of  the 
separate  equity  jurisdiction  having  created  a  multitude  of  rights  to  property  which 
are  not  a  matter  of  public  record.  94  Furthermore,  the  remedy  of  specific 
implement  has  always  had  a  significance  in  Scotland  unknown  to  the  law  of 
England.  95 
"would  cut  the  links  between  many  temporary  expatriates  and  their  homeland,  isolating  them 
and  their  dependants  from  its  law  and  courts  despite  their  remaining  closely  connected  with 
that  country.  The  results  would  be  particularly  dramatic  where  the  cultural  background  of  the 
country  of  habitual  residence,  as  reflected  in  its  law,  was  very  different  or  even  alien  to  the 
culture  of  the  person's  own  country". 
92  See  Chap.  7. 
93  K.  G.  C.  Reid,  "Sharp  v  Thomson:  a  civilian  perspective"  1995  SLT  (News)  75  at  75.  Sec  too 
Smits,  The  Making  of  European  Private  Law,  p112. 
9,  See,  for  example,  P.  Birks  (cd.  ),  English  Private  Law,  Vol  I  (Oxford  University  Press,  2000), 
Chaps  4&5. 
95  D.  M.  Walker,  The  Law  of  Civil  Remedies  in  Scotland  (W.  Green  &  Son,  1974),  pp276-277. 
122 For  the  purposes  of  international  private  law,  however,  both  countries  adopt  the 
classification  of  property  into  immoveables  and  moveables.  This  terminology  is 
quite  different  from  the  English  domestic  categories,  and  there  is  not  an  exact 
correspondence  between  the  two.  96  In  the  Canadian  Common  Law  context, 
Castel  has  argued  that: 
"to  arrive  at  an  internationally  accepted  basis  upon  which  to  solve  ... 
disputes, 
Canadian  courts  do  not  use  the  common  law  technical  distinction  between 
realty  and  personalty.  The  more  natural  civil  law  distinction  between 
movables  and  immovables  has  been  adopted,  even  in  situations  involving 
property  located  in  common  law  jurisdictions".  7 
In  Scots  law  there  is  a  closer  similarity  between  the  domestic  and  the  international 
classifications,  both  in  terminology  and  in  content.  Whilst  it  is  true  that  the 
concept  of  heritage  is  jettisoned  in  international  matters,  the  old  bond  and 
disposition  in  security  seems  to  be  the  only  case  where  the  categories  of  heritage 
and  immoveable  property  may  not  coincide.  98 
There  is  little  differentiation  in  the  generality  of  conflict  rules  in  Scots  property 
law  as  to  whether  English  law,  or  some  other  legal  system  is  involved  99  It  is 
submitted  that  this  can  be  accounted  for  by  a  number  of  factors.  The  Acts  of 
Union  preserved  the  distinct  legal  bases  of  the  two  systems  of  property  law. 
However,  the  existence  of  a  British  state  allowed  persons  to  travel  freely  between 
the  jurisdictions.  Together  with  the  shared  language,  and  the  increasing  ease  of 
travel  over  the  years,  this  made  cross-border  landholding  a  real  possibility  in 
Britain.  '00  By  contrast,  until  the  passing  of  the  Naturalization  Act  1870,  it  was 
96  For  example,  a  mortgage  is  personalty,  but  in  a  conflicts  context  immovable  (North  &  Fawcett, 
Cheshire  and  Norths  Private  International  Law,  p925). 
97  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p155. 
98  R.  D.  Leslie,  "Prior  rights  in  succession:  the  international  dimension"  1988  SLT  (News)  105  at 
106;  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  14.02.  An  English  court  might,  however, 
treat  a  Scottish  heritable  security  as  movable  (see  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International 
Law,  p600). 
99  In  contrast  the  position  when  property  law  comes  into  contact  with  commercial  law  has  been 
noted  in  Chap.  4  (see  pp84-89  above). 
100  For  example  the  propositus  in  the  cross-border  domicile  dispute  of  Marchioness  of  Huntly  v 
Gaskell  (1905)  8F  (HL)  4,  held  land  in  Scotland  and  England. 
123 not  possible  for  non-British  subjects  to  own  land  in  Scotland,  or  England.  10,  Thus 
at  a  time  when  conflict  of  laws  principles  applicable  to  property  were  developing, 
it  can  be  inferred  that  most  such  disputes  would  be  within  Britain.  102  Since  the 
property  laws  of  Scotland  and  England  differed  significantly,  the  rules  developed 
in  a  British  cross-border  setting  could  then  be  applied,  without  the  need  for  any 
further  alteration,  to  international  property  disputes.  Secondly,  property  law  has 
for  many  years  been  characterised  in  Scotland  by  a  lack  of  legislative 
intervention.  103  As  has  been  seen  in  the  last  chapter,  it  is  usually  through  statute 
that  internalising  solutions  are  introduced. 
Matters  of  succession 
Substantive  succession  law  is  an  area  which  has  been  approached  quite  differently 
on  either  side  of  the  Tweed,  thus  giving  rise  to  a  number  of  interesting  conflict 
questions.  104 
Perhaps  the  most  obvious  difference  in  domestic  law  between  the  jurisdictions 
over  the  years  has  been  the  attitude  to  provision  for  close  family  after  death. 
Whereas  in  Scotland,  the  spouse  and  children  have  long  had  indefeasible  rights  to 
fixed  portions  of  the  deceased's  estate,  in  England  a  system  of  complete  freedom 
of  testation  was  favoured.  English  law  has  gradually  moved  to  a  position  where 
the  courts  have  a  discretion  to  award  certain  relatives  and  others  part  of  the 
deceased's  estate.  105 
Potential  cross-border  conflicts  are  resolved  in  Scots  law  by  reliance  on  common 
law,  international  private  law,  rules.  If  the  deceased  died  domiciled  in  Scotland, 
101  1870  (33  &  34  Vict),  c.  14,  s2;  see,  for  example,  Leslie  v  Forbes  (1749)  Mor  4636. 
102  For  example,  cross-border  property  holdings  within  Britain  giving  rise  to  conflict  cases  in  the 
nineteenth  century  in  the  Scots  courts  include  Monteith  v  Monteith's  Trs  (1882)  9R  982  and 
Carruther's  Trs,  Allan's  Trs  (1896)  24  R  238;  and  in  the  English  courts,  Adams  v  Clutterbuck 
(1883)  10  QBD  403,  and  Duncan  v  Lawson  (1889)  41  ChD  394. 
103  Although  this  may  be  changing;  see  Title  Conditions  (Scotland)  Act  2003,  asp  9;  and  the 
current  proposals  for  legislation  on  the  law  of  the  tenement. 
104  Discussed  below.  As  to  the  future,  see  the  discussion  of  the  possibility  of  EU  legislation  at 
p158  below. 
ios  The  first  steps  were  taken  with  the  Inheritance  (Family  Provision)  Act  1938  (1  &2  Geo  VI), 
c.  45,  and  the  law  is  now  contained  in  the  Inheritance  (Provision  for  Family  and  Dependants) 
Act  1975,  c.  63,  discussed  below  at  p126. 
124 legal  rights  are  exigible  from  the  moveable  estate.  106  It  has  been  posited  that 
moveable  property,  situated  in  Scotland,  but  owned  by  an  English  domiciliary, 
could  not  be  used  to  satisfy  legal  rights.  107  Hence  domicile,  rather  than  sites,  is 
the  key.  This  result  seems  justifiable:  a  legal  obligation  to  provide  for  the 
immediate  family  after  death  reflects  the  morals  of  a  particular  society,  and  it 
would  seem  right  that  the  deceased  should  have  'belonged'  to  that  society  before 
he  is  made  subject  to  such  an  obligation.  The  Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964108 
also  established  certain  prior  rights  which  accrue  to  a  person's  spouse  on 
intestacy.  One  of  these  is  the  right  to  a  dwellinghouse  in  which  the  deceased  was 
ordinarily  resident,  and  had  a  relevant  interest.  109  Concerned  as  this  is  with 
immoveable  property,  it  is  the  lex  sites  which  determines  the  application  of  prior 
rights:  thus  a  widow  or  widower  has  a  right  to  such  a  house  if  it  is  situated  in 
Scotland,  but  not  if  it  is  in  England.  11°  This  reflects  the  continued  importance  of 
the  lex  Situs  in  questions  concerning  immoveables.  However,  a  further  right,  to 
furniture  and  plenishings  from  a  house  in  which  the  deceased  was  ordinarily 
resident,  "'  raises  a  nice  point.  Technically,  these  are  items  of  moveable  property, 
and  thus  should  be  available  to  a  spouse  in  fulfilment  of  his  prior  rights  if  the 
deceased  was  a  Scottish  domiciliary  at  the  date  of  death.  '  12  In  practice,  however, 
it  is  very  likely  that  the  furniture  and  plenishings  will  be  those  of  the 
dwellinghouse  referred  to  above.  113  There  would  therefore  seem  to  be  much  to 
recommend  the  view  that  the  furniture  and  plenishings  should  be  within  a  house 
in  Scotland  for  a  prior  right  to  them  to  be  exercised.  '  14  The  spouse  also  has  a 
right  to  a  cash  sum  from  the  estate.  This  is  only  applicable  in  respect  of 
106  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p673. 
107  D.  R.  Macdonald,  Succession,  3`d  edn.  (W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2001),  para  14.26. 
108  1964,  c.  41. 
109  Ibid.,  s8(1). 
110  M.  C.  Meston,  The  Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964,5th  edn.  (W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell, 
2002),  p133;  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  pp674-675. 
Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964,  s8(3),  (4). 
112  Scottish  Law  Commission,  Some  Miscellaneous  Topics  in  the  Law  of  Succession  (Memo  No 
71)  (1986),  para  6.2(b);  Meston,  The  Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964,  p134;  Anton  with 
Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p675. 
113  Although  they  may  not  be:  the  deceased  may  have  had  a  number  of  properties,  or  may  have 
been  ordinarily  resident  in  a  property  in  which  he  did  not  have  the  requisite  interest  demanded 
by  s8(1). 
114  Macdonald,  Succession,  para  14.29;  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p675; 
Leslie,  "Prior  rights  in  succession",  105  (in  which  he  argues  that  the  deceased  must  also  be 
domiciled  in  Scotland  at  death  because  the  furniture  and  plcnishings  are  moveable). 
125 moveables  belonging  to  the  deceased  if  the  deceased  was  domiciled  in  Scotland  at 
death,  and  in  respect  of  heritage  in  Scotland.  '  15 
The  statutory  discretionary  scheme  under  English  domestic  law  is  triggered  only 
where  the  deceased  was  a  domiciliary  of  England  and  Wales,  116  but  applies  in  a 
testate  or  intestate  succession.  117  A  spouse,  118  or  child,  119  or  someone  who  was 
maintained  by  the  deceased,  120  may  seek  an  order,  for  example,  for  a  payment 
from  the  estate  or  a  transfer  of  property.  121  The  test  is  that  reasonable  financial 
provision  has  not  been  made  for  that  person  in  the  succession.  122  This  is 
measured  in  terms  of  what  is  reasonably  required  for  his  or  her  maintenance, 
except  in  the  case  of  the  spouse,  where  it  is  determined  by  a  concept  of 
reasonableness.  123  There  are  a  number  of  factors  to  which  the  court  must  have 
regard  in  considering  the  making  of  such  an  order.  124 
However,  in  contrast  to  the  position  in  substantive  succession  law,  Scots  and 
English  law  rely  upon  the  same  conflict  rules.  In  both  there  is  an  adherence  to  the 
scission  principle,  and  the  same  connecting  factors  are  utilised  on  either  side  of 
the  border  with  respect  to  succession  to  heritage  and  to  moveables.  However,  the 
difference  between  the  domestic  laws  is  perceived  by  some  to  result  in,  for 
example,  unfair  windfalls.  125  The  Scottish  Law  Commission  has  argued  that  the 
operation  of  the  principle  leads  to  an  "anomaly  ... 
between  two  jurisdictions 
115  Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964,  s9  (Meston,  The  Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964,  pp134-135; 
Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Lawv,  p675).  Under  s8(1),  a  cash  sum  can  also  be 
claimed,  but  this  is  in  lieu  of  the  dwellinghouse,  and  thus  entitlement  is  also  determined  by  the 
lex  situs  since  it  is  a  surrogate  for  heritage  (Meston,  The  Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964, 
p134),  although  cf  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p675- 
117 
Inheritance  (Provision  for  Family  and  Dependants)  Act  1975,  sl(1). 
ýýý  Ibid. 
118  Ibid,  sl(1)(a);  and  also  a  former  spouse  who  has  not  remarried  (ibid.,  sl(1)(b)),  or  someone 
living  as  a  spouse  for  a  particular  period  of  time  (ibid.,  sl(1)(ba)  &  I(1A)). 
119  Ibid.,  sl(1)(c);  and  also  somebody  who  was  treated  as  a  child  of  the  family  by  the  deceased 
(ibid.,  sl(1)(d)). 
120  Ibid.,  sl(1)(e). 
121  Ibid.,  ssl(1)  &  2(1). 
122  Ibid.,  sl(1). 
123  Ibid.,  sl(2). 
124  Ibid.,  s3. 
'25  In  the  nineteenth  century  case  of  Train  v  Train's  Executrix  (1899)  2F  146,  the  Court  of 
Session  found  the  widow  of  an  Irish  domiciliary  to  be  entitled  to  terce  out  of  two  bonds  over 
Scottish  subjects,  since  the  bonds  were  heritable  in  Scots  law.  The  bonds  were,  however, 
classified  as  movable  under  the  law  in  Ireland  and  the  widow  accordingly  took  a  further  share 
of  the  bonds  under  that  law.  The  case  is  criticised  in  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private 
International  Law,  p599. 
126 which  attempt  to  achieve  much  the  same  result  in  the  case  of  intestacy  but  by 
different  methods".  126  The  extent  of  the  coincidence  between  the  aims  of  the  two 
systems  could,  however,  be  doubted.  Furthermore,  whilst  heritage  and  moveables 
are,  generally  speaking,  no  longer  separately  dealt  with  domestically  following 
the  passing  of  the  Succession  (Scotland)  Act  1964,  it  is  submitted  that  this  does 
not  necessarily  rob  the  principle  of  an  international,  or  intra-UK,  justification. 
The  law  of  the  situs  does  have  a  colourable  claim  to  regulate  succession  to 
immoveables  in  its  territory. 
Although  properly  a  question  of  status,  issues  of  legitimacy  and  legitimation  are 
often  intimately  linked  with  questions  of  succession.  127  This  is  an  area  where 
widely  differing  stances  once  were  taken  in  Scots  and  English  law.  In  Scotland,  it 
was  possible  for  a  child  to  be  legitimate,  even  if  the  marriage  of  the  child's  parents 
was  invalid;  separately,  there  were  also  rules  of  law  that  a  child  could  be 
legitimated  by  the  subsequent  marriage  of  its  parents.  128  In  conflict  terms,  Scots 
law  looked  to  the  domicile  of  the  child's  parents  at  its  birth,  and  the  domicile  of 
the  father  at  the  time  of  the  marriage,  respectively.  129  A  difficulty  arose  within 
Britain,  because  not  only  did  English  law  (unusually)  not  countenance  either 
legitimacy  arising  from  a  putative  marriage,  or  legitimation,  130  but  its  conflict 
rules  were  designed  to  reflect  this.  Legitimacy  was  determined  solely  by  the  view 
of  English  law  as  to  the  validity  of  the  marriage  of  the  child's  parents.  This  is 
illustrated  by  the  case  of  Shaw  v  Gould.  131  Miss  Hickson  married  in  England  as  a 
result  of  the  fraud  of  her  groom,  Mr  Buxton,  who  was  sentenced  to  imprisonment 
for  his  pains.  Many  years  later,  Mr  Buxton  was  persuaded  to  go  to  Scotland, 
where  the  marriage  between  himself  and  Miss  Hickson  was  dissolved.  Miss 
Hickson  then  became  married  in  Scotland  to  Mr  Shaw.  The  latter  had  initially 
intended  to  become  a  barrister,  but  instead  called  to  the  Scots  Bar,  and  the  couple 
remained  in  Scotland  until  their  death.  After  Miss  Hickson's  (or,  in  the  eyes  of 
126  Scottish  Law  Commission,  Some  Miscellaneous  Topics  in  the  Law  of  Succession  (Memo  No 
71)  (1986),  para  6.3. 
127  J.  H.  C. Morris,  The  Conflict  of  Lativs,  5`h  edn.,  by  D.  McClean  (Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2000),  p295. 
12$  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  pp487  &  492. 
129  Ibid.,  pp487-488  &  492. 
130  North  &  Fawcett,  Cheshire  and  North's  Private  International  Law,  pp888-889  &  899;  Morris, 
The  Conflict  of  Laws,  pp296-297  &  303. 
131  (1868)  LR  3  HL  55. 
127 Scots  law,  Mrs  Shaw's)  death,  a  question  arose  in  the  interpretation  of  her  great- 
uncle's  will,  as  to  whether  the  children  of  her  second  'marriage'  were  legitimate. 
The  House  of  Lords  concluded  that  the  first,  English,  marriage  was  not  dissolved 
by  the  Scottish  divorce,  and  thus  the  children  of  the  second  'marriage'  were  not 
legitimate.  Short  shrift  was  given  to  the  point  that  even  if  the  Scottish  marriage 
had  been  invalid  under  Scots  law,  this  would  not  have  rendered  the  children  of  the 
union  illegitimate  in  Scotland: 
"if  a  constructive  legitimacy  of  this  kind  would,  under  the  circumstances,  have 
arisen  in  Scotland,  I  cannot  think  that  we  could  be  bound  to  recognise  it  so  far 
as  to  qualify  the  offspring  of  a  void  marriage  to  take  under  the  description  of 
'children'  in  an  English  will".  132 
The  conclusion  that  the  children  of  a  couple  validly  married  under  Scots  law,  who 
lived  in  Scotland  for  the  rest  of  their  days,  should  be  held  illegitimate  in  England, 
appears  unsatisfactory.  As  the  editor  of  Morris  observes,  the  effect  of  these  cases 
was  that  "English  law  has  no  conflict  rule  for  legitimacy,  only  a  conflict  rule  for 
the  validity  of  marriage".  133  In  another  sense  too,  English  law  was  bereft  of  a 
conflict  rule  in  such  cases  insofar  as  the  children  of  a  putative  marriage  were 
concerned:  the  concept  being  unknown  to  English  law,  their  legitimacy  could 
never  be  recognised  there.  The  advent  of  the  twentieth  century  signalled  that  a 
different  approach  might  be  taken.  In  the  English  case  of  Re  Stirling134  the 
legitimacy  of  a  child  would  determine  his  right  to  succeed  to  certain  Scottish,  and 
English,  property.  The  child's  mother  had  married  a  Scotsman  in  Canada,  but  he 
had  subsequently  divorced  her  in  North  Dakota.  She  accordingly  remarried,  and 
the  child  was  the  product  of  that  second  relationship.  The  English  judge 
classified  the  (incorrect)  view  of  the  child's  parents  that  the  North  Dakota  divorce 
was  valid,  as  an  error  of  law.  After  hearing  evidence  from  Scots  lawyers,  he 
concluded  that  an  error  as  to  fact  was  required  before  the  child  would  be  regarded 
as  legitimate  in  Scotland  as  springing  from  a  putative  marriage.  Thus  the  child 
was  illegitimate.  However,  the  judge  seemed  perhaps  more  prepared  to 
132  Ibid.  per  Lord  Chelmsford  at  79. 
133  Morris,  The  Conflict  of  Lativs,  p296. 
134  [1908]  2  Ch  344. 
128 countenance  the  possibility  of  recognising  a  child's  legitimate  status  despite  the 
lack  of  a  valid  marriage.  Following  the  introduction  of  legislation  in  1959,  the 
laws  of  England  on  legitimacy  have  changed,  and  the  concept  of  a  putative 
marriage  is  now  recognised. 
135  Concerningly,  however,  the  editor  of  Morris  is  of 
the  view  that  the  current  legislative  provisions  would  not  alter  the  result  of  a 
modem-day  Shaw  v  Gould.  136  Similarly,  it  was  only  with  the  introduction  of  a 
concept  of  legitimation  into  English  law,  that  the  strictness  of  the  conflicts  rule 
was  relaxed.  137  In  Scotland,  legitimation  is  now  governed  by  statute:  the 
Legitimation  (Scotland)  Act  1968138  provides  for  the  legitimation  of  a  child  by  the 
subsequent  marriage  of  its  parents,  effectively  if  its  father  is  domiciled  in 
Scotland  at  marriage.  In  the  case  of  Dunbar  of  Kilconzie,  139  this  was  said  to 
operate  so  as  to  legitimate  the  son  of  an  English  domiciliary  (who  married  the 
child's  mother  in  1912)  as  from  the  date  of  the  Legitimation  (Scotland)  Act 
coming  into  force.  Whilst  this  might  seem  a  possible  statutory  interpretation, 
Anton  is  surely  correct  to  argue  that  what  was  important  was  the  English  law  of 
the  father's  domicile  at  the  time  of  marriage,  and  the  date  that  the  legitimation 
came  into  effect  under  that  law  (1959).  140  An  interesting  point  as  to  how  the 
separate  Scottish  and  English  legislation  meshes  together  presented  itself  in 
Wright's  Trs  v  Callender.  141  Both  the  Legitimation  (Scotland)  Act  1968  and  the 
English  Legitimacy  Act  1959  contained  provisions  to  the  effect  that  their  terms 
did  not  affect  deeds  executed  before  the  passing  of  the  respective  statutes.  The 
House  of  Lords  was  concerned  to  avoid  the  result  that  an  English  legitimation 
could  not  affect  prior  English  deeds,  but  was  effective  in  respect  of  prior  Scottish 
deeds.  142 
"s  Legitimacy  Act  1959  (7  &8  Eliz  II),  c.  73,  and  see  now  Legitimacy  Act  1976,  c.  31,  although 
the  proper  effect  of  the  conflicts  case  of  Re  BischofJsheini  [1948]  Ch  79  remains  a  moot  point 
(Morris,  The  Conflict  of  Laws,  pp299-300;  North  &  Fawcett,  Cheshire  and  North's  Private 
International  Law,  pp893-894). 
136  Morris,  The  Conflict  of  Laws,  p301. 
37  Legitimacy  Act  1926  (16  &  17  Geo  5),  c.  60. 
138  1968,  c.  22. 
139  1986  SLT  463. 
140  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p494. 
141  1993  SLT  556.  The  case  concerned  the  ability  of  persons  to  benefit  under  the  trust  disposition 
and  settlements  of  their  Scottish  great-grandparents.  The  mother  of  the  great-grandchildren  in 
question  was  domiciled  in  England.  The  great-grandchildren  had  been  legitimated  per 
subsequens  niatrinionium  on  the  coming  into  force  of  the  English  Legitimacy  Act  1959. 
142  Wright's  Trs  v  Callender  1993  SLT  556  per  Lord  Keith  of  Kinkel  at  559-560  (expressing  the 
obiter  view  that  "While  it  is  for  the  law  of  Scotland  to  recognise  the  status  of  legitimacy 
conferred  by  the  Act  on  the  children  of  fathers  domiciled  in  England  at  the  time  of  relevant 
129 It  can  be  appreciated  that  the  gulf  between  Scottish  and  English  domestic  law  on 
legitimacy  and  legitimation,  quickly  raised  conflict  issues.  Anton  notes  that  this 
is  the  cause  for  the  speed  with  which  the  subject  of  choice  of  law  in  legitimation 
came  to  be  studied.  143  However,  these  issues  continue  to  be  dealt  with  by  and 
large,  by  the  application  of  traditional  methodology,  rather  than  through 
internalising  legislation. 
One  further  matter  is  of  interest  before  leaving  matters  of  succession.  It  is  widely 
the  case  that  the  property  of  a  deceased  dying  without  heirs  will  fall  to  the  state. 
However,  whereas  in  most  European  countries  this  is  a  rule  of  succession,  in  both 
Scotland  and  England  it  is  analysed  as  a  Crown  right  to  unclaimed  property.  144  At 
one  stage  it  was  recommended  by  the  Scottish  Law  Commission  that  Scots  law 
should  be  changed  to  bring  it  into  line  with  the  majority  of  European  countries,  145 
and  this  seems  unobjectionable.  Possible  cross-border  difficulties  within  the  UK 
caused  by  English  law  remaining  unchanged  seemed  to  have  been  considered,  and 
discounted.  146  However,  some  years  later  the  Commission  recorded  that  it  was 
"persuaded  that  there  is  at  present  no  compelling  reason  to  alter  the  basis  on 
which  the  Crown  takes  and  that  it  could  be  awkward  to  have  the  Crown  taking  on 
one  footing  in  Scotland  and  on  another  in  the  rest  of  the  United  Kingdom".  147 
Later  in  this  chapter  the  potential  effect  of  devolution  on  such  reasoning  will  be 
examined. 
Delict 
Briggs  has  mused  as  to  "whether  there  are,  in  the  conflict  of  laws  in  general,  but 
in  tort  in  particular,  differing  degrees  of  foreignness,  which  in  turn  suggest  that 
the  law  should  develop  choice  of  law  rules  which  vary  according  to  their 
marriage,  it  must  also  be  appropriate  for  that  law  to  recognise  that  the  legitimacy  so  conferred 
was  subject  to  limitation");  and  per  Lord  Jauncey  of  Tullichettle  at  563  (the  avoidance  of  such 
a  "bizarre"  result  strengthening  his  view  on  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  testator's 
intention).  See  also  E.  Crawford,  "It's  a  wise  testator  who  knows  his  own  great  grandchildren" 
1994  SLT  (News)  225. 
143  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p492. 
144  Scottish  Law  Commission,  Some  Miscellaneous  Topics  in  the  Law  of  Succession  (Memo  No 
71)  (1986),  para  6.12. 
145  Ibid.,  paras  6.12-6.13. 
146  Ibid.,  para  6.12. 
147  Scot.  Law  Com.  No  124,  Report  on  Succession  (1990),  para  10.10. 
130 context".  148  As  has  been  touched  upon  earlier,  in  both  Canada  and  Australia,  at 
least  for  a  period  of  time,  it  was  thought  by  some  to  be  appropriate  to  have 
different  choice  of  law  rules  in  tort  dependent  upon  whether  the  case  was 
international  or  interprovincial/interstate.  149  The  extent  to  which  this  was  said  to 
be  justified  with  reference  to  the  constitutional  arrangements  of  those  countries, 
and  the  inapplicability  of  that  reasoning  to  the  situation  of  the  UK,  has  already 
been  discussed  above.  '50  Another  factor  mentioned  in  the  case  of  Tolofson  v 
Jensen  was  the  ease  with  which  the  laws  of  the  various  Canadian  provinces  could 
be  ascertained  within  Canada,  '51  but  the  position  in  the  UK  has  been  touched  on 
above.  152  A  further  argument  put  forward  in  Breavington  v  Godleinan  as 
justification  for  the  differentiation  between  international  and  Australian  interstate 
conflict  cases,  was  that  a  person  would  appreciate  that  he  was  moving  between 
states  which  had  different  systems  of  law.  153  It  is  unclear  why  this  justifies  a 
different  approach  from  that  adopted  in  international  matters,  since  it  is  usually 
just  as  apparent  that  one  is  crossing  an  international  boundary,  if  not  more  so: 
"whereas  it  may  be  plain  within  Europe  that  one  is  in  Rome,  it  may  not  be  so 
obvious  in  the  United  States  that  one  is  not  in  Kansas  any  more".  154  This 
observation  applies  with  equal  force  to  the  border  between  Scotland  and  England. 
Certainly  Scotland  has  never  differentiated  between  England  and  other  countries 
in  the  application  of  choice  of  law  rules  in  delict.  Matters  have  been  dealt  with  by 
undiscriminating,  common  law,  international  private  law  rules.  These  rules  have, 
for  the  most  part,  now  been  replaced  by  a  statutory  lex  loci  delicti  rule,  with  a 
flexible  exception,  introduced  by  the  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)  Act  1995.155  The  possibility  of  an  exception  for  delicts  and  torts 
148  Briggs,  The  Conflict  ofLativs,  p178. 
149  Interestingly,  it  would  appear  that  the  vast  majority  of  tort  conflicts  cases  raised  in  Australia 
are  interstate,  rather  than  international  (Nygh,  "Choice  of  law  in  tort  in  Australia",  60). 
iso  See  Chap.  3,  in  particular  pp57-70  above. 
ýs'  Tolofson  vJensen  (1994)  120  DLR  (4`h)  289  per  La  Forest  J  at  312-313. 
152  See  pp113-114  above. 
153  Breavington  v  Godleinan  (1988)  169  CLR  41  per  Mason  CJ  at  78. 
154  Briggs,  The  Conflict  of  Laws,  p177. 
Iss  1995,  c.  42;  for  the  potential  difficulties  in  establishing  the  locus  delicti  see  B.  J.  Rodger, 
"Ascertaining  the  statutory  lex  loci  delicti:  certain  difficulties  under  the  Private  International 
Law  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1995"  (1998)  47  ICLQ  205.  There  is  likely  to  be  EU 
legislation  (the  proposed  "Rome  II  Regulation")  on  this  subject  in  the  future,  on  the  effect  of 
which  see  Chap.  6. 
131 occurring  entirely  within  the  UK  had  been  considered.  '56  On  this  approach,  the 
law  of  the  part  of  the  UK  in  which  the  most  significant  elements  of  the  wrong 
took  place  would  have  been  applied.  157  Consequently,  there  would  have  been  no 
statutory  displacement  rule  within  the  UK.  158  It  seems  clear  that  this  did  not 
reflect  a  decision  that  different  rules  were  appropriate  depending  on  whether  the 
case  was  international  or  intra-UK.  Rather  it  was  driven  by  the  consideration  that 
common  law  rules  may  in  the  past  have  dictated  that  English  law  would  always 
be  applied  to  torts  occurring  in  England.  159  No  authority  was  cited  by  the  Law 
Commissions  for  such  a  rule  forming  part  of  Scots  law.  It  is  unclear  from  cases 
such  as  Convery  v  Lanarkshire  Trannways  Co160  and  Naftalin  v  London,  Midland 
and  Scottish  Railway  Co161  whether  Scots  law  would  apply  to  delicts  within 
Scotland  because  it  was  the  lex  loci  delicti,  or  as  a  result  of  the  application  of  the 
double  rule.  Given  the  stress  placed  upon  the  lex  loci  delicti  rather  than  the  lex 
fori  by  the  Scots  courts,  and  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  ability  to  rely  upon  a 
flexible  exception  in  Scots  law,  162  this  issue  has  perhaps  caused  less  concern  in 
Scotland  than  in  England.  In  any  event,  for  the  reasons  stated  at  the  outset  of  this 
section,  a  differentiated  approach  is  as  undesirable  as  it  was  unprincipled,  and  was 
indeed  ultimately  rejected.  163  The  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)  Act  makes  it  clear  that  its  provisions  apply  equally  between  Scotland 
and  England,  as  between  Scotland  and  foreign  countries.  164  The  factors  listed  as 
ones  which  a  court  might  take  into  account  in  considering  whether  to  displace  the 
general  rule,  can  be  said  to  relate  to  the  factual  aspects  of  the  case.  165  There  is 
accordingly  nothing  to  prevent  the  displacement  provision  being  utilised  as 
156  Law  Com.  No  193/Scot.  Law  Com.  No  129,  Private  International  Law:  Choice  of  Law  in  Tort 
and  Delict  (1990),  paras  3.14-3.19. 
157  Ibid.,  cl.  3  of  the  proposed  Bill  (pp38-40). 
1S$  Ibid. 
15,  Ibid.,  paras  3.14-3.19;  and  see  Ennstone  Building  Products  Ltd  v  Stanger  Ltd  [2002]  1  WLR 
3059  (the  cause  of  action  having  arisen  prior  to  the  passing  of  the  legislation  described  above), 
in  which  negligent  advice  provided  by  the  Scottish  office  of  an  English  company  to  the 
English  claimant,  in  respect  of  stone  used  in  a  Scottish  building,  was  held  to  be  an  English  tort, 
and  thus  English  law  applied. 
160  (1905)8F117. 
161  1933  SC  259. 
162  See  p133  below. 
163  See  the  criticisms  of  the  Law  Commissions'  proposal  in  P.  B.  Carter,  "Choice  of  law  in  tort  and 
delict",  [1991]  107  LQR  405  at  415-417. 
164  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1995,  s9(7). 
165  Ibid.,  s12(2). 
132 between  Scotland  and  England.  There  is  also  a  public  policy  exception,  '66 
however,  the  ability  of  a  court  to  avail  itself  of  such  an  objection  to  rules  of  law 
within  the  UK  will  be  examined  in  a  later  chapter.  167 
The  old  common  law  choice  of  law  rule  continues  to  apply  in  defamation 
actions.  168  In  Scots  law,  this  rule  operates  so  as  to  require  that  the  delict  should 
be  actionable  under  both  the  lex  loci  delicti  and  the  lex  fori.  169  The  test  under 
English  law,  whilst  similar  and  driving  from  the  same  (English)  roots,  is  not  in 
exactly  the  same  terms:  the  tort  has  to  be  actionable  by  the  lcc  fori,  and  not 
justifiable  by  the  lex  loci  delicti  (which  was  eventually  found  to  mean  that  the 
alleged  tortfeasor  must  be  civilly  liable  for  his  acts  by  the  lex  loci  delicti).  170 
Latterly,  English  law  had  arrived  at  the  position  where  either  the  lex  foci  or  the  lex 
loci  delicti  could  be  displaced  in  particular  circumstances,  171  but  there  were  no 
instances  of  its  use  in  Scotland  before  1996,  and  to  date  there  is  nothing  to 
suggest  that  a  Scots  court  would  in  future  wish  to  take,  or  exercise,  such  a 
discretion.  172  As  between  the  two  jurisdictions,  this  merely  represents  slight 
differences  in  the  development  and  interpretation  of  the  double  rule,  but  on  the 
main  issue  under  discussion  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  same  choice  of  law  rule  will 
be  utilised  in  Scots  law  for  delictual  events  with  an  English,  as  opposed  to  a 
foreign,  element.  The  same  view  will  prevail  in  England. 
The  classic  exposition  of  the  application  of  the  double  rule  in  Scotland  is  the 
intra-UK  case  of  M'Elroy  v  M'Allister,  173  a  case  to  which  history  has  not  been 
166  Ibid.,  s14(3)(a)(i).  An  exception  if  the  application  of  the  lex  loci  delicti  would  result  in 
enforcement  of  penal,  revenue,  or  other  public,  laws  is  contained  in  s14(3)(a)(ii).  The 
operation  of  these  concepts  within  the  UK  has  already  been  discussed  at  pp48-51  above. 
167  See  Chap.  7. 
161  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1995,  s13. 
169  See  Naftalin  v  London,  Midland  and  Scottish  Railway  Co.  1933  SC  259;  M'Elroy  v  M'Allister 
1949  SC  110. 
170  Phillips  v  Eyre  (1870)  LR  6  QB  1;  Chaplin  v  Boys  [1969]  2  All  ER  1085;  see  also  Ennstone 
Building  Products  Ltd  v  Stanger  Ltd  [2002]  1  WLR  3059.  The  case  of  Machado  v  Fontes 
[1897]  2  QB  231  was  authority  in  England  for  a  spell,  but  was  disapproved  in  the  Scottish  case 
of  M'Elroy  v  M'Allister,  supra  (see,  for  example,  the  comments  of  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Thomson 
at  118). 
171  Chaplin  v  Boys,  supra;  Red  Sea  Insurance  Co.  Ltd  v  Bouygues  SA  [  1994]  3  WLR  926. 
172  B.  J.  Rodger,  "The  Halley:  holed  and  now  sunk"  (1996)  1  SLPQ  397  at  399-400;  Crawford, 
International  Private  Law,  paras  13.14-13.16;  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International 
Law,  pp404-405. 
173  1949  SC  110. 
133 kind,  174  but  which  bears  further  examination.  Mr  McElroy  was  employed  by  a 
firm  based  in  Glasgow.  Whilst  in  one  of  the  firm's  lorries,  which  was  being 
driven  by  the  defender  (a  Glasgow  resident),  an  accident  occurred  and  Mr 
McElroy  was  killed.  The  accident  happened  at  Shap,  in  the  north  west  of 
England,  and  Mr  McElroy  and  the  defender  had  been  heading  south  at  the  time. 
The  pursuer  (Mr  McElroy's  widow)  brought  an  action  in  the  Court  of  Session, 
both  as  his  widow,  and  in  her  capacity  as  executrix.  It  was  not  at  that  time 
inevitable  that  the  widow  would  also  be  executrix.  She  sought  damages  under 
four  heads:  solatiuni;  a  sum  under  the  English  Fatal  Accidents  Acts;  a  sum 
under  English  law  in  terms  of  the  Law  Reform  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act 
1934;  175  and  funeral  expenses.  The  pleadings,  even  to  modern  eyes  used  to  a 
more  relaxed  approach,  are  not  admirable.  It  was  said  that  Scots  law  applied,  or 
that  alternatively  English  law  may  apply  in  which  case  only  certain  of  the  claims 
should  succeed.  There  is  no  appreciation  of  the  application  of  the  double  rule. 
However,  the  double  rule  was  applied  both  before  the  Lord  Ordinary,  and  on 
appeal  to  a  bench  of  seven  judges,  with  the  net  result  that  the  pursuer  received 
only  funeral  expenses.  A  bench  of  seven  judges  has  considerable  scope  for 
overturning  older  authorities  to  achieve  a  just  result.  However,  it  seems  that  in  all 
the  circumstances  the  judges  were  not  convinced  that  the  outcome  was  unfair.  '76 
The  claim  for  solatium  fell  because  there  was  no  such  award  under  the  lex  loci 
delicti.  The  claim  under  the  Fatal  Accidents  Acts  was  time-barred  under  English 
law,  and  the  judges  were  particularly  critical  of  the  notion  that  the  defender 
should  be  robbed  of  this  defence  simply  by  the  device  of  the  pursuer  bringing  the 
action  in  Scotland.  '77  The  claim  as  executrix  under  the  Law  Reform 
(Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1934  was  valid  under  English  law,  but  had  no 
Scottish  equivalent,  and  so  also  failed.  It  should  be  noted  that,  certainly  in 
modern  times,  any  sums  awarded  under  this  Act  must  be  set  off  against  awards  in 
174  Collier  describes  the  case  as  "unfortunate",  with  a  "preposterous  result"  (Collier,  Conflict  of 
Laws,  pp221  &  223).  For  the  editor  of  Morris  it  is  an  example  of  how  the  double  rule  can 
cause  "gross  injustice"  (Morris,  The  Conflict  of  Laws,  p361);  and  see  also  the  oblique, 
unflattering,  reference  by  Lord  Wilberforce  in  a  parliamentary  debate  (Lord  Wilberforce,  HL 
Debs,  vol  559,  col  841). 
175  1934  (24  &  25  Geo  V),  c.  41. 
176  Only  Lord  Keith  maintained  a  partial  dissent. 
177  1949  SC  110  per  Lord  Russell  at  126-127;  per  Lord  President  Cooper  at  137. 
134 terms  of  the  Fatal  Accidents  Acts.  178  It  was  clear  that  Lord  President  Cooper  was 
of  the  view  that  the  pursuer  should  properly  have  raised  her  case  in  the  English 
courts.  179  Seen  in  the  light  of  its  circumstances  the  result  is  perhaps  not  as 
monstrous  as  critics  have  suggested.  It  may  be  thought  to  be  unfortunate  that  the 
pursuer  was  not  allowed  to  recover  either  solatium  or  a  sum  under  the  Law 
Reform  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1934.  However,  the  latter  was  payable  to 
an  executor,  and  it  was  simply  fortuitous  that  the  pursuer  also  held  that  capacity. 
Solatiuni  is  a  uniquely  Scottish  concept,  and  it  might  be  questioned  whether  a 
defender  should  properly  expect,  when  driving  under  English  highway  rules,  to 
become  liable  for  such  a  sum.  It  has  been  said  that  the  accident  happened  "a  mere 
40  miles  south  of  the  border",  180  and  so  the  application  of  English  law  was 
inappropriate.  However,  the  argument  for  giving  a  role  to  the  lex  loci  delicti 
should  not  recede  the  closer  one  is  to  home.  181 
It  is  interesting  to  speculate  whether  a  different  result  would  be  achieved  under 
the  new  statutory  provisions  were  an  accident  with  these  facts  to  occur  today.  It 
is  submitted  that  a  radically  different  conclusion  would  not  be  reached.  If  the 
pursuer  was  (fortuitously)  executrix,  she  would  receive  an  award  under  the  Law 
Reform  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1934.  Otherwise  she  would  only  receive 
the  funeral  expenses,  were  section  11  of  the  Private  International  Law 
(Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1995  applied.  Would  the  displacement  rule 
contained  in  section  12  have  been  applied?  The  editor  of  Morris  clearly  thinks 
this  would  be  appropriate.  182  The  English  courts  have  now  twice  invoked  the 
displacement  rule  in  cases  where  an  English  passenger  has  been  injured  in  a  car, 
driven  by  an  English  driver,  in  an  accident  on  foreign  roads.  183  In  a  road  accident 
in  another  EU  member  state,  the  ability  to  raise  an  action  other  than  in  the  courts 
178  P.  Shears  &  G.  Stephenson,  James'  Introduction  to  English  Law,  13th  cdn.  (Butterworths, 
1996),  pp314-315. 
179  1949  SC  110  per  Lord  President  Cooper  at  139  (interestingly  he  remarks  that  "Difficulties  may 
of  course  arise  in  founding  jurisdiction  against  the  defender  in  the  foreign  forum,  but  I  should 
consider  that  risk  a  slight  one  where  the  foreign  forum  is  England"). 
180  Morris,  The  Conflict  of  Laws,  p356. 
181  And  indeed  in  this  example  the  parties  were  travelling  away  from  Scotland! 
182  Morris,  The  Conflict  of  Laws,  p356. 
183  Edmunds  v  Sinunonds  [2001]  1  WLR  1003;  Hamill  v  Hamill  (24  July  2000,  unreported).  Sec 
also  the  remarks  in  Roerig  v  Valiant  Trawlers  Ltd  [2002]  1  All  ER  961  per  Waller  LJ  at  967- 
968.  In  Hulse  v  Chambers  [2001]  1  WLR  2386,  it  was  noted  that  the  plaintiff  had  accepted 
there  was  no  displacement,  despite  the  first  two  cases  referred  to,  which  were  said  to  be 
factually  comparable. 
135 of  the  place  where  that  accident  occurred,  will  depend  on  the  domicile  of  the 
defender.  Accordingly  the  English  courts  will  only  have  jurisdiction  in  'foreign' 
accidents  of  that  kind  if  the  defendant  is  English  domiciled.  184  If  foreign  law  is 
always  to  be  displaced  in  these  circumstances,  then  this  may  point  to  the 
establishment  of  a  homeward  trend,  whereby  English  law  will  usually  be  applied 
in  cases  before  the  English  courts,  of  torts  committed  abroad.  185  Furthermore,  in 
Roerig  v  Valiant  Trawlers  Ltd'  86  the  (English)  lex  loci  delicti  was  not  displaced  in 
a  claim  by  a  Dutch  woman  in  respect  of  her  Dutch  husband,  who  was  an 
employee  of  a  Dutch  company  and  was  injured  on  an  English-registered  trawler 
owned  by  an  English  company  (a  subsidiary  of  a  Dutch  company)  which  had  set 
sail  from  a  Dutch  port  to  fish.  These  cases  therefore  seem  somewhat  concerning. 
Interestingly,  although  in  M'Elroy  v  MAllister187  both  the  deceased  and  the 
defender  were  Scottish,  as  has  been  seen  the  court  appears  to  have  been  of  the 
view  that  England,  and  not  Scotland,  was  the  proper  place  for  the  action  to  have 
been  raised.  188  It  can  be  inferred  from  this  that  the  court  in  that  case  would  not 
have  been  minded  to  invoke  any  available  displacement  rule  to  apply  Scots  law. 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that  a  more  thoughtful  jurisprudence  will  characterise  the 
Scottish  approach  to  the  new  statutory  rules,  in  that  any  tendency  in  England  to 
refer  too  readily  to  the  forum's  law  will  not  be  slavishly  followed  in  Scotland. 
The  precise  amount  recovered  in  damages  for  delictual  actings  with  an  English,  or 
a  foreign,  element,  also  remains  a  matter  governed  by  rules  of  international 
private  law.  In  both  intra-UK,  and  international,  situations,  Scots  law  adheres  to 
the  rule  that  the  availability  of  heads  of  damages  is  a  matter  for  the  law  which 
184  If  the  defendant  is  English  resident,  but  the  plaintiff  is  resident  in  the  country  in  which  the 
accident  occurred,  it  might  be  thought  more  likely  that  the  latter  will  choose  to  raise  the  action 
in  his  home  court,  and  not  in  England.  Such  facts  arc  therefore  perhaps  unlikely  to  come 
before  the  English  courts. 
185  See  B.  J.  Rodger,  "Developments  in  international  private  law  in  2000"  (2001)  6  SLPQ  293  at 
302.  It  is  reminiscent,  perhaps,  of  the  position  in  the  past,  where  a  fictional  English  locus  was 
assigned  to  torts  which  had  occurred  abroad,  in  order  to  bestow  jurisdiction  on  an  English 
court.  Although  note  that  the  proposed  Rome  II  Regulation  would  allow,  as  an  exception  to 
the  general  rule,  a  delictual  obligation  to  be  governed  not  by  the  law  of  the  country  where  the 
damage  arises,  but  by  the  law  of  the  country  in  which  both  the  perpetrator  of  the  delict  and  his 
victim  are  habitually  resident  (the  Wallis  Report,  however,  suggests  this  should  simply  be  one 
of  a  number  of  factors  in  deciding  whether  the  general  rule  would  be  inappropriate).  Both  the 
Rome  II  Regulation  and  the  Wallis  Report  are  discussed  in  Chap.  6. 
186  [2002]  1  All  ER  961. 
187  1949  SC  110. 
188  See  also  Naftalis  v  London,  Midland  and  Scottish  Railway  Co.  1933  SC  259. 
136 governs  liability  for  the  delictual  actings,  whereas  quantification  of  these  heads  is 
left  to  the  lex  fori.  189  Foreign  law  may  be  relevant  to  quantification  in  one  slightly 
unusual  situation.  In  a  claim  under  the  Damages  (Scotland)  Act  1976,  the  court 
may  take  into  account  that  the  deceased  was  under  a  legal  duty  to  support  another 
person.  190  A  recent  case  suggests  this  is  not  limited  to  duties  under  Scots  law.  191 
In  contrast,  the  Australian  courts  have  moved  to  the  position  in  interstate  cases 
where  the  lex  loci  delicti  now  also  governs  the  quantification  of  damages,  192 
although  this  approach  has  not  yet  been  adopted  in  international  cases.  193  The 
appropriateness  of  a  rule  obliging  damages  to  be  quantified  in  terms  of  the  lexfori 
is  a  wide  topic  of  study,  the  detailed  examination  of  which  is  outwith  the  scope  of 
this  thesis.  It  can,  however,  be  observed  that,  at  least  in  intra-UK  personal  injury 
actions,  there  would  appear  to  be  good  reasons  for  removing  the  role  of  the  lex 
fori  in  Scotland  in  matters  of  quanttau.  Whilst  heads  of  damages  may  be  special 
to  a  system  of  law,  and  thus  unusual  for  the  forum,  194  the  assessment  of  many  of 
these  heads  is  simply  a  factual  matter.  195  If  unfamiliar  heads  of  damages  are  to  be 
enforced,  then  it  would  seem  both  possible  and  desirable  that  an  approach  is  taken 
which  approximates  to  that  of  the  system  from  which  they  emanate.  Even  in 
solatiuni-type  awards,  it  might  be  questioned  how  far  questions  of  law  are  really 
involved,  as  opposed  to  the  derivation  of  an  appropriate  figure  from  a  range  of 
past  awards.  It  is  often  argued  that  losses  typically  arise  in  the  forum,  making  the 
law  of  that  court  the  most  appropriate  in  the  exercise  of  quantification.  Of  course 
this  may  not  be  so,  but  even  in  those  cases  where  it  is,  there  seems  no  reason  why 
the  location  of  evidence  as  to  factual  matters  such  as  hospital  treatment  or  loss  of 
wages  particularly  requires  the  quantification  thereof  by  the  lac  fori.  196  As  has 
189  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p405. 
190  1976,  c.  13,  sl(6). 
19`  Shaher  v  British  Aerospace  Flying  College  Ltd,  reported  in  part  2002  SLT  833 
,  reversed  on 
another  point  in  the  Inner  House. 
92  John  Pfeiffer  Pty  Ltd  v  Rogerson  [2000]  HCA  36. 
193  Regie  National  des  Usines  Renault  SA  v  Zhang  [2002]  HCA  10. 
194  See,  for  example,  Mitchell  v  McCulloch  1976  SC  1. 
195  For  example,  in  Scotland,  past  and  future  wage  loss,  or  loss  of  pension  rights,  are  factual 
matters.  In  the  English  case  of  Kornatzki  v  Oppenheimer  [1937]  4  All  ER  133,  the  judge 
concluded  that  the  amount  of  money  to  be  released  was  a  question  of  fact,  rather  than  being  a 
matter  of  discretion. 
196  There  is,  in  any  event,  increasing  flexibility  in  where  courts  may  sit:  a  New  South  Wales  court 
recently  sat  in  Dublin  to  take  the  evidence  of  an  Irishman  who  was  paralysed  in  a  swimming 
accident  in  Australia  ("Australian  -  legal  action  heard  in  Dublin", 
http:  //www.  rte.  ic/news/2002/0902/mulligang.  html;  "Paralysed  swimmer  seeks  S4.8m", 
http:  //www.  news.  com.  au/common/story_page/0,4057,5031  552%5E  1702,00.  html). 
137 been  noted  above,  the  extent  to  which  these  arguments  might  be  sufficient  in  the 
international  arena  to  justify  jettisoning  the  orthodox  approach  is  outwith  the 
purview  of  this  thesis.  However,  it  is  submitted  that  they  certainly  have  added 
force  in  Scottish  conflicts  cases  with  an  English  element.  Scottish  judges  are 
already  able  to  look  for  guidance  to  English  awards  on  pain  and  suffering,  and  the 
seminal  English  case  of  Heil  v  Ranikin197  has  been  accepted  as  a  legitimate  factor 
for  consideration  by  Scottish  judges  in  domestic  damages  awards  in  cases  of 
personal  injury.  198  The  ability  to  call  upon  a  public  policy  exception  may  be 
sufficient  to  protect  the  forum  from  unconscionable  quantifications  of  damages: 
the  availability  of  such  an  objection  within  the  UK  will  be  examined  in  a  later 
chapter.  199 
Cross-border  crime 
In  criminal  matters,  the  divide  between  the  Scottish  and  English  legal  systems  has 
always  been  distinct.  Neither  the  House  of  Lords,  nor  any  equivalent,  has  ever 
had  an  appellate  role  in  the  Scottish  criminal  justice  system.  The  final  court  of 
appeal  in  criminal  matters  is  the  High  Court  of  Justiciary  sitting  in  an  appellate 
capacity  in  Edinburgh.  200  English  cases  do  not  enjoy  the  same  influence  in 
shaping  Scots  criminal  law  as  they  may  do  in  other  areas.  It  is  clear  that  Scots 
law  will  be  applied  by  the  criminal  courts  in  Scotland,  and  thus  both  international 
and  intra-UK  issues  resolve  purely  into  questions  of  jurisdiction.  201 
American  courts  over  the  centuries  have  tried  cases  dealing  quite  literally  with 
shootings202  (and'missesi203)  over  the  state  line.  Such  dramatic  case  law  may  not 
exist  in  Scotland,  but  its  courts  have  been  called  upon  to  adjudicate  issues  of 
cross-border  criminal  liability  within  the  UK.  The  rules  which  have  been  applied 
197  [2000]  2  WLR  1173. 
198  Duthie  v  Macfish  Ltd  2001  SLT  833;  Wallace  v  Paterson  2002  SLT  563. 
199  See  Chap.  7. 
200  Although  appeals  on  devolution  issues  in  criminal  cases  may  now  be  taken  to  the  JCPC  (see 
p63  above). 
201  Various  matters  akin  to  recognition  issues  can  arise:  these  have  been  discussed  in  Chap.  4. 
202  State  v  Hall  114  NC  909,19  SE  602  (1894). 
203  Simpson  v  State  92  Ga.  41,17  SE  984  (1893). 
138 are  for  the  most  part  derived  from  common  law,  and  subject  to  no  differentiation 
dependent  upon  whether  the  crime  has  an  English,  or  other  foreign,  element.  04 
In  HMA  v  Bradbury205  the  accused  posted  in  England  a  letter,  requesting  goods 
from  Scotland,  for  which  he  had  never  intended  to  pay.  Lord  Neaves  took  the 
view  that  since  "[t]he  deceptive  instrument  used,  after  being  set  in  motion, 
exploded,  and  took  effect  ini206  Scotland,  the  Scottish  courts  had  jurisdiction.  It 
was  of  no  moment  whether  or  not  the  actings  complained  of  were  a  crime  in 
England.  207  It  was  also  said  that  the  Scots  court  would  have  been  clothed  with 
jurisdiction  had  a  Scotsman  attempted  to  perpetrate  such  a  fraud  in  England.  208 
Similar  facts  gave  rise  to  the  case  of  HMA  v  Allan.  209  Once  again  the  Scots  court 
was  content  to  take  jurisdiction,  but  indicated  that  the  English  courts  could 
equally  have  heard  the  case210  The  reverse  situation  occurred  in  the  more  recent 
case  of  Laird  and  Goddard  v  HMA.  211  Here  a  plan  was  conceived  in  Scotland, 
and  carried  out  by  actions  in  Scotland  and  England,  to  defraud  an  English 
company.  The  Scottish  courts  were  found  to  have  jurisdiction,  apparently  on  the 
basis  that  the  genesis  of  the  plan  was  in  Scotland,  which  also  hosted  some  of  the 
machinations  necessary  to  action  it.  HMA  v  Bradbury  touches  on  the  issue  of 
whether  actings  require  to  be  criminal  in  England  before  a  cross-border  crime  is 
prosecuted  in  Scotland.  212  This  problem  is  rendered  particularly  acute  by  the 
power  of  the  High  Court  in  Scotland  to  declare  certain  acts  to  be  criminal,  even 
although  there  may  have  been  no  prior  prosecutions.  It  is  uncertain  whether  this 
power  has  survived  the  introduction  of  Convention  rights  into  the  UK 
jurisdictions.  213 
204  For  the  position  with  respect  to  statutory  crimes  sec  Clements  v  HMA  1991  JC  62,  discussed  at 
pp102-103  above. 
205  (1872)  2  Couper  311. 
206  Ibid.  at  319. 
207  Ibid.  per  Lord  Neaves  at  320;  cf  the  position  in  the  delict  of  defamation  (Evans  &  Sons  v  Stein 
&  Co.  (1904)  7F  65). 
208  HMA  v  Bradbury  (1872)  2  Couper  311  per  Lord  Neaves  at  320. 
209  (1873)  2  Couper  402. 
210  Ibid.  per  Lord  Ardmillan  at  407;  per  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Moncrciff  at  408. 
211  1984  SCCR  469. 
212  See  above. 
213  See,  for  example,  C.  H.  W.  Gane  et  al.,  A  Casebook  on  Scottish  Criminal  Law,  3"d  edn.  (W. 
Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2001),  p8. 
139 These  are  thorny  issues.  To  solve  them,  commentators  have  attempted  to  classify 
crimes  into  conduct  crimes,  and  result  crimes,  and  thus  determine  what  actings  in 
each  type  of  crime  should  clothe  a  court  with  jurisdiction.  214  However,  in  such 
debates  it  is  unimportant  whether  the  countries  involved  are  Scotland  and 
England,  or  Scotland  and  another  foreign  country.  The  policy  reasons  for  and 
against  the  prosecution  of  persons  from  another  jurisdiction215  are  not  special  to 
the  intra-UK  situation.  Similarly  in  England,  it  would  seem  that  cross-border 
crimes  within  the  UK  are  treated  no  differently  from  those  involving  a  foreign 
country.  216 
Any  legislative  provisions  in  this  area  have  largely  been  designed  to  bestow 
jurisdiction  in  respect  of  acts  committed  outwith  the  UK,  and  are  of  no 
application  as  between  Scotland  and  England.  217  Section  11(4)  of  the  Criminal 
Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  1995,  is  remarkable  for  its  rarity:  it  allows  a  person  in 
possession  of  property  stolen  in  another  part  of  the  UK,  or  in  receipt  in  Scotland 
of  such  property,  to  be  indicted  as  if  the  property  had  been  stolen  in  Scotland218 
One  remaining  issue  in  the  criminal  law  field  is  the  effect  of  a  previous  trial  in 
England.  Again  it  seems  immaterial  to  the  question  of  whether  the  accused  has 
tholed  his  assize  whether  that  trial  has  been  held  in  England  or  elsewhere.  It  is 
stated  bluntly  in  Renton  &  Brown  that  "[t]he  assize  need  not  be  tholed  in 
Scotland",  219  for  this  doctrine  to  apply.  In  Hilson  v  Easson220  it  was  indicated  that 
214  Ferguson,  "Jurisdiction  and  criminal  law";  G.  H.  Gordon,  The  Criminal  Law  of  Scotland,  3"' 
edn.,  edited  by  M.  G.  A.  Christie  (W.  Green,  2000),  Vol  1,  paras  3.42-3.47. 
215  See,  for  example,  G.  Williams,  "Venue  and  the  ambit  of  criminal  law"  [1965]  81  LQR  276  & 
395. 
216  Rv  Robert  Millar  Ltd  [1970]  2  QB  54.  This  case  involved  the  prosecution  of  a  Scottish 
company  in  respect  of  the  condition  of  one  of  its  motor  vehicles,  which  was  said  to  have 
contributed  to  an  accident  in  England. 
217  For  example,  Criminal  Law  (Consolidation)  (Scotland)  Act  1995,  c.  39,  sl6B;  Criminal 
Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  1995,  ssl  l(1)  &I  IA. 
218  Interestingly,  a  number  of  US  states  have  similar  provisions  (W.  R.  LaFavc  and  A.  W.  Scott, 
Handbook  on  Criminal  Law  (West  Publishing  Co.,  1972),  pp119-120).  Another  such  unusual 
provision  is  to  be  found  in  the  Computer  Misuse  Act  1990,  where  certain  actings  need  not  have 
taken  place  in  Scotland  for  a  conviction  to  be  secured  (1990,  c.  18,  ss4  &  5). 
219  R.  W.  Renton  &  H.  H.  Brown,  Criminal  Procedure  according  to  the  Law  of  Scotland,  6th  edn. 
(updated  looseleaf  edition),  (W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2001),  para  9-09. 
220  (1914)  7  Adam  390.  In  the  course  of  being  tried  for  an  offence  in  England,  the  accused 
admitted  his  guilt  of  a  separate  offence  for  which  a  warrant  had  been  issued  in  Scotland.  It 
appeared  that  the  English  judge  had  taken  this  into  account  when  sentencing.  The  Scottish 
court  witheringly  dismissed  the  notion  that  the  accused  had  tholed  his  assize,  but  allowed  that 
140 an  actual  trial  must  have  taken  place,  which  was  not  so  in  that  case.  There  is  also 
a  later,  obiter  remark  by  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Hope  that  if  someone  has  been  "tried 
for  theft  in  England,  we  would  not  try  him  again  here".  221  Even  if  the  authority 
for  the  proposition  is  somewhat  sparse,  it  does  seem  unlikely  that  the  Scottish 
authorities  would  wish  to  re-try  someone  who  has  already  been  tried  in  England. 
However,  whilst  the  authorities  may  relate  to  an  intra-UK  situation,  the  pragmatic 
and  intuitively  just  reasons  for  such  an  approach  apply  with  equal  force  to  trials 
held  in  foreign  countries. 
A  similarity  between  Scottish  and  English  international  private  law  rules? 
It  has  been  argued  that,  in  the  areas  discussed  in  this  chapter,  a  constitutionalising 
or  internalising  solution  has  been  eschewed,  and  instead  Scots  law  has  used  the 
same  international  private  law  tools  in  cases  with  an  English  element,  as  it  would 
in  truly  international  cases.  Specifically,  most  of  the  examples,  it  will  have  been 
noted,  are  of  the  use  of  choice  of  law  rules.  But,  it  may  be  objected,  is  not  Scots 
international  private  law  merely  a  mirror  of  English  conflict  of  laws  rules?  Such 
a  viewpoint  does  no  justice  to  the  Scottish  international  private  law  rules  which,  it 
is  submitted,  have  no  less  a  claim  to  being  separate  and  special  to  their  legal 
system  than  other  areas  of  Scots  law. 
At  the  outset,  it  must  be  recalled  that  "the  trans-border  nature  of  the  subject- 
matter  and  of  underlying  policy  considerations  has  given  rise  to  significant 
similarities  in  some  areas"  222  of  international  private  law.  Across  the  legal 
systems  of  the  world,  therefore,  there  are  many  points  of  coincidence  in  their 
conflicts  rules.  223  This  will  account  for  some  of  the  similarities  between  conflict 
rules  in  Scotland  and  England,  and  indeed  other  countries.  Anton  argues  that  not 
only  did  Scotland  and  England  learn  much  from  the  international  private  law  texts 
in  the  circumstances  the  English  sentence  could  be  relevant  in  sentencing  in  respect  of  the 
Scottish  offence. 
221  Macgregor  and  Inglis  (1846)  Ark  49  at  60.  And  see  also  Clements  v  HMA  1991  JC  62  per 
Lord  Justice  General  Hope  at  71. 
222  P.  B.  Carter,  General  Editor's  Preface  in  Fletcher,  Luolvency  in  Private  International  Law;  sec 
also  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p2. 
223  For  example,  there  has  been  widespread  reliance  on  the  brocard  locus  regit  actuni  (see  Collins, 
Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  of  Laivs,  para  32-173). 
141 of  mainland  Europe,  but  that  it  was  via  Scotland  that  such  material  reached 
English  lawyers.  224 
Moreover,  it  is  not  correct  to  suggest  that  Scots  international  private  law 
resembles  its  English  equivalent  in  every  particular.  They  differed,  for  example, 
in  their  basic  approaches  to  jurisdiction.  In  English  law  the  ability  to  effect 
service  was  paramount  in  bestowing  jurisdiction  on  the  court,  and  mere  presence 
could  suffice.  This  was  not  a  route  favoured  by  Scots  law,  the  exorbitant 
jurisdictions  of  the  latter  tending  perhaps  to  be  grounded  by  the  presence  of 
property  in  Scotland.  225  Indeed,  when  the  Brussels  Convention  required  to  be 
implemented  by  the  UK,  since  "Scots  law  was  already  much  closer  to  the  civil 
law  tradition  which  so  influences  the  1968  Convention,  the  provisions  of  Title  II 
...  could  be  taken  as  the  basis  for  a  re-writing  of  the  rules  of  jurisdiction  in  civil 
cases  for  Scotland".  226  By  contrast,  there  is  no  English  equivalent  in  the  Civil 
Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  of  the  Scottish  Schedule  8  on  internal  jurisdiction. 
In  the  field  of  domicile,  Lord  President  Clyde  was  unimpressed  by  the  argument 
that  there  could  be  a  place  in  the  law  of  Scotland  for  the  concept  of  Anglo-Indian 
domicile: 
"it  is  clear  that  it  was  evolved  and  developed  entirely  in  the  Courts  of  England. 
In  those  same  courts,  since  1863,  no  one  has  had  a  good  word  to  say  for  it 
... 
I 
cannot  see  any  reason  why,  in  deciding  it  in  Scotland,  we  should  deliberately 
darken  our  minds  by  regarding  as  authoritative  to-day  an  interpretation  by  the 
Courts  of  England  of  the  judgment  in  Bruces  v  Bruce,  which  is  now  recognised 
to  be  a  legal  anomaly  in  the  law  of  England 
... 
".  227 
224  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  pp8-9.  The  development  of  a  body  of 
conflict  rules  in  England  is  normally  traced  to  the  eighteenth  century,  and  the  editors  of  Dicey 
and  Morris  argue  that  it  "came  into  prominence  ...  mainly  because  of  conflicts  between  the 
laws  of  England  and  Scotland"  (Collins,  Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  of  Latins,  para  1- 
014). 
225  See  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  18.04. 
226  Annotations  by  R.  C.  A.  White  &  H.  Currie  to  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982, 
p27-5;  and  see  also  the  comments  of  the  Lord  Chancellor,  HL  Debs,  vol  425,  col  1130. 
227  Grant  v  Grant  1931  SC  238  at  249-250. 
142 Turning  to  family  law,  in  all  the  circumstances,  a  Scottish  court  might  be  unlikely 
to  apply  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  English  case  of  Sottomayor  v  De  Barros  (No. 
2),  228  which  is  that  a  lack  of  capacity  to  marry  by  the  law  of  the  domicile  of  a 
party  to  a  marriage,  which  does  not  pertain  under  English  law,  will  be  ignored  in 
the  event  of  marriage  to  an  English  domiciliary.  229  Furthermore,  a  Scots  court 
will  only  find  a  person  guilty  of  bigamy  if  he  has  attempted  to  re-marry  in 
Scotland,  230  whereas  in  England  such  an  attempt  by  a  British  citizen  will  be  a 
crime  under  English  law,  no  matter  where  it  is  celebrated.  231  Also,  as  has  been 
seen  in  this  chapter,  Scottish  choice  of  law  rules  differed  from  those  originally 
applied  in  England  in  matters  of  legitimacy  and  legitimation.  32 
In  succession  law,  there  is  evidence  of  a  slightly  different  approach  on  either  side 
of  the  Tweed  to  the  construction  of  wills.  Thus  under  Scots  law,  the  law  of  the 
testator's  domicile  will  be  used  to  determine,  for  example,  who  is  an  'heir'  of  the 
testator.  233  But  if  there  is  reference  in  the  will  to  the  'heir'  of  some  other  person,  it 
is  the  law  of  the  latter  person's  domicile  which  is  relevant.  234  Furthermore,  the  lex 
situs  is  likely  to  have  a  role  if  heritage  is  being  bequeathed.  235  By  contrast,  in 
England,  the  identity  of  'heirs'  and  such  like  is  generally  a  matter  for  the  testator's 
domicile,  unless  some  contrary  intention  of  the  testator  can  be  proved.  236  The  lex 
situs  is  not  routinely  applied  even  if  immovable  property  is  involved.  237 
Specifically,  the  'heir'  of  a  named  person  in  the  will  (other  than  the  testator)  is  still 
decided  by  the  laws  of  the  testator's  domicile:  much  to  the  chagrin  of  the  editors 
of  Dicey  and  Morris,  who  favour  the  position  of  Scots  law.  238 
228  (1879)  5  PD  94. 
229  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  9.18,  cf  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private 
International  Law,  p432.  Clive  takes  the  view  that  the  rule  can  "hardly  be  regarded  as  firmly 
entrenched"  (E.  M.  Clive,  The  Law  of  Husband  and  {Vife  in  Scotland,  4`h  cdn.  (W.  Green, 
1997),  para  09.061). 
230  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  9.09. 
231  Offences  Against  the  Person  Act  1861  (24  &  25  Viet),  c.  100,  s57;  Collins,  Dicey  and  Morris 
on  the  Conflict  ofLaws,  para  17-186. 
232  See  pp127-130  above. 
233  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  pp692-693;  Crawford,  International 
Private  Law,  para  17.30. 
234  Mitchell's  Tr  v  Rule  (1908)  16  SLT  189;  and  Smiths  Trs  v  Macpherson  1926  SC  983,  arc  the 
authorities  for  this  proposition:  both  are  intra-UK  cross-border  cases. 
235  Murray  v  Earl  of  Rothes  (1836)  14  S  1049;  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law, 
p694;  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  17.30. 
236  Collins,  Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  ofLaws,  paras  27R-054  to  27-055  &  27-061. 
237  Ibid.,  paras  27-063  to  27-064;  Collier,  Conflict  of  Laws,  p273. 
238  Collins,  Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  para  27-061. 
143 As  was  discussed  above,  there  has  also  been  a  slight  difference  of  approach  in  the 
conflict  rules  in  delict.  239  The  common  law  double  rule  has  not  been  interpreted 
in  the  same  way  in  Scotland  and  England.  The  likelihood  that  Scottish  courts  will 
not  avail  themselves  of  any  flexible  exception  in  the  context  of  the  double  rule, 
has  also  been  noted. 
Of  course,  just  as  there  are  such  differences,  there  are  also  similarities  between 
Scots  and  English  international  private  law  rules.  As  a  small  jurisdiction,  it  is 
always  natural  that  Scotland  will  not  accumulate  the  same  breadth  of  authority, 
and  so  will  have  sometimes  to  look  elsewhere  for  guidance  in  deciding  a  novel 
point  of  law.  For  much  of  the  period  when  the  subject  was  developing  into  the 
framework  we  recognise  today,  Scotland  and  England  have  been  united  into  a 
British  state,  240  and  thus  English  authorities  may  have  been  thought  to  spring  from 
sufficiently  similar  circumstances  to  provide  such  guidance.  However,  in  the 
field  of  international  private  law,  the  cross-border  influences  did  not  all  flow  in 
the  one  direction.  As  has  already  been  hinted  at,  many  key  conflicts  cases, 
regarded  as  so  on  both  sides  of  the  border,  arose  in  Scots  courts.  241  Furthermore, 
whilst  initially  there  was  "reluctance  to  equate  English  law  with  Scots  law",  242  the 
doctrine  of  forum  non  conveniens  was  finally  accepted  by  the  English  courts,  and 
is  now  defended  there  with  the  zeal  of  the  converted!  243  It  also  has  to  be 
remembered  that:  "Borrowing 
... 
does  not  by  any  means  ensure  similarity.  A  cat 
cannot  sing  just  because  it  has  swallowed  a  canary".  244 
239  See  p133  above. 
240  See  Chap.  2.  For  Lord  Reed,  "Scots  private  law  became  heavily  influenced  by  English  law, 
after  1707,  through  the  process  of  integration  of  the  United  Kingdom"  (Lord  Reed,  "The 
constitutionalisation  of  private  law",  70). 
241  See  p117  above;  and  see  Lashley  v  Hog  (1804)  4  Paton  581;  Mackinnon's  Trs  v  Lord 
Advocate  1920  SC  (HL)  171;  Administrator  ofAustrian  Property  v  Von  Lorang  1927  SC (HL) 
80. 
242  North  &  Fawcett,  Cheshire  and  North's  Private  International  Law,  p335.  Sec  also  the 
comments  of  Lord  Diplock  that  "[i]t  would  not  be  consonant  with  the  traditional  way  in  which 
judicial  precedent  has  played  its  part  in  the  development  of  the  common  law  of  England,  to 
attempt  to  incorporate  holus-bolus  from  some  other  system  of  law,  even  so  close  as  that  of 
Scotland,  doctrines  or  legal  concepts  that  have  hitherto  been  unrecognised  in  English  common 
law"  (MacShannon  vRoclavare  Glass  [1978]  AC  795  at  811). 
243  See,  for  example,  Airbus  Industries  GIE  v  Patel  and  Others  [1998]  2  All  ER  257  per  Lord 
Goff  at  271;  I.  Karsten,  "Brussels  II  -  an  English  perspective"  [1998]  IFL  75  at  76. 
244  Weir,  "Divergent  legal  systems  in  a  single  member  state",  574. 
144 International  private  law  in  the  lawyers'  paradise 
The  veteran  critic  of  devolution,  Tam  Dalyell  said  that  his  "fear  is  that  the 
interaction  between  Holyrood  and  Westminster  will  be  a  lawyers'  paradise".  245 
This  is  not  the  place  to  rehearse  the  political  arguments  for,  and  against, 
devolution.  However,  what  is  important  in  the  context  of  this  thesis  is  the  effect 
of  the  new  constitutional  settlement  on  the  Scottish  rules  of  international  private 
law. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  making  of  international  private  law  rules  is  within  the 
legislative  competence  of  the  Scottish  Parliament,  and  the  remit  of  the  Scottish 
Executive.  This  seems  to  have  been  the  view  of  the  Scottish  Office  prior  to  the 
transfer  of  powers.  246  Despite  the  'international'  tag,  conflict  rules  are  not,  of 
course,  "part  of  the  law  of  a  country  or  territory  other  than  Scotland",  247  nor  are 
they  a  reserved  matter,  248  so  the  Scottish  Parliament  can  legislate  in  this  field. 
This  is  reinforced  by  the  explicit  inclusion  of  international  private  law  in  the 
definition  of  Scots  private  law  laid  down  by  the  Scotland  Act.  49  As  a 
consequence,  international  private  law  also  falls  within  the  powers  of  the  Scottish 
Executive.  250  The  potential  therefore  exists  for  Scottish  legislative  change  in  this 
area.  251  Holyrood  has  been  able  to  devote  much  greater  time  to  Scottish  affairs 
than  Westminster  had  in  the  past,  allowing  reforms  to  be  implemented  more 
speedily.  252  There  is  therefore  the  possibility  that  Scots  conflict  rules  could 
diverge  further  from  their  English  counterparts. 
At  a  more  basic  level,  the  advent  of  a  legislative  body  elected  by  Scots  also  raises 
the  prospect  of  a  growing  gulf  between  Scots  and  English  private  law,  thus 
245  Mr.  T.  Dalyell,  HC  Debs,  vol  307,  col  96. 
246  J.  L.  Jamieson,  "Devolution  and  the  Scottish  Law  Officers"  1999  SLT  (News)  117  at  118, 
referring  both  to  private  international  law,  and  separately  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of 
judgments. 
247  Scotland  Act  1998,  s29(2)(a). 
248  Although  the  conflicts  aspect  of  a  reserved  matter,  such  as  intellectual  property,  will  be 
reserved. 
249  Scotland  Act  1998,  s126(4)(a). 
250  Ibid.,  s54. 
251  Indeed,  the  Scottish  Executive  may  not  act  in  contravention  of  EU  legislation,  which  is 
increasingly  important  in  international  private  law  (ibid.,  s57(2)). 
252  For  example,  see  annotations  by  A.  Brown  to  Criminal  Procedure  (Amendment)  (Scotland) 
Act  2002,  asp  4,  p4-1;  annotations  by  M.  Radford  to  Protection  of  Wild  Mammals  (Scotland) 
Act  2002,  asp  6,  p6-1;  and  see  Himsworth,  "Devolution  and  the  mixed  legal  system  of 
Scotland",  125;  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  pp347-348. 
145 creating  more  regular  conflicts  for  international  private  law  rules  to  police.  The 
voting  system  adopted  lends  itself  to  coalition  government,  253  and  this  indeed  has 
been  the  result  of  the  first  two  Scottish  parliamentary  elections.  Furthermore,  in 
modern  British  political  history  the  party  with  the  majority  of  Scots  votes  has  not 
always  been  the  governing  party  at  Westminster.  254  It  is  therefore  likely  that  there 
will  at  times  be  differences  in  the  political  make-up  of  the  executives  in 
Edinburgh  and  London,  each  with  their  own  legislative  agenda.  Another  product 
of  the  method  of  electing  the  Scottish  Parliament  has  been  the  greater 
involvement  of  smaller  parties  and  independents.  Scottish  MPs  at  Westminster 
are  drawn  from  the  Conservative,  Labour,  Liberal  Democrats,  and  Scottish 
National,  parties:  currently  the  Scottish  Parliament  includes  representation  from 
these  parties,  but  also  the  Scottish  Green  Party,  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party,  the 
Scottish  Senior  Citizens  Unity  Party,  and  the  Save  Stobhill  Hospital  Party,  as  well 
as  a  number  of  independents.  This  broader  spectrum  of  opinion  has  the  potential 
to  change  the  tone  of  the  Parliament's  legislative  output.  255 
Thus  far,  the  Scottish  Parliament  has  been  responsible  for  measures  which  deviate 
from  the  political  programme  for  England  and  Wales  pursued  at  Westminster. 
For  example,  certain  forms  of  animal  hunting  have  been  banned  in  Scotland;  256 
measures  have  been  passed  to  control  further  the  physical  chastisement  of 
children;  257  'up-front'  university  tuition  fees  are  not  payable  by  Scottish  students; 
and  the  legislative  framework  has  been  constructed  to  allow  free  personal  care  for 
the  elderly.  258  Freedom  of  information  provisions  relating  to  Scotland  are  thought 
to  be  more  wide-ranging  than  the  Westminster  equivalent.  259  Accordingly 
concerns  over  different  approaches  being  taken  on  either  side  of  the  border,  for 
253  A.  Myles,  "The  new  electoral  system"  in  Hassan  (ed.  ),  A  Guide  to  the  Scottish  Parliament,  p89 
at  91. 
254  B.  Taylor,  Scotland's  Parliament:  Triumph  and  Disaster  (Edinburgh  University  Press,  2002), 
p298;  R.  McLean,  "A  brief  history  of  Scottish  home  rule"  in  Hassan  (cd.  ),  A  Guide  to  the 
Scottish  Parliament,  p21  at  27. 
255  A  good  example  of  the  power  of  a  small  party  to  exert  influence  on  the  introduction  of 
legislation  is  the  input  of  the  Scottish  Socialist  Party  to  the  Abolition  of  Poindings  and  Warrant 
Sales  Act  2001,  asp  1  (see  annotations  by  S.  Styles  on  Abolition  of  Poindings  and  Warrant 
Sales  Act  2001). 
256  Protection  of  Wild  Mammals  (Scotland)  Act  2002. 
257  Criminal  Justice  (Scotland)  Act  2003,  asp  7. 
zsa  Community  Care  and  Health  (Scotland)  Act  2002,  asp  5. 
259  See  annotations  by  R.  McInnes  to  the  Freedom  of  Information  (Scotland)  Act  2002,  asp  13, 
p13-4. 
146 example,  with  respect  to  the  nature  of  the  Crown's  right  as  ultimus  haeres,  may  be 
less  valid  in  the  post-devolution  UK.  Arguably  the  statutes  thus  far  produced  by 
the  Scottish  Parliament  may  also  reflect  the  importance  of  principles  in  Scots 
law.  260  In  the  past,  Acts  of  the  Westminster  Parliament  might  often  commence 
with  a  definition,  before  setting  out  a  number  of  technical  legal  consequences,  or 
possible  judicial  remedies.  261  In  any  event,  Scots  law  might  simply  be  amended 
by  the  inclusion  of  some  additional  provisions  in  a  statute  on  a  topic,  or  by 
collecting  a  number  of  legislative  reforms  into  a  miscellaneous  statute.  262  By 
contrast,  a  number  of  the  Acts  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  begin  by  setting  out 
broad  principles.  263  Perhaps  rather  than  approaching  a  subject  from  the 
perspective  of  the  court  remedies  available,  there  may  in  future  be  a  greater 
concentration  on  the  actual  content  of  the  rights  bestowed. 
However,  another  matter  which  must  be  taken  into  account  when  attempting  to 
predict  how  far  Scots  private  law  may  differ  from  that  of  England  as  a  result  of 
devolution,  is  the  Sewel  Convention.  264  It  is  generally  accepted  that  the  effect  of 
constitutional  doctrine  is  that  the  UK  Parliament  retains  the  power  to  legislate  for 
Scotland  in  devolved  matters.  Despite  some  disquiet,  265  this  was  explicitly  stated 
in  the  Scotland  Act.  266  Reassurance  was  given  that  Westminster  would  not,  in 
fact,  so  legislate  without  gaining  the  consent  of  the  Scottish  Parliament,  and  the 
procedure  of  obtaining  this  agreement  has  come  to  be  known  as  a  Sewel 
motion.  267  The  impression  given  by  Donald  Dewar  both  prior  to,  and  after,  his 
260  Cf  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  pp347-348.  On  the  importance  of  principles 
in  Scots  law  see  N.  R.  Whitty,  "From  rules  to  discretion:  changes  in  the  fabric  of  Scots  private 
law"  (2003)  7  EdinLR  281;  and  note  too  Smits,  The  Alaking  of  European  Private  Law,  p87. 
261  See,  for  example,  Trusts  (Scotland)  Act  1921  (11  &  12  Gco  V),  c.  58;  Companies 
Consolidation  (Consequential  Provisions)  Act  1985,  c.  9;  Sale  of  Goods  Act  1979; 
Conveyancing  and  Feudal  Reform  (Scotland)  Act  1970,  c.  35;  Family  Law  (Scotland)  Act 
1985,  c.  37.  See  too  as  to  the  level  of  detail,  E.  Clive,  "Law-making  in  Scotland:  from  APS  to 
ASP"  (1999)  3  EdinLR  131  at  144-145. 
262  McDiarmid,  "Scots  law:  the  turning  of  the  tide",  159-160;  sec  also  Mr  J.  Wallace,  HC  Debs, 
vo1241,  col  379. 
263  For  example,  see:  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000,  asp  4;  Standards  in  Scotland's 
Schools  etc.  Act  2000,  asp  6;  National  Parks  (Scotland)  Act  2000,  asp  10;  Mental  Health 
(Care  and  Treatment)  (Scotland)  Act  2003,  asp  13. 
264  Although  Munro  has  questioned  whether  it  is  properly  a  convention  at  this  stage  (J.  Munro, 
"Thoughts  on  the'Sewel  Convention"'  2003  SLT  (News)  194). 
265  See  Ashton  &  Finch,  Constitutional  Law  in  Scotland,  para  8.04. 
266  Scotland  Act  1998,  s28(7). 
267  It  initially  seemed  that  this  would  also  entail  opposition  to  a  Private  Member's  Bill  purporting 
to  legislate  for  Scotland  on  a  devolved  matter,  but  this  does  not  seem  always  to  have  been  done 
147 election  as  First  Minister,  was  that  these  motions  would  be  rare,  268  but  this  has  not 
really  been  the  case.  269  This  has  caused  concern,  and  certainly  a  number  of 
constitutional  law  issues  are  raised.  Does  the  system  allow  for  adequate  scrutiny 
of  Westminster  measures  applying  to  Scotland?  270  Does  it  needlessly  complicate 
the  legal  system?  271  Does  it  allow  circumvention  of  the  courts'  control  on 
Scottish  legislation  which  breaches  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights?  272  Centrally,  does  it  affect  the  power  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  to 
legislate  on  an  area  in  the  future?  273  For  many  there  is  a  worry  that  it  gives  away 
the  opportunities  presented  by  devolution  for  Scottish  solutions  to  perceived 
problems.  274  What  is  important  in  the  context  of  the  present  analysis  is  the 
reasons  for  the  greater  than  expected  use  of  the  Sewel  Convention.  One  motive  is 
the  concern  that  a  fragmented  UK  response  will  generate  loopholes.  275  As 
Burrows  has  noted,  the  Scottish  Executive  have  prayed  in  aid  the  value  of 
uniformity,  without  explaining  precisely  what  that  value  may  be  in  the  areas 
concerned  276  Others  have  pointed  to  "a  higher-than-predicted  quest  for 
uniformity  of  provision,  whether  because  of  high  electoral  expectation  of  similar 
rules,  the  need  for  regulatory  equivalence,  or  because  of  the  similarity  of  political 
commitment  of  governments  in  Edinburgh  and  London".  277  However,  as 
Himsworth  has  noted  "when  so-called  anomalies  are  highlighted,  they  are  often 
merely  consequences  of  there  being  different  legal  systems"278  In  debating  a 
Sewel  motion  on  the  Civil  Partnership  Bill  2004,  it  was  said  that  UK  legislation 
(N.  Burrows,  "This  is  Scotland's  Parliament:  let  Scotland's  Parliament  legislate"  2002  JR  213 
at  233-234). 
268 
Ibid.,  216  &  218-219. 
269  Ibid.,  229  &  234;  Taylor,  Scotland's  Parliament,  p143;  and  see  Himsworth  &  O'Neill, 
Scotland's  Constitution,  p197. 
270  Burrows,  "This  is  Scotland's  Parliament",  218  &  231-232;  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's 
Constitution,  p199. 
271  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  p199. 
272  L.  Fabiani,  SPOR,  vol  2,  no  6,  cols  8955-8956  (3  June  2004).  The  concern  here  must  be  that 
whilst  an  Act  of  the  Scottish  Parliament  incompatible  with  Convention  rights  could  be  struck 
down  by  the  Scottish  courts,  if  the  matter  is  legislated  on  for  Scotland  by  the  Westminster 
Parliament,  the  only  remedy  is  a  declaration  of  incompatibility. 
273  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  pp196-197;  Munro,  "Thoughts"  195-196; 
Burrows,  "This  is  Scotland's  Parliament",  235-236;  Devolution  Guidance  Note  13,  Handling 
of  Parliamentary  Business  in  the  House  of  Lords,  para  2.2. 
274  See  p104  above. 
275  See  Burrows,  "This  is  Scotland's  Parliament"  224  &  226. 
276  Ibid.,  225 
277  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's  Constitution,  p198;  and  see  also  Burrows,  "This  is 
Scotland's  Parliament",  235. 
278  C.  M.  G.  Himsworth  &  C.  R.  Munro,  Devolution  and  the  Scotland  Bill  (W.  Green,  1998),  p30. 
148 was  appropriate  because  the  issue  touched  upon  devolved  and  reserved  matters, 
and  that  separate  Scottish  legislation  "would  not  be  in  the  best  interests  of 
consistency  or  clarity,  and  ...  could  lead  to  problematic  cross-border  issues".  279 
Whatever  the  potential  criticisms  or  advantages,  it  seems  that  for  the  foreseeable 
future  these  attitudes  dictating  the  use  of  the  Sewel  Convention  might  diminish 
the  extent  to  which  Scots  law  follows  a  radically  different  path.  280 
However,  the  difference  wreaked  by  the  passage  of  time  in  politics  is 
legendary.  281  As  has  been  argued  above,  it  is  quite  possible  that  in  the  future  a 
political  party,  or  parties,  may  be  in  power  in  Holyrood,  but  not  Westminster. 
Possible  battlegrounds  in  these  circumstances  have  already  been  identified  by 
commentators,  for  example  Westminster's  control  over  the  size  of  the  block  grant 
which  forms  the  majority  of  the  public  funding  open  to  the  Scottish  Parliament  to 
allocate,  282  and  the  lack  of  decisive  Scottish  input  into  EU  negotiations.  283 
Strained  relations,  together  with  ideological  differences,  could  see  further 
divergence  between  Scots  and  English  law,  resulting  in  an  increased  need  to  rely 
upon  conflict  rules  within  the  UK. 
Another  factor  which  may  be  of  some  significance  for  Scots  international  private 
law  is  how  far  a  stronger  Scottish  identity  in  terms  of  matters  of  status  emerges: 
whether  as  a  cause  or  an  effect  of  devolution.  For  Taylor: 
279  H.  Henry,  SPOR,  vol  2,  no  6,  col  8946  (3  June  2004). 
280  The  extent  to  which  most  delegated  legislation  pertinent  to  Scotland  may  be  made  by  the  UK 
government  rather  than  the  Scottish  Executive  has  also  been  the  subject  of  investigation  (C.  T. 
Reid,  "Who  makes  Scotland's  law?  Delegated  legislation  under  the  devolution  arrangements" 
(2002)  6  EdinLR  380). 
281  It  was  Harold  Wilson  who  first  remarked  that  "A  week  is  a  long  time  in  politics". 
282  Ashton  &  Finch,  Constitutional  Law  in  Scotland,  para  8.25;  Himsworth  &  O'Neill,  Scotland's 
Constitution,  pp394-398;  C.  Mair  &  B.  McCloud,  "Financial  arrangements"  in  Hassan  (cd.  ), 
. el 
Guide  to  the  Scottish  Parliament,  p73  at  78-80;  Taylor,  Scotland's  Parliament,  Chap.  13. 
283  Ashton  &  Finch,  Constitutional  Law  in  Scotland,  para  8.45;  N.  Burrows,  "Relations  with  the 
European  Union"  in  Hassan  (ed.  ),  A  Guide  to  the  Scottish  Parliament,  p125  at  130;  T.  StJ.  N. 
Bates,  "Devolution,  the  European  Union  and  the  Scotland  Bill"  1998  Scotland  Forum  (Issue  2) 
4  at  4;  Taylor,  Scotland's  Parliament,  Chap.  14. 
149 "The  history  of  devolution  is  that  of  a  people  who  increasingly  believed  they 
had  a  particular  national  identity  and  wanted  that  identity  expressed  in  political 
form.  It  is  a  history  of  political  response,  not  political  initiative".  284 
The  Scotland  Act  does  not  supply  a  statutory  definition  of  a  Scot.  However,  it  is 
necessary  to  define  a  Scottish  taxpayer.  This  is,  broadly,  someone  who  is  resident 
in  the  UK  for  income  tax  purposes,  but  has  his  closest  connection  with  Scotland 
in  that  tax  year.  285  The  latter  concept  is  linked  to  the  place  of  principal  home  and 
the  days  of  residence  in  Scotland.  286  The  adoption  of  a  different  approach  to  the 
funding  of  university  education  has  also  seen  the  need  to  devise  a  definition  of  a 
Scottish  student.  It  seems  that  this  has  been  done  by  using  the  terminology  of 
domicile,  but  providing  specific  rules  to  allow  domicile  to  be  determined  by  a 
simple  rule  in  each  case:  the  student  must  be  UK  resident  in  terms  of  the  funding 
rules,  and  ordinarily  resident  in  Scotland  at  the  beginning  of  the  university 
course.  287  Therefore  as  well  as  the  continued  role  for  the  common  law  concept  of 
domicile  in  determining  status  for  the  purposes  of,  for  example,  succession  or 
marriage,  there  may  well  be  an  increasing  number  of  special  statutory  Scottish 
domiciles,  such  as  those  described  above. 
It  is  still  too  early  accurately  to  assess  or  predict  the  full  impact  which  all  of  the 
factors  discussed  in  this  section  have  had,  and  will  have,  on  Scots  international 
private  law  rules.  Legislation  on  cross-border  adoption  has  been  left  to 
Westminster  by  use  of  the  Sewel  motion  procedure.  288  There  are  also  conflict 
measures  in  the  Civil  Partnership  Bill  2004,  which  would  apply  to  the  whole  of 
284  Taylor,  Scotland's  Parliament,  pp  116-117;  and  see  also  Nairn,  After  Britain,  pp217-220  & 
303-305. 
285  Scotland  Act  1998,  s75(1).  The  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000  utiliscs  the 
concept  of  habitual  residence  (ibid.,  Sch-3,  para  1;  but  as  we  shall  sec  this  is  derived  from  a 
Hague  Convention:  see  p151  below).  However,  the  court  will  also  have  jurisdiction  over  a 
British  citizen  with  a  closer  connection  to  Scotland  than  another  UK  jurisdiction  (ibid.,  Sch.  3, 
para  1(2)). 
286  Scotland  Act  1998,  s75(2),  (3). 
287  See  University  of  Strathclyde  Student  Finance  Office,  Guidance  for  U.  K.  &  E.  U. 
Undergraduate  Students:  Session  2000/2001  and  Beyond  (2000).  Liability  to  the  Graduate 
Endowment  is,  however,  determined  by,  inter  alia,  ordinary  residence  in  Scotland  (The 
Graduate  Endowment  (Scotland)  Regulations  2001,  SSI  2001/280). 
288  Sewel  motion  passed  in  respect  of  Adoption  and  Children  Bill  (SPOR,  vol  11,  no  11,  cols 
1181-1232  (4 April  2001)). 
150 the  UK  by  virtue  of  reliance  on  the  Sewel  Convention.  289  However,  the  Scottish 
Parliament  has  ventured  into  the  international  private  law  field.  The  first  point 
which  should  be  made  is  that  there  appears  to  have  been  a  change  of  terminology. 
Statutes  passed  by  the  UK  Parliament  tended  to  refer  to  a  'part  of  the  United 
Kingdom'.  290  However,  the  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000,  and  the 
Mental  Health  (Care  and  Treatment)  (Scotland)  Act  2003,  which  are  a  product  of 
the  Scottish  Parliament,  make  reference  to  a  "country  other  than  Scotlandi291  or  a 
"territory  other  than  Scotland".  292  The  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  is  of 
particular  significance.  Reform  of  this  general  area  in  Scotland  had  been 
considered  by  the  Scottish  Law  Commission,  and  pressed  for  by  a  variety  of 
bodies  concerned  in  that  field,  but  the  UK  Parliament  was  unable  to  find  space  for 
any  such  measures  in  its  legislative  programme.  293  Accordingly,  very  quickly 
after  its  establishment,  the  Scottish  Parliament  passed  the  Adults  with  Incapacity 
(Scotland)  Act  2000.  Schedule  3  of  the  Act  deals  with  jurisdiction,  applicable  law 
and  also  recognition  and  enforcement.  Whilst  the  court  may  find  a  law  other  than 
Scots  law  applicable,  mandatory  rules  having  effect  in  Scotland  cannot  be 
evaded.  294  The  coming  into  force  of  the  relevant  Hague  Convention  was, 
however,  awaited,  before  the  Schedule  would  take  effect.  295  Excitingly,  in  2003, 
for  the  first  time,  Scotland  alone  ratified  the  Hague  Convention  on  the 
International  Protection  of  Adults.  296  Once  the  Convention  is  triggered  by  the 
requisite  further  ratifications,  Scotland  will  participate  in  this  international 
scheme,  even  although  the  Hague  Convention  rules  may  not  yet  apply  in  the  other 
jurisdictions  of  the  UK.  This  seemingly  bold  and  independent  approach  to 
289  The  recognition  provisions  of  the  Bill  have  been  discussed  above  at  p105.  The  Bill  will  also 
prevent  the  treatment  as  a  civil  partnership  of  an  overseas  relationship  entered  into  by  a 
Scottish  domiciliary  under  a  certain  age,  or  who  is  incapable  of  understanding  the  nature  of  the 
relationship,  or  which  is  within  certain  degrees  of  relationship  (Civil  Partnership  Bill  2004, 
cl.  209(3),  (4)).  Jurisdiction  with  respect  to  dissolution  and  annulment  of  a  civil  partnership  is 
treated  in  clauses  217  and  211.  It  is  explicitly  said  that  sisting  provisions  similar  to  those 
contained  in  the  Domicile  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  1973,  c.  45,  Sch.  3,  applicable  to 
divorce,  separation  or nullity  of  marriage,  maybe  made  (Civil  Partnership  Bill  2004,  cl.  218). 
290  For  example,  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982;  Child  Abduction  and  Custody  Act 
1985;  Family  Law  Act  1986;  Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990,  c.  36. 
291  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000,  Sch.  3,  para  3(2). 
292  Mental  Health  (Care  and  Treatment)  (Scotland)  Act  2003,  s290(5)(a). 
293  A.  D.  Ward,  Adult  Incapacity  (W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2003),  paras  3-4  to  3-6. 
294  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000,  Sch.  3,  para  5. 
295  Ward,  Adult  Incapacity,  para  3-20. 
296  "Scotland  makes  history  at  the  Hague",  Scottish  Executive  News  Release  (SEJD349/2003),  4 
November  2003,  which  also  noted  that  Canada  has  adopted  a  similar  course  in  allowing  a 
Convention  to  be  ratified  in  respect  of  one  of  its  provinces. 
151 conflict  law-making  may,  however,  still  be  tempered  by  consideration  of  the 
situation  within  the  UK  as  a  whole:  Schedule  3  also  provides  that  secondary 
legislation  can  be  introduced  allowing  for  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of 
orders  from  other  parts  of  the  UK,  and  these  must  not  be  any  stricter  than  that 
applied  with  regard  to  orders  from  other  signatories  of  the  Hague  Convention.  297 
The  availability  of  more  parliamentary  time  for  Scottish  matters  in  the  new 
Scottish  Parliament  could  also  speed  up  the  process  of  the  transformation  of 
conflicts  of  law  into  a  largely  statutory  subject.  298  But  it  cannot  be  said  that  the 
Scottish  Parliament  has  thus  far  rushed  to  legislate  extensively  on  international 
private  law.  Secondary  legislation  such  as  The  European  Communities 
(Matrimonial  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments)  (Scotland)  Regulations  2001299  was 
necessitated  by  the  Brussels  II  Regulation,  which  was  an  EU  development,  and  as 
has  been  seen,  the  conflicts  provisions  of  the  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland) 
Act  are  tied  in  to  a  Hague  Convention  300  Clearly  it  would  be  foolish  not  to  bear 
in  mind  the  intra-UK  aspect  when  considering  future  legislation  on  international 
private  law.  As  has  been  seen,  differing  jurisdictional  rules  in  Scotland  and 
England  have  in  the  past  led  to  unhappy  results.  However,  it  has  also  been  argued 
in  this  chapter  that  certain  reforms  of  conflict  rules  may  be  desirable.  It  is 
submitted  that  if  the  case  for  such  reforms  is  proven,  the  Scottish  Parliament 
should  act,  and  not  be  inhibited  by  a  lack  of  UK-wide  consensus. 
"a  good  place  to  shop  in,  both  for  the  quality  of  the  goods  and  the  speed  of 
service"?  3o1 
Thus  did  Lord  Denning  famously  describe  England  in  the  context  of  choice  of 
forum.  Even  within  the  UK  market  there  are  variations,  both  in  the  goods 
available,  and  in  the  speed  of  proceedings.  Indeed,  it  has  been  submitted  that 
following  devolution,  differences  between  the  two  jurisdictions  might  further 
297  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000,  Sch.  3,  para  10. 
298  See  E.  B.  Crawford,  "What  happened  to  Indyka?  A  survey  of  developments  in  international 
private  law  1958-1990"  in  A.  J.  Gamble  (ed.  ),  Obligations  in  Context:  Essays  in  Honour  of 
Professor  D.  M.  Walker  (W.  Green,  1990),  p151  at  153. 
299  SSI  2001/36. 
300  Although  it  must  be  remembered  that  there  is  no  obligation  to  ratify  Hague  Conventions,  in 
contrast  to  EU  measures. 
301  The  Atlantic  Star  [1973]  1  QB  364  per  Lord  Denning  MR  at  382. 
152 increase.  The  subject  of  forum  shopping  within  the  UK  therefore  demands 
scrutiny. 
The  availability  of  remedies  plays  a  large  part  in  the  preference  of  one  possible 
forum  to  another,  and  this  is  no  less  a  factor  in  cases  as  between  Scotland  and 
England.  At  a  time  when  divorce  in  England  was,  practically,  not  possible,  the 
nineteenth  century  writer  Caroline  Norton  explored  whether  she  might  be  able  to 
obtain  a  divorce  of  her  husband  in  Scotland: 
"I  tried  the  Edinburgh  lawyers.  I  inquired  if  they  could  not  prove  my  marriage 
a  Scotch  one,  all  Mr  Norton's  property  being  in  Scotland,  his  father  a  Scotch 
Baron  of  Exchequer,  and  his  mother  of  a  Scotch  family,  -  but  without 
success". 
302 
Some  of  the  cross-border  cases  of  this  period  illustrate  concern  being  evinced  that 
English  couples  were  resorting  to  Scotland  to  avoid  the  effect  of  English  domestic 
law.  In  Morcomb  v  Macclelland303  it  was  said  by  the  Commissary  Court  that  "the 
courts  of  one  country  ought  not  to  be  converted  into  engines,  for  either  eluding 
the  laws  of  another,  or  determining  matters  foreign  to  that  territory"  . 
304  Despite 
this,  as  has  been  seen,  some  ostensibly  English  couples  did  manage  to  obtain 
3os  decrees  of  divorce  in  Scotland. 
We  have  seen  that  a  suspicion  was  entertained  by  the  Court  of  Session  that  Mrs 
McElroy  may  have  been  attempting  to  evade  the  effects  of  a  claim  under  English 
law  being  time-barred.  306  A  more  modern,  yet  very  clear,  example  of  forum 
shopping  is  provided  by  Sokha  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Honte  Departm  e»t.  307 
This  case  was  remarkable  for  its  lack  of  any  real  link  to  Scotland,  and  seemed 
only  to  have  been  raised  to  take  advantage  of  the  Scots  courts'  greater  readiness  to 
grant  a  particular  remedy.  In  James  Miller  and  Partners  Ltd  v  Whitworth  Street 
302  Norton,  "A  Letter  to  the  Queen",  p49. 
303  (1801)  Ferg  Cons  264. 
304  Ibid.  at  264;  and  see  Hosack,  A  Treatise  on  the  Conflict  ofLaws,  pp271-272  &  284. 
305  See  p96  above. 
306  M'Elroy  vM'Allister  1949  SC  110  (see  pp134-135  above). 
307  1992  SLT  1049  (see  pp101-102  above). 
153 Estates  (Manchester)  Ltd,  308  an  action  was  raised  in  England  in  which  it  was 
argued  that  an  arbitration  between  the  parties  had  been  governed  by  English  law, 
and  thus  a  case  might  be  stated  to  an  English  court.  However,  the  court  noted  that 
in  the  arbitration  "Scottish  procedure  was  followed  throughout  without  objection 
until  the  application  was  made  for  a  case  to  be  stated.  Then  for  the  first  time, 
when  it  was  realised  that  this  procedure  was  not  available  in  Scotland,  was  any 
attempt  made  to  depart  from  what  had  previously  been  agreed".  309  The  arbitration 
was  accordingly  found  by  the  court  to  be  governed  by  Scots  law  and  the  attempt 
to  utilise  an  English  remedy  unavailable  in  Scotland  was  rebuffed.  Differences  in 
the  rules  on  financial  provision  on  divorce  also  act  as  an  encouragement  to  careful 
forum  selection  within  the  UK.  310  Another  powerful  motivation  is  money:  in  a 
variety  of  ways.  Firstly,  there  is  a  perception,  probably  not  ill-founded,  that 
higher  sums  of  damages  are  awarded  in  England  than  Scotland,  particularly  in 
defamation  actions.  311  This  monetary  advantage  seems  to  have  been  the  main 
reason  for  Scottish  workmen  bringing  an  action  in  England  for  injuries  sustained 
in  Scotland  in  MacShannon  v  Rockware  Glass.  312  And  how  else  to  explain  Foxen 
v  Scotsman  Publications  Ltd313  and  Cumming  v  Scottish  Daily  Record  and  Sunday 
Mail  Ltd?  314  Both  were  defamation  cases  against  Scottish  newspapers.  In  the 
first  the  plaintiff  was  a  Scottish  domiciliary,  and  only  ten  per  cent  of  the 
newspaper's  circulation  was  in  England.  The  plaintiff  in  the  second  was  a 
Scottish  student,  and  only  about  7.5  per  cent  of  the  newspaper's  weekly 
circulation  of  850,000  was  through  distribution  in  England.  This  factor  was  quite 
explicitly  discussed  in  Lennon  v  Scottish  Daily  Record  and  Sunday  Mail  Ltd.  315 
The  latter's  circulation  in  England  was  22,069,  but  in  Scotland  more  than  twenty- 
fold  that  figure.  The  defendant  argued  that: 
308  [1970]  1  All  ER  796. 
309  Ibid.  per  Lord  Hodson  at  802. 
310  Both  in  Scotland  and  England  the  lexfori  will  be  applied  in  divorce  cases  before  their  courts 
(on  the  effect  of  such  rules  on  forum  shopping  see  A.  S.  Bell,  Forum  Shopping  and  Venue  in 
Transnational  Litigation  (Oxford  University  Press,  2003),  para  2.38),  and  for  the  differing 
cross-border  approaches  to  financial  provision  on  divorce  see  Editorial  (2001)  50  SLFB  1;  D. 
Hodson,  "Brussels  III;  financial  provision  -  the  next  generation"  [2002]  Fam.  Law  30. 
311  The  quantification  of  damages  currently  being  a  matter  for  the  lex  fori  under  both  Scots  and 
English  law. 
312  [1978]  AC  795. 
31  1994  TLR  84 
314  1995  TLR  333. 
315  [2004]  EWHC  359  (QB). 
154 "it  is  a  well-known  fact  that  awards  for  damages  in  defamation  are  higher  in 
England  than  Scotland 
... 
He  submits  that  the  English  courts  must  thus  be 
vigilant  to  ensure  that  they  are  not  used  as  a  vehicle  to  circumvent  what 
claimants  perceive  to  be  the  less  'remunerative'  attitude  to  damages  under  Scots 
law.  Any  other  approach  ...  would  result  in  the  English  courts  having  a 
jurisdictional  trump-card  with  respect  to  any  defamatory  Scottish  publication 
involving  a  comparatively  small  cross-border  publication".  316 
Another  way  in  which  money  impacts  upon  a  pursuer's  choice  of  forum  is  in 
terms  of  the  cost  of  litigation.  There  seems  to  be  a  popular  feeling  that  legal 
action  in  Scotland  may  be  comparatively  cheaper  and  quicker  than  in  England. 
This  appears  to  have  been  demonstrably  the  case  in  the  distant  past,  as  between 
Scottish  divorces  and  English  judicial  separations.  317  In  more  modem  times  it  was 
thought  that  this  factor  might  cause  one  of  the  more  notorious  libel  battles  to  be 
fought  in  Scottish  courts.  318 
If  both  the  Scots  and  English  courts  have  jurisdiction  in  a  matter,  the  success  or 
failure  of  attempts  to  choose  the  Scots  forum  depends  upon  the  doctrine  of  forum 
non  conveniens:  a  concept  that,  as  we  have  seen,  was  eventually  also  adopted  in 
England.  Scottish  courts  do  not  seem  to  have  applied  the  doctrine  any  differently 
whether  the  alternative  forum  was  England  or  a  foreign  country.  319  In  both  cases, 
for  example,  the  basing  of  jurisdiction  on  the  arrestment  of  property  ad 
fundandam  jurisdictionem  makes  it  more  likely  that  a  plea  of  forwn  non 
conveniens  will  succeed.  In  Williamson  v  North-Eastern  Railway  Co320  a  widow 
attempted  to  sue  an  English  company  for  the  death  of  her  husband  (which  had 
occurred  in  England)  by  founding  jurisdiction  on  the  arrestment  of  property  in 
Scotland.  It  was  recognised  that  the  widow  could  not  bring  an  action  in  England, 
316  Ibid.  para  22. 
317  At  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century,  the  cost  of  divorcing  in  Scotland  was  on  average 
between  £15  to  £30,  but  an  undefended  judicial  separation  in  England  might  cost  from  £120  to 
£140,  and  a  divorce  by  private  Act  of  Parliament  around  £700  (Leneman,  Alienated  Afections, 
p15). 
318  W.  Tinning,  "Legal  views  differ  on  Hamilton  suing  in  Scotland",  The  Herald,  17  November 
1997;  K.  Symon,  "Hamilton  to  sue  Fayed  in  Scotland",  The  Sunday  Times,  16  November 
1997. 
319  See,  for  example,  Robinson  v  Robinson's  Trs  1930  SC  (HL)  20. 
320  (1884)  11  R596. 
155 yet  nevertheless  the  defenders'  plea  of  forum  non  conveniens  was  upheld.  32' 
Anton  believes  that  the  ability  to  cite  witnesses  outwith  Scotland,  but  within  the 
UK,  may  account  for  the  decision  in  Munro  &  Co  v  Anglo-American  Nitrogen 
Co,  322  but  this  is  not  said  explicitly  in  the  report  . 
323 
The  effect  of  EU  Conventions  and  legislation  on  the  existence  of  the  plea  of 
forum  non  corveniens  will  be  discussed  in  another  chapter.  324  For  the  present  it  is 
recorded  that  it  will  be  this  author's  submission  that  neither  the  Brussels  I 
Regulation,  nor  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  prevent  reliance  upon  the  doctrine 
within  the  UK.  325  It  is  submitted  that  in  these  areas,  as  well  as  in  others,  the 
doctrine  continues  to  provide  a  useful  protection.  It  seems  inappropriate  that  a 
case  which  is  most  closely  connected  with  one  forum  should  be  allowed  to 
proceed  in  another.  This  is  particularly  so  if  this  favours  the  more  affluent 
pursuer  able  to  manipulate  the  system  in  search  of  monetary  gain.  Such  concerns 
have  no  less  force  within  the  UK.  326  Giving  evidence  to  the  House  of  Lords 
Select  Committee  on  the  Brussels  II  Regulation,  Clive  argued  that: 
"Assuming  that  the  grounds  of  jurisdiction  are  reasonable,  and  that  all  the 
countries  involved  will  conduct  the  proceedings  in  a  way  which  is  in 
accordance  with  accepted  principles  of  natural  justice,  a  simple  rule  for  the 
resolution  of  such  conflicts  is  arguably  better  than  a  complicated  set  of  rules. 
A  mandatory  system  is  arguably  better  than  a  discretionary  system,  which 
327  leaves  open  the  possibility  of  two  sets  of  proceedings  continuing". 
321  A  decision  applauded  by  Bell  (Bell,  Forum  Shopping,  para  2.12). 
322  1917  1  SLT  24.  This  was  an  action  by  a  Scots  firm  against  an  English  company  for  breach  of 
contract,  in  which  the  latter  appeared  to  base  their  (unsuccessful)  plea  of  fori  m non  conveniens 
on  the  presence  of  witnesses  in  England. 
323  See  the  first  edition  of  Anton  with  Beaumont:  A.  E.  Anton,  Private  International  Law:  A 
Treatise  frone  the  Standpoint  of  Scots  Law,  1"  edn.  (W.  Green  &  Son,  1967),  p152. 
324  See  Chap.  6. 
325  In  the  latter  case,  insofar  as  this  is  not  prevented  by  the  sisting  provisions  of  the  Domicile  and 
Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  1973,  Sch.  3.  On  the  potential  availability  of  a  plea  of  forum  non 
conveniens  in  a  divorce  action  see  P.  R.  Beaumont,  "Conflicts  of  jurisdiction  in  divorce  cases: 
forum  non  conveniens"  (1987)  361CLQ  116. 
326  Indeed,  may  have  more  force  in  a  country  with  no  political  borders  between  its  jurisdictions, 
which  all  have  a  common  language. 
327  E.  M.  Clive,  Memorandum  contained  in  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the 
European  Communities,  Brussels  II:  the  Draft  Convention  on  Jurisdiction,  Recognition  and 
Enforcement  of  Judgments  in  Matrimonial  Matters  (HL  Paper  19,  Session  1997-98),  p3. 
156 That  possibility  is  indeed  undesirable,  and  is  prevented  by  the  operation  of  a 
system  of  lis  alibi  pendens.  But  with  that  certainty  comes  inflexibility.  The 
grounds  upon  which  Scottish  and  English  courts  can  both  legitimately  have 
jurisdiction  are  still  such  that  the  prize  in  the  race  to  litigate  may  be  the  selection 
of  a  forum  which  seems  inappropriate,  in  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  to  the 
impartial  observer.  It  is  submitted  that  the  key  to  the  benefits  of  a  doctrine  of 
forumn  non  conveniens  is  that  a  choice  between  a  number  of  forums  is  not  resolved 
simply  by  rewarding  the  party  who  is  fastest  to  act,  but  by  dint  of  a  more 
sophisticated  mechanism,  rooted  in  the  concept  of  justice  between  the  parties,  328 
and  operated  by  an  independent  judicial  body  in  the  form  of  the  court  . 
329  As  Bell 
observes,  the  idea  of  a  natural  forum  gives: 
"a  neutral  and  objective  solution  to  clashes  between  parties  relating  to  the 
venue  for  the  resolution  of  a  transnational  dispute  -  something  of  a  tie  breaker 
in  cases  of  contested  jurisdiction  and  at  the  same  time  a  corrective  to  the 
phenomenon  of  forum  shopping".  330 
The  preservation  of  the  fortan  non  conveniens  doctrine  within  the  UK  is  to  be 
commended  as  it  allows  the  courts  to  continue  to  fulfil  such  a  valuable  role. 
328  See  Bell,  Forum  Shopping,  paras  3.87-3.88. 
329  The  cynic  may  argue  that  a  court  seised,  before  which  any  arguments  of  forum  non  convenieus 
may  be  heard,  cannot  be  totally  impartial,  as  it  already  has  an  interest  in  the  case.  However, 
cases  such  as  Williamson  v  North-Eastern  Railway  Co.  (1884)  11  R  596;  and  Sokha  v 
Secretary  of  State  for  the  Honte  Department  1992  SLT  1049,  are  testament  to  the  ability  of 
Scots  courts  to  decline  jurisdiction  where  they  conclude  that  England  is  the  proper  forum. 
330  Bell,  Forum  Shopping,  para  3.89. 
157 6  THE  IMPACT  OF  EUROPEAN  UNION 
LEGISLATION  ON  INTRA-UK  CONFLICT 
RULES 
One  of  the  most  significant  events  for  the  UK  in  the  development  of  modem 
international  private  law  has  been  our  entry  into  the  (then)  European  Economic 
Community  (now  the  EU)  signalled  by  the  European  Communities  Act  1972. 
Over  the  years  the  range  of  areas  in  which  EU  action  is  deemed  necessary  to 
support  the  Internal  Market  (and  since  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  of  1997  and  the 
Tampere  Conclusions  of  1999,  to  create  an  area  of  freedom,  security  and  justice) 
between  member  states  has  increased.  The  stated  aim  is  greater  convergence  in 
civil  law.  As  recently  as  1989,  a  writer  on  succession  matters  in  the  international 
arena  commented  that  this  area  of  law  "falls  squarely  within  the  zone  of  matters 
that  are  outwith  the  scope  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  therefore  international  action  in  this 
field  has  to  be  taken  in  alternative  fora".  1  Now  Brussels  IV,  an  EU  Regulation  on 
succession,  is  in  contemplation.  2  Another  important  shift  in  EU  involvement  in 
conflicts  law  has  been  the  move  from  the  use  of  Conventions,  which  the  UK 
would  implement  with  domestic  legislation,  3  to  the  use  of  Regulations,  4  which  are 
directly  enforceable  in  all  member  states,  and  which  have  been  described  as  "the 
most  invasive  legal  instrument  that  European  law  has  at  its  disposal".  5  Briggs  has 
described  the  process  as  "the  concreting  over  of  the  common  law  conflict  of 
laws".  6  But  how  does  this  endless  construction  work  affect  the  regulation  of 
international  private  law  matters  within  the  UK?  And  do  Scotland  and  England 
share  the  same  planning  objections? 
I  Robertson,  "International  succession  law",  377. 
2  C.  M.  V.  Clarkson,  "Brussels  III  -  matrimonial  property  European  style"  [2002]  Fain  Law  683  at 
683;  Hodson,  "Brussels  IIP",  30. 
Such  as  the  Brussels  Convention,  implemented  by  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act 
1982;  and  the  Rome  Convention,  implemented  by  the  Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990. 
°  For  example  the  Brussels  I  Regulation,  and  the  Brussels  II  Regulation.  There  is  also  a 
proposal  to  convert  the  Rome  Convention  into  a  Regulation. 
5  K.  Boele-Woelki  &  R.  H.  van  Ooik,  "The  communitarization  of  private  international  law" 
(2002)  4  YPIL  I  at  28.  Contrast  the  shortcomings  of  Directives  (L.  Niglia,  "The  Non- 
Europeanisation  of  private  law"  (2001)  4  ERPL  575). 
6  Briggs,  The  Conflict  of  Latins,  p.  v. 
158 Choice  of  law  in  contract:  the  Rome  Convention 
Article  19(2)  of  the  Rome  Convention7  presented  the  UK  with  a  clear  choice, 
providing  as  it  does  that  "[a]  State  within  which  different  territorial  units  have 
their  own  rules  of  law  in  respect  of  contractual  obligations  shall  not  be  bound  to 
apply  this  Convention  to  conflicts  solely  between  the  laws  of  such  units".  This 
brought  forth  an  equally  clear  response  in  the  UK  implementing  legislation. 
Section  2(3)  of  the  Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990  provides  that  the  Rome 
Convention  provisions  also  apply  to  conflicts  between  the  jurisdictions  of  the  UK. 
Whilst  the  Bill  was  being  debated,  the  then  Lord  Advocate  stated  that  this  was  the 
government's  intention,  but  did  not  explain  the  thinking  behind  the  move.  $ 
Anton,  who  assisted  in  negotiating  the  Convention,  9  suggests  that  to  do  otherwise 
would  have  led  to  difficulties  for  lawyers.  10  Similarly  the  editors  of  Cheshire  and 
North  ascribe  the  decision  to  "the  obvious  inconvenience""  of  different  rules 
dependent  on  whether  the  conflict  arose  within  the  UK,  or  in  respect  of  a  foreign 
country.  Interestingly,  however,  arguments  were  made  during  parliamentary 
debates  for  the  Convention  not  to  apply  with  respect  to  foreign  countries  who 
were  not  contracting  states,  and  it  was  not  posited  that  this  course  would  cause 
great  difficulties.  12  The  UK  also  decided  to  disapply  certain  Articles  of  the 
Convention.  13  This  would  seem  to  suggest  that  the  view  was  taken  that  the  UK 
was,  in  the  main,  satisfied  with  the  Convention  rules,  and  thus  content  for  them  to 
apply  within  the  UK,  as  well  as  with  respect  to  foreign  countries.  Indeed,  whilst 
it  would  be  inaccurate  to  describe,  and  dangerous  to  regard,  the  Convention  as  a 
codification  of  the  well-developed  English  choice  of  law  rules  in  this  area,  there 
are  undoubted  similarities  between  the  two. 
7  More  properly,  the  Convention  on  the  law  applicable  to  contractual  obligations. 
$  Lord  Fraser  of  Carmyllie,  HL  Debs,  vol  513,  col  1258. 
9  Ibid. 
10  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p314. 
11  North  &  Fawcett,  Cheshire  &  North's  Private  International  Law,  p545- 
12  See  HL  Debs,  vol  513,  cols  1269-1270  &  vol  515,  cols  1474-1482.  In  the  event,  the  Rome 
Convention  does  have  universal  application,  and  thus  must  be  applied  in  the  courts  of  all 
contracting  states  to  qualifying  disputes,  even  if  the  contending  laws  are  not  those  of 
contracting  states. 
13  Namely  Arts  7(1)  &  10(1)(e).  It  is  questionable  whether  the  UK  will  be  allowed  to  disapply 
these  provisions  if  the  Convention  is  converted  into  a  Regulation  (sec  p160  below)  (E.  B. 
Crawford  &  J.  M.  Carruthers,  "Conflict  of  laws  update"  2003  SLT  (News)  137  at  140). 
159 The  Scots  and  English  courts  have  not,  however,  necessarily  adopted  the  same 
approach  as  each  other  to  the  interpretation  of  the  Rome  Convention.  In 
Caledonia  Subsea  Ltd  v  Micoperi  Srl,  14  the  Inner  House  appeared  to  place  much 
emphasis  on  Article  4(2)  of  the  Convention,  the  law  thus  indicated  only  being 
displaced  if  "the  outcome  of  the  comparative  exercise  referred  to  in  para  5 
... 
demonstrates  a  clear  preponderance  of  factors  in  favour  of  another  country".  15 
This  accorded  with  the  Dutch  approach  to  interpretation  of  the  Article.  '6 
Accordingly,  Scots  law  having  been  identified  by  Article  4(2),  this  was  not  to  be 
disregarded  in  a  contract  with  the  defenders  (an  Italian  company  subcontracted  to 
an  Egyptian  company),  for  work  in  Egypt.  This  does  not  coincide  with  the  views 
of  the  editors  of  Dicey  and  Morris,  17  nor  with  certain  English  decisions  which 
suggested  that  Article  4(2)  was  easily  to  be  displaced  by  the  law  suggested  by 
Article  4(5).  18  Whilst  this  latter  approach  may  have  been  modified  in  Definitely 
Maybe  (Touring)  Ltd  v  Marek  Lieberberg  Konzertagentur  GmbH,  19  it  arguably 
still  does  not  coincide  with  the  Scottish  view.  Crawford  and  Carruthers  sense  a 
difference  in  interpretation  within  the  UK.  20 
When  the  Rome  Convention  was  drafted,  a  mechanism  was  also  put  into  place 
whereby  differences  in  interpretation  could  be  lessened  by  means  of  references  to 
the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)21  This  Brussels  Protocol  never  entered  into 
force,  but  the  same  effect  would  be  achieved  if  the  current  proposal  to  convert  the 
Rome  Convention  into  an  EU  Regulation  were  to  succeed.  22  ECJ  jurisdiction 
over  contractual  disputes  involving  the  law  of  a  politically  foreign  country  23 
caused  concern  at  the  time  of  the  preparation  of  the  Rome  Convention.  24  What 
was  much  less  clear  was  whether  the  ECJ  could  accept  a  reference  from  a  UK 
14  2002  SLT  1022. 
's  Ibid.  per  Lord  President  Cullen  at  1029. 
16  Ibid.  per  Lord  Cameron  of  Lochbroom  at  1031;  per  Lord  Marnoch  at  1032. 
17  Ibid.  per  Lord  President  Cullen  at  1029. 
I$  Credit  Lyonnais  v  New  Hampshire  Insurance  Co.  [1997]  2  Lloyds  Rep  I  per  Hobhousc  LJ  at 
5. 
19  [2001]  4  All  ER  283;  followed  in  Ennstone  Building  Products  Ltd  v  Stanger  Ltd  [2002]  1 
WLR  3059. 
20  Crawford  &  Carruthers,  "Conflict  of  laws  update"  (2003),  138-139. 
21  The  first  Protocol  on  the  interpretation  of  the  Rome  Convention  by  the  European  Court  ("the 
Brussels  Protocol"),  contained  in  Schedule  3  of  the  Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990. 
22  See  Crawford  &  Carruthers,  "Conflict  of  laws  update"  (2003),  137. 
23  Because  of  the  universal  application  of  the  Convention  (see  note  12  above). 
24  Tizzano  Report  [1990]  OJ  C219/1,  para  23. 
160 court  in  an  intra-UK  contractual  conflicts  case,  had  the  Brussels  Protocol  been  in 
effect.  The  terms  of  Article  19(2),  and  the  Brussels  Protocol  itself,  together  with 
s2(3)  of  the  Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act,  do  nothing  to  suggest  that  this 
would  not  be  possible.  The  editors  of  Dicey  and  Morris  felt  it  likely  that  such  a 
reference  could  be  made,  and  that  the  ECJ  would  accept  jurisdiction.  25  However, 
whilst  the  case  of  Kleinwort  Benson  Ltd  v  Glasgow  City  Council26  clarified  the 
ECJ's  lack  of  jurisdiction  over  national  legislation  simply  modelled  upon 
European  rules,  it  is  not  entirely  clear  whether  the  reference  of  internal  matters 
directly  to  European  legislation  founds  ECJ  jurisdiction.  7  The  binding  nature  of 
any  ECJ  judgment  arising  from  such  a  reference  was  identified  as  being  of 
importance.  28  Plender  is  of  the  view  that  the  reliance  on  the  Rome  Convention 
itself  for  cross-border  conflicts  within  the  UK,  together  with  the  lack  of  any 
direction  to  treat  ECJ  cases  differently  in  international  or  intra-UK  cases,  is 
currently  sufficient  for  the  ECJ  to  take  jurisdiction  in  the  latter  type  of  case.  29  He 
admits,  however,  that  this  is  "still  an  open  question".  30 
Thus,  in  terms  of  the  choice  of  law  rules  applying  to  contracts,  the  UK  response  to 
the  Rome  Convention  was  to  adopt,  almost  in  their  entirety,  the  Convention  rules 
in  the  areas  which  it  governed.  In  particular,  the  common  law  rules  were  not 
retained  for  choice  of  law  issues  in  cross-border  contracts  within  the  UK, 
although  as  has  been  noted,  there  were  similarities  between  the  English  Common 
Law  (to  which  Scots  conflict  law  owed  a  debt),  and  the  Convention,  rules.  There 
may  presently,  however,  be  some  difference  in  approach  in  Scotland  and  England 
to  the  implementation  of  the  Rome  Convention  rules. 
25  Collins,  Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  para  32-029. 
26  [1996]  QB  57;  the  case  concerned  the  interpretation  of  the  'Modified  Convention'  in  the  Civil 
Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982,  Sch.  4. 
27  This  practice  was,  interestingly,  described  as  a  renvoi  (Kleimvort  Benson  Ltd  v  Glasgow  City 
Council  [1996]  QB  57  per  Advocate  General  at  70).  The  Advocate  General  was  most  hostile 
to  the  ECJ  issuing  rulings  in  such  renvoi  situations  (ibid.  at  73-80),  but  unfortunately  the 
Court's  own  judgment  is  less  clear. 
28  Ibid.,  82-83. 
29  R.  Plender  &  M.  Wilderspin,  The  European  Contracts  Convention:  The  Rollie  Convention  on 
the  Choice  of  Law  for  Contracts,  2°d  cdn.  (Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2001),  paras  2-28  to  2-32. 
30  Ibid.,  para  2-32. 
161 Choice  of  law  in  non-contractual  obligations:  Rome  II 
The  proposed  Regulation  on  non-contractual  obligations31  (commonly  referred  to 
as  "the  Rome  II  Regulation")  would  govern  choice  of  law  in  delict,  and 
obligations  characterised  as  unjust  enrichment  and  agency  without  authority.  As 
with  the  Rome  Convention  discussed  above,  32  the  Rome  II  Regulation  would 
apply  not  just  in  situations  where  the  choice  of  law  is  between  the  laws  of 
member  states,  but  also  where  the  law  of  a  non-EU  country  is  involved.  33 
However,  again  as  with  the  Rome  Convention,  member  states  comprising  more 
than  one  legal  system  are  explicitly  allowed  a  choice  as  to  whether  to  apply  the 
Rome  II  Regulation  in  conflicts  between  the  laws  of  those  legal  systems  34 
To  choose  to  apply  the  Rome  II  Regulation  within  the  UK  would  require 
amendment  of  the  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act 
1995.  The  Rome  II  Regulation  lays  great  stress  on  the  law  of  the  country  in 
which  the  delictual  loss  is  sustained,  35  and  also  contains  special  rules  for 
particular  delicts.  36  The  latter  includes  defamation,  which  currently  remains 
subject  to  the  common  law  double  rule  in  Scotland.  37  In  the  field  of  unjust 
enrichment,  the  Rome  II  Regulation  would  replace  the  existing  common  law 
rules,  such  as  they  are.  The  final  response  to  the  Rome  II  Regulation  with  respect 
to  intra-UK  application  will  presumably  be  taken  at  Westminster  level,  with  input 
from  the  Scottish  Parliament:  38  what  will  the  final  decision  be?  The  outcome  in 
general,  and  in  detail,  is  far  from  clear.  The  Rome  II  proposal  made  insufficient 
31  Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of  the  European  Parliament  and  the  Council  on  the  law  applicable  to 
non-contractual  obligations,  COM  (2003)  427  final;  2003/0168  (COD). 
32  Rome  Convention,  Art.  2. 
33  Rome  II  Regulation,  Art.  2. 
34  Ibid.,  Art.  21(2);  indeed  Scotland  is  specifically  mentioned  in  the  accompanying  discussion  of 
Art.  21  (Rome  II  Proposal,  p28). 
35  Rome  II  Regulation,  Art.  3(1).  This  general  rule  can  be  displaced  in  favour  of  the  law  of  the 
country  where  both  parties  are  habitually  resident  (ibid.,  Art.  3(2)),  or  the  law  of  a  country 
more  closely  connected  with  the  delict  (ibid.,  Art.  3(3)). 
36  For  example,  in  matters  of  product  liability  or  unfair  competition.  For  a  detailed  discussion  of 
the  Rome  II  Regulation,  see  J.  M.  Carruthers  &  E.  B.  Crawford,  "Conflict  of  laws  update"  2004 
SLT  (News)  19;  A.  Dickinson,  "Cross-border  torts  in  EC  courts  -a  response  to  the  proposed 
'Rome  II'  Regulation"  [2002]  EBLR  369. 
37  See  p133  above. 
38  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  The  Rome  II  Regulation  (HL  Paper 
66,  Session  2003-2004),  para  87.  However,  the  Scottish  Executive  Justice  Department  seemed 
to  suggest  in  the  context  of  the  Brussels  I  Regulation  that  amendment  to  Schedule  4  would  be 
dealt  with  by  Westminster,  and  to  Schedule  8  by  Holyrood  (Civil  Justice  and  International 
Division  of  the  Scottish  Executive  Justice  Department,  "New  rules  on  civil  jurisdiction"  2002 
SLT  (News)  39  at  41). 
162 progress  in  the  EU  parliamentary  session  now  ended,  and  in  the  new  session  will 
be  subject  to  the  co-decision  procedure.  Moreover,  the  EU  parliamentary 
Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  and  the  Internal  Market  has  produced  a  draft  Report 
on  the  Rome  II  Regulation39  which  suggests  significant  amendments  to  the 
proposal.  In  particular,  it  suggests  a  rule  for  all  delictual  and  unjust  enrichment 
matters,  but  with  room  for  flexibility  to  take  account  of  various  factors,  and  of  the 
special  features  of  particular  types  of  delict.  There  were  many  within  the  UK  who 
questioned  whether  the  Rome  II  Regulation  (in  its  original  proposed  form)  was 
necessary,  or  indeed  legitimately  a  subject  of  EU  legislation.  40  It  is  submitted, 
however,  that  it  would  be  naive  to  assume  that  the  Commission  can  ultimately  be 
dissuaded  from  its  intention  to  see  this  project  through:  even  if  changes  are  made 
to  the  detail,  a  Rome  II  Regulation  will  come  to  pass.  There  are  some  who  take 
the  view  that  if  a  Rome  II  Regulation  does  come  into  force,  it  would  be  easier  to 
apply  the  Regulation  rules  in  intra-UK  cases  as  in  all  other  cases.  41  Furthermore, 
as  Carruthers  and  Crawford  observe: 
"Since  it  was  a  conscious  decision  that  the  1995  Act  should  contain  no  special 
intra-UK  rules,  it  would  be  ironic  if  the  UK  now  should  choose  to  disapply 
Rome  II  within  its  multi-legal  system  territory"  42 
Jurisdiction,  recognition  and  enforcement:  the  Brussels  Convention  and  the 
Brussels  I  Regulation 
In  contrast  to  the  reaction  to  the  proposed  Rome  II  Regulation,  a  modified 
acceptance  is  apparent  in  the  UK  response  to  the  European  rules  on  jurisdiction, 
recognition  and  enforcement  in  civil  and  commercial  matters.  Like  the  Rome 
39  Committee  on  Legal  Affairs  and  the  Internal  Market  (Rapportcur:  Diana  Wallis),  Draft  Report 
(Revised  Version)  on  the  proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council  regulation  on  the 
law  applicable  to  non-contractual  obligations  ("Rome  II')  (5  April  2004),  ("The  Wallis 
Report"). 
ao  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  The  Rome  II  Regulation,  paras  48- 
79;  "Consultation  on  a  preliminary  draft  proposal  for  a  Council  Regulation  on  the  law 
applicable  to  non-contractual  obligations:  response  of  the  Government  of  the  United 
Kingdom",  http:  //europa.  eu.  int/comm/justice_home/unit/civil/consultation/contributions/ 
govem_uk_en.  pdf,  para  2;  Dickinson,  "Cross-border  torts",  371-372;  Carruthers  &  Crawford, 
"Conflict  of  laws  update"  (2004),  24.  The  amendments  suggested  in  the  Wallis  Report  might 
make  the  Rome  II  Regulation  slightly  more  palatable  to  the  critics. 
at  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  The  Rome  11  Regulation,  para  89. 
42  Carruthers  &  Crawford,  "Conflict  of  laws  update"  (2004),  23. 
163 Convention,  the  original  Brussels  Convention43  applied  between  contracting 
states,  although  there  was  no  equivalent  to  the  Rome  Convention  provision  which 
sharply  points  up  the  choice  of  applying,  or  not  applying,  the  Convention  within  a 
member  state. 
Jurisdiction 
With  respect  to  jurisdiction,  the  UK  adopted  a  tiered  approach.  The  Brussels 
Convention  applied  to  allocate  jurisdiction  in  disputes  involving  Scotland  (or 
England)  and  another  contracting  state.  44  A  modified  version  of  the  jurisdiction 
rules  applied  in  intra-UK  cross-border  cases.  45  As  has  been  noted,  because  of  the 
similarity  of  the  Convention  approach  to  existing  Scots  rules,  it  was  also  possible 
to  include  within  the  implementing  legislation  rules  for  jurisdiction  in  Scottish 
domestic  cases.  46  Some  of  the  differences  between  the  Schedule  4  scheme  and 
the  Brussels  Convention  itself  were  necessitated  by  the  structure  of  the  UK. 
Thus,  certain  of  the  Convention  rules  favoured  central  offices,  which  in  the  UK 
may  often  be  in  London.  Applied  within  the  UK,  these  rules  might  have  resulted 
in  the  English  courts  being  allocated  jurisdiction  in  circumstances  where  Scotland 
might  be  a  more  appropriate  forum.  Article  16(4)  of  the  Convention,  for 
example,  was  not  adopted  in  Schedule  4,  as  otherwise  no  patent  cases  could  have 
been  brought  in  Scotland.  47  However,  other  omissions  from  Schedule  4  merely 
signal  UK  displeasure  with  the  Convention  rule  in  question,  such  as  the 
provisions  on  insurance  contracts.  48  Furthermore,  certain  bases  of  jurisdiction 
absent  from  the  Brussels  Convention  were  not  banished  from  the  intra-UK 
arena.  49  In  the  case  of  the  majority  of  the  Schedule  4  rules,  which  do  coincide 
with  the  Convention  provisions,  it  was  intended  that  Convention  cases  would 
5°  provide  guidance.  As  has  been  seen,  there  was  some  consideration  in 
43  Convention  on  jurisdiction  and  the  enforcement  of  judgments  in  civil  and  commercial  matters. 
44  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982,  Sch.  1. 
as  Ibid.,  s16,  Sch.  4;  and  see  P.  R.  Beaumont,  Anton  &  Beaumont's  Civil  Jurisdiction  in  Scotland, 
2°d  edn.  (W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  1995),  paras  9.01-9.04. 
46  See  p142  above. 
47  The  Maxwell  Report,  para  13.124;  annotations  by  R.  C.  A.  White  &  H.  Currie  to  the  Civil 
Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982,  p27-22. 
a$  See  the  Maxwell  Report,  para  13.78. 
49  For  example,  the  situs  of  moveables  in  actions  relating  to  moveable  property,  or  the  situs  of 
immoveables  in  actions  relating  to  a  security  over  the  property.  50  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982,  s16(3). 
164 Davenport  v  Corinthian  Motor  Policies  at  Lloyds51  of  the  possibility  of  a  different 
course  being  taken  in  jurisdiction  disputes  within  the  UK,  but  the  judges 
ultimately  felt  constrained  to  interpret  Schedule  4  as  they  would  the  Convention 
itself.  52  There  is  no  evidence  that  provisions  appearing  in  both  the  Convention 
and  Schedule  4  have  been  interpreted  differently  by  the  Scots  courts.  53 
Although  the  Brussels  I  Regulation  replaces  the  Brussels  Convention,  54  it  does 
not  itself  alter  the  arrangements  for  the  allocation  of  jurisdiction  within  the  UK. 
The  Brussels  I  Regulation  innovates  upon  the  Brussels  Convention  to  some 
degree,  although  the  basic  framework  is  unchanged  55  The  Schedule  4  scheme 
already  provided  for  the  taking  of  jurisdiction  in  terms  of  Article  5(3)  when  a 
wrong  was  merely  threatened,  but  the  Schedule  has  been  amended  to  take  account 
of  the  altered  rules  on  consumer  contracts,  contracts  of  lease  and  employment 
contracts  in  the  Brussels  I  Regulation.  56  The  greater  clarity  of  Article  5(1)  of  the 
57  Brussels  I  Regulation  has  not,  however,  been  carried  over  to  Schedule  4.  Nor 
was  the  opportunity  taken  to  remove  any  of  the  remaining  differences  between  the 
rules  allocating  jurisdiction  amongst  the  various  parts  of  the  UK,  and  the  rules 
which  apply  when  the  court  of  another  member  state  is  involved. 
A  further  such  difference  is  the  availability  of  the  plea  of  forum  non  conveniens 
within  the  UK.  This  was  initially  the  subject  of  some  confusion.  It  was  clear  that 
as  between  Scottish  courts  and  courts  in  another  contracting  state,  there  was  no 
51  1991  SLT  774. 
52  See  pp100-101  above. 
53  Beaumont,  Civil  Jurisdiction,  para  9.06  and  see,  for  example,  the  intra-UK  cases  of  Montagu 
Evans  v  Young  2000  SLT  1083;  Universal  Steels  Limited  v  Skanska  Construction  UK  Limited 
(31  October  2003,  unreported),  OH.  In  the  intra-UK  cross-border  case  of  Lie  Administration 
and  Management  v  The  Scottish  Ministers  2004  SLT  2,  the  Court's  power  to  make  an  order 
was  reliant  upon  the  proceedings  being  in  respect  of  a  matter  which  was  within  the  scope  of, 
previously  the  Brussels  Convention,  and  now  the  Brussels  I  Regulation.  This  was  determined 
by  reference  to  ECJ  case  law. 
54  Although  the  Brussels  Convention  continues  to  apply  in  respect  of  Denmark. 
55  There  is  greater  specification  in  Art.  5(1)  to  assist  in  determining  the  place  of  performance  of 
the  obligation  in  question;  Art.  5(3)  has  been  expanded  to  include  actual  as  well  as  threatened 
wrongs;  contracts  of  employment  are  separately  dealt  with;  and  there  arc  also  changes  in  the 
rules  applying  to  certain  contracts  of  lease,  and  to  consumer  contracts.  56  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Order  2001,  SI  2001/3929. 
57  Although  it  seems  this  may  be  reconsidered  by  the  government  in  future  (Civil  Justice  and 
International  Division  of  the  Scottish  Executive  Justice  Department,  "New  rules  on  civil 
jurisdiction",  41). 
165 place  for  the  doctrine.  58  However,  it  was  expressly  provided  in  the  Civil 
Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982  that  the  forum  non  conveniens  doctrine  was 
preserved  where  this  was  not  inconsistent  with  the  Brussels  Convention.  59  Nor 
did  Schedule  4  contain  the  lis  alibi  pendens  rule  adopted  in  the  Convention.  The 
stated  intention  of  the  government  of  the  day,  in  drawing  up  the  Civil  Jurisdiction 
and  Judgments  Act  1982,  was  that  fortan  non  conveniens  should  remain  available 
within  the  UK.  60  This  result  seemed  to  have  been  successfully  achieved  by  the 
legislation,  and  this  was  the  view  taken  by  legal  commentators.  61  Matters  were 
somewhat  derailed  by  the  English  judgment  of  Foxen  v  Scotsman  Publications 
Ltd  and  Another,  62  in  which  it  was  held  that  the  use  of  fortan  non  conveniens  in  an 
intra-UK  jurisdiction  dispute  "was  inconsistent  with  at  least  the  spirit  and 
probably  the  letter  of  the  Convention".  63  Somewhat  unusually,  the  opportunity  to 
correct  this  unfortunate  authority  fell  to  the  same  judge  in  the  following  year. 
Cumming  v  Scottish  Daily  Record  and  Sunday  Mail  Ltd  and  Others  64  accordingly 
confirmed  that  fortan  non  conveniens  was  in  fact  available  within  the  UK,  the 
judge  observing  ruefully  that  were  the  case  to  be  appealed: 
"Whatever  the  Court  of  Appeal  decided,  his  Lordship  would  be  held  wrong. 
6s  However,  he  had  the  consolation  that  he  would  also  be  held  right". 
It  is  submitted  that  the  advent  of  the  Brussels  I  Regulation  has  had  no  impact 
upon  the  availability  of  the  plea  of  fonini  non  conveniens  within  the  UK: 
Schedule  4  of  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act,  rather  than  the 
Regulation,  continues  to  govern  intra-UK  jurisdictional  matters,  and  s49  has  not 
58  Brussels  Convention,  Art.  21. 
59  Ibid.,  s49.  It  was  held  in  an  English  decision  that  forum  non  conveniens  could  operate  if  a  non- 
contracting  state  was  the  other  possible  forum  (Re  Harrods  (Buenos  Aires)  Ltd  (No  2)  [1991]  4 
All  ER  334;  although  see  now  Lubbe  v  Cape  plc  [2000]  4  All  ER  268  per  Lord  Bingham  at 
282). 
60  Lord  Chancellor,  HL  Debs,  vol  425,  col  1132. 
61  L.  Collins  &  B.  Davenport,  "Forum  conveniens  within  the  United  Kingdom"  (1994)  110  LQR 
325;  A.  Reed  &  T.  P.  Kennedy,  "Forzun  non  conveniens  and  the  Brussels  Convention"  [1995] 
NLJ  1697;  G.  Amodeo,  "Conflicts  of  jurisdiction  within  the  UK"  (1995)  40  JLSS  321. 
62  1994  TLR  84. 
63  Ibid.  at  85. 
64  1995  TLR  333. 
65  Ibid.  at  333. 
166 been  repealed.  66  This  was  also  the  conclusion  reached  by  the  English  court  in  the 
case  of  Lennon  v  Scottish  Daily  Record  and  Sunday  Mail  Ltd.  67 
Recognition  and  enforcement 
The  UK  government,  however,  chose  not  to  mirror  the  Brussels  Convention  rules 
in  the  field  of  intra-UK  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments.  Instead,  much 
more  far-reaching  recognition  and  enforcement  provisions  were  enacted  in  the 
form  of  Schedules  6  and  7  of  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982.  As 
an  example  of  internalising  rules,  these  have  already  been  discussed  in  a  previous 
chapter.  68 
Jurisdiction,  recognition  and  enforcement  in  family  law  matters:  Brussels  II 
and  Brussels  II  bis 
It  is  submitted  that  it  is  not  unfair  to  say  that  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  provides 
an  example  of  a  somewhat  muddled  response  in  intra-UK  matters  to  EU 
international  private  law  legislation.  As  between  member  states,  the  Brussels  II 
Regulation  regulates  jurisdiction,  and  the  recognition  and  enforcement  of 
judgments,  in  matters  of  divorce,  legal  separation  and  annulment.  69  There  are 
also  provisions  on  related  parental  responsibility  matters.  But  what  is  the  impact 
on  cross-border  jurisdictional  disputes,  or  recognition,  within  the  UK? 
Jurisdiction 
The  trouble  begins  with  the  text  of  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  itself.  Article  2, 
which  sets  down  the  general  jurisdiction  rules,  must  be  read  in  accordance  with 
Article  41,  which  is  directed  at  member  states  with  more  than  one  legal  system. 
Article  41  confirms  that  in  this  case,  habitual  residence  in  a  member  state  should 
be  read  as  habitual  residence  in  a  territorial  unit  with  its  own  legal  system.  70 
References  to  domicile  or  nationality  in  a  member  state,  are  references  to  the 
66  Although  it  is  unfortunate  that  it  has  not  been  amended  to  reflect  the  coming  into  force  of  the 
Brussels  I  Regulation. 
67  [2004]  EWHC  359  (QB)  per  Tugendhat  J.  at  paras  4-16. 
68  See  pp94-95  above. 
69  The  Scottish  actions  of  declarator  of  marriage,  and  declarator  of  freedom  and  putting  to  silence 
thus  fall  outwith  the  scope  of  the  Brussels  II  Regulation. 
70  Brussels  II  Regulation,  Art.  41(a). 
167 territorial  unit  identified  by  the  member  state's  law.  71  This  may  adequately  reflect 
a  federal  approach,  but  is  ill-fitted  to  the  UK  situation.  There  is  no  UK  law  to 
assign  a  Scottish  or  English  domicile  to  a  person.  There  is  no  explicit  statement 
in  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  (unlike  the  Rome  Convention)  that  the  Regulation  is 
not  intended  to  apply  within  member  states.  However,  Article  7  provides  that  a 
person  habitually  resident  within  a  member  state,  or  a  domiciliary  of  a  territory  of 
the  UK,  can  only  be  proceeded  against  in  other  member  states  in  terms  of  Articles 
2  to  6  of  the  Brussels  II  Regulation.  It  is  therefore  submitted  that  whilst  the 
Brussels  II  Regulation  allocates  jurisdiction  as  between  the  courts  of  Scotland  and 
another  member  state,  it  does  not  do  so  as  between  Scotland  and  England.  72 
However,  another  layer  of  confusion  is  occasioned  by  the  domestic  legislation. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  devolved  arrangements,  the  necessary  amendments  to 
existing  legislation  in  the  UK  were  made  by  secondary  legislation  passed  by  the 
Scottish  Parliament  with  respect  to  Scots  law,  73  and  the  Westminster  Parliament 
in  respect  of  English  law.  74  In  terms  of  the  Scottish  legislation,  a  Scottish  court 
will  have  jurisdiction  if  it  has  jurisdiction  under  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  or  if,  in 
the  case  of  excluded  actions  (in  general  terms),  either  of  the  parties  is  a  Scots 
domiciliary.  75  It  has  been  argued  above  that  a  Scots  court  would  not  have 
jurisdiction  under  the  Regulation  in  an  intra-UK  dispute.  But  are  such  actions 
then  excluded  actions?  76  The  definition  of  this  term  is  two-pronged.  Firstly,  no 
court  of  a  contracting  state  must  have  jurisdiction  under  the  Brussels  II 
Regulation,  77  and  it  has  been  argued  that  this  condition  is  satisfied  in  intra-UK 
cases.  Secondly,  the  defender  must  not  be  an  Irish  domiciliary,  78  or  a  national  of 
"  Ibid.,  Art.  41(b). 
72  See  Clive,  "Memorandum",  p4;  insofar  as  Briggs  suggest  otherwise,  it  is  respectfully 
submitted  that  he  is  wrong  (Briggs,  The  Conflict  of  Lawvs,  pp232-233).  73  The  European  Communities  (Matrimonial  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments)  (Scotland)  Regulations 
2001,  SSI  2001/36. 
74  The  European  Communities  (Matrimonial  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments)  Regulations  2001,  SI 
2001/310. 
75  Domicile  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  1973,  s7(2A),  (3A).  The  latter  sub-section  also 
contains  provisions  for  founding  jurisdiction  in  excluded  actions  of  declarator  of  nullity  of 
marriage  if  one  of  the  spouses  has  died. 
76  McEleavy  has  identified  this  as  a  key  issue  (P.  McEleavy,  "Matrimonial  jurisdiction  and 
judgments  -  the  new  law"  (2001)  50  SFLB  3  at  3). 
77  Domicile  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  1973,  s12(5)(d). 
78  Ibid.,  s12(5)(d)(ii). 
168 any  other  member  state  (excluding  the  UK  and  Ireland).  79  It  would  seem  then  that 
the  defender  could  be  a  Scots  or  English  domiciliary.  Accordingly,  matters  of 
divorce,  legal  separation  and  annulment  arising  within  the  UK  where  parties  are 
domiciled  in  Scotland  or  England  will  fall  into  the  category  of  excluded  actions. 
Jurisdiction  is  allocated  in  such  cases  on  the  basis  of  one  of  the  parties'  domicile, 
rather  than  through  application  of  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  rules. 
This  conclusion  might  be  thought  to  be  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  Article  11  of 
the  Brussels  II  Regulation  (the  lis  alibi  pendens  rule)  cannot,  in  its  terms,  apply  as 
between  parts  of  a  member  state,  together  with  the  fact  that  the  sisting  provisions 
of  Schedule  3  of  the  Domicile  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  1973  remain  in 
place.  80  It  is  submitted,  however,  that  it  is  regrettable  that  the  legislation  was  not 
recast  to  make  it  clear,  firstly,  that  Scotland  and  England  were  presented  with  a 
choice  as  to  whether  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  jurisdictional  rules  should  apply 
within  the  UK,  and  secondly,  that  the  decision  taken  was  that  they  should  not. 
This  may  be  partly  caused  by  the  legislative  method  chosen  by  the  EU.  Since 
Conventions  required  statutory  implementation  in  the  UK,  legislation  would  be 
needed  to  introduce  the  Convention,  and  such  a  statute  could  also  contain  intra- 
UK  rules.  81  However,  since  Regulations  are  directly  effective,  the  only  legislative 
action  necessary  by  the  Westminster  or  Holyrood  Parliaments  is  the  making  of 
consequential  repeals  or  amendments.  The  European  Communities  (Matrimonial 
Jurisdiction  and  Judgments)  (Scotland)  Regulations  2001  are  an  example  of  this  - 
and  also  an  example  of  the  muddle  which  can  thereby  ensue. 
Recognition  and  enforcement 
Once  again,  it  is  not  explicitly  said  that  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  provisions  on 
recognition  and  enforcement  do  not  apply  automatically  as  between  Scotland  and 
England.  Fortunately  the  relevant  Articles  of  the  Regulations  are  more  clearly 
79  Ibid.,  s12(5)(d)(i). 
80  These  provide  that,  in  certain  circumstances,  a  consistorial  action  in  Scotland  must  be  sisted  in 
favour  of  proceedings  continuing  elsewhere  in  the  UK,  and  also  allow  the  Scots  court 
otherwise  a  discretion  to  list  consistorial  actions  (Domicile  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act 
1973,  Sch.  3).  Furthermore,  the  English  legislation  (as  amended)  can  also  be  read  so  as  to 
conclude  that  the  jurisdiction  provisions  of  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  do  not  apply  within  the 
UK  (ibid.,  s5(2),  (3)). 
$1  For  example,  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982  and  the  Contracts  (Applicable 
Law)  Act  1990. 
169 framed.  A  judgment  is  defined  as  one  emanating  from  a  court  of  a  member 
state.  82  Such  judgments  must  be  recognised  in  another  member  state.  83  Similarly, 
judgments  concerning  parental  responsibility  which  are  governed  by  the  Brussels 
II  Regulation  are  to  be  enforced  in  other  member  states.  84  It  is  provided, 
however,  that  to  be  enforced  in  the  UK,  such  judgments  have  to  be  registered  in 
the  appropriate  part,  for  example,  in  Scotland.  85  Furthermore,  no  amendment  has 
been  made  to  the  provisions  of  the  Family  Law  Act  1986  which  deal  with  the 
recognition  in  Scotland  of  divorces,  legal  separations  and  annulments  granted  in 
the  British  Islands.  86  In  contrast  those  relating  to  the  recognition  of  overseas 
divorces,  legal  separations  and  annulments  have  been  amended  to  take  account  of 
the  Brussels  II  Regulation.  87  In  its  essentials,  the  intra-UK  scheme  for 
recognition  and  enforcement  of  custody  orders  is  also  unaltered.  It  is  therefore 
submitted  that  whilst  the  recognition  and  enforcement  in  Scotland  of  judgments 
from  other  member  states  is  governed  by  the  Brussels  II  Regulation,  the 
(internalising)  rules  on  recognition  and  enforcement  within  the  UK  are 
unaffected.  This  also  reinforces  the  similar  conclusion  reached  with  respect  to  the 
jurisdiction  provisions  of  the  Brussels  II  Regulation. 
Brussels  II  is  dead 
... 
long  live  Brussels  II  bis 
The  Brussels  II  Regulation  is  not  to  be  much  longer  with  us.  Council  Regulation 
2201/2003  has  already  been  adopted,  and  will  apply  from  1  March  2005,  on 
which  date  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  will  be  repealed.  88  Often  referred  to  as 
"Brussels  II  bis"  during  the  relevant  negotiations,  this  new  Regulation  brings 
together  the  rules  on  jurisdiction,  recognition  and  enforcement  contained  within 
the  Brussels  II  Regulation,  and  also  new  rules  on  jurisdiction,  recognition  and 
enforcement  relating  to  independent  parental  responsibility  proceedings,  and  child 
abduction. 
82  Brussels  II  Regulation,  Art.  13. 
83  Ibid.,  Art.  14  (subject  to  the  exceptions  in  Art.  15). 
84  Ibid.,  Art.  21(1). 
85  Ibid.,  Art.  21(2). 
86  Family  Law  Act  1986,  ss44,51  &  52. 
87  Ibid.,  s45. 
88  Council  Regulation  2201/2003,  Arts.  72  &  71. 
170 Insofar  as  relevant,  the  Brussels  II  bis  Regulation  provisions  with  respect  to  the 
allocation  of  jurisdiction  in  divorce,  legal  separation  and  annulment  echo  those  of 
the  Brussels  II  Regulation.  89  Thus  by  dint  of  the  same  reasoning  as  set  out  above, 
it  is  submitted  that  the  Brussels  II  bis  Regulation  does  not  govern  jurisdictional 
disputes  in  these  matters  within  the  UK.  Jurisdiction  to  make  orders  in  respect  of 
parental  responsibility  falls  to  the  courts  of  the  member  state  in  which  the  child  is 
habitually  resident.  90  The  effect  of  Article  66  is  that  habitual  residence  should  be 
read  as  being  habitual  residence  in  a  territorial  unit  of  a  member  state  which  has 
its  own  legal  system.  In  itself,  this  does  not  make  for  clarity.  However,  Article 
8(1)  is  subject  to  Articles  9  and  10,  which  deal  with  continued  jurisdiction  of  the 
courts  of  the  child's  habitual  residence,  and  jurisdiction  in  child  abduction,  and 
these  provisions  seem  designed  to  apply  as  between  member  states.  Article  11  on 
the  return  of  abducted  children  is  also  only  of  application  between  member  states. 
Therefore,  in  all  the  circumstances,  it  is  submitted  that  the  Brussels  II  bis 
Regulation  provisions  on  jurisdiction  in  parental  responsibility  proceedings  are 
not  intended  automatically  to  apply  to  cross-border  matters  within  a  member 
state.  91  The  substance  of  the  recognition  and  enforcement  provisions  of  the 
Brussels  II  bis  Regulation  are  the  same  as  those  in  the  Brussels  II  Regulation,  92 
and  again,  in  terms  of  the  argument  made  out  above,  it  is  thought  that  these  rules 
are  of  no  application  within  the  UK. 
With  respect  to  divorce  and  related  matters,  presumably  the  Scottish  Executive 
will  again  opt  to  retain  the  previous  Scottish  rules  (as  seems  to  have  been  the 
response  to  the  Brussels  II  Regulation)  rather  than  replicate  the  Brussels  II  bis 
Regulation  rules,  with  respect  to  the  allocation  of  jurisdiction  between  Scotland 
and  England,  and  the  recognition  of  English  judgments.  It  is  suspected  by  this 
writer  that  the  current  rules  in  relation  to  intra-UK  custody  cases  might  also 
survive.  In  truth,  since  both  these  and  the  Brussels  II  bis  Regulation  link 
jurisdiction  primarily  to  habitual  residence,  and  allow  for  recognition  and 
enforcement  with  relative  ease,  it  may  not  be  of  great  consequence.  However, 
89  Ibid.,  Arts  3,6  &  66. 
90  Ibid.,  Art.  8. 
91  Which  may  also  be  the  conclusion  of  Jamieson  (G.  Jamieson,  "The  new  law  on  parental 
responsibility"  2004  SLT  (News)  51  at  53). 
92  Council  Regulation  2201/2003,  Arts  21  (subject  to  Arts  22  &  23),  28;  and  see  Jamieson,  "The 
new  law  on  parental  responsibility",  53. 
171 some  further  amendment  to  the  Domicile  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  1973 
and  to  the  Family  Law  Act  1986  will,  in  any  event,  be  required  in  order  that  the 
Acts  refer  to  the  Brussels  II  bis  Regulation  once  that  Regulation  becomes 
applicable.  The  opportunity  should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  legislation 
explicitly  deals  with  the  grounds  on  which  Scots  courts  may  take  jurisdiction  in 
intra-UK  divorces,  legal  separations  and  annulments.  It  is  unsatisfactory  that  such 
important  questions  should  be  a  matter  of  inference. 
Insolvency 
A  previous  attempt  to  introduce  a  Bankruptcy  Convention  by  the  (then)  EC 
having  failed,  an  EU  Regulation  on  jurisdiction,  recognition  and  enforcement  in 
insolvency  proceedings  is  now  in  force  and  applicable.  93  Article  3  of  this 
Regulation  allocates  jurisdiction  to  open  proceedings  to  the  courts  of  a  member 
state  in  whose  territory  the  debtor  has  his  "centre 
...  of  main  interests".  The  law 
of  that  member  state  will  be  the  applicable  law.  94  Provision  is  also  made  for 
secondary  insolvency  proceedings  to  be  opened  in  another  member  state,  95  and 
for  the  law  of  that  country  to  apply  to  those  proceedings.  96  In  these 
circumstances,  it  is  submitted  that  the  Insolvency  Regulation  does  not  itself 
allocate  jurisdiction  as  between  the  Scottish  and  English  courts.  This  had  also 
been  the  view  of  the  Scottish  Law  Commission  when  discussing  a  draft  of  the 
Bankruptcy  Convention.  97  Provision  is  only  made  for  judgments  to  be  recognised 
in  another  nzenther  state,  98  and  for  liquidators  to  exercise  powers  in  another 
member  state.  99  Once  again,  the  existing  intra-UK  rules  are  not  displaced  by 
virtue  of  the  Insolvency  Regulation. 
It  is  interesting  that  the  Insolvency  Regulation  contains  no  rule  applicable  to 
member  states  which  consist  of  a  number  of  legal  systems.  Accordingly,  it 
93  Council  Regulation  1346/2000 
94  Ibid.,  Art.  4. 
95  Ibid.,  Art.  27. 
96  Ibid.,  Art.  28. 
97  Scot.  Law  Com.  No  68,  Report  on  Bankruptcy  and  Related  Aspects  of  Insolvency  and 
Liquidation  (1982),  para  6.13;  see  also  Collins  (gen.  ed.  ),  Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  of 
Laws:  Third  Cumulative  Supplement  to  the  thirteenth  edition  (Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2003),  para 
31R-058. 
98  Council  Regulation  1346/2000,  Art.  16. 
99  Ibid.,  Art.  18. 
172 appears  merely  to  allocate  jurisdiction  to  courts  in  the  UK,  leaving  it  to  UK 
legislation  to  specify  whether,  for  example,  the  Scottish  or  English  courts  have 
jurisdiction.  This  may,  however,  reflect  the  high  degree  of  harmonisation  and 
internalisation  in  insolvency  legislation  within  the  UK.  1°°  It  is  therefore 
unsurprising  that  there  has  been  little  inclination  to  unpick  intra-UK  insolvency 
legislation  in  response  to  the  Insolvency  Regulation.  The  Scottish  Law 
Commission  was  certainly  not  keen  that  the  jurisdiction  rules  of  the  draft 
Bankruptcy  Convention  be  applied  within  Scotland,  101  although  it  is  not  explained 
why,  and  so  it  is  unclear  what  the  Commission's  view  on  application  within  the 
UK  may  have  been.  As  has  been  seen,  automatic  enforcement  of  insolvency 
orders  is  already  provided  as  between  Scotland  and  England,  102  so  in  that 
particular  regard  the  Insolvency  Regulation  offers  little  that  is  new. 
A  reluctant  partner:  the  effect  of  European  developments  on  intra-UK 
international  private  law 
As  has  been  seen,  Conventions  and  legislation  at  European  level  may  not  directly 
require  that  international  private  law  rules  as  between  Scotland  and  England  be 
altered.  However,  as  can  be  appreciated  from  the  above  discussion,  they  do  have 
an  indirect  effect  on  intra-UK  rules.  On  some  occasions  the  government  has  also 
chosen  to  adopt  the  new  European  rules  for  conflicts  arising  within  the  UK,  and 
on  other  occasions,  a  modified  version  of  the  European  rules  has  been  introduced, 
whilst  sometimes  the  existing  Scots  and  English  law  has  simply  been  retained. 
It  might  have  been  thought  that  a  likely  result  of  increased  EU  involvement  in 
international  private  law,  would  have  been  a  corresponding  increase  in  legislation 
dealing  with  the  intra-UK  aspects  of  the  topics  tackled  by  the  EU.  For  example, 
the  Maxwell  Committee  argued  that  it  should  not  be  the  case  that  enforcement 
between  the  (then)  EEC  countries  after  the  advent  of  the  Brussels  Convention 
100  See  Chap.  4.  Although  lurking  beneath  this  is  a  difference  in  the  traditional  common  law 
approach,  with  Scots  courts  adhering  to  a  theory  of  unity  of  bankruptcy,  and  English  law 
preferring  separate  bankruptcies  in  different  jurisdictions  (Crawford,  International  Private 
Law,  paras  16.01-16.02). 
101  Scot.  Law  Com.  No  68,  Report  on  Bankruptcy  and  Related  Aspects  of  Insolvency  and 
Liquidation  (1982),  para  6.13. 
102  See  pp8l-82  above;  and  see  D.  McKenzie,  "The  EC  Convention  on  Insolvency  Proceedings" 
(1996)  4  ERPL  181  at  190-191. 
173 should  be  much  easier  than  within  the  UK.  103  It  may  well  be  illogical  if  measures 
in  place  between  Scotland  and  England  were  less  comprehensive  than  those  in 
force  between  the  UK  and  other  EU  member  states.  However,  taken  to  extremes, 
such  arguments  are  less  convincing.  An  assumption  is  made  that  the  EU  is  a 
political  grouping,  and  since  the  UK  is  a  much  closer  political  unit,  rules  within 
the  UK  must  be  more  prescriptive,  more  automatic  in  effect,  than  those  between 
EU  member  states.  Political  considerations  are,  therefore,  uppermost.  It  is 
submitted  that  this  would  be  the  wrong  perspective  to  adopt  when  considering  an 
intra-UK  response  to  European  developments.  Scotland  and  England  have 
different  legal  systems,  which  do  not  spring  from  the  same  source.  In  some 
respects,  Scotland  and  England  may  be  no  closer  in  their  legal  approach  than 
Scotland  and  France  (or  other  continental  civil  law  systems). 
Interestingly,  however,  the  approach  to  intra-UK  rules  in  the  areas  of  international 
private  law  which  have  been  the  subject  of  EU  attention  is  perhaps  largely 
characterised  by  reluctance.  A  good  example  of  what  is  meant  by  this  is  provided 
by  the  response  to  the  Brussels  Convention.  The  UK  was  unenthusiastic  about 
certain  aspects  of  the  Convention,  for  example,  the  rules  on  insurance.  104  Having 
decided  to  participate  in  the  Convention,  the  UK  was  obliged  to  implement  its 
provisions  for  allocating  jurisdiction  between  the  UK  and  other  contracting  states, 
and  recognising  judgments  emanating  from  the  latter.  However,  lacking  such  a 
compulsitor  at  the  intra-UK  level,  the  rules  on  insurance  were  not  introduced. 
The  danger,  of  course,  is  that  "it  seems  wrong  in  principle,  and  confusing  to 
practitioners,  to  maintain  in  being  two  separate  and  slightly  different  sets  of  rules 
of  jurisdiction".  105  The  Brussels  II  Regulation  was  not  universally  welcomed  by 
commentators  in  Britain,  '06  and  it  has  been  argued  that  its  terms  have  not  replaced 
the  existing  rules  applying  as  between  Scotland  and  England.  The  Report 
prepared  by  the  appropriate  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  shows  a  marked 
103  The  Maxwell  Report,  para  15.4. 
104  See  p164  above. 
105  The  Maxwell  Report,  para  2.16. 
106  For  example,  see  Karsten,  "Brussels  II";  N.  Mostyn,  "Brussels  II  Regulation:  impact  on  forum 
disputes  in  relation  to  the  main  suit  and  ancillary  relief  proceedings"  [2000]  IFL  162.  The 
English  President's  International  Committee  and  Solicitor's  Family  Law  Association  opposed 
the  application  of  certain  Brussels  II  rules  to  non-member  states,  insofar  as  the  then  draft 
Convention  allowed  (Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European 
Communities,  Brussels  II,  pp22-23). 
174 reluctance  to  be  regulated  by  the  Rome  II  Regulation,  and  doubts  as  to  the 
wisdom  of  the  UK's  participation  in  the  discussions  thus  far.  107  The  impact  this 
will  ultimately  have  upon  the  choice  of  law  rules  applying  as  between  Scotland 
and  England  in  the  field  of  non-contractual  obligations  remains  to  be  seen.  108 
But  how  far  is  this  reluctance  equally  characteristic  of  the  persons  who  operate 
within  the  Scottish  and  English  legal  systems?  The  political  commentator, 
Taylor,  has  noted  that: 
"Perhaps  the  most  persistent  contemporary  myth  is  that  Scotland  is 
intrinsically  pro-European  while  England  is  anti,  that  Scotland  adores  the 
European  Union  while  England  abhors  it.  Again,  myth  does  not  mean 
straightforward  falsehood.  This  collective  self-image  has  something  of  a  basis 
in  fact.  Opinion  polls  have  occasionally  suggested,  for  example,  that  Scotland 
might  be  more  amenable  to  the  single  European  currency.  In  Scotland,  you 
will  encounter  less  strident  anti-European  sentiments  than  might  be  overt  in  the 
south-east  of  England" 
" 
109 
In  addition,  Scotland  is  a  mixed  legal  system.  A  major  difficulty  in  the  project  to 
harmonise  the  substantive  private  laws  of  Europe,  is  the  perceived  gulf  between 
the  civil  and  Common  Law  systems.  "°  This  may  also  cause  problems  in  attempts 
to  harmonise  conflict  rules,  which  is  the  aim  of  the  various  EU  Conventions  and 
Regulations  discussed  above.  Mixed  legal  systems,  such  as  the  Scots  one,  can  do 
much  to  illustrate  how  this  gap  can  be  bridged,  incorporating  as  they  do,  elements 
of  civilian  and  Common  Law  thinking.  "'  By  the  same  token,  it  might  therefore 
107  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  The  Route  11  Regulation;  sec  also 
"Response  of  the  Government  of  the  United  Kingdom",  and  compare  the  European 
Commission's  "Follow-up  of  the  consultation  on  a  preliminary  draft  proposal  for  a  Council 
Regulation  on  the  law  applicable  to  non-contractual  obligations  ("Rome  II")", 
http:  //europa.  cu.  int/comm/justice_home/unit/civil/consultation/contributions  en.  htm. 
108  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  our  fellow  Europeans  are  always  uncritical  of  EU  legislation:  see, 
for  example,  the  view  of  a  Swedish  professor  on  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  -  M.  Jänterä- 
Jareborg,  "A  European  family  law  for  cross-border  situations  -  some  reflections  concerning  the 
Brussels  II  Regulation  and  its  planned  amendments"  (2002)  4  YPIL  67. 
109  Taylor,  Scotland's  Parliament,  p267. 
110  Smits,  The  Making  of  European  Private  Law,  p73.  'll  Ibid.;  MacQueen,  "Discussion  Paper";  cf  Lord  Reed,  "The  constitutionalisation  of  private  law"  69.  However,  it  has  also  been  argued  that  the  differences  between  Scots  and  English  law 
show  that  harmonisation  is  not  required  in  a  common  market  (Weir,  "Divergent  legal  systems 
175 be  thought  that  the  Scottish  legal  system  would  be  less  resistant  to  European 
harmonisation  than  the  English  Common  Law  system.  112 
Certainly  we  have  seen  that  Scots  law  was  sufficiently  compatible  with  the 
principles  of  the  Brussels  Convention  to  allow  Scotland  to  adopt  both  intra-UK, 
and  domestic,  jurisdiction  rules  which  were  a  variation  on  those  applicable 
between  the  contracting  states.  113  England  was  not  in  a  position  to  take  this  path. 
In  preparing  a  response  to  EU  research  on  a  possible  'Brussels  III'  Regulation  on 
matrimonial  property,  it  proved  necessary  to  draft  different  Scottish  and  English 
reports,  since  the  current  domestic  rules  were  too  diverse.  114  In  discussing 
Brussels  III,  an  English  lawyer,  David  Hodson,  attempted  to  identify  some  of  the 
differing  civilian  and  English  law  principles  of  financial  matters  in  marriage  and 
on  divorce.  '  15  Interestingly,  Scots  law  had  much  in  common  with  the  civilian 
rules  highlighted  by  him.  Furthermore,  one  of  the  concerns  held  by  English 
lawyers  about  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  was  that  the  lis  alibi  pendens  principle 
was  incompatible  with  new  rules  to  slow  the  divorce  process,  and  allow  time  for 
reconsideration  and  reconciliation.  116  In  giving  oral  evidence  on  behalf  of  the 
Scottish  Courts  Administration,  Peter  Beaton  stressed  that: 
"one  has  to  be  careful  in  discussing  the  United  Kingdom  position  in  this  regard 
because  the  position  in  England  and  Wales  is  rather  different  with  the  arrival 
of  the  new  law  in  relation  to  divorce  whilst  the  Scottish  position  remains  as  it 
was.  I  accept  fully  the  point  and  I  think  there  is  a  serious  difficulty  in 
philosophy  and  approach  particularly  when  we  come  to  discuss  lis  penrdens.  I 
think  the  negotiating  position  we  adopt  collectively  does  not  depend  on  a  unity 
of  approach  within  the  legal  systems  in  the  United  Kingdom.  I  think  we  live 
in  a  single  member  state"):  business  can  be  carried  on  successfully  in  a  small  geographical 
unit  against  a  background  of  differing  private  laws,  and  perhaps  similar,  but  unharmonised, 
private  international  laws. 
112  In  terms  of  their  conflict  rules,  there  are  similarities  between  Scots  and  English  law,  but  see  the 
discussion  of  this  at  pp141-144  above. 
13  See  p142  above. 
114  Clarkson,  "Brussels  IIP",  684.  Although  this  is  not  to  underplay  the  differences  between  Scots 
law  and  those  systems  which  favour  community  of  property.  115  Hodson,  "Brussels  IIP. 
116  Karsten,  "Brussels  II",  76;  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European 
Communities,  Brussels  II. 
176 within  that  and  the  position  in  Scotland  is  perhaps  not  so  acute  but  our  position 
is  that  we  find  the  present  arrangement  satisfactory".  "7 
The  relatively  small  number  of  published  comments  by  Scottish  practitioners  and 
academics  on  the  Brussels  II  Regulation  does  not  lend  itself  to  a  scientific 
analysis.  However,  Clive  was  generally  positive  about  the  draft  Convention,  118 
whilst  Lord  Rodger  of  Earlsferry  (in  providing  written  evidence  to  the  appropriate 
House  of  Lords  committee)  simply  raised  two  specific  points  regarding  the 
parental  responsibility  provisions.  119  Beaumont,  however,  was  less  convinced  of 
the  necessity  of  the  draft  Convention.  120  McEleavy  accepted  that  there  could  be 
advantages  to  EU  action  in  the  family  law  field,  although  he  had  certain  criticisms 
of  how  the  agenda  was  pursued.  121  Two  practitioners  called  above  all  for 
uniformity,  and  this  appears  to  have  been  of  greater  concern  to  them  than  any 
objections  to  the  rules  set  out  in  the  Regulation.  122 
One  of  the  main  grounds  of  opposition  to  the  Rome  Convention  arose  from  a 
specifically  English  concern.  In  the  House  of  Lords  debates  on  the  Contracts 
(Applicable  Law)  Bill,  Lord  Wilberforce  raised  concerns  about  the  effect  on  the 
English  Commercial  Court,  and  the  London  Court  of  International  Arbitration. 
He  considered  that  "[I]t  is  not  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  United  Kingdom  is, 
I  believe,  the  international  centre  for  commercial  dispute".  123  Although  the 
reference  is  to  the  United  Kingdom,  it  should  more  properly  be  to  England,  as  it 
was  English  institutions,  applying  English  law,  which  were  thought  to  be  under 
threat.  Indeed  it  is  perhaps  one  facet  of  the  attitude  described  by  Geeroms  in  the 
context  of  the  role  of  foreign  law  in  English  courts: 
117  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European  Communities,  Brussels  11, 
p46. 
118  See  generally  Clive,  "Memorandum". 
119  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European  Communities,  Brussels  11, 
p73. 
120  Ibid.,  pp54ff. 
121  P.  McEleavy,  "The  Brussels  II  Regulation:  how  the  European  Community  has  moved  into 
family  law"  (2002)  51  ICLQ  883. 
122  S.  Barker  &  S.  Smith,  "A  response  to  Brussels  II  -a  view  from  Scotland"  [2002]  IFL  44;  and 
see  also  the  observation  of  Crawford  and  Carruthers  on  Rome  II  noted  at  p163  above.  123  HL  Debs,  vol  515,  col  1476;  and  see  also  Lord  Goff  of  Chievely,  HL  Debs,  vol  515,  col  1482. 
177 "English  courts  have  also  refused  to  take  judicial  notice  of  foreign  law  because 
they  believed  that  English  common  law  and  its  institutions  were  superior  to 
other  legal  systems  ... 
Today,  English  commercial  courts  still  apply  English 
law  to  international  commercial  disputes,  in  the  belief  that  it  is  the  better 
law".  124 
This  does  not  reflect  Scottish  thinking,  nor  is  Edinburgh  seen  as  an  international 
commercial  dispute  resolution  centre,  in  the  way  that  has  been  claimed  for 
London  by  those  operating  within  the  English  legal  system  there. 
Of  course  there  are  also  areas  where  English  and  Scots  lawyers  might  be  thought 
to  present  a  united  front  with  respect  to  EU  measures.  Article  10(l)(e)  of  the 
Rome  Convention  which  provides  for  the  applicable  law  to  govern  nullity  of 
contract,  was  not  implemented  by  the  UK,  since  English  and  Scots  law  did  not 
approach  this  as  a  contractual  matter.  125  Forum  non  conveniens,  so  staunchly 
defended  by  English  commentators  in  the  face  of  the  EU  preference  for  lis  alibi 
pendens,  was  of  course  initially  a  Scottish  concept,  and  has  been  applauded  in  this 
thesis.  126  Scotland  and  England  (and  also  Ireland)  remain  loyal  to  notions  of 
domicile,  and  thus  are  favoured  with  special  provision  in  the  Brussels  II 
Regulation.  127  Carruthers  and  Crawford's  suspicion  of  the  inclusion  of  a 
Community  public  policy  exception  in  the  proposed  Rome  II  Regulation  is  in  line 
with  English  commentators  and  the  examining  House  of  Lords  committee.  128 
It  is  submitted,  however,  that  the  English  and  Scottish  responses  to  harmonisation 
of  international  private  law  rules  by  the  EU  probably  do  not  coincide  completely, 
but  rather  fall  on  different  parts  of  a  spectrum.  For  one,  as  a  mixed  legal  system, 
open  in  the  past  to  influences  from  the  continent,  Scots  law  does  not  necessarily 
share  certain  of  the  fundamental  objections  held  by  English  Common  Lawyers. 
However,  negotiations  with  other  member  states  of  the  EU  remains  firmly  a 
124  Geeroms,  Foreign  Law,  para  3.25;  see  also  Smits,  The  Making  of  European  Private  Law,  p94.  125  Annotations  by  C.  G.  J.  Morse  to  the  Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990,  p36-33;  and  sec 
Baring  Brothers  &  Co.  Ltd  v  Cunninghante  District  Council  1996  GWD  25-1405. 
126  See  pp155-157  above;  although  see  Clive,  "Memorandum",  p3  127  Brussels  II  Regulation,  Arts  2(1)  &  7;  although  see  Clive,  "Memorandum",  p2.  128  House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  "The  Rome  II  Regulation",  paras  163-168;  see 
also  Carruthers  &  Crawford,  "Conflict  of  laws  update"  (2004),  23. 
178 matter  for  Westminster.  Whilst  the  Scottish  Executive  may  be  involved,  there  is 
no  way  for  it  to  put  forward  a  view  in  opposition  to  the  final  UK  negotiating 
position.  129  Accordingly,  for  as  long  as  there  is  reluctance  by  English  lawyers  to 
participate  fully  in  EU  legislative  action,  there  are  likely  to  be  situations  where 
EU  Regulations  are  applied  only  insofar  as  is  strictly  required,  and  thus  not  in  an 
intra-UK  situation.  130  In  this  way,  by  accident  rather  than  by  design,  different 
conflict  rules  may  be  applied  between  Scotland  and  England,  from  those  applied 
in  true  international  cases  (at  least  as  far  as  fellow  member  states  of  the  EU  are 
concerned).  131  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  there  might  not  be  instances  where  a 
different,  intra-UK,  approach  could  be  justified.  The  merits  of  the  use  of  the 
forum  non  convcniens  doctrine  within  the  UK  have  already  been  discussed,  '  32  as 
well  as  certain  modifications  necessary  to  allow  the  intra-UK  application  of  the 
scheme  of  the  Brussels  Convention.  133  Equally,  there  are  areas  where  uniformity 
of  Scots  conflict  rules  (irrespective  of  whether  England,  or  an  EU  member  state, 
is  involved)  may  commend  itself.  However,  at  present  the  approach  of  the  UK  to 
European  initiatives  arguably  may  be  driven  by  a  reluctance  to  engage  fully  with 
the  EU  project,  134  rather  than  by  principled  consideration  of  any  specialities  of  the 
intra-UK  situation.  This  would,  it  is  submitted,  be  most  unfortunate. 
Europeaulsation:  the  beginning  of  the  end  for  the  conflict  of  laws? 
EU  harmonisation  of  conflict  rules  continues  to  ripple  outwards  from  commercial 
matters  directly  connected  with  a  European  internal  market,  to  those  issues  which 
seem  more  indirectly  linked,  such  as  family  law.  Fawcett  has  referred  to  the 
"Europeanization"  of  international  private  law,  135  and  there  has  been  recent 
t'9  See  p149  above.  tý0  It  may,  however,  be  open  to  the  Scottish  Parliament  unilaterally  to  adopt  laws  modelled  on  EU 
legislation  in  respect  of  conflicts  with  England  (on  the  powers  of  the  Scottish  Parliament,  see 
131 
p145  above). 
And  sometimes  other  states  too,  for  example,  under  the  Rome  Convention,  and  the  proposed 
Rome  II  Regulation  (see  note  12  and  p162  above).  t3=  Sec  pp155-157  above.  t'3  Sec  p164  above.  "  This  may  be  influenced  by  reluctance  on  a  political  level  regarding  the  EU.  This  thesis  is  not 
the  place  for  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  strength  of  'Euroscepticism'  in  the  UK,  although 
Taylor  in  the  quote  reproduced  at  p175  above  touches  on  the  extent  to  which  such  feelings 
may  not  be  uniform  within  the  UK.  Different  attitudes  to  EU  policies  may  cause  tension  in  the 
relationship  between  Westminster  and  Holyrood  in  future  (see  p149  above). 
133  J.  Fawcett,  "Cross-fertilization  in  private  international  law"  (2000)  53  Current  Legal  Problems 
303  at  303-304;  and  sec  Boclc-Woelki  &  van  Ooik,  "The  communitarization  of  private 
international  law". 
179 discussion  of  what  is  perceived  to  be  the  Europeanisation  of  family  law.  136 
Ilarnmonisation  of  conflict  rules  has  been  argued  to  be  the  first  step  towards 
substantive  harmonisation  in  Europe:  137  certainly  it  is  plausible  that  the  former 
could  provide  the  bridge  to  acceptance  of  proposals  for  a  European  private  law. 
Such  proposals  find  expression,  for  example,  in  working  groups  attempting  to 
harmonise  specific  areas  of  law,  as  well  as  academic  discussion  of  a  corpus  of 
European  private  law.  138  There  is  debate  about  how  far  this  is  driven  by 
economic,  or  political,  objectives. 
139 
Accordingly,  some  commentators  argue  that  international  private  law  will 
disappear.  140  Thus  it  has  been  said  that  "private  international  law  is  destined  to 
fade  into  legal  history,  as  uniform  substantive  law  progressively  rules  the 
world".  141  Full-scale  harmonisation  of  private  law  within  Europe  would  certainly 
remove  the  need  for  conflict  rules  as  between  Scotland  and  England,  since  their 
respective  private  law  systems  would  no  longer  differ.  However,  talk  of  the  death 
of  international  private  law  in  general  is  overly  dramatic.  Europeanisation  is 
geographically  limited.  No  matter  whether  all  European  private  laws  are 
eventually  harmonised,  there  will  still  be  the  need  for  rules  to  allocate  jurisdiction 
when  a  non-EU  member  state  could  potentially  hear  the  case,  to  decide  whether 
the  law  of  such  a  state  should  properly  govern  the  dispute  if  litigated  in  Scotland, 
and  to  determine  when  judgments  emanating  from  such  states  should  be 
recognised  and  enforced  within  the  EU.  142  This  is  not  unimportant.  Into  this 
category  of  non-EU  member  states  fall  former  colonies  such  as  Australia,  Canada, 
and  New  Zealand,  with  which  the  UK  still  has  congress;  developing  markets 
such  as  China;  and  of  course  the  United  States,  a  major  commercial  power,  and  a 
136  C.  McGlynn,  "The  Europcanisation  of  family  law"  (2001)  13  CFLQ  35;  H.  Stalford  &  E. 
Donnelly,  "Brussels  It  revisited  -  an  overview  of  proposed  amendments"  [2002]  Fam  Law  904; 
and  sec  McElcavy,  "The  Brussels  11  Regulation". 
137  McGlynn,  "The  Europcanisation  of  family  law",  38-41. 
138  Sec  MacQuccn,  "Discussion  Paper";  Smits,  The  Making  of  European  Private  Law. 
ý"  Watt,  "I  larmonisation  of  Contract  Law  in  Europe";  McGlynn,  "The  Europeanisation  of  family 
law";  house  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  "The  Rome  11  Regulation",  paras  57-59  & 
66-72. 
140  Sec  McGlynn,  "The  Europeanisation  of  family  law",  40-41. 
14,  T.  dc  Bocr  quoted  ibid.,  41. 
14'  Fcntiman,  Foreign  Law,  p25.  Although  see  the  discussion  on  the  EU's  ability  to  sign  up  to,  for 
example,  Hague  Conventions,  and  whether  its  member  states  remain  able  to  do  so  (Boele- 
\Voclki  &  van  Ooik,  "The  communitarization  of  private  international  law",  12  &  18-24;  and 
sec  McElcavy,  "The  Brussels  11  Regulation",  906-907). 
180 country  which  has  for  many  years  held  a  (perhaps  unhealthy)  attraction  for  forum 
shoppers.  143  The  possibility  of  achieving  worldwide  harmonisation  seems  too 
large  and  ambitious  a  project  to  constitute  an  inevitability.  As  Crawford  notes: 
"Upon  harmonisation  of  domestic  laws,  and/or  of  conflict  rules,  the  conflict 
lawyer  will  disappear,  his  task  complete  -  but  we  think  the  day  is  far  distant, 
and  the  conflict  lawyer  himself  will  be  needed  to  bring  it  forth".  144 
143  "As  a  moth  is  drawn  to  the  light,  so  is  a  litigant  drawn  to  the  United  States";  Smith  Kline  cf:  French  Laboratories  Ltd  v  Bloch  [1983]  2  All  ER  72  per  Lord  Denning  MR  at  74. 
144  Crawford,  "What  happened  to  Indyka?  ",  176. 
181 7  PUBLIC  POLICY  IN  INTRA-UK 
INTERNATIONAL  PRIVATE  LAW 
Public  policy  is  a  nebulous,  multi-faceted,  concept  which  has  a  particularly 
important  role  in  the  conflict  of  laws,  though  the  point  is  always  made  that  our 
policy  sensibilities  should  be  less  open  to  being  shocked  in  a  conflict  context,  by 
virtue  of  the  nature  of  that  context.  It  is  necessary,  in  examining  the  Scottish 
international  private  law  rules  which  apply  in  intra-UK  conflicts,  to  identify  what 
role  public  policy  may  play  in  this  setting.  How  far  can  there  be  said  to  be  a 
Scottish  public  policy  which  could  be  relied  upon  to  exclude  recognition  of  an 
English  judgment  or  rule  of  law?  Further,  has  the  position  been  changed  by 
Scotland's  devolved  status  within  the  UK? 
It  is  necessary  to  try  to  identify  as  exactly  as  possible  what  is  meant  by  public 
policy.  It  is  submitted  that  there  are  three,  intertwined,  levels  of  meaning,  which 
can  be  described  by  the  terms:  underlying  public  policy;  internal  public  policy; 
and  external  public  policy. 
Underlying  public  policy 
Katzenbach  perceptively  notes  that  "[o]ne  premise  of  contemporary  positivism  ... 
is  that  all  law  rests,  in  the  final  analysis,  upon  public  policy  -  upon  'considerations 
of  what  is  expedient  for  the  community  concerned'  ".  1  This  encapsulates  what  is 
meant  by  the  term  underlying  public  policy.  It  is  those  values,  morals  and 
perceived  self-interest  which  inform  the  legislation  passed  by  the  lawmaking 
bodies  elected  by  the  citizens  of  the  country,  and  the  decisions  reached  by  its 
judges.  2  Law  is  not  a  construct  imposed  upon  society,  but  a  set  of  rules  created 
N.  deB.  Katzenbach,  "Conflicts  on  an  unruly  horse:  reciprocal  claims  and  tolerances  in 
interstate  and  international  law"  (1956)  65  Yale  LI  1087  at  1091;  see  also  R.  Leslie,  "The 
relevance  of  public  policy  in  legal  issues  involving  other  countries  and  their  laws"  1995  JR  477 
at  481-484;  P.  B.  Carter,  "The  role  of  public  policy  in  English  private  international  law"  (1993) 
42ICLQ  1  at  1. 
See  Shears  &  Stephenson,  James'  Introduction  to  English  Law,  p235:  "In  one  sense,  all  the 
principles  of  common  law  and  of  equity  which  have  been  evolved  through  the  centuries  are 
rules  of  public  policy,  for  they  have  been  created  by  the  judges  in  the  light  of  what  they  deem 
to  be  the  public  good". 
182 by  the  people  living  and  functioning  within  it.  Every  statute  in  force  reflects 
(some  more  obviously  than  others)  policies  of  the  society.  3  These  policies  are  as 
varied  as  society  itself,  ranging  in  topic  from  the  manner  in  which  the  estate  of  the 
deceased  should  be  divided,  or  the  ability  to  break  the  marriage  bond,  to  the  legal 
enforceability  of  contracts,  or  allowing  businesses  to  limit  their  liability  by 
trading  through  a  company  structure. 
Internal  public  policy 
The  phrase  internal,  4  or  domestic,  5  public  policy  is  used  to  signify  a  more  specific 
legal  concept,  which  operates  only  in  the  domestic  sphere.  It  is  a  common  law 
doctrine  which  can  be  used  by  a  court  to  alter  the  normal  legal  consequences  of  a 
given  set  of  facts.  Through  the  use  of  this  tool,  for  example,  certain  contracts  can 
be  robbed  of  their  usual  legal  effects  on  the  ground  that  the  contract  contravenes 
domestic  public  policy.  Although  this  internal  public  policy  is  often  contrasted 
with  the  doctrine  of  public  policy  which  is  operative  in  conflict  cases,  this 
misleadingly  suggests  that  the  former  is  a  clear  cut  set  of  rules.  In  fact,  internal 
public  policy  is  a  loose  concept,  and  its  boundaries  are  not  easy  to  identify,  except 
that  they  are  often  said  to  be  wider  than  those  within  which  external  public  policy 
operates. 
Bell  states  that: 
"The  private  interests  and  stipulations  of  individuals  must  yield,  and  their 
natural  rights  and  powers  suffer  restraint,  wherever  they  are  inconsistent  with 
the  public  interest".  6 
What  constitutes  the  public  interest,  however,  is  rarely  enunciated,  '  and  can  only 
be  divined  by  enumerating  the  commonly  accepted  instances  of  the  application  of 
For  an  interesting  discussion  of  how  Lord  Mackay  of  Clashfcrn  was  influenced  by  his 
Christian  principles  in  reforming  English  family  law,  sec:  Lord  Mackay  of  Clashfcrn,  "Family 
law  reform:  a  personal  view"  in  P.  Beaumont  &  K.  Wothcrspoon  (cds),  Christian  Perspectives 
on  Law  and  Relation  ism  (Paternoster  Press,  2000),  p237. 
4  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p66. 
S  Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy",  479. 
6  Bell,  Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  Scotland,  7th  edn.,  (cd.  )  J.  M'Larcn,  (Buttcrworths,  1990 
reprint  of  original  1870  edition)  (i,  320). 
7  Indeed  most  writers  concentrate  only  on  the  role  of  public  policy  in  contract. 
183 internal  public  policy.  The  most  widely  documented  role  for  internal  public 
policy  is  in  the  field  of  contract  law.  It  is  clear  that  certain  contracts,  otherwise 
legally  unimpeachable,  will  not  be  enforced  in  Scots  law  since  their  purpose,  or 
terms,  whether  in  whole  or  in  part,  are  regarded  as  being  contrary  to  public  policy. 
In  broad  terms,  such  contracts  appear  to  be  those  which  involve  corruption  within 
the  legal  system  (including  compromising  the  neutrality  of  the  professional 
adviser),  or  of  government  officers;  smuggling;  contracts  which  in  some  way 
frustrate  or  undermine  government  foreign  policy;  contracts  which  limit  freedom; 
and  contracts  which  involve  the  commission  of  a  crime  or  delict.  8  Traditionally  it 
has  been  argued  that  the  courts'  unwillingness  to  adjudicate  in  gambling  contracts 
was  not  in  itself  a  tenet  of  public  policy,  but  was  because  such  agreements  were 
"unworthy  to  occupy  judicial  time".  9  It  is  submitted  that  this  is  a  distinction 
without  a  difference.  The  approach  of  Scots  law  to  gambling  contracts  is 
eloquent  of  a  moral  view  on  such  agreements.  But  it  is  a  viewpoint  which  is 
perhaps  changing,  as  the  courts  become  drawn  into  such  matters.  In  Ferguson  1, 
Littlewoods  Pools  Ltd,  1°  the  pursuers  had  given  an  entry  in  a  football  pools 
competition  to  an  agent.  Had  the  football  pools  coupons  been  duly  submitted  by 
the  agent,  the  pursuers  would  have  won  around  £2.3  million,  but  (disastrously) 
they  were  not.  The  Lord  Ordinary  dismissed  the  action  brought  by  the  pursuers 
against  the  football  pools  company  for  the  prize  money,  as  he  felt  bound  by 
authority  to  find  that  the  transaction  was  a  sponsio  ludicra,  and  thus  not 
enforceable  in  the  courts.  The  pursuers  had  argued  that  the  nature  of  gambling, 
and  the  interest  involved  in  enforcing  gambling  agreements,  had  altered  over  the 
years,  but  the  Lord  Ordinary  felt  that  a  change  in  policy  could  only  be  made  by 
statute,  or  by  the  decision  of  a  higher  court.  "  In  the  later  case  of  Robertson  v 
Anderson,  12  however,  the  Inner  House  held  that  an  agreement  to  share  bingo 
8  L.  J.  Dunlop  et  al.  (eds),  Gloag  and  Henderson:  the  Law  of  Scotland,  11`x'  cdn.  (W. 
Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2001),  para  11.12;  E.  A.  Marshall,  General  Principles  of  Scots  Lau', 
7th  edn.  (W.  Green/Sweet  &  Maxwell,  1999),  para  9-58;  T.  B.  Smith,  A  Short  Commentary  on 
the  Law  of  Scotland  (W.  Green  &  Son,  1962),  p798.  9  Dunlop,  Gloag  and  Henderson,  para  11.15;  and  see  Smith,  Short  Conunentaq,  p799.  Such 
contracts  are  sponsiones  ladicrae. 
10  1997  SLT  309. 
II  Ibid.  per  Lord  Coulsfield  at  312. 
12  2003  SLT  235. 
184 winnings  of  £108,000  was  "related  to  gaming,  but 
...  not  in  itself  a  gaming 
contract".  13  However,  the  Court  also  stated  that: 
"We  were  not  addressed  on  the  question  whether  changes  in  the  commercial 
and  public  significance  of  betting  and  lotteries,  and  in  their  acceptability,  had 
any  implications  for  the  development  of  this  common  law  doctrine.  Nor  were 
we  addressed  on  the  question  whether  a  doctrine  under  which  the  court 
declines  to  entertain  an  action  for  the  enforcement  of  contractual  rights  and 
obligations  is  compatible  with  Convention  rights,  in  particular  the  right  of 
access  to  a  court  guaranteed  by  art  6(1)  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human 
Rights.  In  view  of  the  conclusion  which  we  have  reached  on  the  applicability 
of  the  doctrine  to  the  circumstances  of  the  present  case  it  is  unnecessary  for  us 
to  consider  these  questions  exproprio  motu.  14 
Blom  notes  that  in  Canada: 
"Over  the  last  few  decades,  Canadian  domestic  law  has  moved  from  a  criminal 
prohibition  against  all  gambling  to  a  prohibition  that  applies  only  if  the 
gambling  is  not  sanctioned  by  the  federal  or  provincial  government,  with  such 
sanction  being  granted  to  a  wide  variety  of  activities  across  the  country,  as 
long  as  they  contribute  to  the  public  coffers.  Whatever  unease  the  courts  might 
have  felt  earlier  about  enforcing  foreign  gambling  debts  has  now  evaporated  in 
the  face  of  the  widespread  acceptance  in  Canada  of  officially  approved 
gambling".  15 
This  may  reflect  the  direction  being  taken  in  Scots  law  in  a  domestic  context. 
Over  recent  years  the  restrictions  on  bookmakers  have  eased,  with  longer  opening 
hours  and  no  requirement  for  filled-in  frontages.  The  state  has  also  allowed  the 
introduction  and  promotion  of  a  nationwide  lottery.  In  this  context  it  is  more 
difficult  for  the  courts  to  express  (implicit)  disapproval  of  such  pursuits.  Perhaps 
in  future  the  internal  public  policy  based  rule  against  the  courts'  adjudication  in 
13  Ibid.  per  Lord  Reed  (delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Court)  at  242. 
14  Ibid.  per  Lord  Reed  (delivering  the  opinion  of  the  Court)  at  241. 
15  Blom,  "Public  policy",  391. 
185 gambling  agreements  will  disappear  altogether:  the  dicta  reproduced  above  might 
suggest  that  the  applicability  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  in 
Scotland  might  allow  the  final  coup  de  grace  thereby  to  be  administered  to  the 
rule. 
Outwith  contract  law  the  overt  application  of  public  policy  is  more  difficult  to 
identify.  It  has  been  said  to  be  a  matter  of  public  policy  that  the  court  should  not 
be  denied  a  locus  to  intervene  in  the  workings  of  private  bodies  exercising  a 
function  akin  to  a  tribunal,  to  ensure  that  the  rules  of  natural  justice  are 
respected.  16  It  would  seem  also  that  public  policy  objections  will  prevent  the 
carrying  out  of  contracts  either  to  prevent  someone  from  marrying,  or  arranging  a 
marriage  for  payment,  or  which  are  "to  the  prejudice  of  sexual  morality".  '7  In 
matters  of  succession,  no  effect  will  be  given  to  a  provision  in  a  will  which  is 
illegal  or  impossible,  or  which  attempts  to  prevent  someone  from  marrying.  '8 
Public  policy  can  also  act  so  as  to  strike  down  testamentary  provisions  for 
"excessive  self-glorification  by  the  testator  without  any  benefit  resulting  to 
anyone",  19  and  this  is  most  famously  discussed  in  cases  such  as  various  attempted 
schemes  of  Mr  McCaig  and  his  sister.  20  These  public  policy  restrictions  are 
largely  replicated  in  the  field  of  trusts.  Trust  purposes  must  not  contravene  the 
law,  morality  or  public  policy.  21  It  can  also  be  argued  that  the  rule  that  a  killer 
cannot  benefit  from  his  victim's  will  is  grounded  in  public  policy.  2 
Can  any  general  principles  be  drawn  from  these  examples?  One  major  strand 
seems  to  be  that  a  person  should  not  gain  from  criminal  acts  or  wrongdoing.  As 
well  as  signalling  moral  disapprobation,  this  has  the  practical  result  of  removing 
an  incentive  to  commit  crime.  Another  aim  of  domestic  public  policy  is  the 
16  St.  Johnstone  Football  Club  Limited  v  Scottish  Football  Association  Limited  1965  SLT  171 
per  Lord  Kilbrandon  at  175. 
17  Smith,  Short  Commentary,  p798;  and  see  ibid.,  pp798-799.  18  Ibid.,  pp421  &  798-799. 
19  Macdonald,  Succession,  para  9.51;  see  MacKintosh's  Judicial  Factor  v  Lord  Advocate  1935 
SC  406. 
20  McCaig  v  University  of  Glasgow  1907  SC  231  (testator  desiring  the  erection  of  towers  topped 
by  statues  of  himself  and  his  family);  McCaig's  Trs  v  Kirk-Session  of  United  Free  Church  of 
Lismore  1915  SC  426  (testator  wishing  erection  of  statues  of  family  within  McCaig's  Folly  in 
Oban). 
21  Smith,  Short  Commentary,  p562. 
22  Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy",  479-480;  Macdonald,  Succession,  paras  2.02  &  2.05. 
186 protection  of  impartiality,  whether  of  judges  or  of  public  officials  who  take 
decisions  affecting  the  community.  A  further  principle  appears  to  be  the 
protection  of  liberty,  whether  that  be  a  freedom  to  trade,  or  to  marry  whom  you 
choose.  Scots  are  often  said  to  have  a  Calvinist  character,  and  perhaps  a  dislike  of 
waste,  and  lingering  disapproval  of  certain  sexual  pursuits,  and  of  gambling,  may 
be  ascribed  to  this.  It  has,  however,  been  argued  that  "the  potential  reach  of 
public  policy  has  diminished  with  time  as  moral  imperatives  that  were  taken  for 
granted  in  many  societies  have  lost  their  force".  23  This  observation  is  no  less 
pertinent  to  Scotland. 
External  public  policy 
Definition 
External  public  policy24  describes  the  public  policy  considerations  which  are 
called  upon  in  international  private  law  cases.  Whereas  in  the  context  of 
underlying  public  policy,  moral  values  are  used  in  the  creation  of  law  (which 
necessarily  may  include  the  prohibition  of  certain  behaviour),  external  public 
policy  is  primarily  a  tool  of  exclusion.  It  can  be  used  so  as  not  to  apply  a  foreign 
law  which  has  been  selected  by  the  Scots  choice  of  law  rules,  or  to  refuse 
recognition  and  deny  enforcement  to  a  judgment  from  outwith  Scotland25  In  the 
former  case,  the  consequence  is  normally  the  application  of  the  le.  Y  for"i  26  In  the 
English  case  of  Royal  Boskalis  NV  v  Mountain,  27  the  defendants  sought  to  rely 
upon  French  public  policy,  but  did  not  plead  the  content  of  this.  Accordingly 
French  and  English  public  policy  were  presumed  to  coincide.  28  Since  by  its  very 
nature  public  policy  is  special  to  a  country,  this  approach  seems  intuitively  wrong. 
The  rule  that  the  a  foreign  law  should  be  presumed  to  be  the  same  as  the  lex  foci 
in  the  absence  of  proof  as  to  its  content  has  already  been  criticised,  29  and  it  is 
submitted  that  the  case  of  Royal  Boskalis  NV  v  Mountain  provides  an  illustration 
of  the  shortcomings  of  such  a  rule. 
23  Blom,  "Public  policy",  391. 
24  The  phrase  is  used  by  both  Castel  and  Leslie  (Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p66; 
Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy",  477). 
25  See  Carter,  "Public  policy",  1-2;  Blom,  "Public  policy",  374-375. 
26  Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy",  479;  Blom,  "Public  policy",  375-376. 
27  [1997]  2  All  ER  929. 
28  Ibid.  per  Stuart-Smith  LJ  at  943;  per  Phillips  LJ  at  976-977. 
29  See  pp110-112  above. 
187 However,  public  policy  is  something  of  a  master  of  disguises.  Thus,  on  one  view, 
the  application  of  Scots  law  as  the  lex  fori  to  all  divorces  before  the  Scottish 
courts  is  done  as  a  matter  of  public  policy  in  a  most  sensitive  area.  Public  30 
policy  of  the  forum  may  also  require  the  imposition  of  certain  of  its  own  rules  (so- 
called  mandatory  rules),  even  if  another  law  otherwise  governs  the  matter.  31  For 
example,  English  v  Donnelly  &  Arnor32  concerned  a  contract  which  contained  a 
choice  of  law  clause  in  favour  of  English  law.  The  Court  of  Session  held  that 
section  2  of  the  Hire  Purchase  and  Small  Debt  (Scotland)  Act  193233  was 
nevertheless  mandatory,  and  applied  despite  the  agreement  of  the  parties.  34 
External  public  policy  may  be  relied  upon  at  common  law  by  the  court,  or  such  an 
exception  may  be  expressly  provided  for  in  a  conflict  statute:  of  late,  this  seems 
to  be  universal  practice  (specifically  to  mention  that  which  we  presume  already 
exists).  35  It  is  commonly  said  that  external  public  policy  has  a  more  limited  scope 
than  internal  public  policy.  36  This  must  indeed  be  so.  Simply  because  a  matter 
may  be  unacceptable  to  the  forum  in  a  domestic  context  does  not  automatically 
mean  that  it  will  also  be  contrary  to  external  public  policy  in  a  conflicts  case.  7 
However,  the  impression  given  by  such  statements  is  that  the  content  of  external 
public  policy  is  completely  coincident  with  certain  rules  of  internal  public  policy. 
In  effect,  it  is  suggested  that  a  number  of  matters  contravene  internal  public 
policy,  but  that  in  the  interests  of  comity  and  tolerance  of  others,  only  some  of 
these  can  also  be  relied  upon  to  refuse  to  recognise  laws,  or  judgments,  of  foreign 
countries.  On  this  model,  the  content  of  internal,  and  external,  public  policy 
respectively  could  be  represented  as  follows: 
30  See  Carter,  "Public  policy",  3. 
31  See  Blom,  "Public  policy",  379-382. 
32  1958  SC  494. 
33  1932  (22  &  23  Geo  V),  c.  38. 
34  See  also  Fawcett,  "Evasion  of  law  and  mandatory  rules",  57. 
35  For  example,  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1995,  s14(3)(a)(i); 
Family  Law  Act  1986,  s51(3)(c). 
36  For  example,  Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy",  481.  Sec  also  Anton  with  Beaumont, 
Private  International  Law,  p102. 
37  P.  B.  Carter,  "Rejection  of  foreign  law:  some  private  international  law  inhibitions"  in  R. 
Fentiman  (ed.  ),  Conflict  of  Laws  (Dartmouth,  1996),  p243  at  254. 
Iss Figure  7.1 
internal  public  policy 
external  public 
policy 
It  will  be  argued  that  this  is  not  in  fact  an  accurate  representation  of  the 
relationship  between  internal  and  external  public  policy  rules.  This  is  important 
because  the  actual  links  between  underlying,  internal,  and  external,  public  policy 
are  significant  in  ascertaining  how  far  we  can  properly  speak  of  a  Scots  doctrine 
of  public  policy  in  conflicts  cases  which  could  also  operate  on  an  intra-UK  basis, 
as  well  as  the  likely  long-term  effect  of  devolution  in  this  matter.  It  is  to  the 
former  subject  we  now  turn.  It  is  helpful  to  analyse  the  situation  in  the  context  of 
Scotland  prior  to  the  passing  of  the  Scotland  Act  1998.  The  impact  of  devolution 
will  then  be  examined  in  a  later  section  of  the  chapter. 
Similarities  and  differences  between  Scots  and  English  rules  of  underlying  public 
op  licy 
Prior  to  the  Union  of  the  Crowns,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  role  of  underlying 
public  policy  in  shaping  the  law  was  in  the  context  of  a  Scottish  nation  which  was 
independent  both  politically  and  legally.  It  might  be  questioned  how  far  that 
policy  was  unequally  influenced  by  various  sectors  of  the  population,  or  the 
extent  to  which  rules  of  law  were  borrowed  and  assimilated  from  other  legal 
systems.  However,  the  measures  that  were  passed,  and  the  law  which  was 
developed,  was  in  response  to  the  perceived  needs  of  the  Scottish  nation. 
The  regnal  union  brought  a  slight  change,  in  that  those  reigning,  or  ruling  over, 
Scotland,  also  controlled  England.  As  has  been  seen,  at  certain  times  there  was  at 
least  a  stated  desire  for  the  two  countries  to  be  united  38  The  underlying  public 
38  See  pp22-31  above. 
189 policy  might  thus  be  altered,  and  one  would  expect  that  legislation  passed  in  this 
period,  and  also  in  the  time  of  the  Cromwellian  occupation,  might  reflect  that. 
A  crucial  development,  however,  is  the  passing  of  the  Acts  of  Union.  The 
preservation  of  the  Scottish  legal  system  by  the  Acts  of  Union  meant  that  Scots 
law,  as  it  had  been  shaped  until  that  point,  survived.  Also  Scottish  judges,  who 
would  be  guided  by  Scottish  underlying  public  policy  concerns,  retained  a  large 
measure  of  control  over  the  development  of  the  law.  Accordingly,  there  are  many 
principles  and  rules  of  Scots  law  which  can  be  said  to  spring  from  underlying 
public  policy  concerns  special  to  Scotland.  Into  this  category  might  fall  the  rules 
designed  to  prevent  a  testator  from  willing  all  his  property  away  from  his  family; 
the  principle  that  those  granting  a  security  over  moveable  property  must  give  over 
possession  of  that  property;  or  the  importance  of  specific  implement  as  a  remedy. 
By  contrast,  concerns  of  underlying  public  policy  in  England  have  given  rise  in 
that  legal  system  to  a  necessity  for  consideration  in  contracts;  39  the  laying  of 
great  stress  on  the  freedom  of  parties  to  contract  or  to  test;  40  and  the  existence  of 
a  period  for  objections  to  be  made  to  a  divorce  before  it  becomes  final.  `ý1 
An  equally  important  effect  of  the  Acts  of  Union  was  the  uniting  of  the  two 
Parliaments,  since  legislation  then  emanated  from  a  UK,  rather  than  a  Scottish, 
Parliament.  Thus  the  underlying  public  policy  was  British.  Even  when 
Westminster  legislation  relates  only  to  Scotland,  it  will  generally  have  to  be 
promoted  by,  or  have  the  support  of,  one  of  the  parties  at  Westminster  which 
considers  itself  to  be  a  British  political  party.  42  There  is  also  nothing  to  prevent 
MPs  representing  English  constituencies  voting  on  Scottish  measures.  It  would 
therefore  be  artificial  to  attempt  to  exclude  'Scottish'  legislation  passed  at 
Westminster  from  the  British  underlying  public  policy  concerns.  The  House  of 
39  By  contrast,  lack  of  consideration  will  not  prevent  a  foreign  contract  being  enforced  (Re 
Bonacina;  Le  Brasseur  v  Bonacina  [1912]  2  Ch  394).  Indeed  one  of  the  arguments  put 
forward  by  parties  in  that  case  was  that  a  Scottish  contract  with  no  consideration  could  be 
enforced  in  England  (ibid.,  at  396).  Also,  where  England  was  the  lex  loci  contractus  the 
Scottish  courts  have  respected  the  consequences  of  an  absence  of  consideration  (Williamson  v 
Taylor  (1845)  8D  156). 
40  See  C.  H.  Sherrin  et  al.,  Williams  on  Wills,  8th  edn.  (Butterworths,  2002),  pars  34.12. 
41  Thus  explaining  the  existence  of  decree  nisi  and  decree  absolute  (Shears  &  Stephenson,  James' 
Introduction  to  English  law,  p442). 
42  For  example,  the  Labour  Party,  the  Conservative  Party  or  the  Liberal  Democrats. 
190 Lords  is  also  likely  to  be  influenced  by  a  British  underlying  public  policy  given 
43  its  personnel  and  approach. 
Similarity  between  Scots  and  English  rules  of  internal  public  policy 
As  with  Scotland,  most  of  the  discussion  on  internal  public  policy  in  English  law 
concerns  its  application  in  the  law  of  contract.  An  examination  of  the  standard 
works  on  English  law  suggests  that  the  grounds  on  which  contracts  will  be  struck 
down  as  a  contravention  of  public  policy  are  largely  the  same  as  those  in 
Scotland.  44  Indeed,  certain  of  the  authorities  relied  upon  by  Scottish  textbook 
writers  in  delimiting  internal  public  policy  are  English.  In  England  it  is  clear  that 
a  legal  contract  which  is  to  be  carried  out  in  an  illegal  way  would  fall  foul  of 
internal  public  policy.  5  Whilst  this  was  not  explicit  in  Scotland,  it  was  hard  to 
see  that  a  Scottish  court  would  be  any  more  likely  to  countenance  such  a  contract, 
and  indeed  English  authority  seems  to  have  influenced  the  recent  decision  in 
Dowling  &  Rutter  v  Abacus  Frozen  Foods  Ltd.  46  The  major  difference  between 
the  two  systems  in  their  use  of  internal  public  policy  in  contract  law,  is  that  in 
England  public  policy  has  a  role  to  play  in  determining  what  is  valid 
consideration.  The  latter  does  not  form  part  of  Scots  law  at  all.  Outwith  contract 
law,  English  law  will  not  allow  certain  trust  purposes,  47  or  certain  conditions 
attached  to  bequests  in  wills,  48  which  are  considered  to  be  contrary  to  public 
policy.  The  prevention  of  a  person  benefiting  from  the  will  of  someone  lie  has 
unlawfully  killed  is  clearly  ascribed  in  English  law  to  public  policy  49 
The  relevance  of  all  this  for  Scots  external  public  policy  is  twofold.  Firstly,  since 
it  would  seem  that  there  may  be  little  difference  between  the  internal  public 
policy  rules  of  Scotland  and  England,  it  may  be  questioned  how  far  there  can  be 
any  difference  in  the  scope  of  their  external  public  policy.  This  is  particularly  so 
43  See  pp6l-63  above. 
44  G.  H.  Treitel,  The  Law  of  Contract,  10th  edn.  (Sweet  &  Mawell,  1999),  pp392-415;  P.  S. 
Atiyah,  An  Introduction  to  the  Law  of  Contract,  5th  edn.  (Oxford  University  Press,  1995), 
pp341-345;  J.  C.  Smith,  The  Law  of  Contract,  3'd  edn.  (Sweet  &  Maxwell,  1998),  ppG7,70  & 
242-243. 
45  Smith,  The  Law  of  Contract,  p243. 
46  2002  SLT  491. 
47  J.  Mowbray  et  al.,  Lewin  on  Trusts,  17th  edn.  (Sweet  &  Maxwell,  2000),  paras  5-02  to  5-17. 
48  Sherrin,  Williams  on  Wills,  para  34.12. 
49  Ibid.,  para  9.13. 
191 if  the  relationship  of  external  to  internal  public  policy  is  . that  portrayed  in  the 
diagrammatic  model  (Figure  7.1)  above.  50  This  leads  on  to  the  second  point, 
which  is  that  if  external  public  policy  is  merely  a  more  limited  refinement  of 
internal  public  policy,  and  the  rules  of  the  latter  are  very  similar  on  both  sides  of 
the  border,  then  there  should  be  very  little  room  left  for  the  intra-UK  application 
of  external  public  policy  objections  in  conflict  cases. 
The  foreign  interests  of  the  UK 
One  specific  area  of  external  public  policy  which  is  often  differentiated  from  the 
generality  of  the  doctrine,  is  "where  the  enforcement  of  the  transaction  in  question 
would  prejudice  the  interests  of  the  United  Kingdom  or  its  good  relations  with 
foreign  powers".  51  Carter  characterises  this  as  the  courts  wishing  "to  protect  the 
public  or  national  interest  or  image  of  the  United  Kingdom".  52  This  is 
inextricably  linked  to  the  foreign  policy  pursued  by  the  UK,  and  thereby  infused 
with  British  concerns. 
External  public  policy  objections  at  common  law  in  an  intra-UK  situation 
Academic  definitions  of  external  public  policy  tend  to  fall  into  two  quite  distinct 
groups.  On  the  one  hand,  Anton  states  that  the  "Scottish  courts  will  not  give 
effect  to  foreign  law  when  to  do  so  would  be  contrary  to  the  fundamental  policies 
of  Scots  law".  53  Similarly  the  editors  of  Dicey  &  Morris  define  such  objections  as 
striking  at  that  which  "would  be  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  public  policy 
of  English  law".  54  On  the  other  hand,  some  writers  adopt  a  slightly  different 
approach.  Thus  Leslie  states  that  external  public  policy  acts  so  as  to  exclude  that 
which  "would  be  so  unjust,  immoral  or,  in  some  other  way,  contrary  to  the  basic 
values  or  interests  of  the  state  or  the  community  as  to  be  unacceptable".  55  Akin  to 
this  is  the  belief  that  external  public  policy  is  the  correct  tool  if  a  foreign  law  or 
decree  "is  regarded  as  repugnant  to  fundamental  English  concepts  of  morality, 
50  See  p189  above. 
sl  Crawford,  International  Private  Law,  para  3.17;  see  also  Carter,  "Public  Policy",  4-5;  C.  M.  V. 
Clarkson  &  J. Hill,  Jaffey  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  2°d  edn.  (Butterworths,  2002),  p562.  52  Carter,  "Rejection  of  foreign  law",  p256. 
53  Anton  with  Beaumont,  Private  International  Law,  p101.  54  Collins,  Dicey  and  Morris  on  the  Conflict  of  Laws,  para  5R-001;  see  too  Briggs,  The  Conflict 
of  Laws,  p44. 
55  Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy",  477. 
192 decency,  human  liberty  or  justice".  56  The  first  of  these  two  approaches  links 
external  public  policy  firmly  to  a  legal  system,  whether  that  be  Scots  law  or 
English  law.  However,  the  second  appears  to  concentrate  on  the  moral  values  of 
a  community,  indeed  a  country.  For  Scotland,  which  has  its  own  legal  system  but 
is  not  a  politically  independent  country,  the  distinction  is  crucial.  Are  the  values 
inherent  in  the  very  principles  of  Scots  law  protected  by  the  concept  of  external 
public  policy,  or  only  generic  British  values  such  as  justice  or  decency?  57  If  the 
latter,  there  could  then  be  no  room  for  public  policy  objections  in  an  intra-UK 
case. 
In  the  early  Scots  case  of  Edwards  v  Prescot58  the  pursuer,  an  Englishwoman,  was 
attempting  to  enforce  a  decree  (which  had  been  passed  reliant  on  an  English  strict 
liability  statute).  The  defender,  who  was  also  an  Englishwoman,  had  fled  from 
that  jurisdiction  to  Scotland.  The  pursuer  argued  that  the  union  of  the  countries 
meant  that  enforcement  of  decrees  from  the  courts  of  each  country  should  be 
automatic.  59  One  of  the  defender's  counter-arguments  was  that  the  English  law  in 
question  was  penal  and  "contrary  to  the  constitution  of  the  law  of  Scotland",  60 
although  this  was  disputed  by  the  pursuer.  Unfortunately  the  view  of  the  court  on 
this  point  is  somewhat  unclear:  it  found  that  the  decree  should  be  enforced 
"unless  something  competent  in  law  or  equity  be  objected  against  it".  61 
More  guidance  is  provided  by  later  cases.  Connal  &  Co  v  Loder  &  Others  62 
concerned  a  bankruptcy  with  cross-border  aspects.  It  was  said  that  property  had 
been  transferred  under  English  law  by  the  simple  expedient  of  delivering 
warrants,  rather  than  the  actual  items.  Lord  Justice-Clerk  Patton,  however,  was  of 
the  opinion  that: 
56  Clarkson  &  Hill,  Jaffey,  p559;  see  also  Carter,  "Rejection  of  foreign  law",  255. 
57  Leslie  poses  the  question  of  whether  public  policy  is  Scottish  or  British,  but  does  not  record 
what  he  believes  the  answer  to  this  question  to  be  (Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy", 
485). 
58  (1720)  Mor  4535. 
39  Ibid.,  at  4538. 
60  Ibid.,  at  4540. 
61  Ibid.,  at  4542. 
62  (1868)  6M  1095. 
193 "Now,  that  is  repugnant  to  the  principle  of  our  law,  and  it  is  quite  obvious  that 
it  could  not  exist  with  our  law, 
... 
because  it  would  then  be  no  longer  true  that 
tradition  was  necessary;  it  would  no  longer  be  true  that  intimation  was 
necessary,  and  therefore  our  law  could  not  subsist.  The  adoption  of  the  foreign 
law  in  that  matter  would  be  in  direct  antagonism  to  our  own,  and  everybody 
knows  that  the  fundamental  principle  upon  which  we  introduce  foreign  law  as 
law  affecting  the  rights  of  contracts  or  otherwise,  is  only  to  the  effect  of 
introducing  such  law  when  it  is  not  in  direct  contradiction  to  the  principles 
upon  which  our  law  is  governed,  and  according  to  which  the  rights  of  the 
subjects  in  this  country  must  be  determined".  63 
The  case  of  Hanilyn  &  Co  v  Talisker  Distillery64  arose  out  of  a  contract  between  a 
Scottish  and  an  English  company,  which  included  a  clause  referring  disputes  on 
the  contract  to  'arbitration  by  two  members  of  the  London  Corn  Exchange,  or 
their  umpire'.  An  attempt  was  made  by  the  Scottish  firm  to  raise  an  action  in 
Scotland.  The  First  Division  held  that  the  law  of  the  contract  was  Scots  law,  and 
thus  the  clause  referring  disputes  to  arbitration  was  void  since  the  arbiters  were 
not  named  . 
65  On  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords  it  was  held  that  the  proper  law  of 
the  arbitration  clause  was  English  law  (by  which  the  clause  was  unimpeachable). 
In  the  words  of  Lord  Chancellor  Herschell: 
"But  then  it  is  said  that  the  Scotch  court  is  asked  to  enforce  a  law  which  is 
against  the  public  policy  of  the  law  of  Scotland,  and  that  although  the  parties 
may  have  so  contracted,  the  Courts  in  Scotland  cannot  be  bound  to  enforce  a 
contract  which  is  against  the  policy  of  their  law.  I  should  be  prepared  to  admit 
that  an  agreement  which  was  opposed  to  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  law  of 
Scotland  founded  on  considerations  of  public  policy  could  not  be  relied  upon 
and  insisted  upon  in  the  Courts  of  Scotland;  and  if,  according  to  the  law  of 
Scotland,  the  Courts  never  allowed  their  jurisdiction  to  try  the  merits  of  a  case 
to  be  interfered  with  by  an  arbitration  clause,  there  would  be  considerable 
force  in  the  contention  which  was  urged  by  the  respondents.  But  that  is  not  the 
63  Ibid.  at  1110. 
64  (1894)21R(HL)21. 
65  Although  this  rule  of  Scots  law  was  altered  by  the  Arbitration  (Scotland)  Act  1894  (57  &  58 
Vict),  c.  13,  sl:  another  example  of  an  internalised  conflict? 
194 case  ...  I  have  been  unable  to  understand  upon  what  fundamental  principle  of 
public  policy  the  rule  can  be  said  to  rest  that  where  an  arbitrator  is  not  named 
an  agreement  between  the  parties  to  refer  a  matter  to  arbitration  ought  not  to  be 
enforced".  66 
In  the  twentieth  century,  we  have  seen  that  floating  charges  were  judicially 
described  as  being  "utterly  repugnant  to  the  principles  of  Scots  law",  67  and  that 
certain  dicta  in  cases  involving  Romalpa  clauses  suggested  that  a  Scottish  court 
would  find  such  a  clause  (even  if  enforceable  in  terms  of  the  law  selected  by 
Scots  choice  of  law  rules)  contrary  to  public  policy.  68 
This  is  a  difficult  area,  and  it  has  therefore  been  thought  worthwhile  to  reproduce 
some  of  the  relevant  judicial  dicta  at  length.  The  cases  indicate  that  it  is  possible 
in  Scots  law  to  object  to  the  application  of  rules  of  English  law  on  the  basis  of 
public  policy.  The  basis  of  that  objection  is  that  recognition  of  the  rule  would 
offend  against  the  principles  and  policy  of  Scots  law.  It  is  submitted  therefore 
that  Blom  is  correct  to  identify  an  important  manifestation  of  public  policy  as 
relying  on: 
"the  fundamental  values  that  underlie  the  domestic  system  of  private  law. 
According  to  this  aspect  of  public  policy;  foreign  laws  and  claims  that  are 
wholly  out  of  keeping  with  those  values  must  be  rejected  so  as  to  protect  the 
integrity  of  the  system".  69 
The  cases  discussed  above  may  seem  to  relate  to  quite  technical  rules  of  law,  but 
these  rules  were  inspired  at  one  time  in  history  by  underlying  public  policy 
concerns.  The  values  beneath  Scots  law  which  are  protected  by  the  concept  of 
external  public  policy  range  from  such  seemingly  technical  rules  to  those  which 
owe  more  to  the  morals  of  the  day,  or  to  notions  of  natural  justice.  Whilst  an 
66  Hainlyn  &  Co.  v  Talisker  Distillery  (1894)  21  R  (HL)  21,  at  23-24;  see  also  per  Lord  Watson 
at  27:  "There  may  be  stipulations  which,  though  not  tainted  with  immorality,  are  yet  in  such 
direct  conflict  with  deeply-rooted  and  important  considerations  of  local  policy,  that  her  Courts 
would  be  justified  in  declining  to  recognise  them". 
67  Carse  v  Coppenn  1951  SC  233  per  Lord  President  Cooper  at  239. 
68  See  pp86-88  above. 
69  glom,  "Public  policy",  385. 
195 abhorrence  of  sibling  marriage,  or  a  sense  of  justice  and  fairness  may  be  shared 
by  Scots  and  English  alike,  it  is  submitted  that  this  does  not  mean  that  these  ideals 
are  a  matter  of  British,  rather  than  Scottish,  public  policy.  Such  similarities  of 
approach  on  both  sides  of  the  border  may,  however,  explain  why  it  is  unlikely  that 
public  policy  objections  in  Scotland  to  English  law  will  be  on  the  grounds  of  a 
contravention  of  moral  standards  or  basic  conceptions  of  justice:  it  is  only  to  be 
expected  that  it  is  at  the  other  end  of  the  public  policy  spectrum  that  the  doctrine 
will  tend  to  come  into  play  as  between  Scotland  and  England.  In  the  Canadian 
context,  Blom  rightly  recognised  that  external  public  policy  is  multi-faceted,  and 
that  the  protection  of  morality  is  only  one  aspect  of  this.  Accordingly  there  are 
areas  where  "even  sister  states  in  a  federation  may  conceivably  have  legitimate 
differences" 
'70  and  thus  the  ability  of  a  court  to  avail  itself  of  a  public  policy 
objection  remains  necessary  in  interprovincial  cases.  It  is  submitted  that  this 
same  reasoning  holds  in  the  UK.  It  is  therefore  both  possible,  and  desirable,  for  a 
Scots  court  to  be  able  to  refuse  to  apply  English  law,  or  recognise  an  English 
judgment,  on  the  grounds  that  it  would  contravene  public  policy.  By  this  is  meant 
that  the  rule  or  judgment  in  question  is  contrary  to  certain  essential  principles 
which  inform  the  Scottish  legal  system. 
Accordingly,  it  is  submitted  that  the  correct  analysis  of  the  relationship  between 
the  three  different  levels  of  public  policy  identified  at  the  outset  is  as  follows. 
Underlying  public  policy  contributes  to  the  statutes  which  are  passed  by  the  law- 
making  body  (in  this  case  the  old  Parliament  of  Scotland,  followed  by  the  new 
British  Parliament),  the  tenets  set  down  by  institutional  writers,  and  the 
development  of  both  by  judges.  Certain  public  policy  considerations  are  so  strong 
that  they  also  override  the  normal  legal  consequences  of  actings  in  domestic  law, 
for  example,  to  prevent  persons  profiting  from  a  crime,  or  to  protect  morals.  This 
is  the  application  of  internal  public  policy.  We  recognise  that  in  applying  foreign 
law,  or  recognising  foreign  judgments,  we  cannot  baulk  at  rules  simply  because 
they  are  different  from  our  own.  However,  certain  of  the  moral  objections  which 
drive  the  concept  of  internal  public  policy  are  so  deeply  held,  that  we  would  also 
70  Ibid.,  398. 
196 refuse  to  recognise  a  foreign  law  on  that  basis.  71  In  addition  to  this,.  there  are 
certain  foreign  rules  or  judgments  which  we  consider  would  be  so  destructive  of 
the  fabric  of  our  law  (and  the  underlying  public  policy  reasons  for  those  legal 
rules)  that  we  will  refuse  recognition  to  them.  2  Together,  this  constitutes  the 
doctrine  of  external  public  policy.  We  are  as  careful  not  to  overuse  the  second 
kind  of  external  public  policy  objection,  as  we  are  not  to  impose  our  moral  beliefs 
inappropriately  when  utilising  the  first  kind  of  external  public  policy  exception. 
Thus  in  Hanilyn  &  Co  v  Talisker  Distillery,  73  as  we  have  seen,  a  clause  valid 
under  English  law  referring  disputes  to  unnamed  arbitrators  was  not  void  as  a 
contravention  of  public  policy  since  arbitration  was  possible  in  Scotland. 
However,  if  references  to  arbitration  had  been  impossible  in  Scotland,  then  the 
contractual  clause  could  legitimately  have  been  struck  down  on  this  ground.  It  is 
therefore  argued  that  a  more  accurate  diagrammatic  representation  of  the 
overlapping  contents  of  the  differing  levels  of  public  policy  is  as  follows: 
Figure  7.2 
underlying  public  policy 
i.  p.  p.  e.  p.  p. 
Ke  Y: 
i.  p.  p.  =  internal  public  policy 
c.  p.  p.  =  external  public  policy 
71  For  example,  it  has  been  noted  that  smuggling  contracts  are  contrary  to  internal  public  policy. 
Moreover,  Hume  notes  that  contracts  of  smuggling  entered  into  abroad  may  not  be  enforced  in 
Scotland  (G.  C.  H.  Paton  (cd.  ),  Baron  David  Hume's  Lectures  1786-1822,  Vol  II  (Stair  Society, 
Vol  13,1949),  pp28-31).  By  contrast,  although  the  Scottish  courts  have  (at  least  in  the  past) 
been  loathe  to  become  involved  in  gaming  contracts,,  as  early  as  1937  the  Court  of  Session 
allowed  a  proof  in  a  dispute  arising  from  joint  purchase  of  a  ticket  for  an  Irish  lottery  (Clayton 
v  Clayton  1937  SC  619),  and  see  in  England  the  case  of  Saxby  v  Fulton  [1909)  2  KB  208.  On 
both  sides  of  the  border,  it  was  recognised  early  that  the  status  and  incidents  of  slavery  should 
not  be  given  effect  (in  Scotland  by  the  case  of  Knight  v.  Wedderburn  (1778)  Mor  14545;  and 
in  England  by  virtue  of  Somerset  v  Steinart  (1772)  20  State  Tr  1),  but  later  an  English  court 
enforced  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  slaves,  valid  by  its  Brazilian  proper  law  (Santos  v  Illidge 
(1860)  8  CB(NS)  859).  It  is  impossible  to  predict  what  a  Scots  court  of  that  period  would  have 
done  in  this  situation.  Collier  states  that  it  is  "inconceivable"-  that  such  a  decision  would  be 
reached  in  England  now  (Collier,  Conflict  of  Latins,  p363),  and  this  is  undoubtedly  true  for 
Scotland  also. 
72  See  Connal  &  Co.  v  Loder  &  Others  (1868)  6M  1095;  Hammer  and  Solnre  V  Hli'T 
Realisations  Ltd  1985  SLT  (Sh  Ct)  21  at  23. 
73  (1894)  21  R (HL)  21. 
197 The  above  model  (Figure  7.2)  reflects  the  connection,  between  the  underlying 
public  policy  of  the  law,  and  both  internal  and  external  public  policy.  Changes  in 
the  former  can  accordingly  alter  the  application  of  the  latter  two.  74  However,  it 
also  illustrates  that  although  the  content  of  internal  and  external  public  policy  may 
overlap,  they  are  not  entirely  coincident,  and  nor  is  external  public  policy  merely 
a  subset  of  internal  public  policy. 
The  availability  of  external  public  policy  objections  under  statute  in  an  intra-UK 
situation 
External  public  policy  as  an  exclusionary  device  has  also  been  built  into  conflicts 
legislation.  Whether  this  exception  is  available  within  the  UK,  or  simply  in 
respect  of  rules  or  judgments  emanating  from  a  politically  foreign  country,  is  a 
matter  of  construction  of  the  individual  statute. 
In  general,  the  parliamentary  draughtsman  has  not  disapplied  public  policy 
exceptions  in  the  intra-UK  context.  Under  Article  16  of  the  Rome  Convention,  a 
court  may  decide  not  to  apply  a  rule  of  law  of  the  country  which  governs  the 
contract  by  virtue  of  the  Convention's  choice  of  law  rules,  if  to  do  so  would  be 
"manifestly  incompatible"  with  the  forum's  public  policy.  In  terms  of  the 
Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990,  the  Convention  also  applies  as  between  the 
UK  jurisdictions,  and  there  is  nothing  in  that  legislation  to  prevent  reliance  upon 
Article  16  within  the  UK.  There  is  a  similar  public  policy  exception  in  the 
Convention  on  the  law  applicable  to  trusts  and  on  their  recognition.  75  Again,  the 
legislation  which  allows  the  rules  of  the  Convention  to  apply  within  the  UK,  does 
not  disapply  this  public  policy  exception.  76  The  Private  International  Law 
(Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1995  permits  the  law  chosen  in  terms  of  its 
provisions  not  to  be  applied  if  to  do  so  "would  conflict  with  principles  of  public 
74  For  example,  the  statutory  introduction  of  the  concept  of  the  floating  charge  in  Scots  domestic 
law  both  represented  a  change  in  the  underlying  public  policy  of  Scots  law,  and  removed  the 
possibility  that  recognition  of  the  effects  of  an  English  floating  charge  might  be  held  by  a 
Scots  court  to  be  contrary  to  external  public  policy.  To  take  another  example,  ' changes  in 
underlying  public  policy  which  reflect  an  alteration  in  how  society  views.  marriage  and 
divorce,  may  make  us  more  tolerant  of  certain  foreign  cultural  norms,  and  thus  less  likely  to 
use  external  public  policy  to  exclude  recognition  of  the  status  of,  and  consequences  attendant 
upon,  some  relationships  entered  into  abroad. 
's  Art.  18. 
76  Recognition  of  Trusts  Act  1987,  c.  14. 
198 policy".  77  Once  more,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  a  Scottish  court  making  use  of 
this  exception  so  as  not  to  apply  English  law. 
There  are,  however,  certain  exceptions.  A  judgment  may  be  refused  recognition 
under  the  Brussels  Convention,  and  now  Brussels  I,  if  it  involves  a  contravention 
of  the  forum's  public  policy.  78  The  separate  provisions  for  recognition  and 
enforcement  in  Scotland  of  judgments  from  other  parts  of  the  UK  allow  only 
limited  exceptions  to  the  general  right  to  recognition,  79  and  traditional  common 
law  challenges  based  on  public  policy  or  fraud  have  not  been  preserved.  An 
attempt  was  made  in  the  case  of  Clarke  v  Fennoscandia  Ltd8°  to  circumvent  the 
statutory  provisions  by  seeking  interdict  against  the  taking  of  steps  in  Scotland  to 
enforce  an  English  judgment  which  was  alleged  to  be  tainted  by  fraud.  However, 
this  did  not  succeed.  In  terms  of  the  recognition  of  divorces,  annulments,  and 
judicial  separations,  section  51  of  the  Family  Law  Act,  1986  sets  out  the  grounds 
on  which  such  recognition  may  be  refused.  However,  the  public  policy  and  fair 
notice  objections  set  out  therein  are  expressly  said  only  to  apply  with  respect  to 
overseas  divorces,  annulments  and  judicial  separations.  81  The  Law  Commissions 
were  of  the  view  that  natural  justice  concerns  were  more  properly  raised  in  the 
British  court  where  the  divorce  action  was  heard.  82  They  confirmed  this  view 
when  proposing  the  bringing  of  nullity  within  the  same  statutory  framework  as 
the  recognition  of  divorces.  83  Although  it  was  recognised  that  public  policy  in 
Scotland  and  England  might  sometimes  differ  with'respect  to  nullity,  it  was  not 
proposed  that  a  public  policy  exception  should  be  available  in  respect  of  intra-UK 
cases  on  the  recognition  of  nullity  decrees.  84  Similarly,  it  is  not  proposed  that 
77  s.  14(3)(a)(i)" 
78  Art.  27(1)  of  the  Brussels  Convention;  Art.  34(1)  of  Brussels  I. 
79  Broadly,  if  the  registration  procedure  was  not  correctly  carried  out,  or  if  the  subject-matter  of 
the  judgment  for  which  recognition  was  sought  had  already  been  decided  in  another  court 
$o 
(Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982,  Sch.  6,  para  10;  Sch.  7,  para  9). 
1998  SLT  1014. 
$1  Family  Law  Act  1986,  s51(3).  British  divorces  can  only  be  refused  recognition  in  Scotland  on 
the  grounds  of  irreconcilability  with  a  previous  Scottish  judgment  in  that  case,  or  if  Scots 
international  private  law  dictates  that  there  was  in  fact  no  valid  marriage  (Family  Law  Act 
1986,  s5l(1),  (2)). 
82  Law  Com.  No  34/Scot.  Law  Com.  No  16,  Hague  Convention  on  Recognition  of  Divorces  and  Legal  Separations  (1970),  para  2  of  Notes  to  clause  8  of  draft  Bill. 
83  Law  Com.  No  137/Scot.  Law  Com.  No  88,  Recognition  of  Foreign  Nullity  Decrees  and  Related  Matters  (1984),  para  6.67. 
94  Ibid. 
199 there  be  an  intra-UK  public  policy  exception  with  respect  to  the  recognition  of 
85  dissolutions  and  annulments  of  civil  partnerships. 
The  Westminster  Parliament  has  the  power  -to  remove  the  ability  to  rely  on 
external  public  policy  objections  within  the  UK,  and  has  sometimes  done  so  when 
passing  internalising  rules.  However,  in  many  situations  where  statute  provides 
that  the  Scottish  courts  may  refuse  to  apply  a  rule  of  foreign  law  on  public  policy 
grounds,  this  option  is  equally  open  to  the  court  where  a  rule  of  English  law  is 
involved.  The  paucity  of  occasions  on  which  Scottish  courts  have  required  to  do 
so  86  is  testament  not  just  to  the  reluctance  of  the  courts  to  use  such  a  powerful  tool 
as  public  policy,  87  but  also  to  the  many  similarities  in  the  underlying  public  policy 
of  the  two  countries.  However,  it  is  submitted  that  it  is  appropriate  that  the  option 
remains  open.  It  is  always  possible  that  as  between  two  legal  systems  springing 
from  different  roots,  recourse  to  public  policy  objections  may  sometimes  be 
required. 
The  impact  of  devolution  on  public  policy  in  Scotland 
The  establishment  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  with  wide-ranging  legislative  powers 
could  lead  over  time  to  a  change  in  the  underlying  public  policy  of  Scots  law. 
The  influence  of  smaller  parties  on  the  Scottish  legislative  process,  and  the 
possibility  that  the  Scottish  Parliament  is  passing  a  different  style  of  legislation  in 
which  principles  have  a  more  obvious  place  than  heretofore,  has  already  been 
discussed.  88  The  new  Parliament  has  not  shied  away  from  morally  charged  issues 
such  as  the  hunting  of  foxes.  89  Accordingly,  it  is  quite  possible  (particularly  were 
radically  different  administrations  to  be  in  power  in  London  and  Edinburgh  in  the 
future),  that  the  underlying  public  policy  of  Scots  law  might  shift  slightly.  This 
could  affect  both  internal  and  external  public  policy.  How,  for  example,  might  a 
85  Civil  Partnership  Bill  2004,  cl.  228(3)(c). 
86  There  appears  to  be  no  Scottish  case  in  which  a  litigant  has  successfully  invoked  the  public 
policy  exception  under  the  Contracts  (Applicable  Law)  Act  1990,  the  Recognition  of  Trusts 
Act  1987  or  the  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act  1995,  whether  in 
respect  of  English  law  or  any  other  foreign  law.  This  is  not  to  say  that  foreign  law  may  not 
have  been  excluded  by  other  means,  but  that  apparently  no  judge  has  taken  the  bold  step  of 
refusing  recognition  to  a  judgment  or rule  of  law  on  public  policy  grounds  alone. 
87  W.  E.  Holder,  "Public  policy  and  national  preferences:  the  exclusion  of  foreign  law  in  English 
private  international  law"  (1968)  17  ICLQ  926  at  929  &  937. 
88  See  p147  above. 
89  Protection  of  Wild  Mammals  (Scotland)  Act  2002. 
200 Scottish  court  view  an  English  contractual  clause  relating  to  fox  hunting?  What  if 
an  action  was  raised  in  Scotland  for  damages  relating  to  the  physical  chastisement 
of  a  child  which  occurred  in  England?  Over  time  wider  chasms  in  attitude  might 
open  up,  90  giving  rise  to  even  more  difficult  intra-UK  questions.  This  could  also 
lead  to  judges  being  less  reluctant  to  invoke  external  public  policy  objections 
based  on  moral  values,  in  intra-UK  cases. 
The  Scottish  Parliament  also  has  the  power  expressly  to  legislate  in  order  to 
narrow  or  expand  the  scope  of  internal  public  policy.  Furthermore,  in  passing 
statutes  dealing  with  international  private  law,  it  has  a  choice  as  to  whether 
external  public  policy  exceptions  should  be  available  in  respect  of  English  rules 
of  law  and  judgments.  What  course  has  been  taken  thus  far?  The  Adults  with 
Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000  provides  that  a  rule  of  law  found  to  be  applicable 
by  virtue  of  the  legislation  need  not  be  given  effect  to  by  the  Scots  courts  if  it 
would  "produce  a  result  which  would  be  manifestly  contrary  to  public  policy".  91 
Furthermore,  a  measure  taken  in  a  country  other  than  Scotland  may  be  refused 
recognition  if,  for  example,  it  involves  a  breach  of  natural  justice,  92  or  of  a 
mandatory  rule  of  Scots  law,  93  or  if  to  do  so  would  be  incompatible  with  public 
policy.  4  These  provisions  could  equally  well  be  invoked  if  an  English  rule,  or 
measure,  was  involved.  However,  as  we  have  seen,  the  legislation  also  allows  for 
special  regulations  to  be  introduced  in  future  on  the  subject  of  intra-UK 
recognition.  95 
90  As  Blom  notes  "[v]iewcd  abstractly,  fundamental  values  like  honesty  and  freedom  do  not 
change  much  over  time,  but  perceptions  as  to  what  violates  those  values  do  change,  sometimes 
quite  swiftly"  (Blom,  "Public  policy",  391).  It  is  submitted  that  in  future  Scotland  might  see 
this  type  of  change  of  emphasis  not  just  on  a  temporal,  but  also  on  a  geographical,  basis. 
Belief  in  certain  fundamental  values  may  continue  to  be  common  to  Scotland  and  England, 
however,  there  may  be  a  greater  divergence  in  the  way  in  which  those  values  are  respected  and 
upheld  on  either  side  of  the  Tweed. 
91  Adults  with  Incapacity  (Scotland)  Act  2000,  Sch.  3,  para  6. 
92  Ibid.,  para  7(3)(a). 
91  Ibid.,  para  7(3)(c). 
94  Ibid.,  para  7(3)(b). 
95  Ibid.,  pars  10. 
201 Foreign  affairs,  however,  are  one  of  the  subjects  reserved  to  the  UK  Parliament  in 
terms  of  the  devolution  settlement  Thus  one  of  the  aspects  of  external  public  96 
policy,  that  of  not  damaging  the  UK's  relationships  with  its  allies,  will  remain 
singularly  within  the  control  of  Westminster. 
Constitutionalising  external  public  policy? 
In  a  dispute  over  the  recognition  of  an  American  judgment  in  British  Columbia, 
Tetley  characterises  the  public  policy  challenge  as  an  (unsuccessful)  argument 
that  recognition  would  be  contrary  to  British  Columbia,  rather  than  Canadian, 
public  policy.  97  Could  therefore  a  judgment  from  a  sister-province  also  be  argued 
to  contravene  public  policy?  Judgments  from  outwith  Quebec  may  be  refused 
recognition  within  Quebec  on  public  policy  grounds,  98  and  logically  this  would 
seem  potentially  to  encompass  those  from  sister-provinces.  The  Civil  Code  of 
Quebec  also  provides  for  an  ordre  public  exception  to  the  application  of  foreign 
laws,  99  and  the  text  of  the  Code  is  arguably  such  that  this  could  be  relied  upon  to 
exclude  the  laws  of  Canada's  Common  Law  provinces.  ioo  Legislation  which 
would  allow  for  the  registration  and  enforcement  of  Canadian  judgments  has  gone 
through  some  of  the  provincial  assemblies,  but  has  not  yet  been  brought  into 
force.  To  take  those  of  British  Columbia  and  Nova  Scotia  as  an  example,  both 
allow  for  the  courts  of  those  states  to  refuse  to  recognise  a  judgment  from  a  sister- 
province  on  the  grounds  of  public  policy.  ")'  For  the  same  reasons  expanded  upon 
when  discussing  the  availability  of  an  external  public  policy  objection  in  the  intra- 
UK  situation,  the  inclusion  of  such  an  exception  in  the  legislation  seems  both 
necessary  and  desirable. 
96  Scotland  Act  1998,  s29;  Sch.  5,  para  7.  Furthermore,  paragraph  9,  which  reserves  defence 
matters,  explicitly  covers  "trading  with  the  enemy  and  enemy  property"  (Scotland  Act  199S, 
Sch.  5,  para  9(1)(e)). 
97  It  was  not  "contrary  to  British  Columbia  public  policy,  not  being  repugnant  to  any  essential 
public  or  moral  interest  of  the  province  or  to  B.  C.  conceptions  of  essential  justice  and 
morality"  (Tetley,  "On-going  saga",  43  (discussing  the  case  of  Old  North  State  Breiring  Co.  t' 
Newlands  Services  Inc  (1999)  58  BCLR  (3d)  144,46  OR  (3d)  480  (BC  CA))).  This  would 
seem  to  suggest  that  each  Canadian  province  could  possess  a  distinctive  doctrine  of  public 
policy,  rather  than  there  being  a  pan-Canadian  concept  of  public  policy.  98  Civil  Code  of  Quebec,  LQ  1991,  c.  64,  art.  3155(5). 
99  Ibid.,  art.  3081. 
i°°  Ibid.,  art.  3077. 
10j  Enforcement  of  Canadian  Judgments  Act,  RSBC  1996,  c.  115,  s6(1)(d);  Enforcement  of  Canadian  Judgments  and  Decrees  Act,  RSNS  2001,  c.  30,  s8(2)(c)(iv);  see  also  Blom,  "public 
policy",  398. 
202 However,  as  has  been  discussed  in  an  earlier  chapter,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Canada  has  taken  quite  a  different  path.  102  In  terms  of  the  choice  of  law  rules  in 
tort,  La  Forest  J  saw  "a  limited  role,  if  any,  for  considerations  of  public  policy  in 
actions  that  take  place  wholly  within  Canada".  103  The  Supreme  Court  has  opined 
that  there  is,  in  the  Canadian  constitution,,  an  implicit  notion  of  "full  faith  and 
credit",  meaning  that  judgments  from  other  provinces  properly  seised  of 
jurisdiction  should  be  recognised  within  Canada.  104  The  result  of  this 
constitutionalising  of  conflicts  is,  in  Castel's  view,  that  "in  light  of  recent  Supreme 
Court  of  Canada  decisions,  public  policy  should  no  longer  be  relevant  on  the 
interprovincial  or  interterritorial  level".  105  It  was  noted  in  Morguard  Lrvestwents 
Ltd  v  De  Savoye106  that  between  the  Canadian  provinces  there  could  not  properly 
be  "concerns  about  differential  quality  of  justice".  107  The  basis  for  this  was  the 
control  of  Canadian  central  government  over  the  appointment  of  judges,  and  the 
ability  of  litigants  to  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada,  which  would 
enforce  the  same  (constitutional)  rules  across  Canada  in  respect  of  jurisdiction 
and  recognition  decisions.  108  It  was  also  said  that  the  existence  of  a  Canada-wide 
standard  on  lawyer's  ethics  would  militate  against  breaches  of  natural  justice.  109 
As  has  already  been  discussed,  the  House  of  Lords  and  the  JCPC  are  not 
analogous  in  terms  of  function  and  approach  with  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Canada.  '  10  The  introduction  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  might 
be  thought  to  standardise  minimum  natural  justice  guarantees  in  Scotland  and 
England.  However,  as  has  been  seen,  the  method  of  implementation  adopted  in 
the  Scotland  Act  1998  and  the  Human  Rights  Act  1998  is  not  the  same,  which  can 
lead  to  Convention  articles  having  different  effects  north  and  south  of  the 
border.  l  1  In  any  event,  a  means  to  refuse  recognition  to  judgments  considered  by 
the  forum  to  breach  rules  of  natural  justice  is  only  one  aspect  of  the  role  played  by 
102  See  Chap.  3. 
103  Tolofson  v  Jensen  (1994)  120  DLR  (0)  289  at  308. 
104  Morguard  Investments  Ltd  v  De  Savoye  [1990]  3  SCR  1077;  Hunt  v  MN  plc  [1993]  4  SCR 
289;  and  see  generally  Chap.  3. 
105  Castel,  Introduction  to  Conflict  of  Laws,  p67.  He  specifically  names  Hunt  v  T&NN  plc,  supra  as 
an  example  of  the  Supreme  Court  decisions  to  which  he  refers. 
io6  [1990]  3  SCR  1077. 
107  Ibid.  per  La  Forest  J  at  1100. 
Ios  Ibid. 
109  Ibid. 
110  See  pp59-63  above. 
111  See  pp52-53  above. 
203 external  public  policy.  As  has  been  argued  above,  external  public  policy  includes 
a  whole  gamut  of  objections,  ranging  from  contravention  of  fundamental  moral 
beliefs  or  notions  of  fairness  to  protection  of  the  fabric  of  our  law  and  its 
fundamental  legal  principles.  Furthermore,  there  is  not  the  same  centralisation  or 
harmonisation  of  judicial  appointments  and  the  regulation  of  lawyers  in  the 
UK.  112  It  is  submitted  that  the  approach  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  to  the 
availability  of  a  public  policy  exception  within  Canada  is  irredeemably  bound  up 
with  the  constitutionalisation  of  conflicts  described  in  an  earlier  chapter.  113  As 
was  argued  there,  it  would  be  neither  appropriate,  nor  desirable,  for  that  approach 
to  be  followed  within  the  UK. 
In  any  event,  the  constitutionalisation  of  conflicts  in  Canada  may  not  have  been  as 
successful  as  the  judicial  dicta  might  suggest  in  removing  public  policy  front 
interprovincial  conflict  law.  In  Hunt  v  T&Nplc,  114the  Supreme  Court  of  Canada 
found  that  the  courts  of  one  province  could  examine  the  constitutionality  of 
legislation  of  a  sister-province:  "all  judges  within  the  Canadian  judicial  structure 
must  be  taken  to  be  competent  to  interpret  their  own  Constitution".  '  15  This  case 
was  an  action  for  damages,  based  on  exposure  to  asbestos  fibres.  The  action  was 
raised  in  British  Columbia  where  the  alleged  exposure  had  taken  place:  the 
defendants  (who  had  sold  goods  said  to  contain  the  asbestos  fibres)  were  based  in 
Quebec.  The  plaintiff  attempted  to  recover  certain  documents  in  terms  of  the 
relevant  British  Columbia  procedural  rules.  However,  the  defendants  stated  that 
they  were  unable  to  produce  the  requested  documents  since  Quebec  legislation 
forbade  the  taking  of  business  records  outwith  that  province  on  the  strength  of  an 
order  of  a  court  in  a  sister-province.  The  Supreme  Court  made  it  clear  that  the 
British  Columbia  courts  had  the  power  to  declare  the  Quebec  statute  to  be 
unconstitutional.  "6  It  is  submitted  that  the  ability  to  declare  legislation  frone 
another  province  to  be  unconstitutional,  is  no  more  than  an  (admittedly  uniquely 
Canadian)  expression  of  public  policy.  It  fulfils  the  same  role  as  public  policy,  as 
it  could  act  to  exclude  rules  of  law  (or  judgments  based  upon  then)  from  other 
112  See  p59  above. 
113  See  Chap.  3. 
14  [1993]  4  SCR  289. 
its  Ibid.  per  La  Forest  J  at  314. 
116  Ibid.  per  La  Forest  J  at  307-317. 
204 provinces.  It  says  much  for  the  resilience,  and  usefulness,  of  the  doctrine  of 
public  policy  that  an  analogue  is  still  required  in  a  system  of  constitutionalised 
conflicts. 
Conclusion 
External  public  policy  embraces  a  range  of  objections  to  laws  or  judgments  from 
outwith  Scotland.  It  draws  on  some  of  our  internal  public  policy  objections,  but 
also  protects  the  essential  structure  of  the  Scots  legal  system  with  its  underlying 
public  policy  roots.  Because  of  this  wide  definition,  it  has  been  submitted  that 
external  public  policy  can  be  relied  upon  at  common  law  by  Scots  courts  to  refuse 
recognition  to  an  English  judgment,  or  so  as  not  to  apply  a  rule  of  English  law 
which  would  otherwise  govern  the  matter  under  our  choice  of  law  rules.  Such 
public  policy  objections  are  also  explicitly  allowed  by  certain  statutes,  although 
when  passing  legislation  which  internalises  conflicts,  the  Westminster  Parliament 
has  also  tended  to  remove  the  intra-UK  public  policy  exception.  Prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Scottish  Parliament,  similarities  in  internal  public  policy  and 
(to  a  lesser  extent)  underlying  public  policy,  might  suggest  that,  in  practice,  there 
would  be  few  occasions  on  which  external  public  policy  would,  in  fact,  be  relied 
upon  in  the  intra-UK  context,  and  indeed  the  case  law  bears  this  out.  However, 
this  does  not  mean  that  there  is  no  need  for  an  external  public  policy  exception  in 
this  particular  cross-border  situation.  Blom  has  described  public  policy  as  "a 
safety  valve",  117  and  this  is  an  apt  metaphor.  No  matter  how  close  the 
relationship,  there  should  always  be  such  a  safety  valve.  This  is  well  illustrated 
by  the  introduction  of  a  power  to  declare  legislation  from  another  province 
unconstitutional,  even  in  the  midst  of  a  Canadian  project  to  constitutionalise 
conflicts  and  remove  the  public  policy  doctrine  from  interprovincial  disputes. 
The  advent  of  constitutional  change  in  Scotland,  in  the  shape  of  a  devolved 
Parliament,  simply  reinforces  the  need  for  an  external  public  policy  exception  to 
be  open  to  Scottish  courts  in  intra-UK  disputes.  The  establishment  of  a  Scottish 
Parliament  may  alter  Scottish  underlying  public  policy,  and  internal  public  policy, 
causing  them  to  diverge  further  from  that  pertaining  in  England.  This  in  turn 
117  Blom,  "Public  policy",  398. 
205 impacts  upon  the  grounds  on  which  a  Scottish  court  might  legitimately  and 
properly  feel  unable  to  apply  an  English  (or  other  foreign)  law,  or  recognise  a 
judgment  from  outwith  Scotland.  It  is  not  thought,  however,  that  Scots  judges 
will  abandon  the  restraint  which  they  currently  show  in  utilising  such  a  potentially 
powerful  weapon.  A  further  issue  in  the  future  for  Scots  judges  might  be  the 
addition  of  a  further  layer  of  public  policy  concerns.  As  Leslie  has  noted,  the 
Giuliano-Lagarde  report,  which  accompanied  the  Rome  Convention,  contained  a 
reference  to  "Community  public  policy".  118  The  proposed  Rome  II  Regulation 
would  not  permit  punitive  damages,  on  the  grounds  that  this  would  contravene 
Community  public  policy.  '  9  This  has  been  much  criticised.  120  However,  could  a 
breach  of  a  concept  of  Community  public  policy  be  relied  upon  in  an  intra-UK 
conflict  case?  This  is  a  question  for  the  future. 
:$  Leslie,  "The  relevance  of  public  policy",  485. 
129  Rome  II,  Art.  24. 
120  House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  "The  Rome  II  Regulation",  paras  164-1GS.  $ce 
also  Carruthers  &  Crawford,  "Conflict  of  laws  update"  (2004),  23.  Indeed,  its  deletion  is 
proposed  in  the  Wallis  Report. 
206 8  CONCLUSION 
This  thesis  has  sought  to  explore  the  effect  of  the  constitutional  relationship 
between  Scotland  and  England  on  the  Scottish  approach  to  resolving  competitions 
of  jurisdiction  with  English  courts,  or,  cases  where  both  Scottish  and  English  law 
have  a  claim  to  applicability,  as  well  as  the  Scottish  attitude  to  decisions  and 
orders  emanating  from  English  courts.  What  makes  this  particular  constitutional 
relationship  a  good  basis  for  such  a  study  is  its  different  permutations  over  time: 
from  neighbouring  independent  nation  states,  to  partners  in  a  political  but  not 
legal  union,  then  to  a  Scotland  with  its  own  devolved  legislature  but  still 
remaining  a  part  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
Anglo-Scottish  conflict  of  laws  prior  to  1707 
At  the  most  basic  level  there  is  an  essential  interplay  between  the  constitution  and 
international  private  law.  Constitutional  law  is  concerned  with  the  source  of  legal 
authority  within  a  country,  with  the  apparatus,  and  powers,  of  the  nation  state,  and 
with  defining  that  state.  Once  there  are  different  nations  subject  each  to  their  own 
system  of  law  and  each  with  their  own  central  legal  authority,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  formulate  rules  to  settle  their  competing  jurisdiction  claims,  to 
determine  which  (if  either)  of  their  laws  should  govern  a  set  of  facts,  and/or  to 
consider  whether  recognition  should  be  afforded  to  judgments  emanating  from  the 
other  nation. 
Between  the  eleventh  and  the  sixteenth  centuries  the  separate  nation  states  of 
Scotland  and  England  emerged  from  amongst  the  peoples  of  the  island  of  Britain, 
and  their  laws  and  rules  developed  into  recognisable  systems  of  law  with  central 
courts.  Even  during  times  of  hostility,  there  was  contact  between  them  at 
different  levels  of  society,  from  royal  marriages,  and  cross-border  landholding  to 
the  merchant  or  border  reiver.  1  However,  for  Scotland,  for  quite  a  considerable 
time,  many  such  types  of  contact  took  place  in  the  context  of  supra-national 
bodies  of  law.  Thus  the  law  merchant  provided  regulation  for  traders,  and  the 
1  See  Chap.  2. 
207 importance  of  maritime  law  cannot  be  underestimated  in  a  country  which  relied 
so  much  on  sea  travel.  In  addition,  many  matters  of  family  law  would  have  fallen 
within  the  domain  of  the  canon  lawyers.  Even  the  Anglo-Scottish  border 
lawlessness  was  controlled  for  a  time  by  a  special  set  of  rules:  the  March  Laws. 
The  existence  and  operation  of  such  supra-national  bodies  of  law  acted  to  dull  the 
problems  of  jurisdiction  and  clashing  laws  which  otherwise  could  have  arisen  in 
Scottish  courts,  with  regard  to  both  English  law  and  other  foreign  laws.  However, 
by  the  seventeenth  century  we  can  discern  what  we  would  now  describe  as  choice 
of  law  questions  arising  involving  Scots  and  English  law.  Courts  can  be  seen  to 
be  concerned  with  questions  of  jurisdiction;  and  institutional  writers  with  the 
concept  of  domicile.  Constitutional  changes  in  the  seventeenth  century  could 
easily  have  smothered  the  growth  of  these  early  international  private  law  rules,  in 
the  British  context.  However,  both 
.  the  Union  of  the  Crowns  in  1603,  and  the 
Cromwellian  occupation  in  the  latter  half  of  that  century,  failed  to  bring  about 
either  a  harmonisation  of  Scots  and  English  substantive  law,  or  the  imposition  of 
one  system  wholly  upon  the  other.  3 
Intra-UK  conflicts  and  the  UK  constitution  1707  to  1999, 
Undoubtedly,  one  of  the  key  constitutional  events  in  the  development  of  intra-UK 
rules  of  international  private  law  is  the  union  of  the  Scottish  and  English 
Parliaments  in  1707.  It  is  important  not  to  underestimate  how  unusual  was  the 
accommodation  arrived  at  by  the  two  countries.  Contemporaries  saw  the  creation 
of  the  largest  free,  common,  market  of  their  times.  Almost  three  hundred  years 
later,  the  existence  of  different  legal  systems  which  had  no  separate  legislatures, 
ensured  that  Great  Britain  possessed  a  constitutional  system  without  parallel, 
although  perhaps,  as  Nairn  muses,  what  was  different  in  the  eighteenth  century  by 
virtue  of  being  new  and  exciting,  had  in  the  twentieth  century  had  become  odd 
and  anachronistic. 
Between  the  creation  of  Great  Britain  in  1707  and  the  advent  of  a  devolved 
Scottish  Parliament  in  1999,  this  unusual  constitutional  arrangement  prevailed 
2  See  Chap.  2. 
3  See  pp22-31  above. 
4  See  Nairn,  After  Britain. 
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Ir between  Scotland  and  England.  There  was  political  unity,  with  one  (supreme) 
legislature  and  executive.  5  However,  the  separate  systems  of  private  law  of 
Scotland  and  England  survived  the  Union,  although  statutory  change  and 
development  of  these  two  different  legal  systems  was  carried  out  through  the 
single,  British,  Parliament.  The  separate,  hierarchies  of  courts  remained 
unmerged.  The  eagerness  of  litigants  for  a  further  avenue  of  appeal  led  quickly  to 
the  establishment  of  jurisdiction  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  Scottish  civil,  but  not 
criminal,  cases.  This  did  not  act  so  as  to  create  a  unified  court  structure.  Nor  did 
it  lead  to  the  merging  of  the  two  systems  of  law,  since  the  House  of  Lords  must 
apply  Scots  law  to  Scots  cases,  and  its  decisions  in  English  cases  are  not 
technically  of  binding  effect  on  Scottish  courts.  6  However,  the  anomalous 
position  of  the  House  of  Lords  has,  over  the  years,  served  to  introduce  a  further 
complicating  factor  into  the  relationship  between  Scots  and  English  law.  One 
example  of  this  is  the  ability  of  the  House  to  call  upon  its  judicial  knowledge  of 
English  law  when  hearing  a  Scots  appeal  on  an  intra-UK  choice  of  law  issue. 
The  terms  of  the  Acts  of  Union  which  brought  about  the  Union  of  the  Scottish  and 
English  Parliaments  had  therefore  created  a  situation  in  which  persons  could 
move  freely  between  different  territorial  legal  jurisdictions  without  altering  their 
nationality;  a  common  market  whose  members  might  be  subject  to  different  laws; 
and  separate  court  systems  which  could  issue  conflicting  judgments. 
Lack  of  constitutionalisation  of  conflicts 
The  relationship  between  the  various  public  law  bodies  within  a  state,  such  as 
legislature  to  executive,  or  federal  legislature  to  central  legislature,  is  regulated  by 
constitutional  law.  Latterly,  some  of  the  Commonwealth  countries  such  as 
Canada  and  Australia  have  experimented  with  the  idea  that  the  regulation  of 
private  law  relationships  within  a  country  should  also  be  referred  to  constitutional 
laws.  Thus  constitutional  rules  would  dictate  whether  judgments  issued  by  one 
provincial  court  should  be  afforded  recognition  by  the  courts  of  a  sister  province, 
and  also  delimit  the  occasions  on  which  the  court  may  choose  to  exclude  the  laws, 
S  Despite  Lord  President  Cooper's  dicta  in  MacCormick  v  Lord  Advocate  1953  SC  396  (sec  p44 
above). 
6  See  pp61-63  above. 
See  pl  15  above. 
209 or  judgment,  of  a  sister  province.  This  method  of  approach  is  referred  to  in  this 
thesis  as  the  'constitutionalising  of  conflicts'.  8 
How  far  did  such  reasoning  find  favour  in  the  UK  prior  to  the  devolution 
settlement  of  the  late  twentieth  century?  It  is  true  that  there  is  a  different 
approach  to  the  subject  of  the  applicability  of  statutes  within  the  UK,  than  to  the 
operation  (extra-territorially)  of  statutes  of  (entirely)  foreign  sovereigns. 
Traditionally  the  reach  of  legislation  of  politically  foreign  countries  has  been 
prohibited  (except  in  matters  of  status)  by  the  application  of  the  doctrine  of  extra- 
territoriality,  which  insists  that  a  law-making  body  is  only  sovereign  within  its 
own  territory.  Attempts  to  legislate  outwith  those  confines  will  not  be  afforded 
recognition  by  the  Scottish,  or  indeed  the  English,  courts.  Within  the  UK, 
however,  the  Westminster  Parliament  holds  sovereign  power  to  legislate  for  the 
all  of  the  territories  which  comprise  it.  The  existence  of  separate  legal  systems 
and  court  structures  means  that  the  Parliament  is  obliged  to  legislate  in  a  variety 
of  different  modes:  either  for  England  and  Wales  alone,  for  Scotland  alone, 
latterly  for  Northern  Ireland  alone,  or  for  a  combination  of  these.  Even  when 
directing  its  legislative  attention  to,  say,  England,  Westminster  undoubtedly 
retains  the  power  to  make  statutory  provision,  for  Scotland.  Accordingly,  the 
concept  of  extra-territoriality  is  of  no  application  when  determining  the 
geographical  reach  of  statutes  within  the  UK.  Instead  it  is  a  question  of  pure 
statutory  construction:  a  matter  of  "constitutional  practice,  not  ... 
international 
comity".  9  Given  that  the  theory  of  sovereignty  also  underpins  the  unwillingness 
of  the  Scots  and  English  courts  to  give  effect  to  the  penal  and  revenue  laws  of  a 
foreign  state,  it  has  been  submitted  that  a  Scottish  court  may  not  invoke  this 
exception  so  as  to  exclude  an  English  penal,  revenue,  or  other  public,  law.  10 
However,  these  are  isolated  examples,  not  part  of  a  wider  trend.  The  creation  of 
the  British  state  in  the  early  eighteenth  century  did  not  lead  then,  or  at  any  other 
time  in  the  years  which  followed,  to  the  wide-spread  constitutionalising  of 
8  See  Chap.  3. 
9Rv  Treacy  [1971]  AC  537  per  Lord  Diplock  at  564  (see  pp45-48  above).  1°  See  pp48-51  above. 
210 conflicts.  "  Part  of  the  reason  for  this  was  the  lack  of  a  constitutional  base  on 
which  such  an  approach  could  have  been  founded:  Great  Britain  does  not  have  a 
founding  constitutional  document  in  the  style  of  the  American  Constitution,  nor 
was  one  adopted  on  its  enlargement  into  the  United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland.  Furthermore,  although  the  Acts  of  Union  which  established  the  new  state 
might  have  provided  the  necessary  basis,  their  potential  has  never  been 
developed.  There  have  been  many  hints  in  Scottish  cases  over  the  years  that  the 
Acts  of  Union  might  be  a  type  of  higher  law,  limiting  the  power  of  the 
Westminster  Parliament.  However,  there  has  been  little  agreement  on  how  such 
power  might  be  loosed,  and  certainly  no  Scottish  court  has  successfully  relied 
12  upon  the  Acts  of  Union  to  strike  down  legislation. 
The  internalisation  of  conflicts 
Whilst  there  was  not  a  constitutionalisation  of  the  conflicts  of  jurisdiction,  laws, 
and  judgments  between  Scotland  and  England  in  the  British  state,  this  is  not  to 
say  that  the  constitutional  arrangements  of  that  state  did  not  affect  how  such 
conflicts  were  handled.  The  existence  of  one  Parliament  made  possible  the 
phenomenon  which  has  been  described  in  this  thesis  as  the  'internalising  of 
conflicts',  13  and  indeed  such  internalisation  is,  by  and  large,  the  result  of 
legislative,  and  not  judicial,  action.  An  early  example  of  internalisation  is 
provided  by  runaway  marriages.  Differences  between  Scots  and  English  marriage 
laws  had  made  Scotland  a  paradise  for  young  lovers  marrying  against  their 
parents'  wishes:  not  just  in  the  penny  novel,  but  in  real  life.  Both  the  Scots  and 
English  courts  initially  dealt  with  all  the  issues  arising  from  this  situation  in  terms 
of  the  fledgling  rules  of  international  private  law.  '  However,  by  1856  legislation 
had  been  passed  in  an  attempt  to  prevent  such  runaway  marriages  occurring  at 
all.  '4 
11  See  Chap.  3. 
12  See  Chap.  3. 
13  Which  has  been  defined  as  including,  firstly,  the  removal  of  a  conflict  by  changes  to  the 
Scottish  and/or  English  domestic  rules  which  give  rise  to  the  conflict  and,  secondly,  the  introduction  of  special  rules  to  regulate  cross-border  consequences  as  a  replacement  for  the 
normal  international  private  law  rules. 
14  See  pp72-74  above. 
211 The  internalisation  of  conflicts  has  been  most  prevalent  in  two  areas.  15  The  first 
of  these  is  in  what  might  be  called  'UK  common  market  law'.  This  includes  such 
topics  as  company  law  and  insolvency  law,  and  the  law  of  sale.  The  response  of 
the  common  UK  legislature  has  been  to  harmonise  (for  example,  the  law  of 
sale),  16  or  to  internalise  the  conflicts  which  could  arise  (for  example,  in 
insolvency).  17  Internalisation  of  conflicts  has  also  allowed  the  sublimation  of 
property  law  principles  where  these  were  thought  to  hinder  the  UK  common 
market.  It  is  submitted  that  this  underscores  the  nature  of  the  union  in  which 
Scotland  and  England  were  the  major  partners.  Matters  of  trade  and  access  to  an 
Empire,  rather  than  legal  integration,  had  been  uppermost  in  the  forging  of  the 
British  state.  This  attitude  is  therefore  reflected  in  the  drive  to  internalise 
conflicts  where  they  could  occur  in  the  operation  of  the  British  common  market 
which  had  been  created.  It  also  coheres  with  the  wider  arguments  which  link  the 
flourishing  of  Britain  with  the  growth  and  existence  of  the  Empire  with  all  its 
opportunities  for  trade,  and  question  whether  the,  collapse  of  Empire  led  to 
Scottish  discontentment  with  the  UK  partnership.  18 
The  second  field  in  which  there  has  been  much  internalising  of  conflicts  within 
the  UK  is  'recognition',  in  its  very  widest  sense.  A  succession  of  UK  statutes  have 
replaced  with  special  intra-UK  rules  the  normal  international  private  law  rules  on 
the  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments,  culminating  in  the  near  automatic 
intra-UK  scheme  contained  in  Schedules  6  and  7  of  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and 
Judgments  Act  1982.  Registration  of  judgments  in  terms  of  the  scheme  is  more 
akin  to  an  administrative  than  a  judicial  procedure,  and  Parliament  has  also 
removed  the  ability  to  refuse  recognition  on  the  basis  of  public  policy,  fraud  or 
other  such  objections.  The  recognition  in  Scotland  of  divorces  obtained  in 
England  is  subject  to  only  very  limited  exceptions.  After  a  fraught  history  of 
conflicting  decrees  on  both  sides  of  the  border,  the  recognition  and  enforcement 
See  Chap.  4. 
16  See  pp77-79  above. 
17  See  pp79-84  above. 
8  See  Fry,  The  Scottish  Enrpire,  Chap.  38;  Nairn,  After  Britain;  Welsh,  The  Four  Nations, 
p381;  Urwin,  "Territorial  structures  and  political  developments  in  the  United  Kingdom",  p67"  Colley,  Britons,  pp374-375;  Devine,  Scotland's  Empire,  p350;  C.  Lee,  Scotland  and  the  United  Kingdom:  the  economy  and  the  Union  in  the  twentieth  century  (Manchester  University 
Press,  1995),  ppl7-18;  cf  Devine,  Scotland's  Empire,  pp62-63. 
212 of  custody  decrees  within  the  UK  has  also  been  placed  by  internalising  legislation 
on  an  almost  administrative  footing.  Furthermore,  internalising  statutes  have 
eased  'recognition'  in  a  wider  sense.  Thus  a  Scottish  confirmation  gives  an 
executor  sufficient  title  to  deal  with  property  belonging  to  the  deceased  but 
situated  in  England,  without  any  need  for  resealing  or  the  obtaining  of  a  fresh 
confirmation.  This  applies  in  the  reverse  situation  for  an  English  personal 
representative.  In  the  criminal  law  sphere,  prosecutors  may  place  in  front  of  a 
Scottish  court  previous  convictions  from  England,  but  not  those  of  a  politically 
foreign  country.  Provisions  also  exist  allowing  for  the  enforcement  of  warrants 
for  apprehension  and  imprisonment  within  the  UK.  Implicit  in  all  of  these  rules, 
it  is  submitted,  is  recognition  in  Scotland  of  the  status  and  powers  conferred  upon 
a  person  by  an  English  court,  or  the  warrants  granted  under  its  authority,  or  the 
judgment  reached  by  such  a  court  in  criminal  matters.  Furthermore,  both  in  these 
examples  and  in  the  mainstream  recognition  and  enforcement  of  judgments, 
recognition  within  the  UK  has  become,  at  the  legislator's  hand,  an  administrative 
rather  than  judicial  procedure. 
The  use  of  international  private  law  rules  in  an  intra-UK  context 
Outwith  UK  common  market  law  and  the  intra-UK  recognition  of  judgments  and 
other  court  decisions,  however,  Scottish  courts  have  generally  called  upon  rules  of 
international  private  law  (usually)  regardless  of  whether  the  other  court  claiming 
jurisdiction,  or  the  potentially  applicable  law,  is  English  or  politically  foreign. 
Indeed  English  law,  like  any  other  law,  must  be  introduced  into  an  action  in 
Scotland  by  the  party  who  wishes  to  rely  upon  it.  Contrary  to  what  may 
commonly  be  believed,  it  has  been  argued  that  it  is  not  even  true  to  say  that  on 
exceptional  occasions  English  law  may  come  within  the  judicial  knowledge  of  a 
Scots  judge.  As  with  any  other  foreign  law,  English  law  is  a  matter  of  fact 
requiring  proof  before  a  Scots  court.  This  is  not  simply  a  result  of  the 
preservation  of  the  Scottish  legal  system  by  the  Acts  of  Union,  but  is  essential  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  distinction  between  the,  legal  systems  obtaining  in  the 
different  territories  of  the  UK.  Furthermore,  whilst  in  practice  Scots  lawyers 
might  have  acquired  some  knowledge  of  the  English  legal  system  and  English 
law,  the  danger  of  falling  into  error  as  to  the  content  of  the  law,  or  failing  properly 
213 to  appreciate  its  structure  or  effect,  is  too  great  to  allow  evidence  of  English  law 
to  be  led  otherwise  than  with  the  involvement  of  an  expert  English  practitioner. 
But  it  has  been  submitted  that  it  would  not  be  desirable  to  allow  English  lawyers 
to  appear  in  the  Scottish  courts  in  a  representative  capacity,  rather  than  simply  as 
an  expert  witness.  To  do  so  would  endanger  Scots  practices,  and  indeed  the 
Scottish  legal  system  itself.  The  teens  of  the  British  Law  Ascertainment  Act 
1859  allow  a  remit  from  a  Scots  court  to  an  English  court  to  determine  how 
English  law  would  be  applied  to  a  set  of  facts,  and  this  could  provide  a  valuable 
method  of  accurately  ascertaining  the  effect  of  English  law  in  an  important  choice 
of  law  question  involving  difficult  issues  of  English  law.  That  aside,  it  has  been 
argued  that  in  all  the  circumstances  there  is  no  justification  for  allowing  English 
law  to  be  proved  any  differently  from  a  politically  foreign  law,  i.  e.,  for  example, 
by  way  of  leading  an  expert  witness  or  remit  to  a  foreign  lawyer.  19 
Another  consequence  of  the  lack  of  legal  integration  in  the  Acts  of  Union  was  that 
nationality  could  not  be  used  in  Britain  as  a  connecting  factor  in  matters  of  status, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  make  use  of  a  concept  of  domicile.  20  The  way  in  which 
the  rules  of  domicile  have  developed  owes  much  to  Scotland's  enthusiastic 
participation  in  the  British  Empire.  Scotland  contributed  to  the  jurisprudence, 
cases  which  firmly  establish  the  theories  of  the  continuance,  and  revival,  of  the 
domicile  of  origin.  Both  of  these  doctrines  reflect  a  desire  to  retain  unbroken  the 
bonds  of  an  Empire  administrator  or  merchant  to  his  homeland,  as  well  as  the 
reality  of  an  outward  flow  of  emigrants.  It  is  submitted  that  it  is  not  true  to  say 
that  it  is  easier  to  effect  a  change  of  domicile  as  between  Scotland  and  England, 
than  as  between  Scotland  and  a  politically  foreign  country.  Furthermore,  the 
Polish  experience  of  differing  internal  and  external  connecting  factors  in 
questions  of  status  was  never  copied  in  Britain.  2,1  Instead  any  variation  in 
connecting  factors  over  the  years  has  been  on  a  topical  basis,  particularly  as 
concepts  such  as  habitual  residence  have  taken  hold  in  certain  areas  of  the  law, 
Consequently  it  is  possible  in  future  that  in  a  particular  area  Scots  and  English 
law  might  make  use  of  different  connecting  factors.,  This  has  occurred  in  the  past 
19  See  pp107-115  above.  20  See  p116  above. 
21  See  pp  116-120  above. 
214 in  the  field  of  child  custody,  although  the  result  was  somewhat  unfortunate, 
resulting  inevitably  in  conflicting  decrees  in  some  custody  disputes  with  a  cross- 
border  element.  2 
The  extent  to  which  disputes  over  property  with  a  truly  international  element 
could  arise  in  Scotland  or  England  was  diminished  by  the  laws  in  place  prior  to 
the  Naturalization  Act  1870.  There  was,  however,  no  limit  on  cross-border 
landholding  within  Britain.  Rules  required  therefore  to  be  devised  to  regulate 
potential  clashes  between  the  two  very  different  systems  of  property  law  which 
obtained  on  either  side  of  the  Tweed,  and  the  courts  turned  to  principles  of 
international  private  law.  These  rules  could  be  Applied  with  equal  ease  to 
international  disputes,  once  the  bar  on  foreigners  acquiring  British  land  was 
removed.  The  traditional  absence  of  statute  in  the  field  of  Scots  property  law  has 
also  spared  it  from  internalising  legislation.  23 
There  were  also  very  different  approaches,  in  both  domestic  and  conflict  rules,  to 
legitimacy  and  legitimation  in  Scots  and  English  law.  This  quickly  gave  rise  to  a 
study  of  the  choice  of  law  issues  involved,  and  nothing  over  the  years  has  shaken 
the  hold  of  international  private  law  rules  as  the  optimum  method  of  resolving 
conflicts  in  this  area.  24 
Criminal  law  is  one  of  the  areas  where  the  English  and  Scots  legal  systems  have 
always  been  most  distinct,  free  even  from  the  rather  anomalous  appellate  role  of 
the  House  of  Lords.  The  strictly  territorial  nature  of  criminal  law  means  that  the 
only  cross-border  issues  which  can  arise  are  those  of  jurisdiction.  For  the  most 
part  this  difficult  question  has  been  approached  and  analysed  in  the  same  way 
irrespective  of  whether  criminal  conduct  has  taken  place  in  England  or  in  a 
politically  foreign  country.  25  Indeed,  while  crime  may  have  taken  on  more  of  an 
international  aspect  in  modern  times,  the  issues,  of  jurisdiction  actually  raised 
22  See  pp120-121 
above. 
23  See  pp122-124  above. 
24  See  pp  127-130  above. 
25  See  ppI3S-141  above. 
215 perhaps  do  not  differ  greatly  from  those  presented  in  late  nineteenth  century  intra- 
UK  cases  such  as  HMA  v  Bradbury26  and  HMA  v  Allan.  27 
Delict  is  another  area  of  law  in  which  the  selection  of  which  set  of  rules  should 
govern  wrongdoing  within  the  UK  has  been  left  to  traditional  choice  of  law  rules, 
making  no  differentiation  between  intra-UK,  and  international,  cases.  This  lack 
of  a  special  intra-UK  approach  remains  the  position,  even  after  the  enactment  of 
legislation  by  Westminster  to  reform  the  choice  of  law  rules  in  both  Scotland  and 
England.  28  Given  that  the  common  law  double  rule  had  been  interpreted 
somewhat  differently  by  the  English  and  Scots  courts,  it  will  be  interesting  to  see 
whether  the  courts  of  the  two  countries  interpret  in  the  same  way  the  new  choice 
of  law  rules  in  the  Private  International  Law  (Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act 
1995.  It  has  been  argued  that  a  Scottish  court  may  prove  to  be  more  capable  of 
resisting  the  homeward  pu11.29 
It  has  also  been  submitted  that  at  common  law,  external  public  policy,  that  most 
powerful  of  weapons  in  conflicts  cases,  remains  available  to  Scottish  courts  in 
intra-UK  cases.  0  Internalising  legislation  has  blunted  its  force  with  regard  to 
English  judgments,  since  public  policy  is  not  a  valid  ground  of  objection  in  intra- 
UK  cases  under  either  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982  or  the 
Family  Law  Act  1986.  By  contrast,  however,  the  ability  of  a  Scottish  court  to 
refuse  to  apply  English  rules  of  law  on  public  policy  grounds  has  been  retained  in 
the  twentieth  century  legislation  on  choice  of  law  31  It  has  been  argued  that  the 
ability  to  exclude  English  law  on  grounds  of  public  policy  is  desirable.  Although 
the  moral  backdrop  in  Scotland  and  England  prior  to  the  devolution  settlement 
may  have  been  similar,  external  public  policy  also  has  a  role  to  play  in  protecting 
underlying  public  policy  values  expressed  in  the  very  fabric  of  Scots  law,  and 
which  have  no  English  equivalent.  2  Undoubtedly  the  existence  of  an  external 
public  policy  objection  has  been  asserted,  more  often  than  it  has  been  utilised,  in 
26  (1872)  2  Coupcr  311. 
27  (1873)  2  Coupcr  402. 
28  See  ppl3l-133  above. 
29  See  pp135-136  above. 
30  See  Chap.  7. 
31  See  pp198-199  above. 
32  See  Chap.  7. 
216 intra-UK  cases.  In  this  there  is  a  parallel  with  the  power  of  a  Scottish  court  to 
strike  down  legislation  as  contrary  to  the  Acts  of  Union:  a  power  hinted  at,  but 
never  effectively  accessed.  Although  the  latter  is  a  facet  of  constitutional  law, 
and  external  public  policy  is  a  tool  of  the  conflict  lawyer,  they  can  both  perform 
the  same  function,  viz.,  protection  of  the  legal  system  which  both  helps  to  define 
the  Scottish  community  and  has  been  greatly  shaped  by  it. 
To  sum  up,  the  degree  of  harmonisation  and  internalisation  in  that  area  of  law 
which  can  be  described  as  'UK  common  market  law'  is  unusual,  and  in  areas  such 
as  delict  and  succession,  for  example,  conflict  rules  accordingly  remain  relevant 
on  an  intra-UK  basis.  Jurisdiction,  choice  of  law,  and  the  recognition  and 
enforcement  of  judgments,  can  be  described  as  the  three  pillars  of  international 
private  law.  The  traditional  conflict  rules  on  recognition  are  now,  however,  of 
little  relevance  in  an  intra-UK  context.  'Recognition',  in  its  widest  sense,  of 
orders  or  judgments  emanating  from  English  courts  is  so  often  automatic,  and 
achieved  by  procedures  so  akin  to  administrative  rules,  that  the  relevant 
legislation  can  accurately  be  described  as  internalising  in  its.  nature  33  Special 
intra-UK  rules  also  exist  for  many  questions  of  jurisdiction  in  terms  of  the  Civil 
Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act  1982,  although  the  extent  to  which  these  were  a 
modified  response  to  the  Brussels  Convention  (and  the  reasons  for  the 
modifications)  have  been  discussed.  34  In  family  law  matters,  by  contrast,  there 
are  generally  not  special  jurisdictional  rules  as  between  Scotland  and  England.  35 
The  connecting  factors  in  matters  of  status  vary  on  a  topical,  rather  than  a 
geographical,  basis.  36  Nor  are  the  difficult  questions  of  jurisdiction  in  criminal 
law  usually  answered  any  differently  whether  England,  or  a  politically  foreign 
jurisdiction,  is  involved.  37  Rules  of  international  private  law  continue  to 
constitute  the  main  method  of  solving  questions  of  choice  of  law,  irrespective  of 
33  See  pp91-100  above. 
34  See  pp163-167  above. 
35  See  pp9G-97  above,  and  discussion  of  the  connecting  factor  in  matters  of  status  at  pp115-122 
above,  and  see,  for  example,  Domicile  and  Matrimonial  Proceedings  Act  1973,  s7,  and  Family 
Law  Act  1986,  s9  (although  see  pp167-172  above  on  the  effect  of  EU  legislation  in  this  area). 
However,  note  that  the  secondary  base  of  custody  jurisdiction  in  the  Family  Law  Act  1986, 
sl0,  of  presence  in  Scotland,  is  not  available  if  the  child  is  habitually  resident  in  another  part  of 
the  UK. 
36  See  p120  above. 
37  See  pp138-141  above. 
217 whether  those  questions  arise  in  an  intra-UK,  or  international,  context. 
Furthermore,  there  would  appear  to  be  no  special  intra-UK  choice  of  law  rules.  8 
This  is  fortified  both  by  the  continued  treatment  of  English  law  as  any  other 
foreign  law  in  terms  of  the  necessity  for  (and  the  method  of)  proof,  39  and  also  by 
the  continuing  availability  of  an  external  public  policy  objection  in  respect  of 
English  law.  440 
Existence  of  a  separate  Scottish  international  private  law 
It  is  submitted  that  international  private  law  rules  have  been  invaluable  in 
providing  a  mechanism  to  ease  potential  conflicts  in  areas  where  the  approach  of 
Scots  and  English  domestic  laws  may  differ  sharply,  ,  and  in  regulating  the 
attempts  of  litigants  to  exploit  the  variation  in  available  remedies,  and  costs  41  It 
might  be  thought  that  the  conflict  rules  of  the  two  countries  are  themselves  very 
similar,  but  different  paths  have  sometimes  been  taken  in  Scots  and  English 
conflict  rules  over  the  years.  42  It  would  be  inaccurate  to  suggest  that  international 
private  law  rules  are  any  less  Scottish  than  the  other  areas  of  Scots  law.  Nor 
should  it  be  thought  that  similarities  between  the  two  systems  must  always  be  put 
down  to  slavish  Scottish  copying  of  the  English  conflicts  approach.  There  is, 
internationally,  an  underlying  correspondence  between  many  of  the  rules  of 
international  private  law,  and  it  could  not  be  expected  that  Scots  law  would  be  an 
exception  to  this.  Furthermore,  cross-border  borrowing  within  the  UK  has  not 
been  all  one  way:  English  law,  for  example,  adopted  the  Scots  doctrine  of  foruu: 
non  conveniens.  43  It  must  also  be  remembered  that  even  the  use  of  the  same 
conflict  rule  on  both  sides  of  the  border  will  not,  produce  uniform  effects 
throughout  Britain  if  the  approach  to  characterisation  differs,  or  if  the  domestic 
rules  themselves  differ  significantly.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  scission  principle, 
which  is  utilised  in  conflict  cases  involving  succession  to  property  in  Scotland 
and  England.  The  Law  Commissions  have  observed  how  this  may,  in  their  view, 
31  9  See  Chaps  4&5. 
39  See  pp107-115  above. 
40  See  pp192-198  above. 
41  See  pp152-157  above. 
42  See  pp141-144  above. 
43  See  pp62  &  144  above. 
218 act  to  frustrate  the  policy  of  both  sets  of  succession  laws  in  an  intra-UK  cross- 
border  case. 
Intra-UK  conflicts  and  Scottish  devolution 
The  establishment  of  the  devolved  Scottish  Parliament  has  been  one  of  the  most 
significant  constitutional  events  in  Scotland's  history.  However,  it  is  submitted 
that  it  is  also  an  important  event  for  the  Scottish  conflicts  lawyer. 
Undesirability  of  the  constitutionalisation  of  conflicts  on  the  basis  of  the  Scotland 
Act  1998 
Very  quickly,  the  Scotland  Act  1998  became  seen  as  providing  at  least  a  partial 
constitution  for  Scotland.  45  Could  this,  and  indeed  should  this,  trigger  the 
constitutionalising  of  conflicts  in  Scotland? 
. 
After  all,  the  Canadian 
constitutionalisation  of  conflicts  was  not  built  on  a  traditional  or  orthodox 
constitutional  document.  In  truth,  however,  the  existence  of  a  constitutional 
document  of  sorts  came  too  late  to  provide  a  basis  for  the  constitutionalising  of 
conflicts  in  Scotland.  The  legacy  of  the  Acts  of  Union  meant  that  the  variety  of 
legal  systems  in  the  UK  was  more  marked  than  in  Canada,  where  Quebec  is 
merely  a  pocket  in  a  Common  Law  whole.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  House  of  Lords 
springs  more  from  the  exploitation  of  a  loophole  in  the  Acts  of  Union,  than  from 
an  express  grant  in  those  Acts.  Even  when  taken  together  with  the  new  functions 
of  the  JCPC  under  the  Scotland  Act,  there  is  not  such  a  strongly  and  avowedly 
unifying  central  court  in  the  UK  as  there  is  in  Canada,  in  the  form  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Canada.  Most  important  of  all,  is  the  difference  in  political  direction 
between  the  UK  and  Canada.  Whilst  Canada  is  becoming  more  closely  unified 
under  a  Canadian  'brand',  the  UK  is  fragmenting,  with  its  constituent  parts  such  as 
Scotland  gaining  more  control  over  their  own  affairs.  It  has  therefore  been 
submitted  that  the  passing  of  the  Scotland  Act  1998  is  unlikely  to  lead  to  the 
widespread  constitutionalising  of  conflicts  in  Scotland  46  This  conclusion  should 
not  be  a  cause  for  lament.  The  very  purpose  of  international  private  law  rules  is 
as  See  pp126-127  above.  Whilst,  in  that  particular  circumstance,  it  may  be  doubted  whether  that 
is  the  case,  conflict  lawyers  must  always  be  alert  to  the  possibility  of  'false  conflicts',  whether 
in  an  intra-UK,  or  international,  sphere. 
as  See  pp52-56  above. 
46  See  pp57-68  above. 
219 to  provide  a  means  of  resolving  conflicts  between  jurisdictions,  and  it  is  submitted 
that  they  are  equally  well-suited  to  the  resolution  of  such  disputes  even  within  one 
political  country.  By  contrast,  the  'conflict'  role  is  not  a  natural,  far  less  principal, 
function  of  constitutional  rules  and  trying  to  stretch  them  to  perform  such  a 
function  is  as  undesirable  as  it  is  unnecessary.  Proponents  of  the 
constitutionalising  approach  are  often  driven  by  political  concerns.  They  wish  to 
stress  the  political  unity  of  the  country,  and  see  the  use  of  international  private 
law  rules  as  a  threat  to  that  union.  But  this  is  a  fundamental  misunderstanding. 
Conflict  rules  do  not  create  disharmony:  they  merely  recognise  it,  and  aim  to 
provide  a  solution. 
Internalisation  of  conflicts  after  Scottish  devolution 
As  has  been  seen,  one  approach  which  has  heretofore  been  possible  in  the  UK, 
and  which  has  been  adopted  in  certain  areas,  is  the  internalising  of  conflicts.  It 
has  been  submitted  that  devolution  will  bring  a  number  of  factors  to  bear  on  this 
practice.  7  On  the  one  hand  the  fragmentation  of  legislative  power  inherent  in  the 
devolution  settlement  could  act  to  inhibit  further  internalisation  of  conflicts, 
particularly  since  legislation  is  generally  the  medium  through  which 
internalisation  has  occurred.  On  the  other  hand,  the  greater  than  expected  use  of 
the  Sewel  Convention  means  that  the  Scottish  Parliament  could  allow 
Westminster  to  continue  to  pass  internalising  legislation,  even  though  such 
legislation  concerns  areas  of  law  now  devolved.  It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that 
this  may  only  be  a  short-term  consideration,  since  the  current  scale  of  use  of  the 
Convention  may  owe  much  to  the  similarity  in  the  policies  of  the  administrations 
now  governing  in  Scotland,  and  the  UK  as  a  whole.  Thus  a  change  in  government 
in  either  Edinburgh  or  London  could  result  in  a  reduction  in  the  occasions  in 
which  the  Sewel  Convention  is  invoked.  More  significant  in  the  long  term  is  the 
reservation,  under  the  Scotland  Act  1998,  of  'UK  common  market  law'  to  the  UK 
Parliament  in  Westminster.  This  has  been  an  area  where  there  has  always  been  a 
great  deal  of  internalisation.  Not  only  does  the  passing  of  such  measures  remain 
possible  after  devolution,  but  the  very  fact  that  UK  common  market  law  has  been 
reserved  may  persuade  those  in  power  at  Westminster  that  internalising 
47  See  pp103-105  above. 
220 legislation  is  singularly  appropriate.  Perhaps  once  again  this  illustrates  the  extent 
to  which  the  economy,  rather  than  legal  integration,  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
in  the  Anglo-Scottish  union. 
International  private  law  rules  after  Scottish  devolution 
The  Scottish  Parliament  has  the  power  to  legislate  in  a  variety  of  areas.  The 
voting  system  currently  in  use  has  involved  'many  smaller  parties  and 
independents  in  the  legislative  process,  on  a  scale  unknown  in  Westminster.  It 
has  also  been  argued  that  the  Edinburgh  Parliament  may  have  stressed  principles 
and  rights  in  its  legislative  output,  rather  than  adopting  a  pragmatic,  remedy- 
driven  approach.  Some  controversial  issues  have  been  tackled,  such  as  fox 
hunting.  8  For  all  of  these  reasons  the  new  devolutionary  situation  may  encourage 
the  emergence  of  greater  differences  between  the  laws  which  apply  in  Scotland 
and  England  respectively.  This  is  particularly  so  if  different  administrations  were 
to  be  in  power  at  Holyrood  and  Westminster  in  the  future.  Thus  the  introduction 
of  a  concept  of  civil  partnerships  is  a  radical  reform,  but  it  would  appear  currently 
that  internalising  legislation  will  be  used  to  ensure  uniform  rules  throughout  the 
UK.  49  This  was  made  possible  by  the  passing  of  a  Sewel  motion  in  the  Scottish 
Parliament.  50  However,  it  is  possible  that  in  the  future  there  may  be  occasions 
(particularly  if  different  political  parties  are  in  control  in  Edinburgh  and  in 
London)  where  such  radical  changes  will  be  made  in  the  law  of  England,  but  not 
Scotland,  and  no  consensus  for  internalising  legislation  will  exist.  It  would  then 
be  necessary  to  utilise  international  private  law  rules  to  deal  with  the  intra-UK 
conflicts  which  would  be  bound  to  arise.  In  this  way,  devolution  may  give  rise  to 
new  conflicts,  and  accordingly  to  an  increased  need  to  rely  upon  rules  of 
international  private  law  within  the  UK. 
All  the  factors  set  out  above  could  also  result  in  a  shift  in  the  underlying  public 
policy  in  Scotland,  or  even  express  changes  in  the  rules  of  internal  public  policy 
applying  in  the  Scottish  legal  system.  In  itself,  this  could  produce  consequent 
changes  in  the  external  public  policy  which,  in  an  intra-UK  context,  can  be  relied 
49  Sec  p146  above. 
49  See  pp105  &  150-151  above. 
50  See  p105  above. 
221 upon  mainly  for  the  purpose  of  excluding  rules  of  English  law  which  are 
otherwise  indicated  to  apply  by  Scots  choice  of  law  rules.  Furthermore,  whereas 
at  present  a  Scottish  court  would  be  unlikely  to  use,  or  even  threaten  to  use,  an 
external  public  policy  objection  based  on  what  could  be  described  as  'moral' 
grounds  in  an  intra-UK  case,  this  may  subtly  change  over  time.  51 
The  Scottish  Parliament  also  has  the  power  to  legislate  for  the  conflicts  aspect  of 
any  of  the  devolved  areas  of  law.  52  Thus  far,  it  has  been  necessary  to  define  such 
entities  as  a  Scottish  taxpayer  and  a  Scottish  student,  and  it  has  been  argued  that 
there  may  be  an  increase  in  statutorily  defined  domiciles,  or  similar  concepts,  as  a 
result.  A  most  significant  event  has  also  taken  place  on  the  Scottish  Parliament's 
watch,  with  Scotland  signing  up  alone  to  a  Hague  Convention,  and  passing  the 
appropriate  legislation.  3  This  is  an  important  precedent.  When  considering  the 
making  of  a  change  to  Scottish  conflicts  rules,  it  is  of  course  important  to  bear  in 
mind  the  practical  consequences  which  would  follow  in  both  the  intra-UK  and  the 
international  arena;  a  different  approach  to  jurisdiction  in  custody  cases  in  the 
past  produced  unfortunate  results.  However,  if  the  case  for  reform  of  a  conflicts 
rule  is  convincingly  made  out,  the  Scottish  Parliament  should  be  prepared  to  act, 
alone  if  necessary. 
In  the  course  of  this  thesis,  a  number  of  areas  have  been  highlighted  where,  it  is 
submitted,  reform  could  be  beneficial.  For  example,  it  has  been  suggested  that 
the  invocation  of  rules  of  international  private  law,  and  consequently  of  foreign 
law,  should  not  be  a  matter  of  choice  by  the  litigants..  It  has  also  been  noted  that 
convincing  arguments  can  be  made  out  for  judges  to  insist  that  foreign  law  is 
introduced  into  an  action  in  appropriate  circumstances  and  properly  proven.  'This 
would  end  any  reliance  on  presumptions  that  Scots  law  applies,  or  that  the  content 
of  Scots  and  foreign  law  are  the  same,  in  the  absence  of  argument  to  the 
contrary.  54  In  the  field  of  succession  law,  the  basis  upon  which  property  falls  to 
the  Crown  in  Scotland  should  be  altered  to  bring  it  into  alignment  . with  the 
mainstream  continental  analysis.  In  the  context  .  of  the  new  constitutional 
51  See  Chap.  7. 
52  See  p145  above. 
53  See  pp151-152  above. 
54  See  pp111-112  above. 
222 settlement  now  obtaining  in  the  UK  after  devolution,  it  is  no  longer  valid  to  object 
to  a  change  in  the  law  simply  because  it  would  mean  that  the  basis  of  Crown 
acquisition  differs  north  and  south  of  the  Tweed.  55  Finally,  it  has  been  noted  that 
there  are  advantages  to  the  treatment  of  the  quantification  of  damages  in  certain 
delictual  actions  as  a  matter  for  the  lax  causae,  which  in  an  intra-UK  setting  at 
least,  may  appear  to  outweigh  the  disadvantages.  56  It  is  submitted  that  this  area  in 
general  is  therefore  one  which  deserves  further  study.  . 
One  of  the  benefits  of  the  establishment  of  a  Scottish  Parliament  has  been  the 
speed  with  which  it  has  been  able  to  react  to  Scottish  problems,  and  the  ability  to 
give  Scottish  legislation  more  time  and  consideration  than  had  been  possible  in 
Westminster.  Cheshire  once  famously  described  the  conflict  of  laws  as  "only 
lightly  touched  by  the  paralysing  hand  of  the  Parliamentary  draftsman":  57  a 
statement  which  became  less  and  less  accurate  as  the  twentieth  century 
progressed.  If  the  Scottish  Parliament  is  prepared  to  grasp  the  nettle  (or  perhaps 
more  properly  the  thistle),  this  may  serve  to  hasten  the  trend  towards  a  statutory 
basis  for  international  private  law  rules. 
The  effect  of  the  European  Communities  Act  1972  on  intra-UK  international 
private  law 
A  further  constitutional  change  of  enormous  importance  which  occurred  in  the 
twentieth  century  has  been  the  UK's  entry  into  what  was  then  the  European 
Economic  Community,  and  is  now  the  EU.  Parallels  can  perhaps  be  drawn 
between  the  UK  and  the  EU,  with  respect  to  the  importance  of  economic  factors 
in  bringing  countries  together  into  a  union,  and  the,  drive  to  harmonisation  of 
laws,  or  the  internalisation  of  conflicts,  where  this  would  assist  the  development 
of  a  common  market. 
The  significance  of  this  constitutional  event  for  international  private  law  cannot 
be  underestimated.  North  has  commented:  "I  believe  it  fair  to  say  that,  for  half  a 
century,  the  agenda  for  change  in  this  area  of  the  law  has  been  very  substantially 
55  See  pl30  above. 
56  See  ppl37-138  above.  57  Quoted  in  P.  North,  "Private  international  law:  change  or  decay?  "  (2001)  50  ICLQ  477  at  477. 
223 set  abroad  and  not  in  this  country"  58  The  EU  has  overseen  the  introduction  of 
legal  instruments  dealing  with  jurisdiction  and  recognition,  insolvency  and  choice 
of  law  in  contract.  59  Further  measures  on  choice  of  law  on  non-contractual 
obligations,  matrimonial  property  and  succession,  remain  on  the  agenda.  Indeed, 
concern  has  been  expressed  that  the  EU  is  now  branching  out  beyond  economic 
matters  G0  No  less  significant  is  the  way  in  which  the  EU  agenda  is  carried  out. 
Initially  the  measures  took  the  form  of  Conventions  to  which  the  consent  of 
countries  was  required,  and  which  in  the  UK  needed  parliamentary  legislation  to 
be  effective.  Increasingly  now,  Regulations  are  used:  this  is  a  form  of  legal 
instrument  which  will  affect  the  laws  of  all  countries  which  have  not  been 
allowed  to  opt  out,  and  the  provisions  of  which  can  be  relied  upon  directly 
61  without  any  domestic  legislation  being  required. 
Whichever  form  they  take,  these  EU  measures  raise  a  stark  question  in  the  UK. 
Should  the  provisions  of  the  Convention  or  Regulation  be  replicated  for  intra-UK 
conflicts,  or  should  their  effect  be  confined  to  questions  arising  between  Scotland 
(or  England)  and  other  EU  member  states?  It  is  disappointing  that  there  seems  to 
have  been  no  overriding  methodology  or  serious  thinking  applied  to  the  UK 
approach.  Indeed  sometimes,  it  seems,  there  has  been  no  clear  legal  opinion  at 
the  outset  upon  the  legal  effect  of  participation  in  negotiations:  'opting-in'  to  a 
conflict  measure  may  be  seen  as  less  far-reaching  than  participation  in  the 
drafting  of  measures  to  harmonise  substance.  62  With  respect  to  the  recognition 
rules  contained  in  the  Brussels  Convention,  the  opportunity  was  taken  to  improve 
upon  internalising  rules  which  had  previously  applied  in  Britain.  Thus  Schedules 
6  and  7  contain  an  internalising  scheme  more  far-reaching  than  the  recognition 
rules  applying  as  between  EU  member  states.  63  In  general,  however,  the  UK 
approach  so  far  has  been  shaped  somewhat  by  tension  between  the  admitted 
convenience  of  uniform  rules,  and  a  reluctance  to  adopt  EU  measures  more  fully 
than  is  required.  The  Rome  Convention,  which  contained  rules  not  greatly 
58  North,  "Private  international  law:  change  or  decay?  ",  505. 
S9  See  Chap.  6. 
60  See  Chap.  6. 
See  Chap.  6. 
62  See  Report  of  the  House  of  Lords  European  Union  Committee,  The  Rome  II  Rcgu1atioac,  paras 
80-81. 
63  See  pp94-95  above. 
224 dissimilar  to  those  obtaining  in  Scotland  and  England  at  common  law,  was 
adopted  on  an  intra-UK  basis,  seemingly  on  the  grounds  of  convenience. 
However,  some  of  the  differences  between  the  Brussels  Convention,  and  the 
Modified  Convention  in  Schedule  4  of  the  Civil  Jurisdiction  and  Judgments  Act 
1982,  arguably  serve  simply  to  signal  discontent  with  aspects  of  the  Brussels 
Convention  scheme.  It  has  also  been  posited  that  the  Brussels  II  Regulation, 
which  was  thought  by  many  commentators  in  the  UK  to  be  unnecessary,  does  not 
apply  to  regulate  either  jurisdiction  or  recognition  in  matrimonial  and  related 
custody  matters  as  between  Scotland  and  England.  65 
In  the  past  one  might  observe  ever-decreasing  ease  of  enforcement  and  ever- 
increasing  availability  of  forum  discretion  and  objections,  as  one  moved  out  from 
the  intra-UK,  to  intra-Empire,  to  international,  arrangements  (for  example  in  the 
recognition  of  judgments,  or  in  the  administration  of  a  succession).  Such  a  clear 
pattern  does  not  emerge  in  the  UK  response  to  EU  instruments.  Partially  this  may 
be  due  to  a  lack  of  control.  As  the  centre  of  Empire,  the  UK  took  the  lead  not  just 
in  devising  intra-UK  schemes,  but  also  those  which  applied  in  the  Empire. 
Within  the  EU,  the  UK  is  required  to  submit  to  closer  co-ordination  with  its 
attendant  advantages  and  disadvantages.  The  UK  is  simply  one  voice  among 
many  (and  a  voice  moreover  from  beyond  the  Franco-Genpan  power  axis)  asking 
for  a  compromise  solution.  It  has  been  suggested  that  Scotland  may  perhaps  be 
rather  less  sceptical  of  the  European  project  than  her  southern  neighbour.  In 
terms  of  the  law,  the  Scottish  mixed  legal  system  may  be  more  amenable  to 
European  harmonisation  of  conflict  rules,  and  of  substantive  law,  than  the  English 
Common  Law  system.  However,  there  is  also  some  common  ground  in  Britain. 
In  truth,  the  Scottish  and  English  responses  to  harmonisation  of  international 
private  law  rules  by  the  EU  may  well  fall  at  slightly  different  parts  of  the  same 
spectrum  6.6  Despite  the  establishment  of  a  devolved,  legislature,  however, 
negotiations  with  the  EU  are  a  matter  for  the  UK  Parliament.  Indeed  many 
64  Although  as  has  been  seen,  there  has  not  been  a  uniform  'British'  interpretation  in  the  courts 
(see  p160  above). 
65  Sec  pp167-170  above. 
66  See  pp173-179  above. 
225 political  commentators  are  concerned  that  this  will  be  a  future  source  of  friction 
between  the  Holyrood  and  Westminster  Parliaments.  67 
It  is  not  being  suggested  that  the  UK  reaction  to  EU  measures  in  the  field  of 
international  private  law  must  always  be  a  full-scale  adoption  of  the  rules  on  an 
intra-UK  basis.  Nor  is  it  being  argued  that  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  have 
concerns  about  some  aspects  of  EU  legislation  in  the  field  of  international  private 
law.  For  example,  elsewhere  in  this  thesis  it  has  -been  argued  that  forum  non 
conveniens  is  a  valuable  doctrine  which  should  continue  to  be  utilised  on  an  intra- 
UK  basis,  in  preference  to  the  lis  alibi  pendens  rule  currently  favoured  by  the 
EU.  68  It  is,  however,  submitted  that  at  present  the  UK  response  is  typified  more 
by  the  desire  to  apply  EU  measures  only  insofar  as  is  strictly  necessary,  rather 
than  by  a  principled  and  methodical  consideration  of  whether  or  not  it  would  be 
valuable  to  adopt  any  of  the  EU  rules  on  an  intra-UK  basis,  or  whether  it  would 
be  permissible  (or  desirable)  to  have  separate  intra-UK  rules  operating  in  parallel 
with  EU  measures.  69 
In  the  long  term,  the  effect  on  intra-UK  conflict  rules  of  becoming  a  member  of 
the  EU  could  be  far-reaching,  if  not  apocalyptic.  The  scope  of  EU  legislation  has 
moved  beyond  matters  directly  concerned  with  economic  union,  and  a 
Community  public  policy  has  been  mooted.  The  fast-paced  harmonisation  of 
conflict  rules  is  seen  by  many  merely  as  preparatory  to  the  harmonisation  of 
substantive  law  itself.  There  are  currently  groups  working  on  such  a  project.  It 
has  been  noted  that  international  private  law  would  survive  to  regulate  the 
conflicts  arising  between  this  new  European  law,  and  the  law  of  other  nations 
outwith  the  EU.  However,  any  replacement  of  Scots  and  English  law,  along  with 
all  the  other  European  systems,  with  a  uniform  European  law  would  remove  the 
need  for  conflict  rules  in  the  intra-UK  context.  0 
61  See  p149  above. 
68  See  pp155-157  above.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  Article  15  of  the  Brussels  II  bis  Regulation 
will,  exceptionally,  allow  a  case  involving  matters  of  parental  responsibility  to  be  transferred 
to  a  court  in  another  member  state  which  is  "better  placed  to  hear  the  case",  than  the  court 
otherwise  indicated  by  the  Regulation's  jurisdiction  provisions. 
69  See  Chap.  6. 
70  Sec  pp179-181  above. 
226 Conclusion 
There  is  an  important  interaction  between  constitutional  law  and  international 
private  law  within  the  UK.  The  growth  of  Scottish  and  English  nation  states  set 
the  scene  for  the  development  of  conflict  rules  to  regulate  questions  as  to  which 
court  should  take  jurisdiction  in  a  case  and  which  law  should  be  applied,  as  well 
as  the  related  issue  of  what  effect  a  judgment  from  a  court  of  the  neighbouring 
country  should  have.  Crucially,  the  constitutional  settlement  reached  in  the  early 
eighteenth  century  embraced  legislative  unity,  but  eschewed  legal  integration. 
This  quite  novel  system  had  the  effect,  over  time,  of  leading  to  the  internalising  of 
certain  conflicts,  and  their  removal  from  the  scope  of  traditional  international 
private  law.  Such  internalisation  has,  however,  been  dictated,  to  a  large  extent,  by 
economic  imperatives,  although  it  is  also  clear  that  the  Westminster  Parliament 
has  sought  to  achieve  near-automatic  recognition  of  judgments  and  court  orders 
throughout  the  UK.  Furthermore,  certain  conflicts  concepts  (such  as  extra- 
territoriality)  were  rendered  irrelevant  on  an  intra-UK  basis  by  constitutional 
rules,  although  there  was  no  widespread  constitutionalising  of  conflicts  within  the 
UK.  However,  in  many  other  areas,  such  as  property  law,  delict  and  substantive 
succession  law,  the  questions  of  choice  of  law,  and  sometimes  jurisdiction,  arising 
between  the  Scots  and  English  legal  systems  have  been  settled  by  the  use  of 
international  private  law  rules  with  no  discrimination  between  intra-UK,  and  truly 
international,  conflicts.  The  concept  of  domicile  has  also  been  of  service  in 
providing  a  connecting  factor  to  the  Scots  or  English  legal  system  in  matters  of 
status.  External  public  policy  has  provided  the  comfort  of  a  safety  valve  in  the 
relationship  between  the  two  legal  systems  bound  together  in  a  political  whole. 
But  fortunately,  not  unlike  the  threat  of  relying  on  the  Acts  of  Union  themselves 
as  a  fundamental  law,  it  is  a  power  which  has  very  rarely  required  to  be  drawn 
upon. 
The  devolution  settlement  of  the  late  twentieth  century  is  another  key 
constitutional  event  for  Scotland.  Given  the  interplay  between  constitutional  law 
and  international  private  law,  it  is  necessary  to  re-assess  the  role  of  conflicts  law 
in  this  new  Scottish  constitutional  landscape.  It  has  been  submitted  that  the 
constitutionalising  of  conflicts,  which  has  been  thought  appropriate  in  some  other 
countries,  is  of  no  value  in  the  context  of  a  devolved  Scotland  within  a  UK  state. 
227 The  nature  of  the  constitutional  settlement  will,  however,  as  has  been  seen,  result 
in  a  continued  potential  for  the  internalisation  of  conflicts  within  the  UK. 
However,  the  significance  of  Scottish  international  private  law  rules  in  a  UK 
setting  is  heightened  by  devolution,  as  such  rules  may  increasingly  require  to  be 
called  upon  to  deal  with  difficult  cross-border  issues.  They  are  ideally  suited  for 
this  task,  their  very  purpose  being  the  provision  of  a  mechanism  for  resolving 
conflicts  of  jurisdiction,  laws  or  judgments,  arising  between  different  legal 
systems.  Devolution  also  brings  with  it  the  real  potential  to  alter  the  content  of 
Scots  conflict  rules,  and  the  opportunity  should  be  taken  to  hone  the  tools 
available  to  us  for  the  task  in  hand. 
It  is  perhaps  ironic,  however,  that  quite  the  most  crucial  constitutional  change  for 
the  use  of  international  private  law  rules  within  the  UK,  may  be  one  which  goes 
much  further  than  simply  a  regulation  of  the  relationship  between  Scotland  and 
England.  As  we  have  seen,  entry  into  the  European  Economic  Community  may 
have  been  the  first  step  to  a  uniform  European  substantive  law.  Just  as  supra- 
national  bodies  of  law  slowed  the  development  of  international  private  law  in 
Scotland  in  earlier  centuries,  the  return  to  supra-national  rules  in  the  future  may 
remove  the  need  for  any  conflicts  mechanism  within  the  UK.  But  that  is  a  long 
journey,  whose  end  is  not  yet  in  sight.  In  the  meantime,  international  private 
lawyers  must  be  alert  to  recognise,  and  skilful  in  treating,  the  conflict  issues  to 
which  in  the  twenty-first  century,  the  constitutional  system  within  the  UK  may 
give  rise. 
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